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The responses of British people to the French Revolution have recently received
considerable scholarly interest. Their views on the ensuing wars have been much less
well covered, however, and this thesis seeks to provide a wide-ranging examination
of these. Using government and parliamentary papers, pamphlet literature, printed
ephemera, printed and manuscript letters, novels, poetry, newspapers, periodicals and
graphic satires, the thesis considers the attitudes of various groups of people to the
conflict. It attempts to highlight the debate in England and Scotland provoked by the
war, both as distinct from the polemic on the French Revolution itself and, more
substantially, as the sequel to the Revolution debate, though integrally linked to it.
This debate concerned the grounds, aims, nature and conduct of the war, the issues
surrounding negotiations for peace with France, and especially the effects of the
conflict on British society.
Groups of people across the whole political spectrum took part in the
controversy. Edmund Burke's views were crucial to its development, and the thesis
begins with a discussion of his analysis. Succeeding chapters examine the attitudes of
various political groups. The second chapter studies the opinions of members of the
government (particularly those of Pitt, Grenville and Dundas) and of George III. This
is followed by a chapter on the war-time activities and attitudes of loyalists inside and
outside Parliament and of the ' war crusaders' (those conservatives who sympathized
with Burke's interpretation of events, such as the government pamphleteer John
Bowles). The next two chapters consider the opposition to the war: the Foxite Whigs
in Parliament and their supporters, and radical politicians and 'Friends of Peace' out-
of-doors. Each of these four chapters is to some extent organized around a coherent
and unified view of the war, but the thesis attempts to show the dialogue within each
group as well as their disagreements with other groups. The debate on the war also
took place at various social levels, and at many levels of sophistication, and the three
final chapters consider the discussion within particular social groups. The theological
and political-theological responses of ministers of both Established and Dissenting
churches in England and Scotland are examined; the roles and views of women during
the war are investigated, particularly focusing on the perceptions expressed by female
writers of the decade; while the last chapter deals with the attitudes of the ordinary
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Introduction
On 12 February 1793 the British Prime Minister, William Pitt, informed the House of
Commons that the revolutionary government of France had declared war on Great
Britain and its ally, the United Provinces. The news was not unexpected, for,
although Britain had responded with strict neutrality to the French conflict against the
Austrian Empire and Prussia which had begun in spring 1792, and had made
strenuous efforts to preserve this stance, British alarm over the French abolition of the
monarchy in August 1792 had developed into mutual suspicion and rising tension
between the two countries by November. By January 1793 it was clear that patience
on both sides was wearing thin and that attempts to reach an understanding were vain.
Brissot and the revolutionary rulers of France claimed that the corrupt court of George
III was leading Britain into the European war of tyrants and despots against the
French Republic; this must be met with military force and the Republic itself must
become an armed camp, dedicated to fighting tyranny on behalf of all the oppressed
peoples in Europe, including those of Great Britain.1 The communications between
the two governments over the past months had similarly failed to dispel the fears of
the Pitt administration regarding a French threat to British security and European
stability, fears which had arisen in the wake of French decrees of fraternity with the
'
oppressed peoples' of Europe and of military intervention, annexations of territory to
the Republic and the opening of the River Scheldt to international navigation. These
appeared to be clear indications of the Republic's menace towards the Low Countries
which, in the eyes of the British government, were tantamount to a direct challenge to
Great Britain. 'The psychology of Revolution renders difficult the maintenance of
peace with neighbouring States of the old type,' wrote J. Holland Rose. 'Suspicion
and aversion naturally set in; and these are the parents of war.'2
It has been shown that the French Revolution produced widespread and lasting
effects in its impact upon Britain in many spheres.3 The polarization of British
1 J.T. Murley, 'The Origins and Outbreak of the Anglo-French War of 1793', unpublished D. Phil,
thesis (University of Oxford, 1959), p.503.
2 J. Holland Rose, 'The Struggle with Revolutionary France 1792-1802', in A.W. Ward and G.P.
Gooch (eds.), The Cambridge History ofBritish Foreign Policy, vol. i (1922), p.216.
3 See, for instance, the essays in ITT. Dickinson (ed.), Britain and the French Revolution 1789-1815
(London, 1989). On the Revolution debate in Britain, see also idem., British Radicalism and the
French Revolution (Oxford, 1985); Thomas Philip Schofield, 'English Conservative Thought and
Opinion in Response to the French Revolution 1789-1796', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University
College, London, 1984); Yang Su Hsien, 'The British Debate on the French Revolution: Edmund
Burke and His Critics', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Edinburgh, 1989); Mark Philp (ed.),
The French Revolution and British Popular Politics (Cambridge, 1991); Gregory Claeys, 'The French
Revolution Debate and British Political Thought', History ofPolitical Thought, xi (1990), 59-80.
opinions on the Revolution and its consequences began slowly to crystallize after the
publication of Richard Price's lecture, A Discourse on the Love ofOur Country, in
January 1790 and Edmund Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France in
November 1790. Over the next two years many replies were published to Burke's
pamphlet,4 which had argued that the French Revolution was an evil plot of massive
dimensions directed against not only all the monarchies of Europe but the whole
European moral and social order, and that it was a dire threat which must be
combatted. Questions were raised of sovereignty and legitimacy, of the civil liberties
and the natural rights of men and women, of absolute and relative truths and values,
and of the adequacy of the British constitution itself. The passion of the polemics and
the breadth of their application ensured that the debate was not purely literary and
philosophical, but also political; and that it was not restricted to the traditional
governing and literary classes of society. Popular societies and clubs had sprung up
nationwide on both sides of the ideological divide before war was declared even
between France and Austria in April 1792, such as the radical Constitutional Societies
and the resurgent conservative Church and King clubs.5
Nevertheless, the outbreak of war between Britain and France in February
1793, in its more direct impact upon the British population, heralded the debate of
problems of still greater political complexity. The war was to last for twenty-two years
except for the truce of Amiens in 1802-3, and it was to involve a greater proportion of
the British population than any previous international conflict had done. It therefore
demanded a reponse of some sort from an even wider cross-section of the nation than
had the Revolution. War against France in the 1790s did not merely add another layer
of intensity to the debate on the French Revolution. New questions were fired at an
alarming rate at ministers reeling from the enormity of international events and their
domestic repercussions, and these were heatedly discussed inside and outside
Parliament. These questions, concerning the causes of the war, and its purposes,
nature, conduct and impact upon both Britain and France, inextricably complicated the
previous debate on the Revolution and inexorably pulled it into a whole new
orientation. This thesis is an examination of the responses of different individuals and
groups of people to the conflict and the questions that it posed for them.
The scale of the warfare in which Britain found itself engaged was
unprecedented in terms of the human and material resources it required and in terms of
its eventual duration. Between 1793 and 1815 Britain lost 315 000 men in the wars
4 Among the most famous were Thomas Paine, Rights of Man (Part I: London, 1791; Part II:
London, 1792); Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights ofMen (London, 1791); and James
Mackintosh, Vindiciae Gallicae (London, 1791).
5 See Philp (ed.), The French Revolution and British Popular Politics, pp. 1-6.
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and spent £1 500 million in loans and taxes.6 Such a conflict preoccupied British
public thought; as William Windham put it, 'war seemed to have become the whole
business of life'.7 The Morning Chronicle noted in August 1799 that 'a great deal of
war-like science' had been called forth. 'No inconsiderable portion of our annual
publications is occupied with treatises on military tactics, and sermons on public
affairs, with instructions for the drill of horse and foot, and heart-stirring sounds from
the ecclesiastical trumpet.' Gayle Trusdel Pendleton's evidence bears out this
assertion, demonstrating that the war was by far the single most-discussed topic in
political pamphlet literature between 1792 and 1802.8 Commentators of all opinions
and backgrounds were impressed by a sense of the novelty and scale of the
dimensions of the crisis. On the announcement in October 1801 of the signature of the
preliminaries of peace, The Times declared that it had been 'a war which neither in its
native character or object can be fitly compared with any scourge or calamity with
which the earth has been visited, since the subversion of the Roman Empire, and the
darkness of the middle ages'. Thomas Erskine, the Foxite MP and barrister, claimed
that 'we were suddenly placed by the most extraordinary events in a new situation,
both as it regarded our moral feelings as good men, and our prudence as enlightened
members of civil life'.9
Support for and hostility to the war in the 1790s largely followed the division
of opinion in the debate on the French Revolution; loyalists continued to support the
government in its military conflict against France as well as in its ideological battle
against foreign and domestic radicalism, while reformers and radicals usually opposed
the conflict, because of their admiration for the Revolution and their distaste for war.
This does not mean, however, that opinions on either side of the divide were uniform.
'We all unfortunately too well know,' wrote Francis Plowden, Foxite lawyer and
writer, in 1794,
that at this moment we are engaged in a very bloody and desperate
war with France; and yet neither in nor out of parliament can be
found ten men who agree in the reasons, views, motives and objects
of the war... .so little are you at present able or willing to agree upon
any one great and common point respecting the war that.. .there must
6 Colin Jones (ed.), Britain and Revolutionary France: Conflict, Subversion and Propaganda (Exeter,
1983), p.9.
7William Cobbett (ed.), The Parliamentary History ofEngland, From the Earliest Period to the Year
1803 (London, 1806-1820) [hereafter P.H.], xxxv, 1440,William Windham, 2 June 1801.
8 The Morning Chronicle, 3 August 1799; Gayle Trusdel Pendleton, 'English Conservative
Propaganda During the French Revolution, 1789-1802', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Emory
University, 1976), p.443.
9 The Times, 3 October 1801; Thomas Erskine, A View of the Causes and Consequences of the
Present War with France (3rd edition: London, 1797), p. 134.
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be a very thick mist or veil thrown over the circumstances, which are
so misrepresented or withholden from our sight.10
This heterogeneity of opinion provoked the dialogue and was in turn perpetuated by
it—an inter-genre debate carried on in government papers, parliamentary debates,
newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, the resolutions of societies and public meetings,
sermons, novels, poetry and graphic prints, each reacting or replying to another. 'As
always,' Norman Hampson has warned, 'the historian must choose between
generalizations which are never quite true in any specific instance and an
incomprehensible anarchy of individual cases.'11 Each chapter in this thesis seeks to
show the dialogue within each group of people as well as their disagreements with
other groups concerning the war.
Contemporaries recognized the French Revolutionary Wars as the first since
the wars of religion to be fought over competing ideologies, and that in this lay the
unusual nature of the conflict. This prompted questions concerning the nature of the
conflict and therefore also its proper conduct, but it also raised the issue of the
legitimacy of the British government's involvement in the war. Conservative
commentators thought it vital that Britain should range itself in armed conflict against
the wicked forces of licence on the continent before they invaded Britain. Lord
Mulgrave succinctly expressed a common view when he told the House of Lords in
December 1794 that 'the war which had been declared against us was no ordinary
war; it was a war for the annihilation of our laws, our liberties, our prosperity, our
civilization, and our religion.'12 Those who were hostile to the war, on the other
hand, often argued that it was illiberal to wage war against opinions and to force one
nation's views on constitutional government on another. Historians have disagreed
concerning the extent to which the war was seen by contemporaries as being
fundamentally ideological; one view recently expressed is that after 1795, with the fall
of Robespierre and the rise of Directorial and, later, Napoleonic government in
France, the war reverted to a traditional eighteenth-century type, no longer fuelled by
partiality or hostility to a political ideology but fought simply for territorial prestige
and economic gain.13 This issue is dealt with in chapter 2, but it may be noticed here
that contemporaries were also divided on whether or not a ' new era' of the war had
10 Francis Plowden, A Friendly and Constitutional Address to the People ofGreat Britain (London,
1794), pp.3-5.
11 Norman Hampson, The Enlightenment (Harmondsworth, 1968; 1990), pp. 129-30.
12 P.H., xxxi, 983, Lord Mulgrave, 30 December 1794.
13 Philip Schofield, 'British Politicians and French Arms: the Ideological War of 1793-1795',
History, 77 (1992), 183-201.
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begun by the middle of the decade.14 Radicals and liberals were affected by this
question as much as conservatives: after Napoleon's invasion of Switzerland in 1798
and his coup d'etat of 1799, some liberals withdrew their opposition to the war, since
its aims could no longer be described as the overthrow of a true republican
government.
After the breakdown of the Amiens settlement in 1803 the British displayed a
much greater degree of united hostility towards the French under Napoleon than had
been elicited in the 1790s. This thesis explores the more diverse attitudes to the
conflict of different groups of British people in the 1790s. In so doing, it attempts to
highlight the debate in England and Scotland provoked by the war, both as distinct
from the polemic on the French Revolution itself and, more substantially, as the
sequel to the Revolution debate, though integrally linked to it. The first five chapters
deal with the spectrum of political opinion-groups and their reactions to the war.
Edmund Burke's views were crucial to the development of the controversy on the
war, as they had been to the debate on the French Revolution. He was the first in
Britain publicly to advocate a war against revolutionary France, and this thesis begins
with a discussion of his analysis. The two succeeding chapters examine the attitudes
and war-related activities of those in favour of the armed struggle against France:
those of the government and King George III, and those of loyalists inside and
outside Parliament and the 'war crusaders' (those conservatives who sympathized
with Burke's interpretation of events). Chapters 4 and 5 study the opposition to the
war: the Foxite Whigs inside Parliament and their supporters, and radical politicians
and 'Friends of Peace' out-of-doors. The next three chapters consider the discussion
on the war that took place among various social groups. Chapter 6 examines the
theological and political-theological responses of ministers of both Established and
Dissenting churches in England and Scotland; chapter 7 investigates the roles and
views of women during the conflict, particularly focusing on the perceptions
expressed by female writers of the decade; and the final chapter deals with the attitudes
of the ordinary people of Britain and the role of public opinion in the debate on the
war against revolutionary France.
Clearly, such an organization of the material creates a certain degree of
overlap. Chapter 2, for instance, which studies the attitudes of the government and the
King, includes the views of such figures as Lord Auckland, Lord Malmesbury, the
Marquess of Buckingham and Thomas Grenville, none of whom was a member of the
administration. They have been included in this chapter, however, because they seem
14 See pp.65-8, 111-2.
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to fit more usefully into a study of government attitudes than into one on loyalist
attitudes, because of their personal closeness to members of the government or
because of their executive role in the policy of the administration. The Marquess of
Buckingham and Thomas Grenville were brothers of Lord Grenville, the Foreign
Secretary.15 Lord Malmesbury, an ex-Foxite as was Thomas Grenville, committed
himself to support of the war in 1793 and was sent on a diplomatic mission to Berlin
in November of that year; in 1796 and 1797 he was the government's envoy in its
negotiations for peace with the French Republic. Lord Auckland, another senior
diplomat, was in addition a close personal friend of the Prime Minister. Chapters 4
and 5 together form a unit on the opposition to the war, in which there is further
potential for overlap: Thomas Erskine, examined in chapter 4 as a staunch member of
the Foxite party and opponent of the Pittite administration, might as helpfully have
been included in chapter 5 as the author of one of the most successful pacifist
pamphlets of the decade, A View of the Causes and Consequences of the Present War
with France (1797). William Wilberforce is cited both in chapter 3, as a loyal
supporter of Pitt and his government for most of the decade, and in chapter 5, as a
prominent 'Friend of Peace' between December 1794 and spring 1796.
Revolutionary France may have declared war against Great Britain on 1
February 1793, but Edmund Burke had fired his own opening salvo against the
French Revolution in November 1790, with the publication of his Reflections on the
Revolution in France. He hinted at the possible necessity for a war in the Reflections,
and by January 1791 he was arguing that it was the only way to deal with the
Revolution in France. By the summer of 1791 he was writing to members of the
government, urging such a course of action upon them. He saw the French
Revolution as a blatant attack on the basic foundations of European civilization, that
is, on property and religion, and he feared both the spread of revolutionary ideas
throughout Europe and into Britain, and their forcible propagation by French armies.
So great was the danger posed by the evil political and moral doctrines of the French
Revolution, according to Burke, that Britain and the other countries of Europe must be
prepared to engage in a war to the death to destroy the appeal of these principles. The
military defeat of the French armies was only a means to this end, in Burke's eyes,
and the ideological character of the war seemed so important to him that he viewed it
almost in the light of a spiritual battle. The first chapter examines Burke's
publications, letters and speeches in order to understand his reasoning on the conflict
15 Thomas Grenville was a Foxite until the end of 1793, when he switched to support the
government, as the Duke of Portland and others later did, because of his support for the war and his
hostility towards domestic radicalism. See British Library Additional Manuscripts [hereafter BL Add.
MSS] 47569 ff. 30-52, Thomas Grenville to Charles James Fox, 29 December 1793.
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and its grounds, aims, nature and conduct. Despite his lack of direct influence on
government policy, which frustrated him intensely, to a great extent Burke created the
framework and polarization of the controversy on the war in Britain by the breadth,
depth and vehemence of his arguments. This chapter therefore sets the scene for an
examination of the rest of the debate.
The question of how far hostility towards the political ideology of
revolutionary France motivated the government and the King in their attitudes to the
war is a major theme of chapter 2. While Burke was, after the first few months of the
French Revolution, intimidatingly sure of his views concerning it and concerning the
nature and aims of a war against it, the ministry often appeared vague and even
divided on these matters. Historians have therefore held differing interpretations of the
parts played by political ideology and pragmatic power politics in establishing the
British government's grounds for the war against revolutionary France and, among
those who agree that ideological hostility was a significant factor at the beginning of
the war, there is disagreement on how long it continued to play a significant part in the
government's thinking. Official government policy and the sympathies of individual
ministers and the King naturally often diverged, and both official and private attitudes
changed over time as conditions at home and abroad fluctuated. This chapter examines
the British government's thinking on the conflict and the different shades of opinion
among ministers and the King, particularly focusing on William Pitt, Lord Grenville
and Henry Dundas. Ministerial rhetoric and ministerial motivation, as T.C.W.
Blanning has pointed out in examining the French grounds for the war, often differ:
Analysing motives is a notoriously imprecise and hazardous
business. Even the individuals or groups of individuals concerned
are often unaware of why they are really pursuing a certain course of
action. Not only is the human capacity for self-deception eternal but
politicians, in particular, appear to possess a special talent for
believing their own rhetoric.16
It is argued here, however, that ideological issues and the more pragmatic
issues of strategic interests were not so easily divided in the British government's
thinking as historians have often assumed. Ministers were aware that French foreign
policy in the 1790s was directed by a revolutionary government following
revolutionary notions of international relations, which were unacceptable to the old
governments of Europe and which threatened British strategic interests. This
understanding affected both Britain's entry into the war and the government's
subsequent reluctance to hold peace talks until the end of 1795. It also affected their
16 T.C.W. Blanning, The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars (London, 1986), p.210.
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conception of how France was fighting the war and the views of some ministers on
how Britain ought to conduct its own war effort. It was recognized that France was
fighting in a new way and some ministers, notably Windham, Grenville and Portland
(and also George III), thought that Britain ought to be responding, if not in the same
degree, then in kind. Furthermore, their fears concerning domestic radicalism induced
ministers to look on the war in more than a pragmatic light: since the popular radical
societies claimed to subscribe to the principles of the enemy, it was all the more
necessary that they should be suppressed. While, however, Burke and the other'war
crusaders', together with some more militant loyalists, opposed the ideological basis
of the French Revolution itself, it was the role of the British government to oppose the
practical expression of that ideology, especially as it threatened the British state, rather
than primarily the principles behind French revolutionary conduct.
The third chapter deals with the wartime conduct and opinions of those within
Parliament and outside it who actively supported the government's struggle against the
French revolutionaries, both 'loyalists' (those who generally supported government
policy) and 'war crusaders' (those who campaigned for a more hardline, Burkean
strategy and view of the war). It attempts to plot their attitudes along the spectrum of
conservative thinking on the war, and to show how far they were influenced by
government policy and by Burke's views. Loyalists tended to present the war as an
ideological crusade, but they also defended the deviations of ministers from the logic
of a strictly crusading strategy. They emphasized issues which were of most direct
and immediate concern to the insular British public, and they paid less attention to
matters of general European concern. Later in the war, some loyalists began to deny
that it was any longer a conflict over political opinions and that it had become a
struggle merely to tame French territorial greed. Others, however, continued to attack
'French opinions', being particularly concerned about the attraction that French
democratic principles held for certain elements in British society. Loyalists allowed
little of their desire for peace to show in their discussions of the issue, vigorously
defending the necessity of the war and blaming the French for its continuance, except
between 1796 and 1797 and after October 1801, when the ministry was attempting to
negotiate a settlement with France. The loyalists were, however, almost always
greatly relieved when ministers sought peace, and they defended them for doing so.
Crusaders, on the other hand, looked with horror on the possibility of peace with
revolutionary France. Like Burke, they were fixated by the principles of the French
Revolution: French aggression abroad was only a symptom of these doctrines, and
these were the principal danger to Britain and to European society in general. They
must be crushed by overthrowing the French Revolutionary regime; peace with the
8
French Republic would leave Britain still more vulnerable to their insidious influence
than it was during the war. Nevertheless, various of the most prominent crusaders
were tied to the government by obligations of one kind or another, and they were less
inflexible in their judgements on ministerial conduct of the war than was Burke.
The conflict against revolutionary France was actively opposed in a consistent
way for three main reasons: party politics, political idealism and pacifism. While these
motivations might overlap in the anti-war reasoning of any individual or group of
people, the arguments of each of the three groups investigated in chapters 4 and 5
were predominantly characterized by one of them. Chapter 4 concentrates on the
Foxite Whigs inside Parliament and their supporters outside it, who tended to be
preoccupied by party political opposition to the conflict. By their attitudes to the
secession of the Portland Whigs in 1794, to the French Revolution in general, and to
the aims and conduct of the war, the Foxites showed themselves to be more concerned
to defeat Pitt and his government than to preserve peace with France. This rather
factious party spirit laid them open to charges of inconsistency when they sometimes
tried to argue from principle and whenever the government began to negotiate for
peace. It also made them vulnerable to accusations of disloyalty and sympathy with
the French military effort.
Chapter 5 deals with the hostility to the war of radical politicians and the
'Friends of Peace'. Radicals opposed the war mainly because they supported the
principles and declared aims and objectives of the French Revolution, and also
because the conflict imposed great hardship on many ordinary people. Their
arguments were more consistent than those of the Foxite Whigs and less tied to party
politics, but opposition to the war was also a secondary concern for them. Whereas
the Foxites used it as another context in which to oppose the Pitt administration and as
another stick with which to beat the government's back, the radicals exploited the war
to further their primary concern for parliamentary reform and, in particular, for the
extension of the franchise. Although they continued to try to appropriate the character
of ' true' patriots, associating themselves with the mythical history of Ango-Saxon
freedom and a Norman oppression continued still by the present governors of Britain,
the radicals lost support during the war, because they had gained a pro-French and
therefore anti-British image by their overt admiration for the French Revolution and
support for its military cause. The 'Friends of Peace' were the group which most
singlemindedly opposed the war against France as an end in itself. They campaigned
against it both because they opposed war in general, on grounds of religion and
morality, and because they had specific ideological and practical objections to the
conflict against revolutionary France in particular. They channelled various political,
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religious and commercial groups to the general anti-war protest whenever and
wherever they could, including the Foxites in Parliament and the radicals outside it.
By this means, and by their primary concern with seeing the war brought to an end,
the Friends of Peace led the British campaign against the government's war with
revolutionary France.
Religious arguments were used by laymen both to support and to oppose the
war, but usually in combination with political reasoning and in a supporting role. By
contrast, sermons preached by churchmen on the subject of the conflict naturally
emphasized a theological reading of the situation and made less attempt to persuade
their audiences with secular political arguments. The continued importance of religion
to the great majority of the British people in the eighteenth century, and of religious
polemic to political debates of the period, have recently been highlighted by several
historians. Chapter 6 considers the theological-political responses to the war of
churchmen of different British denominations. In their sermons, questions such as the
moral and theological justifications for war and patriotism were examined; and the
nature of this particular conflict, and such grounds for it as related to religious and
moral issues, were discussed in the light of a theological understanding of the nature
of God and of man, and in terms of a political theology of society, the State and the
international community. This chapter also studies the influence of politics and
ecclesiastical politics as further factors in the formation of churchmen's attitudes to the
war, as well as the practical responses that ministers urged on their congregations and
the impact that their political preaching during the war may have had.
Chapter 7 investigates the active involvement of British women in the war
against revolutionary France (both in support of and in opposition to it) and the
opinions of female writers on its grounds, nature and conduct. Their opinions were
naturally often identical to those of men, but it is argued that, whatever part of the
political or social spectrum they represented, women consistently emphasized certain
issues or concerns. They struggled also with the question of their own role as women
in a society at war, and the chapter also looks at the views of both male and female
writers on women's participation in the war effort. The length of the war, its direct
impact on the civilian population of Britain and the conscious emphasis in Britain on
its ideological issues, together with the recent substantial growth of literacy, the press
and popular politics, all contributed to allow women a greater opportunity to become
involved in the British debate on this war than had been the case in previous conflicts.
Finally, the attitudes of the ordinary people of Britain and the role of public
opinion in the war are discussed in chapter 8. This uses the evidence of diaries,
letters, memoirs and graphic prints. It also uses the records of more sporadic, and
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perhaps temporary, demonstrations of pro-war and anti-war feeling than those which
were discussed in chapters 3 to 5 under the headings of campaigning patriotism and
hostility to the war. The attempts of the political elite to influence public opinion
demonstrate its importance to them. Nevertheless, after tracing popular pro-war, anti¬
war and uncommitted popular behaviour, it is argued that public opinion was
generally fluid in its reactions to the conflict and that it did not substantially engage
with the issues of the war debate.
The British war against revolutionary France was naturally often supported for
pragmatic and self-interested reasons. It was also opposed instrumentally, to further
other ends, or for reasons of private economy and welfare. To a significant extent,
however, it was both perceived to be, unusually, a conflict about political and even
religious ideologies, and supported or opposed on those grounds.
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1. Edmund Burke and the War Against the French
Revolution
[Burke] is the man that will mark this age, marked as it is in itself,
by events, to all time.1
After months of mutual suspicion, fragile communications and increasing tension,
Revolutionary France declared war on Great Britain on 1 February 1793—a struggle
which was to last for twenty-two years, except for the truce of Amiens in 1802-3—
and the news reached Britain on 7 February. Edmund Burke, the British conservative
politician and polemicist, however, had been at war against the French Revolution
since the autumn of 1790, when he had written and published his hugely successful
Reflections on the Revolution in France. This eloquent and detailed condemnation of
all that the French Revolution seemed to Burke to stand for was his personal
declaration of a war whose active fire would cease only with his death in 1797. The
British ministry appeared vague and even divided about the nature of the conflict and
its fundamental aims, but Burke's campaign against the French Revolution was from
its inception war to the death. Because of his early response to the Revolution and
support for a war against it, moreover, and because of his loud proclamation of his
views, he largely set the battle-lines for the rest of the British debate on the war.
In August 1789 he had written to Lord Charlemont of the British response to
the French Revolution:
As to us here our thoughts of every thing at home are suspended, by
our astonishment at the wonderful Spectacle which is exhibited in a
Neighbouring and rival Country—what Spectators, and what actors!
England gazing with astonishment at a French struggle for Liberty
and not knowing whether to blame or to applaud! The thing indeed,
though I thought I saw something like it in progress for several
years, has still something in it paradoxical and Mysterious. The
spirit it is impossible not to admire; but the old Parisian ferocity has
broken out in a shocking manner. It is true, that this may be no more
than a sudden explosion: If so no indication can be taken from it.
'But,' he continued ominously, 'if it should be character rather than accident, then
that people are not fit for Liberty, and must have a Strong hand like that of their
former masters to coerce them.'2 By October 1789, his own hesitation and doubtful
1 George Canning, 13 July 1797, quoted in third Earl of Malmesbury (ed.), Diaries and
Correspondence of James Harris, First Earl of Malmesbury (4 vols.: London, 1844) [hereafter
Malmesbury Diaries and Correspondence], iii, 399.
2 T.W. Copeland et al (eds.), The Correspondence of Edmund Burke (10 vols.: Cambridge and
Chicago, 1967-1970) [hereafter Burke Corr.], vi, 10.
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admiration were evaporating and he was writing to his son Richard about his concern
for 'the portentous state of France—where the Elements which compose Human
Society seem all to be dissolved, and a world of Monsters to be produc'd in the place
of it—where Mirabeau presides as the Grand Anarch; and the late Grand Monarch
makes a figure as ridiculous as pitiable.'3
The French Revolution was an attack on aristocratic power and privilege in
France, and Burke's concern deepened as he saw signs of the revolutionary Jacobin
movement spreading throughout Europe.4 He came to see the Revolution as an attack
on the basic foundations of European civilization, which included not only the social
order but also the systems of morality and belief on which that was built. The
Reflections and the rest of Burke's battery of literary weapons against the French
Revolution were therefore fired against it primarily from a desire to preserve the old
European order, especially since that of Britain was an integral part of it. The
European ancien regime's 'code of chivalry' was to him, as James K. Chandler
explains, a means of covering decently and indeed of ennobling the naked power of its
rulers, and the only alternative that he could envisage was 'a state of Hobbesian
chaos'.5
It was not long before Burke began to view war against the French Revolution
as a possibility. As early as 12 November 1789, he told Lord Fitzwilliam that he
would wish to see France 'circumscribed within moderate bounds'. In his speech in
the House of Commons debate on the Army Estimates on 9 February 1790, he in fact
gave it as his opinion that France need not be considered as much of a military threat
for some time to come; but he also suggested that the French Revolution had 'brought
on such calamities as no country, without a long war, has ever been known to suffer,
and which may in the end produce such a war, and perhaps, many such.' In the
Reflections, he hinted that the British government 'may find it expedient to make war'
upon the revolutionaries.6 Burke was also the first to argue that force must be used
against revolutionary France. On 25 January 1791, he wrote to a distressed member
of the French aristocracy, the Comtesse de Montrond. 'Alas! Madam, it is not to me,
or to such services as can come from me, that the persecuted honour of France must
apply,' he told her. 'Nothing more can be said. Something must be done. You have
3 ibid., pp.29-30.
4 Frank O'Gorman, Edmund Burke. His Political Philosophy (London, 1973), pp. 120-3.
5 James K. Chandler, 'Poetical Liberties: Burke's France and the "Adequate Representation" of the
English', in Francois Furet and Mona Ozouf (eds.), The French Revolution and the Creation of
Modern Political Culture, vol. iii, The Transformation of Political Culture, 1789-1848 (Oxford,
1989), p.53.
6 Burke Corr., vi, 36; P.H., xxviii, 353, 358, 9 February 1790; Edmund Burke, Reflections on the
Revolution in France (1790), ed. Conor Cruise O'Brien (Harmondsworth, 1968), p.263.
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an armed Tyranny to deal with; and nothing but arms can pull it down.'7 From this
time on, he vigorously advocated European intervention in France, certain that the
royalists within France were too weak to overturn the Revolution by themselves,
dispersed and disarmed as they were, and equally convinced that 'no Monarchy
limited or unlimited, nor any of the old Republics, can possibly be safe as long as this
strange, nameless, wild, enthusiastic thing is established in the Center of Europe'.8
He told Sir James Bland Burges that Britain must be prepared for 'very great and
awful Events both at home and abroad', and expressed his astonishment that the
European Powers without exception had chosen to be 'mere Spectators of this scene'.
They were, he lamented to the Chevalier de la Bintinaye, 'contending with each other
about points of trivial importance, and on old, worn out principles and Topics of
Policy, when the very existence of all of them is menaced, by a new Evil...'. By July
1791 he was becoming more impatient. Writing to Henry Dundas, the Home
Secretary, he argued that' this seems to me a moment for some decision in the foreign
System so far as it regards France.—Surely a Step may be taken with great safety,
great dignity and great Effect. The time for it may pass.' He told his son in August
that he was sure that the revolutionaries were making preparations of some kind, and
he began talking in terms of an enemy: 'Oh! let those who would [restore] the good in
that Country be careful how they despise their Enemy!'9
Burke did not limit his personal battle against the French Revolution to the
Reflections and his wide private correspondence. He thought himself publicly 'bound
to express his own sentiments with freedom and energy in a crisis of such importance
to the whole human race,' he wrote in his Letter to a Member of the National
Assembly (May 1791);10 and his Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs (August
1791), Thoughts on French Affairs (December 1791) and Headsfor Consideration on
the Present State of Affairs (November 1792) also denounced the Revolution and
urgently insisted that the European Powers intervene. Some of his pamphlets were
clearly written in a specific attempt to prevail upon government policy, such as Hints
for a Memorial to be Delivered to M.M. (1791) and Thoughts on French Affairs, and
he even sent his son to Coblenz to try to influence counter-revolutionary tactics.11
7 Burke Corr., vi, 211.
8 Burke to John Trevor, [January 1791], Burke Corr., vi, 217-8.
9 Burke to Sir James Bland Burges, [29 June 1791], to the Chevalier de la Bintinaye, [March 1791],
to Henry Dundas, [1 July 1791], and to Richard Burke, jr., 9 August 1791, Burke Corr., vi, 279,
242, 280,333.
10 The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke (general editors Paul Langford et al; Oxford)
[hereafter, Writings and Speeches], viii (ed. L.G. Mitchell, 1989), 308. For Burke's split from the
FoxiteWhigs in Parliamentary Opposition and move to supporting the Pitt administration, see ch.4.
11 Conor Cruise O'Brien, The Great Melody: A Thematic Biography and Commented Anthology of
Edmund Burke (London, 1992), pp.439, 452,466-7,490, 544.
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Nevertheless, his efforts to stir his country to action did not end with the outbreak of
war, for he was rarely satisfied with the ministry's conduct of it and the national spirit
often seemed to waver. He therefore continued to speak out in the House of
Commons until his retirement in June 1794, and to write letters, talk to statesmen and
publish his views on the war until his death, his language as colourful and pointed, as
R.B. McDowell has remarked, as James Gillray's caricatures.12 There were times and
circumstances, he declared in the Appeal, in which not to speak out was at least to
connive.13 This chapter considers his reasons for demanding a war with revolutionary
France, the aims for which he insisted it should be fought, his views on its nature and
conduct, and his reasons for vehemently opposing peace with the French Republic.
I
Burke's view of the French Revolution was fundamental to his reasons for insisting
that Britain and indeed Europe should make war upon France. The war he advocated
was no typical eighteenth-century pursuit of territorial aggrandizement and power.
Nor was it primarily motivated by a desire for vengeance against the foreign
aggression of revolutionary France, which to him was a mere symptom of its real
malignancy. He reduced the French Revolution to a system of principles which had
overturned the ancien regime in France, and which was fast spreading to menace
European peace, security and moral values, and he insisted that it must be wholly
destroyed for the future of European civilization.
Burke wrote and published his Reflections on the Revolution in France in
direct response to the publication in January 1790 of Richard Price's A Discourse on
the Love of Our Country. In this lecture to the Revolution Society, Price had
associated an enthusiasm for the American and French Revolutions with a radical
interpretation of British politics and, in particular, the Glorious Revolution of 1688,
pointing to the French Revolution as completing what the 1688 Revolution had merely
begun.14 The pamphlet alerted Burke to the possibility of British radicals following
the French example, and the Reflections were therefore designed to expose what in his
view was false thinking about both the French and Glorious Revolutions in order to
obstruct this potential disaster.15 A substantial part of the book was devoted to an
12 Burke Corr., viii, p.xviii. 'He would prefer infinitely a solid English dish; a slice of good roast
beef to all the kick-shaws of France' (P.H., xxx, 437, 18 February 1793).
13 Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke (Bohn edition: 6 vols., London, 1883-6) [hereafter,
Works], iii, 95.
14 John Derry, 'The Opposition Whigs and the French Revolution 1789-1815' in H.T. Dickinson
(ed.), Britain and the French Revolution (London, 1989), pp.41-2.
15 O'Brien, The Great Melody, pp.394-6.
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exposition of the 1688 Revolution as 'a revolution not made, but prevented',16 a
series of events preserving the political power of the king and the landed governing
elite in the British constitution. Burke went on to argue that the radical doctrines
falsely claimed to be at work in the English Revolution of 1688 were proved by their
activity in the French Revolution to be evil by nature and by effect.17
The particular danger of the French doctrines of equality, reason and liberty
lay in their superficial appeal to ordinary men. Burke argued, however, that these
abstract principles were a menace to political and social order, because they
encouraged men to seek perfection in human affairs, where it could not be found and,
in its pursuit, to overturn all else (including admirable compromises with perfection),
leaving a trail of destruction in their wake.18 Universal peace and international
concord, he argued, was 'a coarse and clumsy deception': far from peace and good
will to men, the French revolutionaries' meditated war against all other governments'
through systematically inciting sedition among the peoples of Europe.19
Essential to Burke's own political thinking were the principles of prejudice and
prescription. These were the claims and authority of long usage and possession which
bound one generation to the next, preventing the anarchy of disjointed social
relationships and structures by securing property to its owners and their descendants.
'Men are born into a society whose order is already established, and much of that
order depends upon an instinctive, unthinking adherence to prescriptive claims.'20 It
was wise to use the mature experience of the past for the benefit of the present
generation. The fact that prescription had worked in the past and, moreover, was now
working in the present proved its utility.21 It was not, therefore, only the
revolutionaries' assertion of reason alone to which Burke particularly objected, as
Francis P. Canavan points out, but also their claims for individual reason. No
individual intellect or reason was likely to prove more reliable than the collective
16 P.H., xxviii, 361, 9 February 1790; c.f. 'An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs' (1791),
Works, iii, 41-64.
17 In Burke, Paine, and the Rights ofMan (The Hague, 1963), R.R. Fennessy has noted that Burke
used the device of a letter to a French friend for the Reflections to avoid the appearance of lecturing
the British on their own constitution, by addressing his remarks to a foreigner. This allowed him to
present his own ideas as typical of the British system of government and to place his British
adversaries in the postion of an unconstitutional and un-British minority, and to flatter British
national sentiments by stressing the superiority of die British constitution and institutions (pp. 145-
6).
18 Michael Freeman, Edmund Burke and the Critique ofPolitical Radicalism (Oxford, 1980), p. 168;
see also P.H., xxviii, 434-5, 2 March 1790.
19 'Appeal', pp. 10-11.
20 Quotation from Reflections, pp. 192-3, 195; Carl B. Cone, Burke and the Nature ofPolitics, vol.
II, 'The Age of the French Revolution' (Kentucky, 1964), pp.333-4.
21 J.G.A. Pocock, 'Burke and the Ancient Constitution—A Problem in the History of Ideas', in The
Historical Journal, iii (1960), 129; Freeman, The Critique ofPolitical Radicalism, p.96.
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wisdom of a people through history.22 Burke was not opposed to change, however;
he knew that it was both necessary and inevitable in human experience. Rather, he
argued that progress should be gradual. The political system of a country ought to
evolve slowly over time, conserving the good and improving upon it. The British
constitution was an excellent example of this, he thought, evolving as prudence acted
on circumstances through time to safeguard and to refine. The French had been
presented with a perfect opportunity to follow suit—their monarchy had not been
incapable of reform—but the revolutionaries had swept all aside in their mad rush after
what they supposed to be perfection.23
For Burke, the twin pillars of society were property and religion, for the social
order was based upon property and sanctioned by the divine will, and as much upheld
by the church as by the state.24 He regarded them both as inviolable, and he
condemned the Revolution's subversion of both as the attempted annihilation of the
entire social order. The leading Jacobins were themselves 'drawn from the dregs of
society', and he believed the Revolution to be the result of a plot hatched by
philosophers, the new monied interest in France and the men of letters.25 Their
political system, based as it was on the immediate self-interest of the individual, was
inherently unstable, for it must lack certainty and constancy. Burke 'could not
conceive of the individual as a moral and rational being apart from society', and could
only see the French Revolution as regressive in its unchaining the individual from the
established links of society and claiming his right to self-government.26 He did not
deny the existence of God-given, innate rights, but he held them to be irrelevant to
men in society. The real rights of men were civil rights, which were simply aspects of
justice and social order—they were another way of defining social relations.27 How,
he asked, 'can any man claim, under the conventions of civil society, rights which do
not so much as suppose its existence? Rights which are absolutely repugnant to
it?...Men cannot enjoy the rights of an uncivil and of a civil state together.'28 Social
22 Francis P. Canavan, The Political Reason ofEdmund Burke (Cambridge, I960), pp.73-7.
23 Reflections, pp. 105-6, 121-5, 236, 266-7, 323, 375.
24 Cone, 'The Age of the French Revolution', p.424.
25 Yang, 'The British Debate on the French Revolution', pp.75-84; O'Brien, The Great Melody,
pp.448-9.
26 O'Gorman, Edmund Burke. His Political Philosophy, p. 124; Alfred Cobban, Edmund Burke and
the Revolt against the Eighteenth Century (London, 1929), p.52; Freeman, The Critique ofPolitical
Radicalism, p.79.
27 O'Gorman, Edmund Burke. His Political Philosophy, pp.48-9; Freeman, The Critique ofPolitical
Radicalism, pp.320-1; Fennessy, Burke, Paine, and the Rights ofMan , pp. 139-141.
28 Reflections, p. 150.
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restraint was also a right of men. Moreover, these rights were an inheritance under the
laws of the nation, not rights justified by abstract reason.29
Corrupted by their false principles, the revolutionaries, Burke claimed, were
inherently and irredeemably wicked men. A new school of murder and barbarism had
been set up in Paris, he warned, inspired and controlled by philosophers and
metaphysicians, men who pursued unattainable ideals and used these to justify any
means they considered necessary. The heart of a ' thoroughbred metaphysician', he
wrote, 'is like that of the principle of evil himself, incorporeal, pure, unmixed,
dephlegmated, defecated evil.'30 They were all 'atheistic banditti', whether they were
Brissotins or Maratists; even the constitutional royalists, if they differed at all, were
simply the tools of the 'more determined, able, and systematic regicides', 'the
synagogue of antichrist'.31 Evidence of this, he suggested, was to be found in the
increasing dissipation of life in France and particularly in its capital city. Marriage, for
instance, had been degraded from a Christian sacrament into a civil contract, with the
result that by 1793 one in three marriages in Paris was ending in divorce. 'From this
we may take our estimate of the havoc that has been made through all the relations of
life.'32
France was much more of a danger to Britain and the rest of Europe as a
republic than it had been under the monarchy, according to Burke. The fourth Letter
on a Regicide Peace was a later work addressed to Earl Fitzwilliam in refutation of
Lord Auckland's pamphlet, Remarks on the Apparent Circumstances of the War in the
Fourth Week ofOctober, 1795, in which Auckland asked whether France, weakened
by republicanism and the exertions of war, might not be a more peaceable neighbour
for Britain than the old monarchy had been. Such a claim, insisted Burke, was
Jacobinism 'sublimed and exalted into most pure and perfect essence'. Auckland had
fallen into the trap of Jacobin deception, for the true comparison was not between a
greedy monarchy and a fatigued republic, but between a moderate territorial power
and a powerful empire in the hands of a republic lusting after dominion 33 Republican
29 Pocock, 'Burke and the Ancient Constitution', p. 128; Charles Parkin, The Moral Basis ofBurke's
Political Thought (Cambridge, 1956), p. 17.
30 'A Letter From the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, to a Noble Lord' (1796), Writings and
Speeches, ix (ed. R.B. McDowell, 1991), 176.
31 'Remarks on the Policy of the Allies with Respect to France' (1793), Writings and Speeches, viii,
461; First 'Letter on a Regicide Peace' (1796), Writings and Speeches, ix, 245; Harvey Mitchell,
'Presentation', in Furet and Ozouf (eds.), The Transformation of Political Culture, p. 15. See also
Writings and Speeches, ix, 6-7. Burke, as O'Brien points out, had dubbed the revolutionaries
'regicides' as early as April 1792 [O'Brien, The Great Melody, p.486].
32 Gerald W. Chapman, Edmund Burke. The Practical Imagination (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), p.235;
First 'Letter on a Regicide Peace', p.245.
33 Fourth 'Letter on a Regicide Peace' (1797), Writings and Speeches, ix, 52.
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France was neither the ancient France with ordinary ambition and ordinary means, nor
a new power of an old kind, but 'a new power of a new species'. One of the principal
targets of the Revolution had been France's international relations: 'The Revolution
was made, not to make France free, but to make her formidable; not to make her a
neighbour, but a mistress; not to make her more observant of laws, but to put her in a
condition to impose them. To make France truly formidable, it was necessary that
France should be new-modelled'.34
He feared French expansion per se, and its upset of the European balance of
power, but still more did he fear the subversion of the continent by French principles.
The combination of these two threats was terrifying, for it meant the destruction of
European society.35 The Revolution was not just the subversion of the monarchy, but
a crusade against a whole way of life, against the social order which to Burke was the
embodiment and bulwark of men's rights and liberties in its protection of property and
the propertied—'that order of things under which our part of the world has so long
flourishd, and indeed been in a progressive State of improvement, the Limits of
which, if it had not been thus rudely stopped, it would not have been easy for the
imagination to fix' .36
It was in Britain's own interests to go to war with France, Burke argued, as a
self-interested safety precaution, if for no other reason. It would be foolish in the
extreme for the British government not to take French events seriously and with due
caution. By its mere geographical position, France could affect every state of Europe,
and it had always been British policy to exercise vigilance over French external
proceedings. Now those were intimately bound up with France's internal affairs;
indeed, the French had made it impossible for European governments to ignore the
Revolution and its principles by actively notifying them of their new domestic
arrangements, an unusual step for any state to take. War was 'a plan formed upon the
ancient policy and practice of Great Britain, and of Europe... which is...more strongly
called for by the present circumstances than by any former...' ,37
The response of the British government would have to be made in the light of
the British constitution and domestic situation, for the effects of the Revolution could
not be confined to France. It was 'a revolution of doctrine and theoretick dogma'' with
a policy of proselytism and exploiting divisions, factions and opposition to established
34 Second 'Letter on a Regicide Peace' (1796), Writings and Speeches, ix, 278.
35 Burke to General Dalton, 6 August 1793, Burke Corr., vii, 383; Reflections, p. 170.
36 Quotation from Burke to the Comte de Mercy-Argenteau, c.6 August 1793, Burke Corr., vii, 387.
See also 'Remarks on the Policy of the Allies', Appendix, p.505; Cobban, The Revolt Against the
Eighteenth Century, pp.112-3; Kramnick, The Rage ofEdmund Burke, p. 144; Canavan, The Political
Reason ofEdmund Burke, p.92.
37 'Heads for Consideration', p.400.
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government abroad.38 The Austrian Netherlands, the German and Italian states, Spain
and Switzerland would be the first objects of French attack because of their weakness
and proximity to France; but Sweden, Russia, Poland and the United Provinces were
also unstable politically and hence also vulnerable. 'The revolution harpies of France,
sprung from night and hell, or from that chaotic anarchy, which generates equivocally
"all monstrous, all prodigious things", cuckoo-like, adulterously lay their eggs, and
brood over, and hatch them in the nest of every neighbouring state.'39 Britain itself
had no cause for complacency, for, since it possessed the greatest international
influence in Europe, Britain was the nation which the French wished most to corrupt,
in order to speed the progress of their anarchism.40 Revolutionary France had
declared that physical and moral ties already connecting Savoy with itself justified its
annexation of Savoy; 'no doubt,' he warned, 'they will soon find out the physical and
moral connexion subsisting between them and this country...'.41
Strong measures were the more vital because of French partisans already in
Britain and elsewhere in Europe. At the time of the publication of his Reflections,
Burke was not over-anxious about them, though cautious: he told Calonne that 'I dont
much fear from the faction here who correspond with those who resemble them on the
other side of the Water—but no man living is intitled after all that has happend to
despise men that mean ill on account of their apparent want of power.'42 By the end
of 1791 he was suspicious of 'all who are dissenters in character, temper, and
disposition', whether in a political or religious sense. He was also hostile to the
British press, claiming that the Jacobins had got almost complete possession of it and
used it to the full ('the Newspapers of Hell are doing their Business diligently—and
do all they can to stir up the Mobb').43 Parliamentary reform might look innocent,
even to some of its supporters, but it had the same tendency as Jacobinism— the
complete destruction of the constitution and 'the rude inroad of Gallic tumult'. In his
Observations on the Conduct of the Minority, he claimed of the campaign for
parliamentary reform that 'Whether it is necessarily connected in theory with
Jacobinism is not worth a dispute. The two things are connected in fact.'44
38 'Heads for Consideration on the Present State of Affairs' (1792), Writings and Speeches, viii, 387-
8; 'Thoughts on French Affairs' (1791), Writings and Speeches, viii, 341-2.
39 'Letter to a Noble Lord', p. 156.
40 'Appeal', p.95.
41 P.H., xxx, 71, 54-5, 13 December 1792.
42 25 October 1790, Burke Corr., vi, 141.
43 Burke to Earl Fitzwilliam, 5 October 1792, and to Richard Burke, jr., 1 October 1792, Burke
Corr., vii, 229, 225.
44 'Letter to a Noble Lord', p.173; 'Observations on the Conduct of the Minority' (1793), Writings
and Speeches, viii, 443.
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Burke made no distinction between British and French Jacobins: 'There is a
Confraternity between the two divisions of the French faction, on the other side of the
Water, and on this. They are both guilty, and equally guilty of the late acts which have
wounded to the Quick all the moral feelings of mankind.'45 He thought that the British
Jacobins aimed to conspire with their French counterparts to arrange an invasion of
Britain and the subjugation of the nation and its government to the French Republic.
'The [British] Jacobins are worse than lost to their country. Their hearts are abroad.
Their sympathy with the regicides of France is complete.'46 The Irish radicals were
particularly dangerous in this regard, he believed, for they threatened to open a back
door for Jacobinism to take Britain by the rear. Ireland, he told Windham, 'is no
longer an obscure dependency of this Kingdom. What is done there vitally effects
[v/c] the whole System of Europe.'47
His frustration with the British government, which before late 1792 seemed
not to realize the danger of the advance of French doctrines in Britain, was intense.
'My poor opinion,' he wrote to Grenville on 19 September 1792, 'is that these
principles, considering their Quality, and the means by which they are supported,
cannot possibly be realized in practice in France, without an absolute certainty, and
that at no remote period, of overturning the whole fabrick of the Constitution.'48 He
was convinced that 'the foreign System will now settle domestick politicks.'49 From
November 1792, the case was stronger still. The French had shown republican
revolution to be 'a thing feasible in practice' and, since the Edict of Fraternity of 19
November, were offering forces to assist subject peoples of other nations to overturn
their governments in favour of republicanism.50 The combination of domestic
partisans and French troops was the real threat to the British constitution and social
order; war against France was the only alternative to a British civil war.51
In his implacable hostility to French principles, Burke conceived the
revolutionaries to have a drive equally unremitting, and he warned against hoping for
signs of repentance in them. Such hopes were tantamount to believing in the
conversion of the devil himself.52 He was also convinced that neither instability nor
bankruptcy would succeed in dissolving the Revolution in France. By December
45 Burke to Lord Loughborough, 27 January 1793, Burke Corr., vii, 344. See also Burke to
Windham, 23 August 1793, Burke Corr., vii, 415.
46 Fourth 'Letter on a Regicide Peace', p. 105.
47 Burke toWindham, 16 October 1794, Burke Corr., viii, 34-41.
48 Burke Corr., vii, 219.
49 Burke to John King, 2 Nov. 1791, Burke Corr., ix, 439.
50 'Thoughts on French Affairs', p.371.
51 P.H., xxx, 110, 15 December 1792.
52 'A Letter to a Member of the National Assembly', p.299; Fourth 'Letter on a Regicide Peace',
p.70.
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1791, French bankruptcy had run as far as it was ever likely to run, in his opinion, yet
the revolution showed no signs of faltering.53
Material resources never have supplied, nor ever can supply, the
want of unity in design, and constancy in pursuit. But unity and
design and boldness in pursuit, have never wanted resources and
never will. We have not considered as we ought the dreadful energy
of a state, in which the property has nothing to do with the
government.54
There was no hope that that the French Revolution, evil, menacing, and grasping,
would fail of its own accord. Only war would remove the evil at the heart of Europe,
which, if left, would spread to every part of the circumference, circle beyond circle,
defying whatever petty defences were employed against it.55 As Burke wrote in the
preface to his Observations on the Conduct of the Minority (September 1793), 'I
considered a general war against Jacobins and Jacobinism, as the only possible chance
of saving Europe (and England as included in Europe) from a truly frightful
revolution.'56 Negotiation with the revolutionaries, as advocated by the Foxites, was
a completely inadequate means of dealing with the situation. It was extremely unlikely
that the French would be persuaded to repeal the offending decrees of November and
December 1792 by mere negotiation; the revolutionaries, having violated international
treaties and laws as it pleased them, could scarcely be trusted to treat on any basis of
law; and it would open Britain to the insult of having her ambassador sent home
unrecognized. The revolutionaries were 'outlaws of humanity, an uncommunicable
people'.57
Burke was by no means a war-monger, as his pleas for peace in India, Ireland
and America had demonstrated, but he was quite clear that war was the ultimate means
of justice in the world, and that this was an occasion when it was indispensable.58 He
realized that the balance of power was too often made the pretext for wars of ambition,
but he constantly defended the right of a country to interfere in the internal affairs of
another if it became necessary for the sake of its own security. Those who argued
otherwise, he said, failed to distinguish between the promotion of sedition and
rebellion in another country and the support of one side in a country already divided.
He frequently referred to Vattell's Law ofNations (1758) for support, where it was
53 'Thoughts on French Affairs', p.362-3.
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stated that a nation trampling on the rights of other nations might be repressed by the
international community; that foreign powers might help oppressed peoples against
tyranny; and that, in civil war, there were two distinct powers, either of which might
be assisted from abroad—all of these principles, Burke argued, were applicable to the
European situation created by the Revolution in France.59 Furthermore, by the law of
civil vicinity, a man was entitled to make representation to a judge against his
neighbour who had erected something on his property which was unacceptable to him;
between nations the principle was the same, but, in the absence of an impartial judge,
the 'grand vicinage of Europe', or the rest of the commonwealth, must be aware of
and use its right to prevent 'any capital innovation which may amount to the erection
of a dangerous nuisance', under which heading the French Revolution might certainly
be placed.60
War was necessary to strengthen the 'sound part' of France—the royalists. No
counter-revolution could be expected from forces within France alone, due to the
weaknesses of the royalists: their lack of internal leadership, the tyranny of the
municipal republican committees and their dissipation throughout the country. Even
before the execution of Louis XVI, it was plain that he was not likely to succeed in
'breaking their prisons, terrifying their Enemies and animating their friends'.61
External force was necessary in order to achieve the destruction of the Jacobin
government of France. It was also incumbent upon Britain to help its allies. This was
partly because of treaty obligations, as in the case of the United Provinces; and partly
because the European opposition to revolutionary France had no chance of victory
without Britain's involvement and, indeed, leadership. Britain could not afford to sit
back and hope that the other states would do the dirty work for it. It was more likely
to play a fair mediating role in the alliance than any other power, since its interests
were less likely to clash with those of other states, due to its geographical situation as
an island and maritime power; besides, it possessed the only navy which could keep
that of France in check. Without Great Britain, the cement which might hold all the
other States together was missing. In late November 1792 he thought 'Europe
recoverable yet. But it must be by a great and speedy Effort of this Country.''62 Those
who argued for peace were misguided, for peace with France might well place Britain
at war with the rest of Europe.63
59 'Remarks on the Policy of the Allies', Appendix, pp.500-1.
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Burke vehemently criticized the ministry's hesitancy to go to war. It was
simply not worthwhile, in this case, to discuss, 'like sophisters', whether some evil
might be tolerated for the sake of some benefit. Great and unequivocal good 'must be
probable almost to certainty' before the well-being of British citizens ought to be
risked.64 Even in 1794 he was complaining to Lord Loughborough:
I very much doubt, whether in any Country, they who have the
charge of the flock, are sufficiently aware of the Giant strides with
which the great overbearing Master-calamity of the time is advancing
towards us. All you the Great act just as if you thought a thousand
things were to be feard or pursued for their own separate sakes
when, in reality, none are worth notice, otherwise than as they tend
to promote or to resist the Cause of Jacobinism. 65
The ministry had persevered in neutrality 'with the most pedantick excess' for too
long. 'If your hands are not on your swords, their knives will be at your throats.
There is no medium,—there is no temperament,—there is no compromise with
Jacobinism.'66
II
Burke thought that the allies' aims ought to be clear and unambiguous, in order to
prevent needless bloodshed and waste in the pursuit of irrelevant ends. To this end, he
wrote the Heads for the Consideration on the Present State ofAffairs in November
1792 and his Remarks on the Policy of the Allies with Respect to France in October
1793. Once the allied aims had been specified, they should be pursued
singlemindedly. 'Our politics want directness and simplicity,' he complained in
November 1793.67
Burke believed that the extinction of Jacobinism in France was 'the sole
worthy object of the Arms and politicks of this time', and that this should be the
primary aim of the war against revolutionary France. The more permanent the Jacobin
regime seemed to be, the more convinced Burke became that if it were not destroyed,
it would destroy the whole European social order. 'We are, as I think, fighting for our
a//.' Jacobinism, however, would not fall so long as it was pursued as a secondary
object, behind the distraction of territorial ambition in the guises of indemnity and
64 'Appeal', p. 16.
6^ 19 October 1794, Burke Corr., viii, 44.
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security. His comment on the French recapture of Dunkirk was 'that the whole
Scheme of the war is mistaken, (or appears to me to be so), for it ought to be, not for
Dunkirk, or this or t'other Town—but to drive Jacobinism out of the World.'68 The
aims of the British government and of the European alliance, judged by this standard,
lay wide open to criticism. They were too numerous: 'The allied powers have many
Objects in common, and many seperately [s/c]; and I fear they are not, all of them
perfectly consistent with each other nor pursued in proper subordination to their
relative importance.'69 Moreover, they were too concerned with greed and territorial
ambition, 'as if no Jacobinism existed in the world'.70
Burke made it clear that in seeking the destruction of Jacobinism he did not
mean that France itself should be destroyed. He was at war with Jacobinism, not
France, and for him, military victory was only a necessary preliminary to the re-
establishment of French society. Nor did he think the total annihilation of France
desirable either for Britain or for Europe. He feared that Austria and Prussia wanted
the destruction of France as a great power and that this would ruin the balance of
power in Europe and lead to further war among countries preying upon France.
France would be weakened sufficiently by the time Jacobinism had been extirpated not
to pose a threat to the other European states; indeed, it would require to be nursed and
supported rather than further drained.71
As to the government which should be established in France after the Jacobin
regime had been crushed, Burke thought that its precise details could be determined
only after the conclusion of peace. He also argued that its form was irrelevant so long
as it was stable and guaranteed property rights and justice. 'It was not for any
particular system of government that he contended, but for some government.'72
Nevertheless, he did have clear ideas on the form he believed would be the most likely
to achieve these standards. In his Remarks on the Policy of the Allies (October 1793),
he suggested that a military government would be necessary immediately after the end
of the war 'for the energetic foundation of a lasting order.' The 'lawful prince' would
not have an easy beginning, and he would need to win loyalty and submission. 'He is
to be always (I speak nearly to the letter) on horseback.'73 Burke was persuaded that
68 Burke to Loughborough, 12 January 1794, Burke Corr., vii, 518; Burke to Capt. Woodford, 13
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the only adequate form of government for the renewed France would be the 'lawful
prince', that is, a restored monarchy. 'France to be anything,' he wrote, 'must be a
Monarchy; and a very strong Monarchy too.' Theoretical constitutions and plans had
bedevilled France throughout the Revolution and nothing would be of real service to it
but to re-establish the old order.74 As time passed, he favoured less and less
modification of the old regime.75
Burke's idea of the re-establishment of the old order, therefore, did not merely
involve the restoration of the monarchy but also the restoration of property. This, he
argued, followed logically and necessarily. A hereditary monarchy could not exist if
nothing else was hereditary or permanent. Moreover, the re-establishment of the
whole propertied order was necessary if Jacobinism was to be properly extinguished.
The alternative, Burke warned, was over the next twenty years to watch the property
and government of every state in Europe falling as they had done in France.76 The
French constitution must be fitted to the French people themselves—precisely what
the Jacobins had failed to do, for, in Burke's opinion, 'the people' were limited to the
original landowners, the estates, the corporations, and the clergy, 'as the true
constituent parts of the nation, and forming the legally organized parts of the people of
France'.77 Therefore it was essential that property should be restored as well as the
monarchy. He did, however, recognize that it would be impractical as well as
impolitic to attempt to reinstate the ancien regime in every detail. 'That was though not
so violent a State of Anarchy as well as the present. If it were even possible to lay
things down exactly as they stood, before the series of experimental politicks began, I
am quite sure that they could not long continue in that situation.'78
Ill
Burke had a very clear conception of what sort of war Britain was involved in and
ought to be fighting against revolutionary France, and he was probably the first in
Britain to see it in this way. He had an almost Pauline vision of wrestling 'not against
flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the
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darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places', and indeed a
following of 'war crusaders' collected behind him: those writers and politicians who
shared many of his views on the war and often treated his writings and opinions as if
they had near apostolic authority.79
In determining the nature of the war, Burke's first consideration was the
character of the enemy. He continually exhorted the ministry that, 'in all we do,
whether in the struggle or after it, it is necessary that we should constantly have in our
eye the nature and character of the enemy we have to contend with.' Ministers must
abandon the notion that Britain was fighting the people of France, or they would be
unable to fight the real enemy effectively. Britain was not involved in 'a common
political war with an old recognized member of the commonwealth of Christian
Europe'. Burke distinguished between the geographical nation of France and what he
called 'the moral France'. These were normally one and the same thing, but in these
disjointed times, 'the truth is, that France is out of itself'; almost literally so, for the
emigres made up a good deal of what he classed the 'moral' nation.80
Thus, Britain was involved in a French civil war, and a civil war on the grand
scale. 'The state of France is perfectly simple. It consists of but two descriptions—
The Oppressors and the Oppressed.'81 He often, however, identified 'the country'
with the establishment and the landed interest of a country; thus, France, properly
speaking, was largely in exile. This tended to disparage the royalist sector of the lower
orders, left behind in France. These he brushed aside as, at least temporarily, having
no 'independent and deliberative existence'— they had no power and so were at the
mercy of the Jacobins.82 They were therefore irrelevant to the ' moral essence' which
was the country.
As to what you talk of the people of France, I know of no such
people. That community, as it now stands, is composed [of] an
handful of Tyrants and some Millions of the most Abject Slaves ever
heard of in the world. The opinion of these millions is not so much
as dust in the balance. I always except the Royalists, a good many of
whom still exist, and have not at all abandond their old principles;
but having been themselves treacherously abandond, and even
persecuted, by the Allies—they are for the present confounded in the
general Mass.83
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Burke watched with a mixture of revulsion and horror as revolutionary France welded
itself into a military nation-state. 'It is military in its principle, in its maxims, in its
spirit, and in all its movements. The state has dominion and conquest for its sole
objects; dominion over minds by proselytism, over bodies by arms.'84
The British ministry, according to Burke, was fighting the war on the wrong
basis altogether.85 The conflict was primarily with the French Revolutionary system,
not simply with French ambition or arrogance per se, which were but manifestations
of the revolutionary ideology in practice. The attack on the United Provinces, the
attempt to upset the European balance of power and the declaration of war on Britain
were all good grounds for war, but in themselves they were little more than evidence
for the real ground of war, the revolutionary system of France—'a posture, which
was in itself a declaration of war against mankind.'86 Burke enlarged on this in his
Letters on a Regicide Peace:
As I understood the matter, we were at war not with its conduct, but
with its existence; convinced that its existence and its hostility were
the same...The faction is not local or territorial...It exists in every
country in Europe; and among all orders of men in every country,
who look up to France as to a common head. The centre is
there... Everywhere else the faction is militant; in France it is
triumphant...It is not France extending a foreign empire over other
nations; it is a sect aiming at universal empire, and beginning with
the conquest of France.87
The contest against revolutionary France was therefore no ordinary war—it
was a new kind of war. Burke wrote to Pitt: 'I pray...that you may not fall into the
one great Errour from whence there is no return... that you may never be led to think,
that this War is, in its principle, or in any thing that belongs to it, the least resembling
any other War...'.88 Britain was struggling against a set of political and religious
doctrines, not just against men. Thus,
We are in a war of a peculiar nature. It is not with an ordinary
community, which is hostile or friendly as passion or as interest may
veer about: not with a state which makes war through wantonness,
and abandons it through lassitude. We are at war with a system,
which, by its essence, is inimical to all other governments, and
which makes peace or war, as peace and war may best contribute to
their subversion. It is with an armed doctrine that we are at war.89
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French arms and principles were 'things inseperable' and 'went as those of
Mahomed, the Rights of man in one hand, and the Sword in the other'.90
This was the first war since the wars of religion to be fought between
competing ideologies. The principles at stake were those of the old social order of
Europe, rooted in the protection of property. Even in defending the clergy in the
Reflections, Burke's main charge was the confiscation of Church property, as a crime
against human property rights rather than as sacrilege, or rather than objecting to the
Civil Constitution of the Clergy as a secular interference in the Church's spiritual
jurisdiction.91 Nevertheless, Christianity itself was also basic to the ideology of the
established social order of Europe, and here, too, Burke found the Jacobins at their
work of destruction:
Look at all the proceedings of the National Assembly from the first
day of declaring itself in 1789, to this very hour, and you will find
full half of their business to be directly on this subject. In fact it is
the spirit of the whole...This religious war is not a controversy
between sect and sect as formerly, but a war against all sects and all
religions.92
In Burke's view, as Gerald Chapman has pointed out, since he thought that religious
belief was the basis of civil society, 'the armed doctrine was really religious in its
substance, political in its scale and aspirations...'.93 This was the nature of the
conflict in which Britain was involved.
Whether overtly political or religious, the fanaticism of the revolutionaries
alarmed Burke: '...it is now obvious to the world, that a theory concerning
government may become as much a cause of fanaticism as a dogma in religion.'94
The Jacobin Revolution is carried on by men of no rank, of no
consideration, of wild, savage minds, full of levity, arrogance, and
presumption, without morals, without probity, without prudence.
What have they then to supply their innumerable defects, and to
make them terrible even to the firmest minds? One thing, and one
only—but that one thing is worth a thousand—they have
energy...this dreadful and portentous energy, restrained by no
consideration of God or man, that is always vigilant, always on the
attack, that allows itself no repose, and suffers none to rest an hour
with impunity...95
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The force of the Revolution seemed unnatural to Burke. 'That country has but too
much life in it, when everything around is so disposed to tameness and languor.'96
He described this energy as a fire which was constantly at work: sometimes blazing
forth, sometimes covered by its ashes, but always living and burning: 'The whole
Aedifice of antient Europe is shaken by the Earthquake caused by that fire...'. This
force or energy (one of whose elements, he claimed, was the French' immortal hatred
of England'97) was the more frightening because it was the sole resource of
revolutionary France. 'The state is all in all,' Burke noted, and everything was
devoted to producing that energy, and everything which the Revolution achieved was
produced by that energy. While the republican government could produce nothing but
misery and anarchy at home, it still possessed 'the malignant power of great offensive
operations' abroad.98
This new type of war, produced by the evil principles of Jacobinism
combined with the novel and unnatural energy of the Revolution, created a new style
of warfare.
I cannot persuade myself, that this War bears any the least
resemblance (other than that it is a War) to any that has ever existed
in the world—I cannot persuade myself, that any examples or any
reasonings drawn from other Wars and other politicks are at all
applicable to it—and I truly and sincerely think, that all other wars
and all other politicks have been the games of Children in
comparison to it.99
Everything was an unknown. As early as May 1791 Burke was predicting that 'the
new school of murder and barbarism, set up in Paris, having destroyed (so far as in it
lies) all the other manners and principles which have hitherto civilized Europe, will
destroy also the mode of civilized war...'.100 It was warfare conducted without a
sense of honour or integrity; no efforts would be spared by the Jacobins (who were
now inured to warfare) to gain their ends, and Britain could take no conventions of
eighteenth-century warfare for granted.101
Crucially, this was total warfare. Revolutionary France was throwing
everything it had into its war effort, and would stop at nothing to achieve its ends—it
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would conquer or be crushed. Burke realized this, and saw that a similar commitment
from Britain would be necessary if France was to be defeated. 'The hell-hounds of
war,' he predicted in 1791, 'on all sides, will be uncoupled and unmuzzled.'102 In
this new system or principle of war, even peace would be pressed into service by the
unscrupulous Jacobins—-they would be working towards universal empire whether
through force in time of hostility or by intrigue and subversion in time of 'peace'.103
Finally, Burke stressed that such a conflict as this would inevitably be long. No
dangerous power in the past had ever been reduced to acceptability without a long
war, and revolutionary France was no ordinarily dangerous power.104
IV
Naturally, Burke's views on the reasons for the war and its aims and nature governed
his opinion of how Britain should fight it. This included views on general strategy, of
which his main concern was that Britain ought to give full support to the French
counter-revolutionaries, and views on how the political nation ought to be managed
and to conduct itself in waging such a war.
Strategically, it was again necessary that the ministry should recognize that this
was a new kind of war and understand the nature of the enemy. It was incumbent
upon the administration to think the issues through properly in the light of these facts.
In his Letter to William Elliot, Esq. (May 1795), he accused the British of superficial
thinking: 'People talk of war, or cry for peace—Have they to the bottom considered
the questions either of war, or peace, upon the scale of the existing world? No, I fear
they have not.'105
Had the issues been considered properly, according to Burke, strategy would
have been focused correctly and energy and resources used effectively. He believed
that Britain ought to be fighting the revolutionary system, not France itself; but, since
this system was based in France, the centre of Europe, he insisted that it must be
defeated there. Burke urgently wanted a military strike at Paris and the destruction
there of Jacobinism once and for all before it became entrenched. 'We are at war with
a principle, and an example, which there is no shutting out by Fortresses or excluding
by Territorial Limits. No lines of demarcation can bound the Jacobin Empire. It must
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be extirpated in the place of its origin, or it will not be confined to that place.'106 All
chasing after objects elsewhere in Europe or further afield, in the East or West Indies,
was therefore a waste of time and resources. This policy made sense militarily, too:
'France is strong at arm's length. She is, I am convinced, weakness itself, if you can
get to grapple with her internally.'107
When important conquests were made in France, such as Toulon, Burke
insisted that they should be held in the name of the French monarchy, although under
the civil and military influence of the allies, to speed the counter-revolution and to
prevent quarrels among the allies.108 In fact, the whole conflict ought to be fought in
the name of the French King. Not to recognize Louis XVII and the princes, Provence
(later Louis XVIII) and Artois, was 'virtually to acknowledge the usurpation' and to
justify the judicial murder of Louis XVI. The capture of Toulon by Lord Hood in the
name of the French monarchy gave Burke pleasure because 'the War was at length put
upon a proper footing; the only rational manly and honourable footing it can be placed
upon.'109
Burke constantly criticized the British administration for inadequately
supporting the French counter-revolutionaries:
It is then plain by a conduct which overturns a thousand
declarations, that we take the royalists of France only as an
instrument of some convenience in a temporary hostility with the
Jacobins, but that we regard those atheistic and murderous
barbarians as the bona fide possessors of the soil of France.110
He tried hard to make the British administration see that supporting the French royalist
cause was in their interests, since it gave them internal allies in France, as well as
being the only just or viable means of fighting Jacobinism.111 He urged that the allies
should make good use of the potential of the French counter-revolutionaries. 'I have a
strong opinion that Frenchmen are best for French affairs,' he told Windham. 'I have
an opinion too, which I don't know whether I can make equally evident; it is, that the
emigrants have better parts than the people among whom they have taken refuge.'112
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The allies and the French royalists, Burke insisted, were mutually dependent. The
emigres especially understood the country better and had most interest in it, but they
were not nearly strong enough to effect a counter-revolution on their own. They must
be consulted and employed. He estimated that there must be at least seventy thousand
deprived civil and ecclesiastical proprietors; much of their force of ten thousand which
had served with the Prussian troops in 1792 still existed and would willingly act
again. They were also by far the best people to lead and inspire the royalists in
France.113
The fact that the conflict was in a basic sense a religious war presented another
reason for using the emigres. The French royalist clergy should be used to the full in
helping to wipe out atheistic Jacobinism, and it had been senseless to forbid the entry
of the bishop of Toulon once the port had been taken by the allies. Burke reserved
severe censure for those who hesitated on doctrinal grounds to use the French
Catholic clergy. The Jacobins had declared war on all religion, he said—it was not a
time for Christians to be squabbling among themselves—and he claimed that the
Protestant minority in France had actually colluded with the revolutionaries and had
thus put themselves beyond countenance.
The French clergy are the great instrument, by which this End is to
be accomplishd—and if we can make any serious impression upon
France by Arms in the beginning, this Clergy will be of more effect
in the progress of the Business, than an hundred thousand
Soldiers.114
As for the conduct and management of the British political nation in waging
war against revolutionary France, Burke made four main points. Britain must fight
wholeheartedly; it must fight as a united nation, as far as possible; resolute leadership
was vital; and public opinion must be properly managed and used.
'Humanly speaking,' Burke wrote in the Letters on a Regicide Peace, 'that
people which bounds its efforts only with its being, must give the law to that nation
which will not push its opposition beyond its convenience.' It was vital that Britain
should at least match the force and spirit of revolutionary France. The crimes and
madness of the Jacobin regime, far from weakening the vigour of France, were
integral to it; but novelty was not the only possible source of zeal. Burke called for a
because of Puisaye's early support for the Revolution and the 1791 Constitution—'put the saddle on
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passionate defence of the laws, the constitution, the institutions, the social character
and the liberties of Britain;115 he paced up and down the pages of his letters and
publications with distressed impatience at the ministry's caution and lack of urgency.
On 19 November 1793, he wrote to Sir Gilbert Elliot:
To say the truth, I am more full of anxiety than I can well express.
The operation of our remedies to the French Pestilence is slow. The
Course has begun late. It is pursued without any true knowledge of
its specifick Nature. It has been tardily applied—whilst the disorder
moves with the pace of a Giant...116
It was a 'meanness of Spirit' in the ministry's conduct of the war which had 'brought
on all our misfortunes and rendered all our resources fruitless.' His own extravagance
of spirit would have thought 'our last penny well given and our last drop of blood
well shed' for the sake of seeing Jacobinism destroyed, and so ardent was his zeal for
this that it was almost beyond his comprehension that the ministry could engage in the
conflict in any other way.117 Defensiveness, he pleaded, was not sufficient to keep
the Jacobins at bay because the attack was not only external, but came also via internal
corruption ('a sort of dry rot').118 No physical defence could shield a country from
the effects of the example of French subversion. The ministry's Aliens Bill, for
instance, was patently inadequate against Jacobinism. It might keep suspected
foreigners out of Britain, but there was nothing to stop British subjects travelling to
France, becoming infected with republican corruption, and returning to spread the
disease even more effectively than French visitors could, whose speech betrayed
them.119 Burke also roundly criticized the policy of recruiting large numbers of men
for home service only. This was much easier than recruiting for foreign service, and
accorded with the administration's defensiveness in the middle years of the decade as
Britain became increasingly isolated in the struggle against France. To Burke,
however, the policy of keeping so many of the armed forces inert at home drained
them of their glory and, more importantly, was based on a wholly erroneous
conception of how to defend the country effectively. In his view, it seemed to be a
plain statement of abandoning the war and maintaining only passive defences. 'I
suppose it is the first time,' he wrote to Fitzwilliam in December 1796, 'that an army
115 First 'Letter on a Regicide Peace', p. 195; Burke to Richard Burke, jr., 17 October 1792, Burke
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of near 100, 000 men (no fewer are here and in Ireland, under various denominations
of old and new Militia and fencibles) who are under an absolute legal disability of
being employed against the Enemy except in one case only and that absolutely in his
Choice. This is sad work.'120 A defensive alliance with the other European states was
more foolish still, since in this their discordant interests were far more difficult to deal
with than in a common offensive, which provided a focus. 'Mercy and Breteuil are at
the Head of this Hopeful Scheme,' he told his son in October 1792. 'We add our
nothing to their inanity. They propose, that all Europe shall form a Cordon to hedge in
the Cuckoo. They are to form a defensive Alliance to hinder the propagation of French
principles!'121 In war, Burke argued, 'something must be risqued—and perhaps all
our present dangers have arisen not from want of precautions, but from having used
too many of them...'.122
He also complained that advantage was not taken of allied victories, such as
the capture of Toulon, as it should have been, due to the lack of British and allied
conviction about the nature and aim of the war.
...it is not from our defeats, that my hopes are damped, but from our
Successes. If we had been only beaten, better conduct and greater
force, with our share of the Chances, might set us right again. But I
see nothing, which all the Successes we have had, and much greater
than I dare to look for, can do towards bringing things to the
conclusion we wish, as long as the plan we have pursued and still
pursue, is perseverd in.123
It was an extremely inefficient way to wage war. 'The greatest skill conducting the
greatest military apparatus has been employed; but it has been worse than uselessly
employed, through the false policy of the war.' He criticized the fact that the King of
Prussia's subsidy was nearly three times as large as the Emperor's loan, yet Austria
was contributing far more to the allied campaign—another inefficient use of resources.
He was impatient, too, with military errors. Brunswick's defeat in September 1792
could not be attributed to sickness and the weather alone—'there is a great deal of
superfluous humiliation in this business, a perfect prodigality of disgrace.'124
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To fight wholeheartedly, of course, meant not just the elimination of
inefficiency and hesitancy, but also to act with pride and determination, the pride and
determination of the British people throughout their history. 'To a people who have
once been proud and great, and great because they were proud,' Burke warned, 'a
change in the national spirit is the most terrible of all revolutions.' In his first Letter on
a Regicide Peace (1796), Burke referred to the writings of John Brown, whose
Estimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times (1757-58) had expressed his
concern that the national character had become preponderantly frivolous and
effeminate, partly due to a sense of inferiority beside the French. Burke feared that the
present government's lack of resolution might subdue the national spirit once more.
He acknowledged the enormity of the struggle, but forbade any return to a spirit of
inferiority:
To us it is a Colossus which bestrides our channel. It has one foot
on a foreign shore, the other upon the British soil. Thus advantaged,
if it can at all exist, it must finally prevail. Nothing can so completely
ruin any of the old governments, ours in particular, as the
acknowledgement, directly, or by implication, of any kind of
superiority in this new power.125
As battle must be taken to the French wholeheartedly, so, secondly, it must be
done with unity. There must be unity among the allied nations and unity within Britain
itself. In the Heads for Consideration on the Present State of Affairs (November
1792), Burke urged the British ministry to placate, conciliate, support, encourage and
stir up the other European states so that one great confederacy might be formed against
France, and he continued to insist that, just as the rest of Europe was ineffective
against revolutionary France without Britain's cooperation and leadership, so neither
could Britain 'pretend to cope with France but as connected with the body of
Christendom.' In this, Burke included the papacy and the papal states, and he wanted
Britain to put bigotry aside and make use of another potential ally.126 He did
acknowledge the failings of the other states as allies against the Jacobins, and often
denounced their conduct of the war in scathing terms—but this, he insisted, did not
excuse Britain from making every possible effort to hold the confederacy together.127
So far as Britain itself was concerned, Burke did his best to elicit an integrated
and total war effort of unity and full cooperation from the political nation, that its
whole weight might be thrown against Jacobin France. He called for unity within the
125 First 'Letter on a Regicide Peace', pp.188, 192,200.
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royal family (that is, between George III and his profligate son, the Prince of Wales),
between the ministry and opposition in Parliament (so long as it was a union in favour
of a full-blooded war on Jacobinism, with no compromise on the part of the
ministry), and between Protestants and Roman Catholics in Ireland. He also worked
hard for the coalition of the Portland Whigs with the ministry which was eventually
achieved in 1794.
Against this Grand and dreadful Evil of our time (I do not love to
cheat myself or others) I do not know any solid Security
whatsoever: But I am quite certain, that what will come nearest to it,
is to interest as many as you can in the present order of things,
religiously, civilly, politically—by all the ties and principles by
which mankind are held. This is like to be effectual policy.128
It was necessary to oppose a systematic support for the government to the French
system of anarchy; not 'a layer of support and a layer of opposition', but full and
deliberate support.129
Burke saw the religious unity of the country as holding particular importance.
He accorded priority of status to the established Church of England as the historical
expression of the national unity of beliefs and values, and of the present corporate
worship of the commonwealth, including both governors and governed.
Nevertheless, he also valued its breadth and suitability for moderation between the
various other 'sects', something he saw as a national preference because the
established Church had evolved in such a way as to favour toleration.130 In the war
against revolutionary France, religious unity was more important than ever, since he
regarded it as fundamentally a war for the existence of religion, which was the basis
of European civilization. A civil war amongst the enemies of Jacobinism would do
their cause no good. All the denominations of European religion shared a common
foundation, he argued, and they must all be supported, 'or they must all fall in the
crash of a common Ruin.'131 He was especially bitter about the oppression of Roman
Catholics in Ireland. 'Instead of preparing to resist the French,' he told French
128 Quotation from Burke to William Smith, 29 January 1795, Burke Corr., vii, 298; Burke to
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Laurence, 'they are making war with all might upon Popery...'.132 This sense of
injustice and frustration grew until he saw in all the failures of the British
administration to conduct the war in a manner satisfactory to him, a scheme against
Catholicism on an international scale, a 'Western Crusade against Popery'.133
Thirdly, the political leadership of Britain in the crusade against Jacobin
France was of great concern to Burke. 'We must have leaders,' he wrote in the first
Letter on a Regicide Peace. 'If none will undertake to lead us right, we shall find
guides who will contrive to conduct us to shame and ruin.'134 While recognizing that
they ' meant well' and were not inactive, and indeed that they formed ' by far the most
honest and by far the wisest system of administration in Europe', so that 'their fall
would be no trivial calamity',135 Burke nevertheless became increasingly disillusioned
with Pitt and his cabinet in their conduct of the war. He compared the likely effects of
a ministry headed by Fox to those of the Pitt administration in his Observations on the
Conduct of the Minority (1793) and concluded that, even in a worst case scenario, Pitt
was at least the lesser of two evils. ' Mr. Pitt may be the worst of men, and Mr. Fox
may be the best; but, at present, the former is in the interests of his country, and of the
order of things long established in Europe: Mr. Fox is not.' By November 1796,
however, he was telling Lord Fitzwilliam that 'Mr. Pitt, except for the direct Objects
of his own power, is not a bold Politician. Even for them I do not think that Great
Courage is his Character'; and three months later he wrote to French Laurence that
there was little to choose between him and Fox.
I call them Sophisters and declaimers because they have melted
down all the faculties that God has given them into those characters;
and in proportion to their perfection in those they sink in every other
respect. Neither of them have even the shadow of a statesman.136
Burke's complaint was that Pitt did not declare for the anti-Jacobin cause sufficiently
distinctly, nor did he pour everything into upholding the European allies and the
French princes and their supporters. His theory of the war was as inspiring, as J.
Holland Rose pointed out, as the practice of it was impossible for ministers
contending with the disabilities of self-interested and short-sighted European allies and
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bitterly divided French royalists.137 It was easy to criticize, as a spectator; in his
passionate zeal for his cause, Burke seemed not to understand the exigencies of
Cabinet office.
Finally, Burke was convinced of the importance of public opinion and of the
need for the government to use it and control it. In 1770 he had argued that the
confidence of the people was 'the great and only foundation of government.' He
believed that the minds of the people (that is, he made clear, the minds of the
economically independent and therefore politically significant people) were as much a
national resource as men, money and ships, and a resource whose significance was
entirely unappreciated by the government.138 He was persuaded of the relationship
between ideas and political activities, and he realized that this was what made the
French Revolution dangerous. It was therefore essential that the government should
make the effort to woo and hold the loyalty of public opinion for the safety of the
social order. An enthusiasm for the war must be raised in the nation to counter the
Jacobin fanaticism and to bear the country through the hardships of a long struggle.
He saw that it was not enough for the government simply to expect a loyal and
patriotic spirit to arise from the mere fact of being at war with France; this was
naturally produced in the first few months of the war and, thanks to the quality of the
British national spirit, continued to exert its force for much longer than was deserved
by the government, which neglected it shamefully:
My clear opinion is, that if you excite a spirit in the people, which,
in part at least, is ever the effect of art and management, it will carry
you through every thing. If you do not, you will sink under the very
weight of your own work. You, and the people you neglect, will
together have the lot of those who will choose to go to sleep on the
edge of Dover cliff.139
' I am sure that so far from endeavouring to excite this spirit, nothing has been omitted
to flatten and lower it,' he lamented to Mrs. Crewe.140
When Burke wrote about how Britain ought to fight the war against France, he
urged the use of new means of fighting for the sake of saving the old order of Europe.
'New wine' could not be dealt with in the 'old Leathern Bottles'.141 His cry for a
'manly' leadership and his exhortations to the general political public of Britain for
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wholeheartedness and unity of spirit were alike pleas for a national conviction and
fervour which would subordinate everything to the supreme end of extinguishing
Jacobin principles from Europe. He involved the public in his struggle against the
French Revolution for the sake of its brute force; he realized, as Cobban pointed out,
that such a movement as Jacobinism had primarily to be fought on the ground of
opinion.142 In this sense he was calling for the force of nationality to be exerted in a
total war against the French revolutionaries.
V
Edmund Burke was in many ways a most humane man. 'The blood of man,' he
wrote, 'should never be shed but to redeem the blood of man. It is well shed for our
family, for our friends, for our God, for our country, for our kind. The rest is vanity;
the rest is crime.'143 He was not a war-monger, and he would not have advocated war
against France had he not believed it to be absolutely necessary and a lesser evil than
allowing the French Revolution to establish itself in Europe. He had no patience,
therefore, with any suggestion of peace with France before Jacobinism had been
utterly destroyed and the monarchy restored. His four Letters on a Regicide Peace
were written and published in the years 1795-7 because of the attraction that
negotiations with France held for the British administration during those difficult
years. Much of his private correspondence was also taken up by the same concern. He
argued against peace with Jacobin France on principle, on the basis of the
consequences he predicted from it, and from various other pragmatic considerations.
First, Burke believed that Britain ought not to make peace with revolutionary
France on principle, since the original grounds for war had not been removed.
Jacobinism remained and any termination of the war at this point would merely
achieve' a Sansculottick peace'— it would be to abandon mankind to the mercy of the
revolutionaries.'Our moral world will be wasted by this peace,' he told Windham in
January 1796. It was a 'sedative remedy', cowardly and superficial.144
The point which the ministry and the majority of the political nation seemed
infuriatingly unable to grasp was that Britain was not dealing with any ordinary
power, and therefore the ordinary conventions of war and peace were irrelevant and
ineffective. To suppose that a stable government in France would guarantee a stable
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peace was to betray a complete misunderstanding of the French Revolution, based on
the fallacy that France's hostility to other nations proceeded from its own internal
anarchy, which its rulers were not strong enough to master. France was not an
anarchy, although it was certainly anarchic; it was a despotism of the worst kind—'a
series of short-lived tyrannies'. Burke argued that the Revolution was neither made
nor sustained by the people, but was the work of a revolutionary 'cabal', and since the
war was not the result of popular tumult, it followed that the arrival of relative
domestic stablility and order would not necessarily produce peace with the other
nations.145
It was vital that the Revolution itself be crushed and wiped out before peace
was made with France, because until that was accomplished, there could be no peace
in any meaningful sense of the term. 'If 1 am right in my ideas of this new republic,'
he wrote, 'the different states of peace and war will make no difference in her
pursuits....Enmity to us and to all civilized nations is wrought into the very stamina of
its constitution.' In peace, France would merely pursue through intrigue and
proselytism what now she pursued with the sword, while Britain and the allies would
have no effectual means of resistance. The allies were complacently waging war under
an error of grotesque proportions, namely, that they could end it whenever they
chose, simply by deciding to forget French crimes. Rather, 'we are at war with a
system, which, by its essence, is inimical to all other governments, and which makes
peace or war, as peace and war may best contribute to their subversion.' A peace with
revolutionary France would have' a thousand barking monsters of a thousand wars in
its womb,' he told French Laurence. The worst thing Britain could do would be to
acknowledge the superiority of the revolutionary power, whether directly or
implicitly, by soliciting peace or yielding to its terms.146
Moreover, while any retreat was dishonouring to Britain—he called the
withdrawal of the Navy from the Mediterranean in autumn 1796 'the most disgraceful
Event, and possibly the most fatal that has ever occurrd in our History'— France had
declared war, and her obstinate arrogance must not be met with importunate British
self-abasement in seeking peace. Every fresh attempt to establish negotiations after the
French rejection of Britain's first approach in 1796 could only be motivated by a
masochistic desire to be mortified, so far as Burke could see, since there was no
reason to believe that there had been any change in French policy. Equally shamefully,
Britain's pursuit of peace with France ('such an improvident and stupid selfishness')
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would betray the allies. His third Letter on a Regicide Peace'{\191) discussed and
condemned the official pledge given by the British government 'in the face of all
Europe' of good faith towards France, and readiness to negotiate whenever France
was willing. No European power had demanded that Britain go through such 'judicial
purgations and ordeals'—no European power was remotely interested in British good
faith towards France. What they desperately wanted and needed was assurances of
British fidelity to the alliance against France. 'No man,' Burke wrote to Pitt, 'can
more cordially pray for your bringing this arduous contest to an happy and honourable
termination than I do,' but the necessary prerequisite for that termination was the total
extirpation of Jacobinism.147
Burke also argued against peace on the basis of the consequences he predicted
from it. He complained that those who cried out for it did not realize what it was that
they were demanding. ' God send that by one step apparently dictated by precaution
you may not do...the rashest thing in the world and in a peace (a terrible misnomer)
find infinitely more perils than even in a disastrous War...' he wrote to Dundas. His
prognosis was indeed gloomy. Britain's very eagerness to make peace would cost it
dearly, he forecast. If the revolutionaries noticed this anxiety, they would exploit it
mercilessly and make Britain pay heavily for peace. 'Nothing can quell the manliness,
or fatigue the perseverance of our determined poltroonery. We have a sort of
eagerness for disgrace, a sort of alacrity in sinking,' he mourned.148
To make peace was ultimately to cooperate with the French plan for universal
revolution. Not only would it remove physical resistance to the French, but it would
also open the British door to the Revolution. The French government, Burke warned,
' has thought proper to invite ours to lay by its unjust hatred, and to listen to the voice
of humanity as taught by their example.' He had received a letter of Windham's, he
told his friend, when he had been 'half the Channel over in Mr. Erskines Pamphlet'
(that is, Thomas Erskine's newly-published and highly successful View of the Causes
and Consequences of the Present War with France which argued for a speedy peace).
If the British government yielded to the enemy abroad, it could not hope to subdue
conspirators at home. Lord Auckland had argued in his pamphlet, Remarks on the
Apparent Circumstances of the War in the Fourth Week ofOctober, 1795, that peace
was quite safe: Britain could be cured by French diseases, in that the distempers of the
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French constitution must have taught the British people a healthy respect for and pride
in their own constitution. Not so, retorted Burke in his fourth Letter on a Regicide
Peace, noting the riots and the attempt on the King's life which had taken place the
week after the publication of Auckland's pamphlet and, indeed, the mass meeting held
on 26 October 1795, which, he claimed, had declared against the life of George III.
Peace could only weaken Britain and the allies internally to the advantage of
France.149
Besides contending against peace on the principle that the grounds for war
remained intact and on the basis of what seemed to him its inevitable consequences,
Burke's polemical battery supplied various other arguments. The very insults returned
by the French to British overtures, for instance, were cause enough for British pride
to determine to stop at nothing to crush such insolence. In the first Letter on a
Regicide Peace, Burke enumerated four stages of British approaches and their
rejection by France: Bird's mission to solicit mercy for the Due de Choiseul in 1795;
the speech from the British throne and the direct message from the Crown and the two
Houses of Parliament offering to negotiate for peace at the end of the same year;
William Wickham's mission to Basle in March 1796 to sound out French willingness
to hold talks; and the shameful attempts (to Burke's mind) to achieve the mediation of
the King of Prussia and the Danish minister at Paris later in that year. All had been
rejected by the French on the grounds of British insincerity and bad faith; a cover,
Burke believed, for the fact that the French despised the idea of a congress rather than
their own dictation of the terms of peace. Later, he depicted Lord Malmesbury's return
to Britain after his failed mission to establish negotiations as the return of a
'Mongrel...whipped back to the Kennel yelping and with his Tail between his Legs.'
The apparent placidity of the ministry in response to this barrage of insults was
incomprehensible to Burke.150
The enforced union of Spain with France in 1795 was another strong reason
against seeking peace. Spain's cession of its part of San Domingo to France
completely upset the balance of power in the West Indies ('and indeed everywhere
else', he added morosely), and effectively gave France access to all the Spanish
colonies. It was, however, the complete union of France and Spain which such a
transaction indicated that Burke found 'truly alarming', for it starkly demonstrated the
progress of the Jacobin empire. 'Here we have, formed, a new, unlooked-for,
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monstrous, heterogeneous alliance; a double-natured monster; republic above, and
monarchy below.'151
Characteristically, Burke often used arguments from the history of British
foreign policy to counter the demand for peace with France. Frugality and pacificity
were not necessarily guarantees of British liberty, he admonished Auckland; that
liberty had often been defended best by warlike and prodigal princes. He dreamed of a
British army comparable with 'the least of those by which, in former times, we so
gloriously asserted our place as protectors...at the head of the great commonwealth of
Europe.' Indeed, for the first time since 'the days of our Edwards and Henrys',
British allies were in the heartland of France itself—yet Britain was talking of peace.
Things had also been different in the days of Louis XIV: then, England had
'considered herself as embodied with Europe' and that 'nothing in foreign affairs was
foreign to her'.152
It was perilous to assume, as the ministry seemed to do, that the failure of
negotiations would stir up British patriotism. 'A long habit of humiliation does not
seem a very good preparative to manly and vigorous sentiment.' It was a gamble not
worth the risk, for it missed the point that neither Parliament nor the great majority of
the British people, as Burke claimed, had any desire for peace with revolutionary
France. It would therefore have quite the opposite effect, that of dampening their
ardour in the cause, by dispiriting and humiliating them. Burke insisted that there had
been no call for peace until autumn 1795, when Auckland's pamphlet, the speech
from the throne and various reports in the newspapers had drawn attention to it as a
possibility. He clung to the hope that at least the British people must see things
clearly, even though their government appeared to have taken leave of its senses. This
was
a war which the people consider, not as a war made on the
suggestion of ministers, and to answer the purposes of the ambition
or pride of statesmen, but as a war of their own, and in defence of
that very property which they expend for its support; a war for that
order of things, from which everything valuable that they possess is
derived, and in which order alone it can possibly be maintained.153
Moreover, even if the people had wanted peace, that was still not a sufficient reason
for seeking it. He told Windham that, when the Norwich Petition was brought up to
the House of Commons in February 1795, asking for steps to be taken to achieve a
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swift peace, it was his opinion that the House ought to make it quite clear that no
petition of that nature had any hope of success, by delivering a resolution on the
necessity of pursuing the war with determination and vigour until liberty and stability
were secured once more to Europe by the destruction of the Jacobin regime in France.
To yield to the people on this point would have been to revert to the very democracy
which the British constitution was formed to avoid and which the supporters of the
French Revolution seemed bent on promoting.154
Burke brushed aside with contempt the various objections to the continuance
of the war. Scarcity of grain and lack of resources were no reasons for peace; such
notions, he wrote, were hardly worth his 'powder and shot'. Burke insisted that
Britain had never been so powerful and wealthy as it now was—'full even to
plethory'. The public loan of autumn 1796 of £18 million ought to have been a
sufficient demonstration both of the nation's ability to defend the European balance of
power and of the vitality of its 'ancient spirit'. So overwhelming was the evidence of
Britain's prosperity that he could only conclude that, of those who predicted economic
gloom for Britain, 'I fear too many are actuated by a more malignant and dangerous
spirit. They hope, by depressing our minds with a despair of our means and resouces,
to drive us, trembling and unresisting, into the toils of our enemies, with whom, from
the beginning of the Revolution in France, they have ever moved in strict concert and
co-operation.'155 Just as in the beginning of the war French force had been too much
despised, so now it was too much dreaded. Britain was giving up far too easily, and
making the task simple for the French revolutionaries. By displaying a willingness to
negotiate whenever France should deign to do so, Britain was allowing its enemy to
choose the moment of its own optimum advantage.
He accused ministry and opposition alike of being swayed by party
factionalism in the urgent question of war and peace: 'I do not in the least wonder, that
you were so soon, and so compleatly sick of London,' he informed Fitzwilliam in
January 1797. 'The emulation between parties, which of them should bid highest for
the destruction of their Country, and who should be the most forward in betraying it,
is a spectacle never before presented in any publick Council.' 'This cursed Peace is at
the bottom of all the mad things done by Ministry and opposition,' he had grumbled to
another correspondent a few weeks earlier. 'I see nothing short of insanity. Pitt and
Fox are not contending for the Government of an independent Country, but who
should be the Viceroys deputy under a French Lord Paramount.' He feared that Pitt
154 Burke to Windham, [circa 2 February 1795], Burke Corr., viii, 134; First 'Letter on a Regicide
Peace', p.260.
155 'Thoughts and Details on Scarcity' (1795), Writings and Speeches, ix, 142-3; Third 'Letter on a
Regicide Peace', pp.346,350-386,371.
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would rather be defeated on the Rhine or the Po ' than suffer a Badgerring every day in
the House of Commons,' and might be harried into peace by the opposition.156
Peace with revolutionary France would for Burke have been the worst result
possible, and he urged that it ought not to be debated at all; but he was to struggle to
the end of his days with what appeared to him to be a willing blindness to the
unspeakable dangers that such a peace would involve.'In every other posture of things
there are at least chances,' he wrote; but a 'Jacobin peace' would lead to the
irrevocable ruin of Britain.157
VI
Burke, if by no means the sole advocate of a crusading, total war against Jacobin
France, clearly had particularly strong and systematic views, and he was certainly the
earliest to urge such a vision on the country. His perception of the French Revolution
as an immensely significant ideological event was unusually profound, and this was
often recognized, even if most did not feel able to endorse his opinions and
conclusions entirely. Men of such diverse views as the Duke of Portland (who
eventually joined the government and took a seat in the cabinet in 1794) and James
Mackintosh (whose Vindiciae Gallicae [1791] and anonymous Monthly Review
articles on the first Two Letters on a Regicide Peace [1796] had been arguments
against Burke's position) wrote of their early admiration for his publications and the
strength of his convictions.158 'I do not stand in need of any apology for my
principles, my sentiments, or my conduct,' Burke himself wrote in the 'Letter to the
Duke of Portland' which prefaced his Observations on the Conduct of the Minority
(1793), and he continued to be completely unrepentant of his stance on the war amidst
the varying hardships and difficulties that Britain faced in the 1790s.159 As far as he
could, he practised what he preached, showing particular concern for the emigres in
Britain—he found many of them accommodation, loans, commissions and
employment; he extended his own friendship to some, and even seems to have settled
some on his own land in Canada; he helped to establish and campaign for the Fund for
the Relief of the Suffering Clergy of France; and he set up the school at Penn to house
156 Burke to French Laurence, 16 December 1796, Burke Corr., ix, 179.
157 Burke to John Wilmot, 12 February 1795, Burke Corr.,\ii, 148; Burke to Windham, 25
December 1796, Burke Corr., ix, 205.
158 Sir Gilbert Elliot to his wife, [spring 1792], Burke Corr., vii, 121-2; the Duke of Portland to
Burke, 10 October 1793, Burke Corr., vii, 447; James Mackintosh to Burke, 22 December 1796,
Burke Corr., ix, 193.
159 'Observations on the Conduct of the Minority', p.405; see also 'letter to William Elliot, Esq.',
p.39.
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and educate sixty boys whose parents had fled to Britain. Conor Cruise O'Brien
points out that his lack of fuss when his ally, Fitzwilliam, was recalled from the
viceroyalty of Ireland in March 1795 shows how important to Burke even in his
personal life and attitudes was the need to subordinate all to the destruction of
Jacobinism.160
Burke's views on the French Revolution and war were deeply grounded in a
coherent world-view which was in turn a product of his reverence for the established
social order and for established religion. 'I have, for one, been born in this order of
things, and would fain die in it,'161 he concluded in his Observations on the Conduct
of the Minority, and his panegyrics on the property-based, hierarchical social order of
Europe are among the most well-known passages of his works. 'Order', indeed, was
to him an integral part of society, essential to the protection of men's rights to their
lives, liberties and property, and he could not envisage society being ' ordered' in any
other system. Democracy would be a grotesque hybrid of tyranny and anarchy,
inevitably attended by such turmoil, violence and cruelty as the French experienced in
the 1790s. Burke's undoubted personal attachment to Christianity was largely a
respect for the necessity of the established Church in the upkeep of social order,
softened by a clear affection for the rituals and services performed by the Church, and
it is difficult to explore fully Burke's drive to see Jacobinism crushed without gaining
an impression of some degree of religious awareness and even motivation beyond a
political and intellectual need for transcendant moral sanctions.
The intensity of Burke's writing on the Revolution and the war was a result of
the fact that his views were not merely part of his public,' professional' persona, but a
heavy and deeply felt personal burden. As he wrote to Fitzwilliam in 1792, 'To say
that I was somewhat uneasy would but ill paint the State of my Mind.' Elsewhere, he
wrote of 'a heavy weight upon my mind', 'a good deal of serious inquietude', his
dread, dejection, terror, and 'absolute despair'.162 His last years sorely blighted by
the death of his son, his failure to secure the impeachment of Warren Hastings, his
large debts and his failing health, Burke often seemed to identify his own troubles
with the European calamity, part and parcel of the apocalyptic evil of the times.
In 1795, he wrote to a correspondent that he himself had assumed that with his
retiral from Parliament in the previous year his involvement with public issues would
fade; but, as he admitted, 'I reckond wrong. I find it is not easy for a man who has
160 Lucas, 'Edmund Burke and the Emigres', pp. 110-2; O'Brien, The Great Melody, pp.516-7.
161 Writings and Speeches, viii, 452.
162 Burke to Fitzwilliam, 29 November 1792, Burke Corr., vii, 309; 'Heads for Consideration',
p.402; 'Observations on the Conduct of the Minority', p.404; Burke to Grenville, 18 August 1792,
Burke Corr., vii, 178; Burke to unknown, [1795], Burke Corr., viii, 363.
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deeply interested himself in the affairs of the world totally to extinguish all the
Sentiments and all the emotions they have produced.' This suggested to him that his
strong feelings were in the nature of a divine calling:
These very emotions may be Notices of our Duty. A reviving
Sympathy with the State of the Country may possibly be a call to
serve it. If the Creator never can be absent from the minutest as no
more than from the greatest of his Works...if the whole scale of
Nature is subservient to a moral End, then it is most sure that as no
sparrow falls to the Ground without a purpose so no being is
preserved in its vital Energies but for some purpose too.163
In large part, probably, his prolific publication and persistent nagging of
ministers were simply part of his large personality—his powers of rhetoric, his
concern to be involved, his clear affection for his country and desire to serve it, his
sense of his own superior abilities.164 He also felt the urgency of his own advancing
years and increasing physical weakness pressing him to speak out. 'I am come to a
time of Life,' he wrote to Fitzwilliam in 1793, 'in which it is not permitted that we
should triffle with our Existence...The moral State of Mankind fills me with dismay
and horrour. The Abyss of Hell itself seems to yawn before me. I must act, think, and
feel according to the exigencies of this tremendous season.' Here he was primarily
referring to his inability to give up his parliamentary seat yet because of the Hastings
trial which did not end until June 1794. But the sense of impending doom and his
consciousness of his duty to act for the good of his country and even mankind were
more general than his thoughts about the trial.165 Burke spoke often in fatalistic
terms—'It seems decided, that some great Change is to take place in the whole of
human affairs,' he wrote in 1795—and perhaps could not adequately convey this
sense of doom in any other than religious terms.
Perhaps a sense of vocation was Burke's way of reconciling his own activism
and fatalism, for certainly his appreciation of the enormity of the international situation
gave him a keen awareness of his own impotence to affect events. He often insisted
that he was 'heartily sick of Politicks',166 and that his next effort to convince
163 Burke to unknown, [1795], Burke Corr., viii, 364.
164 After his death in 1797, Fanny Burney wrote of him, 'Though free from all little vanity, high
above envy, and glowing with zeal to exalt talents and merit in others he had, I believe, a
consciousness of his own greatness, that shut out those occasional and useful self-doubts which keep
our judgement in order, by calling our motives and passions to account' (quoted in Isaac Kramnick,
ed., Edmund Burke [Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1974], p.95). See also Writings and Speeches, ix,
2.
165 Burke to Fitzwilliam, 29 November 1793, Burke Corr., vii, 496. Gerald Chapman wrote of
Burke being able to hear 'the adumbral tattoo of Napoleonic drums' (Chapman, The Practical
Imagination ofEdmund Burke, p.227).
166 Burke to Loughborough, 12 January 1794, Burke Corr., vii, 518.
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ministers, or the public in general, would be his last, and he complained increasingly
about the onset of old age.167 'I am past and gone by; and not being able to play the
game, sit cross-legged for the support of those who are,' he wrote in 1793. 'Nature
has put me aside.' If even Windham, young and liberally endowed with virtues and
talents, could do nothing to convince the public of the full horror of the evil of
Jacobinism, he expostulated to his friend, 'what can be done, by the expiring snuff of
my farthing Candle?'168 He was also sharply aware of the limitations of his position
as a backbench MP and later as a retired man, firmly entrenched in the home front. He
often felt as though he was in combat single-handed, and told French Laurence, 'I am
afraid I have been guilty of a great folly, in extreme age, infirmity, and debility, in the
jaws almost of death, to encounter the whole power of the world both at home and
abroad.'169
Nevertheless, he continued to long and to work for 'a war on my ideas and my
principles.' He rejoiced whenever official policy seemed at last to be consistent with
his views—to Burke, the naval battle won by Lord Howe in 1794 on the 'Glorious
First of June' was a shaft of 'Joy which shoots across the gloom'.170 In particular,
Burke dreamed of a man of integrity, courage, determination and wisdom to lead
Britain in a crusade against the French Revolution. 'How often has public calamity
been arrested on the very brink of ruin by the seasonable energy of a single man!' he
exclaimed again and again. 'But when and where and how is this man to appear.'171
Pitt was a sore disappointment to him—cautious, and bearing the ultimate
responsibility without Burke's luxury of being able to look on and criticize, he was
hardly the epic hero standing forth unambiguously against the principles and
stratagems of Jacobinism. Burke urged such allies in active politics as Windham and
Earl Fitzwilliam to take the moral leadership of the country upon themselves, and
surely part of his frustration with his age, failing health and lack of real influence on
political events was that he could not take on such a role himself. In 1791 he had
167 See, for example, his letters to the Chevalier de la Bintinaye, March 1791, Burke Corr., vi, 243;
to Richard Burke, jr., 1 September 1791, Burke Corr., vi, 358, and circa 1 November 1791, Burke
Corr., vi, 440; to the King of Poland, 28 February 1792, Burke Corr., vii, 78; and the conclusion to
his 'Thoughts on French Affairs', p.386; P.H., xxviii, 362, 1029, 9 February 1790, 17 December
1790.
168 Burke to Sir Gilbert Elliot, [16 September 1793], Corr., vii, 429; Burke to Windham, 1 August
1796, Corr., ix, 64; see also his letter to the Chevalier and Abbe de la Bintinaye, 27 January 1792,
Corr., vii, 42-3.
109 Burke to French Laurence, 10 October 1796, Corr., ix, 94; see also P.H., xxix, 417-8, 11 May
1791.
170 'Letter to a Noble Lord', p.187; Burke toWindham, 10 June 1794, Corr., vii, 549.
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written to the Under-Secretary of State, James Bland Burges, on the news of the
recapture of the French royal family, that his own concern at the news,
must be a very barren concern. But if he [Burke] were otherwise
situated, he would think himself obliged practically to interfere with
discretion but firmness in a Cause which is that of all the sovereigns
of Europe, our amongst the rest, as well as of all honest men who
wish to preserve their country upon a solid and permanent basis.172
Burke probably had more influence on British attitudes to the French revolutionary
wars than he often admitted. He was frequently accused of indirectly causing the
war,173 and certainly in large part he set the framework and polarization of the debate
in Britain by the breadth and vehemence of his arguments, becoming almost a stock-
figure whose name became the subject both of eulogy and abuse. Most of the political
nation was, whether conscious of it or not, responding in some degree to his views.
The Reflections was a great bestseller174 and several editions of extracts from it were
published, as well as selections in periodicals and newspapers; and arguably his
greatest impact was made by the many loyalist associations spread throughout the
country, headed by men who were themselves sympathetic to a Burkean, crusading
view of the war and who disseminated it in a crude and simplistic form to the masses
of ordinary people who came under their influence.
Nevertheless, for all his insistence that the British people must be
wholeheartedly behind the war effort, Burke's influence was weakest where he most
wanted it to be felt. He was in close contact with ministers at the beginning of the
war,175 and they treated him with patience and a good deal of civility. But he could
'distinguish between complaisance and confidence', and he knew that his practical
172 Burke to Windham, 30 March 1797, Corr., ix, 300-1; Burke to Fitzwilliam, 2 September 1796,
Burke Corr., ix, 79; Burke to Sir James Bland Burges, 26 June 1791, Burke Corr., vi, 278.
173 See, for instance, Sir Brooke Boothby, Observations on the Appeal from the New to the Old
Whigs, and on Mr. Paine's Rights ofMan (London, 1792), p.80; William Fox, The Interest ofGreat
Britain respecting the French War (2nd edn., London, 1793), p.6; Considerations on the French
War...by a British Merchant (London, 1794), p.8; The Evidence Summed Up or a Statement of the
Apparent Causes and Objects of the War (London, 1794), p.27; John Raithby, 'Peace' (London,
1795); also Writings and Speeches, ix, 14-15. He once confessed to feeling this responsibility
himself: 'To say the Truth, I feel very awkward. I am as responsible, as a Minister, for the War, and
yet in no one instance have I...been consulted or communicated with.' (Burke to Dr. Charles Burney,
14, 15 September 1793, Burke Corr., vii, 423).
174 Within a month of publication, 12 000 copies had been sold in Britain and editions had also been
published in Paris and Dublin; the book went through five editions between its publication on 1
November 1790 and the end of December. 19 000 copies had been sold in Britain by the end of May
1791 (Writings and Speeches, viii, 13). The first Two Letters on a Regicide Peace (1796) went
through eleven editions between 20 October 1796 and the end of the same year (Writings and
Speeches, ix, 22).
173 Burke Corr., vii, 348-9, n.; O'Brien, The Great Melody, pp. 490,495-6.
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influence on them was 'not very considerable'.176 He had a group of followers and
admirers whose projects and activities against revolutionary France were, as Colin
Lucas has remarked, no more than 'private initiatives occasionally elevated by an
appointment to an official post', notably Windham's job of dealing with the emigres in
Britain while he was Secretary ofWar (1794-6).177
Sir Gilbert Elliot, one of his more pragmatic admirers, wrote in 1793 that 'Pitt
says of him that he is always right, but that it is six months before other people.
Possibly this is as bad for practical purposes as being six months too late.' By 1795,
Pitt was more irritable—he returned to Auckland a letter of Burke's on government
war strategy with the remark that it was 'like other rhapsodies from the same pen, in
which there is much to admire, and nothing to agree with.'178 It was not to be until
the wars against Napoleon Bonaparte in the 1800s that Burke's crusading ideas would
be seen by ministers as anything other than visionary ' rhapsodies' —which, ironically,
was the very criticism he had levelled at the principles of the revolutionaries and
radicals. For his part, Burke had declared in December 1792 that 'he was determined
to wage eternal war with such abominable principles', and certainly his was a war to
the death in every way against the French Revolution.179
176 Burke to Col. John St. Leger, 23 October 1793, Corr., vii, 459-460.
177 Lucas, 'Edmund Burke and the Emigres', p. 112. See also ch. 3.
178 Burke Corr., viii, 335n.
179 P.H., xxx, 188, 28 December 1792. The Gentleman's Magazine reported that in his last hours
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2. Government Attitudes: The Pitt Administration and George III
The parts played by ideology and practical power politics have been differently
weighed as motivating factors for the British government in the war against France.
It has been argued, for instance, that the administration of William Pitt was
considerably influenced by Burke's analysis of events and that, as Cyril Matheson
put it, 'the struggle of the British Government with revolutionary principles became
merged into the European war.' J. Holland Rose, on the other hand, claimed that 'the
war between France and Great Britain was not, for us at least, mainly a war of
principle. The material issues at stake always outweighed those arising from a clash
of political ideals.' T.C.W. Blanning refined the problem by recognizing that,
although ideological differences create hostility, they do not necessarily lead to war
and that, while opposing ideologies caused misunderstandings and miscalculations
on both sides, Britain and France did not go to war over them. In his view, power
and security were the fundamental concerns. Jeremy Black has recently countered
this by arguing that fear and distrust caused by ideological differences were as
responsible for the outbreak of war as the clash over traditional interests.
Furthermore, whereas Philip Schofield has contended that, for the period 1793-5,
talk of a 'war of principles' was not 'mere gloss', but that after this the conflict
became much more blatantly a matter of the balance of territorial and trading power,
Peter Jupp has shown that Lord Grenville, the Foreign Secretary, became
increasingly sympathetic to a Burkean interpretation of events and ideologically-
motivated strategy from 1795 onwards.1
All of these explanations attempt to reconcile the ideological aspect of the
wars against revolutionary France with the government's role as an active player in
them. Official government policy and the sympathies of individual ministers often
diverged, and both official and private attitudes naturally changed over time as the
nature and scale of the conflict changed and as the prospects of British success
fluctuated. This chapter will consider the views of government ministers and King
George III on the reasons for going to war against revolutionary France, the nature
of the conflict, their objectives, the strategies to be adopted during it, the conditions
necessary for concluding peace and the terms achieved by Britain in its eventual
1 Cyril Matheson, The Life ofHenry Dundas, First Viscount Melville (London, 1933), p.173; Holland
Rose, 'The Struggle with Revolutionary France', p.256; T.C.W. Blanning, The Origins of the French
Revolutionary Wars (London, 1986), p.206; Jeremy Black, 'The Coming ofWar Between Britain and
France, 1792-1793', Francia, 20 (1993), 100-8; idem., British Foreign Policy in an Age of
Revolutions, 1783-1793 (Cambridge, 1994), pp.460-71; Philip Schofield, 'British Politicians and
French Arms: The Ideological War of 1793-1795', History, 77(1992), 183-201; Peter Jupp, Lord
Grenville 1759-1834 (Oxford, 1985), pp. 177, 187.
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settlement in 1802. In doing so, it will argue that, for the British government,
ideological issues and the more pragmatic issues of strategic interests were not so
easily divided as historians have sometimes assumed and that in this lies a key to
understanding its attitudes to the wars against revolutionary France.
I
Strategic issues were undoubtedly crucial in propelling the two nations into armed
conflict. Great Britain and France had been habitual enemies throughout most of the
eighteenth century and, by the time of the outbreak of the Revolution in France, each
once again had reason to harbour resentment against the other. French opportunism
and Schadenfreude over Britain's defeat in the American War of Independence still
rankled in Britain, while the British triumph in the United Provinces in 1787 was
resented in France. British ministers were also concerned about the artificial harbour
under construction at Cherbourg, which was much nearer to Britain than either
Toulon or Brest, and about renewed French interest in India.2 The French
Revolution, however, held little appeal for the British government as a pretext for
war. It appeared initially to ministers to be an imitation of the Glorious Revolution
which as yet acted only to weaken the French state internationally. As William
Grenville remarked, 'The main point appears quite secure, that they will not for
many years be in a situation to molest the invaluable peace which we now enjoy.'3
As late as February 1792 the Prime Minister, William Pitt, was forecasting a long
period of peace: ' unquestionably,' he told the House of Commons,' there never was
a time in the history of this country, when, from the situation of Europe, we might
more reasonably expect fifteen years of peace, than we may at the present moment'.4
It was only when vital British interests were threatened that war loomed.
Pitt's administration tended to be governed in foreign affairs by two main
principles: on the one hand, an inclination towards seclusion from European affairs
and, on the other, a concern to safeguard British security by seeking to maintain
stability in Europe, or 'the balance of power'. The dovetailing or clash of these
usually determined its participation or otherwise in European matters. Public opinion
united with the government's necessary preoccupation with the effects of
international events on Britain in a strong desire for British isolation, an inclination
2 Blanning, The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars, p.49.
3 Grenville to the Marquess of Buckingham, 14 September 1789. Quoted in John Ehrman, The
Younger Pitt: The Reluctant Transition (London, 1983), p.47. Grenville became Foreign Secretary in
April 1791.
4P.H., xxix , 826, Pitt, 17 February 1792.
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only increased by the humiliation of the Ochakov fiasco of 1791. Ministers clung to
neutrality with regard to France, and were anxious to preserve normal relations with
her, until it was clear that this position had become untenable. It was believed that
France was its own worst enemy and that its inner convulsions would weaken it
sufficiently to preclude the need for a declaration of war by Britain.
With respect to British security from direct external threat, the Low
Countries were of paramount importance. The upheavals in the Austrian Netherlands
and the United Provinces concerned the British government far more than did the
Revolution in France. It was held to be necessary that the United Provinces should
be kept susceptible to British influence, in order that they should not be dominated
by France and extend the cross-Channel launching-pad for French aggression
towards Britain. Likewise, Austrian sovereignty in the Belgic provinces was a
standard principle of British policy because of fear of French expansion up the
Channel coast and interference with substantial British trading interests. So
important was this that Pitt stated in 1790 that the prevention of a union of either the
Austrian or the United Provinces with France was 'worth the risk, or even the
certainty of war.'5 That he meant what he said had been demonstrated in 1787, when
Britain had acted decisively in concert with the Dutch Stadtholder to defeat the
republican Dutch patriots and their ally, France. In 1788, Britain's entry to a Triple
Alliance with the United Provinces and Prussia had increased its maritime security
by guaranteeing to it the support of the Dutch navy and a safe entry into Europe for
British goods in war-time.
These principles were therefore established before France declared war on
Britain on 1 February 1793, and they can also be seen in the ministry's attitude to
the war between France and Austria and Prussia in 1792. The British government
remained carefully neutral for over three years after the outbreak of the Revolution,
before tension began to build up dangerously between the two states in the autumn
of 1792. William Grenville, as Foreign Secretary, was anxious not to see an Austrian
war against France because it would mean either a weakening of Austrian garrisons
in the Netherlands, or perhaps even a Dutch concert with Austria, which would
probably entangle Britain in the conflict (as an ally of the United Provinces),
perhaps provoking public protest at home and an increase in the activities of
domestic radicalism.6 Neither the Declaration of Pillnitz in August 1791,
proclaiming Austrian and Prussian neutrality until other powers joined them against
France, nor the eventual outbreak of war, in April 1792 between Austria and France
5 Quoted in Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, p.49.
6 Jupp, Lord Grenville, p. 143.
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and in July between Prussia and France, encouraged Britain to prepare for war,
despite its ministers' increasingly partisan sympathies. It was thought unlikely that
the war would last long: Austria and Prussia would soon defeat France and restore
order in Paris. According to Lord Auckland, the British ambassador at The Hague,
the internal and external pressures on France were sufficient to ensure that it must
' burst like a Bomb' some day without the need for British intervention.7
The Prussian military failure at Valmy in September was alarming, but for
the moment it was only further confirmation of the wisdom of the policy of
neutrality: peace was still the safest option. The French annexation of Savoy
rendered dubious earlier assurances that they were not interested in acquiring foreign
territory, but it was not a direct challenge to British interests or obligations. Lord
Grenville was 'thankful that we had the wit to keep ourselves out of the glorious
enterprize...and that we were not tempted by the hope of sharing the spoils in the
division of France, nor by the prospect of crushing all democratical principles all
over the world.'8 Even after the defeat of the Austrians at Jemappes in November
1792, which led to the conquest of the Austrian Netherlands by France, the British
ministry continued to explore every chance of peace. Auckland met secretly with
General Dumouriez's agents. Charles Long was to have been sent to Paris to
negotiate, but his trip was rendered unnecessary by Pitt's conference with Maret, a
senior official from the French foreign ministry, which seemed promising as late as
2 December 1792.9
Britain entered the war in February 1793 because by then the drama and
implications of the events of the French Revolution were no longer regarded as
belonging safely on the other side of the Channel, as they had been in 1789. The
violence within France, particularly that perpetrated upon the French royal family,
had shocked and galvanized British opinion. It was, however, the external impact of
the Revolution upon British strategic and commercial interests which led the Pitt
administration into war with France. Following the evacuation of the Belgic
provinces by Austrian troops on 14 November 1792, the French government
declared the River Scheldt open to international navigation on 16 November, a step
contrary to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia and several major treaties thereafter,
which had guaranteed it to the Dutch. This step was understood by Britain to reveal
7BL Add. MS 34443 f.2, Auckland to Grenville, 'Most Secret and Confidential', 1 June 1792; ibid.,
34445 f.368, Auckland to Grenville, 'Most Secret and Confidential', 23 Nov. 1792.
8Grenville to Buckingham, 7 Nov. 1792. Quoted in Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, p.205.
9 Harvey Mitchell, The Underground War Against Revolutionary France. The Missions of William
Wickham 1794-1800 (Oxford, 1965), p.28; Black, 'The Coming ofWar Between Britain and France',
p.71.
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French ambitions in the United Provinces and, especially after the declaration of the
National Convention on 19 November that assistance would be forthcoming for all
peoples who wished to overthrow their monarchs, it was feared that the republican
government sought not only to conquer Dutch territory but also to overthrow the
existing regime and install an administration consonant with revolutionary principles
and answerable to that of France. Steps were taken to assure the Dutch of British
assistance against invasion, should it be required. On 26 November an intercepted
letter of Dumouriez's arrived in London, in which he had written: 'I count on
carrying liberty to the Batavians [the Dutch] as I have done to the Belgians; also
that the Revolution will take place in Holland...'; on the same date Brissot, in an
outburst of flamboyant patriotism, proclaimed, 'We cannot be calm until Europe, all
Europe, is in flames.'10 Pitt and Grenville believed that the French were trying to
force them to choose between declaring war and abandoning their Dutch ally and
their own security. Grenville wrote to Auckland that he saw 'little doubt that the
whole is a concerted plan to drive us to extremities.'11
If French aggression in the Low Countries was the crucial element in
Britain's entry into the war, however, it would also be true to say that there were
other considerations in the minds of members of the Cabinet. If war could not be
averted, for instance, circumstances by early 1793 seemed to show that the time was
right to embark on hostilities. The Dutch seemed to be in earnest against France;
Russia, Spain and several of the smaller European states were signalling their
readiness to join in if Britain did. The King was increasingly in favour of a tough
line against France, as was the country at large—a very different situation from that
of 1791 and the Ochakov crisis. Sir James Bland Burges concluded on 18 December
1792 that the sooner war was begun the better, because public opinion was excellent,
and there was 'an earnest desire to go to war with France'.12 There was confidence
in British power and resources in comparison with those of France, particularly in
British naval power and finances. France appeared to be consumed by civil war and
bankruptcy. Furthermore, while this was not a primary consideration in the
government's moves towards war, there was the added bonus that to do so would
most probably split the Whig opposition in Parliament into those who would support
the war and those who would continue to support the French.
10 Quoted in Blanning, Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars, pp. 141, 137.
11 Ibid., p. 141. See also Schofield, 'English Conservative Thought', pp. 186-7.
12 Quoted in Holland Rose, 'The Struggle with Revolutionary France', p.220; see also third Earl of
Malmesbury (ed.), Diaries and Correspondence ofJames Harris, First Earl ofMalmesbury (4 vols.:
London, 1844), ii, 501-2,20 January 1793.
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Other domestic considerations also played a part. At first, the government
had not identified the British radical movement with the French revolutionaries. In
1792, however, as British radicalism grew in strength and as the military success of
the revolutionary armies forced itself on ministers' notice, it became difficult for
them to separate the conquests of French arms from the spread of French doctrines,
and they grew alarmed at the prospect of a radical attempt to impose French
principles of government on Britain.13 The growth of the popular radical societies
and evidence of the correspondence of some of these with the French National
Convention, and reports of increasing violence within France (particularly the arrest
and deposition of Louis XVI on 10 August 1792, and the September Massacres, in
which 1200 people were killed in Paris), dismayed ministers and prompted the two
Royal Proclamations of May and December 1792, the first banning seditious
publications and meetings, and the second calling out the militia and assembling
Parliament. The building of barracks in Sheffield, Manchester, Nottingham,
Birmingham, Coventry and Norwich was begun by the autumn, to accommodate
troops in the event of civil unrest becoming unmanageable by ordinary restraints. A
poor harvest triggered substantial domestic unrest to join the brew of French military
success and British radical activity in ministers' minds—the common people in
France had shown that they could be moved by political ideas as well as by
hunger—but even more worrying than the actual activities of the radicals in Britain
was the example they were being set by the revolutionaries in France.14 Hence the
anxiety caused to ministers by the boatloads of emigres who were arriving in
Britain, and increasingly so after the decree of the French Executive Committee on
25 August 1792 banishing refractory priests and after the September Massacres, in
which over 200 priests were assassinated. Not all of the immigrants were clerical,
and the government feared that some were agents of the republic, sent to instigate
insurrection in Britain.15 Its sense of foreboding was deepened by the French decrees
of 19 November and 15 December promising to export the revolution by means of
French arms wherever they might find support for French doctrines, and to
13 Schofield, 'British Politicians and French Arms', pp.187, 188, 191; idem., 'English Conservative
Thought', p.189; Black, British Foreign Policy in an Age ofRevolution, pp.411, 413; idem., 'The
Coming ofWar Between Britain and France', p.77.
14 Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, p. 194; Murley, 'Origins of the War', pp.59-60. See, for
instance, Dundas to the House of Commons, 13 December 1792, P.H., xxx, 47. On Dundas's frenetic
efforts to cajole and coerce the Scottish population into loyalty in autumn 1792, see Murley, 'Origins
of theWar', p.202; Michael Fry, The Dundas Despotism (Edinburgh, 1992), pp. 168-9.
15 R.R. Dozier, For King, Constitution, and Country (Lexington, 1983), pp.37-43. On the general
anxiety caused by the rush of emigres arriving in Britain, see Richard A. Soloway, 'Reform or Ruin:
English Moral Thought During the First French Republic', Review ofPolitics, xxv (January 1963),
118.
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requisition occupied countries in order to sustain revolutionary France in its military
and proselytising activities. Revolutionary foreign policy was unconventional and
apparently without scruple or caution in the magnitude of its vision to impose
republican government, it was feared, throughout Europe. The triumph of the French
Republic in the Netherlands, its clear intention in the United Provinces, and the
admiration, hope and communication with Paris it inspired in British and Irish
radicals deeply alarmed the Pitt administration concerning French plans regarding
Britain itself.
Both domestic sedition and the French military threat, therefore, must be
opposed; this would be a war on two fronts. According to Charles Long of the
Treasury, 'The present war... derives its origin and its justification from the decrees
of French democracy.' He went on to acknowledge the significance of French
aggression in Europe, but he claimed that the offensive acts in question were not
necessary causes of war, and that the ideological element was of substantial
importance. 'It may safely be asserted, that the justification of the present war with
France is not merely deduced from considerations of policy, but rests upon
foundations as broad and as solid, as the existence and preservation of civil society
itself.'16 Long was writing in 1796, after three years of war rhetoric and
conditioning, and his interpretation of the origins of the war has been questioned by
historians.
To T.C.W. Blanning the most significant contribution of the opposing
ideologies of revolutionary France and Great Britain to the outbreak of war was its
creation of fundamentally different criteria for the assessment of their mutual assets
and weaknesses and, therefore, the birth of misunderstandings on both sides of the
chances of success in any potential conflict. 'This kind of mutual miscalculation is
notoriously common during periods of ideological turmoil, for a conservative's idea
of strength is a radical's idea of weakness, and vice versa. It is also common when
reliable information is hard to obtain.'17 Norman Richards agreed with this analysis
of the British government's motivation: questions of principle, he maintained, were
only of secondary importance to British ministers, and in this they differed markedly
from the Portland Whigs, who did not join the government until 1794 and who were
inspired by Burke's opinions on the need for an ideological crusade against
France.18 Pitt and his colleagues before that time did not pay much attention to
16 Charles Long, A View of the Relative State ofGreat Britain and France, at the Commencement of
the Year 1796 (London, 1796), pp.7, 12-13, 15.
17 Blanning, The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars, pp. 163, 206,208-9.
18 Norman Frank Richards, 'British Policy and the Problem of Monarchy in France, 1789-1802',
unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of London, 1954), p.66.
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Burke's efforts: it was well over a year after the publication of the Reflections before
they began to share his fears concerning the spread and threat of revolutionary ideas;
they dismissed his attempts at diplomacy through his son in Coblenz in August
1791; and they recognized that external military force alone would prove unable to
crush French revolutionary democracy.
J.T. Murley points out, however, that 'it remains a fact that there was a
fundamental conflict of principle in the respective positions taken by the two
countries,' and that French foreign policy was conducted in terms of a new ideology,
however inconsistently, while British policy continued to represent old values and
traditions. This affected not only the calculation of mutual resources for war, but
also the issues over which armed conflict was begun and the manner in which the
war was conducted. The opening of the Scheldt was of little real advantage to
France: it was an act of propaganda symbolic of the Convention's belief in the
application of the doctrine of natural rights to international affairs. It might in fact
have benefited Britain, allowing its traders to use both Antwerp and Amsterdam; but
treaty obligations and the maintenance of international law were more important in
the British view of foreign relations and, as a symbol of revolutionary abrogation of
established rights, it could not be permitted to stand.19
Murley's argument perhaps does not allow enough importance to the British
fear of a French conquest of Holland and the implications of that for British security.
It does, however, highlight the infusion of political and philosophical thinking into
policy-making, supporting the view that it is impossible, in the last analysis, to
separate the two. As Philip Schofield writes, 'French aggression in opening the
Scheldt and threatening the United Provinces were grounds of war in themselves,
but these were viewed in the context of the proselytizing ideology of the
Revolution.'20 Not only so, but they were viewed in that context by British minds
steeped in the Whig ideology of the British constitution and balance-of-power
notions of European relations. Grenville wrote to Auckland on 4 February 1793: 'It
is to these views [of aggression and aggrandizement] rendered infinitely more
dangerous by the principles of Anarchy with which they are connected, both in their
means, and in their ultimate object, that His Majesty is to oppose a vigorous and
effectual resistance.'21
19 Murley, 'Origins of (lie War', pp.365-7; Black, British Foreign Policy in an Age ofRevolutions,
p.465.
20 Schofield, 'British Politicians and French Arms', p.201.
21 BL Add. MS 34447 f.430v, Grenville to Auckland, 4 February 1793.
59
Jeremy Black emphasizes that British fear, which 'derived from a distrust
that arose from the perception of the French government as being unwilling to
accept limits to its ambitions and revolutionary pretensions', was at least as
important as mutual miscalculations of political strength and military resources in
the Anglo-French failure to avert war by negotiating a compromise.22 British
ministers feared that the French government intended to transform international
relations in line with its own revolutionary principles. Foreign policy, under their
system, was formed by public debate rather than in discreet Cabinet discussions;
treaties were made to conform to the universal natural rights of man rather than to
the rights of nations and pragmatic balance-of-power considerations; and France
intended to head a new diplomatic order in Europe in which the rights of the people
against their sovereigns would be safeguarded. These threats, as Black argues, were
not so much 'a distraction from the vital question' of the Low Countries as 'the
essential objectives of French policy'.23
To Burke, France was dangerous because of its doctrines and doubly
dangerous because these doctrines were armed. To the ministry, by contrast, France
was a threat because it was aggressive, and doubly so because its aggression was
inextricably linked to a revolutionary system of political thought. Ideology was
secondary but necessary; the British government may not have gone to war against
French ideas, but they did go to war against French idealists because of the way they
carried their ideas into practice. In reply to the Marquis of Lansdown's criticism that
the government was leading the country into 'a war of metaphysics', Lord
Loughborough replied, 'but who were the metaphysicians? They were 120, 000
French soldiers, and their cannon and bayonets were the arguments they used.'24
II
Throughout the 1790s ministers themselves debated the nature of the war. They
were united, however, in beginning the conflict with what Michael Fry has described
as 'a faintly irresponsible optimism',25 convinced that it would be short and
successful. They planned for a short war, agreeing to subsidize only the smaller
powers,26 and by early March 1793 Grenville was writing to Auckland: 'I look with
22 Black, British Foreign Policy in an Age ofRevolutions, p.461.
23 Ibid., pp.381,433,462-3.
24 P.H., xxx, 332, Loughborough, 1 February 1793.
25 Fry, The Dundas Despotism, p. 188.
26 John M. Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder: British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France 1793-
1815 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), p.27.
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great confidence now to the final result of this crisis, tho' I am sensible that its
danger is not yet completely passed.' On the previous day Sir Gilbert Elliot had
written complacently to his wife: 'There is an immense power confederating against
France, and allowing for the uncertainty of war and of all human calculations, there
seems reason to expect a successful issue to this most important struggle between all
the order and all the anarchy of the world.' 'It is impossible for events to succeed
one another more prosperously,' wrote the King to Dundas a month later.27 There
was a sense that the British cause was right and just and destined to triumph.
This optimism continued, to a greater or lesser degree, throughout 1793.
Grenville acknowledged that the first campaign had not achieved all that had been
hoped of it, but he insisted that the Dutch should recognize the substantial gains that
had been made in the defence of their country. Pitt admitted that the failure at
Dunkirk was 'a severe Check', but was disposed to see it in the light of a spur to
British exertions. On 6 March 1794 he told the House of Commons: 'There is no
doubt that in the course of a campaign, the prospects of success will become more or
less sanguine according to the complexion of events. But the true criterion of the
success of the campaign, is to compare the general state of Europe with what it was
at the commencement of the campaign.'28 Holland had been saved; Conde,
Valenciennes and Quesnoy had been seized; and, outside Europe, acquisitions had
been made at the expense of France in both the East and West Indies.29 Whether or
not they genuinely still felt it in succeeding years, ministers naturally continued to
express optimism publicly concerning the outcome of the war.30
It was assumed that the French state was weak internally, especially at the
outbreak of the war. Lord Auckland was one of the most staunch believers in the
theory that 'the whole French machine may suddenly fall to pieces under the general
pressure which bears against it',31 and others believed with him that despite their
great programme of requisitions, the republican government could not much longer
27 BL Add MS 34449 f.23, Grenville to Auckland, 8 March 1793; Countess of Minto (ed.), Life and
Letters ofSir Gilbert Elliot, First Earl ofMinto, from 1751 to 1806 (3 vols.: London, 1874), ii, 121;
A. Aspinall (ed.), The Later Correspondence ofGeorge III (5 vols.: Cambridge, 1962-8) [hereafter
LCGI1I], ii, 26, George III to Dundas, 7 April 1793. See also Schofield, 'English Conservative
Thought', p.202.
28 Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on the Manuscripts ofJ.B. Fortesque, Esq., Preserved
at Dropmore (10 vols.: London, 1892-1927) [hereafter Dropmore], ii, 464, Grenville to Auckland, 11
Nov. 1793; BL Add. MS 42772 f.58v, Pitt to George Rose, 13 September 1793; P.H., xxx, 1485, Pitt,
6 March 1794.
29 P.H., xxxi, 258-260, Pitt, 10 April 1794.
30 See, for instance, P.H., xxxi, 1442-3, Grenville to the House of Lords, 30 March 1795; P.H., xxxii,
142, the King's Speech, 21 October 1795; Lord Auckland, Some Remarks on the Apparent
Circumstances of the War in the Fourth Week ofOctober 1795 (London, 1795), pp.9-12,66-7.
31 Dropmore, ii, 419, Auckland to Grenville, 1 September 1793.
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bear the expense nor the public unrest incurred by such a large-scale conflict.
External hostilities, internal political turmoil, religious chaos, civil war, galloping
inflation—in every sphere France had been ravaged by its own government. To
Charles Long it presented 'the image of a vast volcano, surrounded with heaps of
lava, on whose surface, during many years, scarcely any trace of verdure will
appear.'32 George III wrote to Grenville in November 1795: T think no problem in
Euclid more true than that if the French are well pressed in the next year, their want
of resources and other internal evils must make the present shocking chaos crumble
to pieces. '33
The only style of warfare of which the ministers had any experience was that
of the limited conflicts of the eighteenth century, and it is not surprising that they
expected the present conflict to be merely another in the series. In this style of
conflict, war was an instrument of diplomacy rather than a substitute for it, and it
was fought for recognizable and attainable objectives. This was the warfare of
Prussia and Austria, made of compromises, bargains and limited territorial aims;
and, to a substantial extent, it was the warfare of Britain, based on limited military
commitment to continental warfare, subsidies to foreign allies, maritime and
colonial hostilities, and Britain's own small and amateurish army which depended
on individual efforts and whose structure was highly resistant to change. It was a
system which knew wars of interests, not ideological crusades. Some ministers, such
as Henry Dundas, rarely saw the wars against revolutionary France in any other but
a traditional light. He wrote of France in 1799, T am sure that country will always
be the natural enemy of this, and if it is in our power we ought to use our best
exertions to annihilate their naval power...we are a small spot in the ocean without
territorial consequence, and our own power and dignity as well as the safety of
Europe rests on our being the paramount commercial and naval power of the
world.'34 In the following year, in the midst of his struggle to send an expedition to
Egypt to defend Britain's Indian trade against the threat posed by Napoleon, he
wrote to the Lord Chancellor:
When we depart from great leading principles uniformly adhered to
in the Wisdom of our Ancestors, I cannot help being jealous of
what is to happen afterwards...This is to me the more distressing,
32 Long, A View of the Relative State, p.57. See also P.H., xxxi, 987, the Earl of Mansfield to the
House of Lords, 30 December 1794; Dropmore, iii, 80-1, memorandum by Grenville, May - June
1795; Auckland, Some Remarks on the Apparent Circumstances of the War, passim.
33 Dropmore, iii, 149, George III to Grenville, 30 November 1795.
34 Quoted in Piers Mackesy, War Without Victory: The Downfall ofPitt 1799-1802 (Oxford, 1984),
p.13.
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because I protest solemnly I cannot discover the temptation we
were under to depart from our Antient Practice.35
The Marquess of Buckingham saw nothing new in France attempting to extend its
borders and impose the power and influence of its government throughout Europe—
this had ever been its aim since the late seventeenth century.36
This, however, was only one side of the picture, for the opposition of the
British government to French revolutionary ideology had not been left behind when
battle was joined in February 1793. There was, firstly, a recognition that France was
fighting in a new way. It was 'a military democracy, actuated by the energies, the
secrecy, and the decision of despotism.'37 The French 'Nation in Arms' had
employed 'the new invention of raising an armed force by the operation of popular
tyranny', they were 'waging war with their whole substance', posing a universal
threat, and the results were unpredictable to the British government.38 Ministers also
claimed that the war involved a battle for the fundamental principles of society. Pitt
told the House of Commons on 12 February 1793 that the French had thrown down
the challenge of principles 'not levelled against particular nations, but against every
country where there was any form of government established...calculated every
where to sow the seeds of rebellion and civil contention, and to spread war from one
end of Europe to the other, from one end of the globe to the other.'39 The King's
Speech on 30 December 1794 informed Parliament that Britain was fighting for 'the
deliverance of Europe from the greatest danger with which it has been threatened
since the establishment of civilized society.'40 Translated into practical terms, this
might mean particularly that Britain's future economic and political development
were understood to be in jeopardy;41 but it was the business of government ministers
to protect these, and they were jeopardized precisely because of the sort of war that
France was fighting, which in turn was caused by its revolutionary doctrines.
The French Revolution was made animate in the language of ministers: it
was a 'spirit of restlessness and intrigue,' or 'the Spirit of Jacobinism',42 a spirit
35 BL Add. MS 40102 f.72, 14 Sept. 1800.
36 Dropmore, ii, 390, Buckingham to Grenville, 7 April 1793.
37 Long, A View of the Relative State, p.42.
38 P.H., xxx, 1065, Auckland, 21 January 1794; P.H., xxx, 587, the Solicitor General, 15 March
1793; Lord Castlereagh's comment, quoted in Clive Emsley, British Society and the French Wars
1793-1815 (London, 1979), p.22.
39 P.H., xxx, 347, Pitt, 12 February 1793.
40 Ibid., xxxi, 961.
41 Michael Duffy, 'British War Policy: The Austrian Alliance, 1793-1801', unpublished D.Phil,
thesis (University of Oxford, 1971), pp.1-2.
42 Dundas to Sir James Murray, 12 September 1792, quoted in Mitchell, The Underground War,
p.26.; BL Add. MS 34453 f.97v„ Auckland to Pitt, 1 December 1794.
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which persisted long after the fall of Robespierre and the leaders of the Jacobin club
of Paris. 'It is in power alone that moderatism differs from Jacobinism,' explained
Canning, 'its virulence remains unimpaired.'43 The Duke of Portland could still
describe the French government in 1798 as 'that tremendous monster'; and even
Dundas warned the Commons after Bonaparte's coup of 18 Brumaire 1799 that the
Jacobinical government of France was only at an end in terms of its form—in
substance and in essence it was unchanged.44
Moreover, the war was internal as well as external, and this too cast the war
in an ideological light for government ministers. The radicals continued to work and
hope for political reform in Britain through 1794 and 1795, and they tapped the
unease and distress in the country caused by war-weariness and poor harvests. 'In
this atmosphere,' writes John Ehrman, 'a fresh wave of radical action looked to
Pitt...like revolution.'45 The naval mutinies of 1797 were believed to have been
instigated by radical agents in order to weaken Britain's defences severely, and it
was feared that the same activity was being industriously pursued among the
soldiers.46 Since the popular radical societies claimed to subscribe to the principles
of the enemy, the government was fighting enemies within as well as enemies
without. Pitt claimed that the Revolution and the war were dependent on one
another. The war, therefore, was a conflict between 'the national identities of the
respective combatants.'47 Canning wrote:
But what avails to guard each outward part,
If subtlest poison, circling at thy heart,
Spite of thy courage, of thy power, and wealth,
Mine the sound fabric of thy vital health?48
The perception of the role of the Parliamentary Opposition was blurred. As part of
the propertied elite, they were only hazily connected by ministers with the dangerous
forces of radicalism. Yet the connection was thought real enough to be an anxiety:
on one occasion, after Fox had toasted 'the people, our sovereign' at the Whig Club,
Pitt wondered whether he should try to get the House of Commons to send him to
43 P.M., xxxi, 1011,30 December 1794.
44 LCGIII, iii, 135, the Duke of Portland to Pitt, 5 October 1798; P.H., xxxiv, 1242-4, Dundas, 3
February 1800. Towards the end of 1799, in private, Dundas did suggest that the Jacobin element of
French government was declining, but Grenville rounded on him immediately—see Dropmore, vi,
37-9,47, Dundas to Grenville and Grenville to Dundas, 24 and 25 November 1799.
45 Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, p.452. On the radicals and the war, see ch. 5.
46 P.M., xxxiii, 798, 806-7, Pitt, 2 June 1797.
47 Dozier, For King, Consititution, and Country, pp. 143-4.
48 George Canning, 'New Morality', in The Poetical Works of the Right Hon. George Canning, M.P.
(Glasgow, 1825), p.23.
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the Tower of London for a spell, and in the end had him struck off the Privy Council
instead.49
It was vaguely recognized that Britain itself might have to pursue a new kind
of warfare. Auckland wrote to Pitt on 1 December 1794 to tell him that, 'exposed as
we have been to a System of hostility equally new & dangerous, we seem hitherto to
have pursued on our part only the old beaten ground of Warfare...such
Measures...were not likely to prove adequate to the exigencies of the present
War,'and that 'it [is] expedient & even essential, to pursue the war by unusual and
extraordinary Means',50 although he declined to dictate these to the Cabinet, who, he
said, had access to greatly superior sources of information than he did.
Schofield attempts to explain the new, ideological and the old-fashioned,
interest-based aspects of the British government's perception of the war by
chronology, maintaining that ministers, for all practical purposes, largely abandoned
their opposition to French revolutionary principles after 1795. In favour of his
argument, he enlists the government's first announcement of its willingness to make
peace, in October 1795, and the cowing of the radical movement in Britain
especially after the Two Acts of December 1795 against Seditious Meetings and
Treasonable Practices, which allowed ministers to think again of British radicals and
French revolutionaries as two separate threats. The stated views of Henry Dundas,
Charles Long and Lord Auckland also fit comfortably into this interpretation.51
Schofield contends that counter-revolutionary rhetoric was used in the first years of
the war to justify the conflict and its conduct, and that, in turn, this rhetoric must
have influenced the conduct of the war. The pursuit of peace from late 1795 onwards
was also justified by ministers partly on similar ideological grounds, that is, that
with the smothering of the radical movement, the war to save the British constitution
had been won.52
This argument is quite persuasive, but not entirely convincing. Counter¬
revolutionary rhetoric continued to be used in the ministerial defence of the war and
their conduct of it, especially after peace was not to be had, in 1796 or 1797; nor had
it been drained of effect on policy. After the failure of the Lille talks in 1797,
Grenville complained that the French republican government wished 'to spread
confusion over Europe, to prolong the miseries of their own country on Jacobin
49 Dropmore, iv, 187, Pitt to Grenville, 5 May 1798; LCGIII, iii, 59, Pitt to George III, 8 May 1798.
50 BL Add. MSS 34453 ff. 94, 94v.
51 See P.H., xxxii, 603, Dundas, 9 December 1795; Dropmore, vi, 37-9, Dundas to Grenville, 24
Nov. 1799; Long, A View of the Relative State (1796); idem., The New Era of the French Revolution,
or. Observations Upon the Constitution Proposed in the Convention, on the Twenty-Third of June,
1795 (London, 1795); Auckland, Some Remarks on the Apparent Circumstances (1795).
52 Schofield, 'British Politicians and French Arms', pp. 17-18, 21-2.
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principles and by Jacobin means.'53 Moreover, Schofield's analysis does not account
for Grenville's increasing keenness to help the French royalists, or indeed the lack of
British aid sent to them between 1793 and 1795, when the counter-revolutionary
sympathies of the government are supposed to have been at their height. Certainly,
after the entrance of the Portland Whigs to the Cabinet in July 1794, the government
contained a significant lobby whose crusading views were not to be rapidly eroded
in the manner Schofield suggests.
What Burke and the other ideologues often failed to see was that ministers
were not spectators of the drama, as they were, but principal actors in it, whose
strategy was constrained by a powerful enemy and by limited resources, difficult
allies, and the need to justify themselves before Parliament and the nation. The need
to produce viable and successful strategies, moreover, inevitably shaped ministers'
views of the very nature of the war. Opinions affect the conduct of those who hold
them54 and, while it was for philosophers, political writers and publicists to oppose
the ideological basis of the French Revolution itself, it was for the government to
oppose that conduct which was attacking society rather than the principles behind
the conduct. Ministers were preoccupied with the balance of power in Europe, but
they recognized that it was the Revolution within France which caused it to destroy
that balance of power.55 Canning told the House of Commons in 1794 that he could
not 'see such nice distinctions' as that between opposing French arms and opposing
French principles, since the principles propelled the arms. Even Henry Dundas, one
of the ministers least inclined to crusading views, wrote of the French Revolution in
1794:
It was...a conspiracy of the most profligate and ignorant people in
the nation, against all the principles of society and religion, against
all property, landed or commercial; and this conspiracy, too,
formed in the centre of Europe, and threatening the subversion of
every neighbouring government; a conspiracy made up of men
equally destitute of principles and of property; who had everything
to gain and nothing to lose by a general convulsion in Europe.56
Pitt, responding to a charge of fruitlessly pitting arms against opinions, said in 1799:
53 P.H., xxxiii, 982-3, Grenville, 8 November 1797.
54 As Pitt told the House of Commons on 21 January 1794: '...one of the leading features of this
government [in France] was the abolition of religion. It will scarcely be maintained that this step
could tend only to affect opinions, and have no influence upon the conduct of a nation.... surely no
event can be looked for more desirable than a destruction of that system which at present exists, to the
misery of France and the terror of Europe' (P.H., xxx, 1281,1283).
55 H.T. Dickinson, 'The French Revolution and the Counter-Revolution in Britain', in Hans-
Christoph Schroder and Hans-Dieter Metzger (eds.), Aspekte der Franzosischen Revolution
(Darmstadt, 1992), p.258.
56 P.H., xxx, 1322, Canning, 31 January 1794; Dundas quoted in Fry, The Dundas Despotism, p. 155.
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We are not in arms against the opinions of the closet...We are at
war with armed opinions; we are at war with those opinions which
the sword of audacious, unprincipled, and impious innovation,
seeks to propagate amidst the ruins of empires, the demolition of
altars, the destruction of every venerable and good and liberal
institution, under whatever form of polity they have been raised.57
The arming of French opinions was terrifying to the British government
because those arms vitally affected British territorial interests, but also because it
indicated an alarming development of those opinions themselves into a tyrannical
and self-propagating force not content to remain within the confines of France. In
December 1796, in the debate on the failure of the Paris negotiations, Pitt referred
to 'the additional expedient of disseminating new, unheard of, destructive
principles...from the interior of France, into all the quarters of Europe, where no
rampart could be raised to oppose the dangerous, the fatal inundation.' He claimed
that this 'madness and fanaticism' had not lasted long. Later in his speech, however,
he complained of the unique and unacceptable mode of foreign relations now carried
on by the French—that they held their republican laws and constitution to be the
sole authority on what could happen to territory conquered by them, and that this
could not be negotiable.58 In the equivalent debate in the House of Lords, Lord
Auckland made the same objection. He knew enough of the French constitution, he
said, to know that it was 'incompatible with a state of peace'. The experiment had
now been tried, and it had been proved that the French government was 'entirely for
war'.59 Both statesmen were, in effect, calling for a counter-revolution against
French foreign policy, which was a major aspect of the Revolution, and the one with
which the British government was principally concerned. Not all ministers held the
purely ideological aspect of the conflict in equal importance. William Windham,
Lord Spencer and, later, Lord Grenville were much more sympathetic to Burkean,
crusading ideas in support of a strategy of attacking French revolutionary principles
within France itself than were Dundas and Pitt. Pitt was more anxious to defeat
French revolutionary principles at work on the balance of power in Europe and to
prevent the French revolutionary government from attacking other states than to
destroy that government, and this view of counter-revolution became the dominant
voice of the government. He more often employed Burkean language for effect, to
57 P.H., xxxiv, 1051, Pitt, 7 June 1799.
58 Ernest Rhys (ed.), Orations on the War by William Pitt (Everyman), pp.211-2, 220, 224, 30
December 1796.
59 P.H., xxxii, 1500-3, Auckland, 30 December 1796.
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please those who leaned towards that interpretation of events, but he pursued a more
limited war policy.60 Dundas, though willing to accept that the revolutionary
character of the French government made it particularly dangerous and inimical, was
chiefly concerned to weaken Britain's old rival as much as possible by winning as
many French and (once Holland had been conquered by France in 1795) Dutch
colonial possessions as possible. His aim was the greatness of Britain, not the
destruction of the Revolution.61
Ill
Differing views of the nature of the enemy and of the war among ministers naturally
produced varying opinions about what British aims in the war should be. They were
careful not to pledge themselves to anything too clearly defined, perhaps also
because this might have committed them to war for an indefinite period of time until
these objectives were achieved. Pitt told the Commons on 7 June 1799, 'With
respect to that which appears so much to embarrass certain gentlemen—the
deliverance of Europe—I will not say particularly what it is.'62 With a rampantly
aggressive France menacing Europe, could British security really be assured merely
by the defence of the United Provinces? Did not the spread of revolutionary
principles constitute a threat even within Britain? 'Security', as the Opposition MP
George Tierney pointed out in 1800, was a justifiable and perennial war aim, but
what exactly did it mean in practical terms? In fact, British war aims were unclear
throughout the 1790s. Parliamentarians spent much time trying to define them; in
November 1797 Lord Gwydir complained that 'the powers of language have been so
often employed to describe the complicated nature of this war, that words have lost
their effect by repetition.'63
The fundamental war aim was to repel what ministers claimed was an
unprovoked attack on British interests by France. As Pitt said in April 1793, in a
sense it did not matter what Britain's grounds for war against France were, 'for
while they were discussing that principle, the circumstance that arose was, that
France had declared war against this country.'64 This aim was taken up with
60 Overton Walter Place, 'Parliamentary Debate in Great Britain Regarding the War with France,
1793-1806', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Kentucky, 1975), pp.62-3, 67.
61 Matheson, Life ofHenry Dundas, p. 186.
62 Michael Duffy, 'British Policy in theWar Against Revolutionary France', in Jones (ed.), Britain
and Revolutionary France, p.21; P.H., xxxiv, 1046; see also P.H., xxxiv, 44-5, Canning, 11
December 1798.
63 P.H., xxxiii, 860, Lord Gwydir, 2 November 1797.
64 Ibid., xxx, 715, Pitt, 25 April 1793.
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renewed urgency after the failure of the attempts to negotiate a peace in 1796 and
1797—success in the conflict was necessary for survival. The defence of Britain
included the defence of British commerce. Sir Gilbert Elliot reported that Dundas
saw the destruction of French naval power as 'the principal object proposed by the
war in favour of Great Britain as a compensation for our charge in it'.65
Ministers also claimed that it was a war to preserve the British constitution.
'The war was not made to prevent France from giving herself the constitution that
she might prefer; but to prevent her from giving to Great Britain, and to her allies,
all the wretchedness and horrors of a wild democracy.'66 Invasion was a very real
fear, heightened by anxiety concerning a Jacobin fifth column within Britain. In a
speech to the Commons in December 1797 Spencer Perceval warned that the
tendency towards popular influence in British government had gone far enough, and
that the naval mutinies and General Hoche's attempted invasion of Ireland had
shown how close Britain was to disaster. The answer he proposed was firm control
of domestic affairs and zealous pursuit of the war against France 67
Repelling French aggression involved the preservation of the integrity of the
Low Countries as well as that of Britain itself. Auckland wrote to Grenville from the
United Provinces at the beginning of the war: 'Men, Commanders, Ships & Money,
We could not ask for more if this Country was a part of Yorkshire; but I incline to
think that it should be considered as such for the present...'.68 The British
government was also anxious to restore the Belgic provinces to Austrian
sovereignty, despite Austria's manifest lack of interest in recovering them. Ministers
therefore wanted a restoration of the territorial status quo ante and of the balance of
power in Europe. This held attractions for those of different persuasions concerning
the nature of the war—Grenville and others of more Burkean convictions wanted to
see Jacobinism at least contained within France, Dundas and those more
preoccupied with material matters also wanted to see France stripped of its
revolutionary prizes, while Pitt thought that it held out the best hope of a stable
peace. In Canning's catch-all words, 'we can be but precariously safe, so long as
there is no safety for the rest of Europe.'69 George III was particularly anxious for
65 8-9 September 1793, quoted in Paul Kelly, 'Strategy and Counter-Revolution: the journal of Sir
Gilbert Elliot, 1-22 September 1793', in the English Historical Review, xcviii (1983), 340.
66 P.H., xxxi, 1137, Auckland, 6 January 1795.
67 Denis Gray, Spencer Perceval: The Evangelical Prime Minister 1762-1812 (Manchester, 1963),
pp.36-7.
68 BL Add. MS 34448 f. 186, Auckland to Grenville, 15 February 1793.
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the fate of his electorate of Hanover.70 A restoration of the status quo ante would,
moreover, defeat the ambitions of Prussia and Austria to take advantage of the
conflict to seize whatever territories they could. So concerned were they, however,
that the Austrian Netherlands should not remain in French hands that, in 1796,
ministers compromised long-held British policy by trying to persuade Prussia to give
Bavaria to Austria and receive the Belgic provinces (once they were retrieved from
France) in compensation. In 1799 Grenville toyed with the idea of joining them with
the United Provinces as one independent state.71
A secondary aim on which most of the Cabinet could unite was that of
indemnity for itself and for its allies—as Pitt told the House of Commons in 1799,
somewhat coyly, 'Our simple object is security, just security, with a little mixture of
indemnification.'72 To Dundas, it was a major objective. In his opinion, Britain,
having been dragged into the war most unjustifiably by France, had every reason to
make the most of the opportunity to defend itself by seizing what new colonies it
could, not so much for the purpose of territorial aggrandizement as for that of
acquiring new markets.73 Acquisitions of this nature were also sought in order to
strengthen Britain's hand in future peace negotiations, both against French
pretensions and against Austrian manoeuvres concerning the Low Countries;
Dunkirk was specifically attacked in 1793 with Austria in mind.
Ministers further wanted to be able to treat with a stable French government
for a secure peace, and Opposition politicians were repeatedly told that Britain
would not agree to negotiations until there was a firmly-established administration in
France to provide some guarantee that a peace settlement would be upheld. Canning
said in December 1794, 'I would have their government, whatever it may be, strong
and solid at home, that it may be safe for other nations'.74 It was hoped that this had
been accomplished by the Thermidorian reaction to Robespierre's Terror in July
1795, and in October of that year ministers began to express a willingness to treat
for peace; but the triumph of the militant party in France in September 1797 and
Bonaparte's coup d'etat in November 1799 made this desire for a stable French
government an objective of continuing relevance. 'A stable French government' was
a vague demand in which ministers of all opinions could acquiesce; when it was
more closely defined, however, disagreements were exposed. Pitt said in June 1793
70 See, for instance, LCG111, ii, 327, George III to Pitt, 5 April 1795; ibid., 401-2, George III to Pitt,
13 September 1795; ibid., iii, 97, George III to Grenville, 24 July 1798.
71 Dropmore, v, 328-9, Grenville to Sir Charles Whitworth, 27 August 1799.
72 P.H., xxxiv, 1047, Pitt, 7 June 1799.
73 Ibid., xxx, 1251, Dundas, 21 January 1794.
74 Ibid., xxxi, 1015, Canning, 30 December 1794.
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that it could be achieved in one of three ways: if the French Revolutionary system
was completely overturned from within France, if it was extinguished by external
force, or if it was sufficiently weakened to render it safe to other European states.75
Each of these solutions found advocates in the British government: most ministers
would have been happy to see the first occur; Windham and Spencer pressed for the
second, with the support of Grenville, Portland and George III; and Pitt leaned
towards the third, while Dundas urged its adoption by the administration.76
Changing the revolutionary system of government in France was an
attractive aim for British domestic reasons, as well as for the guarantee of a lasting
peace. Pitt wrote in January 1794 that the destruction of the French revolutionary
government would be 'desirable in itself as well as 'most likely to terminate the
war'.77 As the King's Speech put it that summer: 'these designs against our domestic
happiness are essentially connected with the system now prevailing in France, of
which the principles and spirit are irreconcileably hostile to all regular and
established government'78 The British war was clearly carried on against the French
revolutionary government rather than against the French nation. The Duke of York
wrote to his troops in Holland in 1794 that he trusted that they would 'confine their
sentiments of resentment and abhorrence to the National Convention alone' 79
Yet even those who wanted to change the revolutionary system of
government in France were divided as to the form of government that should replace
it. The King, and those ministers more influenced by Burke's thinking were,
unsurprisingly, more decidedly in favour of a monarchical restoration. William
Windham, who was Secretary for War from 1794-6 with a special responsibility for
Britain's dealings with the French emigres and counter-revolutionaries, expressed
himself vehemently on the subject on numerous occasions.80 The Duke of Portland
also confessed himself very unhappy with the Cabinet's decision in autumn 1795 to
be less committed to a restoration.81 Grenville was cautious for the first few years of
the war, but, by 1799, he believed that the restoration of the French monarchy was
not only a feasible objective but also that which ought to be pursued by the
75 Ibid., xxx, 1017, Pitt, 17 June 1793.
76 Pitt wavered on this, however; on his desire in the early years of the war for a change of
government in France, see Schofield, 'English Conservative Thought', p. 192-5, 201.
77 Quoted in Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, p.327.
78 P.H., xxxi, 958-9,11 July 1794.
79 Quoted in Alfred H. Burne, The Noble Duke of York. The Military Life ofFrederick Duke of York
and Albany (London and New York, 1949), p. 158.
80 See, for instance, BL Add. MS 37846 f.50, Windham to Grenville, 25 September 1796; ibid.,
37844 f. 120, Windham to Pitt, 31 January 1796.
81 Dropmore, iii, 135-6, the Duke of Portland to Grenville, 23 September 1795.
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European coalition: 'nothing will terminate this war but such success in France as
enables us to restore the monarchy'.82
The British government, none the less, even when it came closest to backing
a monarchical solution, never stipulated the exact form of monarchy, since it was
recognized that it was necessary that whatever was eventually established should be
widely supported within France.83 Most ministers did not see a restored Bourbon
monarchy as a sine qua non of peace; they vehemently repudiated suggestions from
the Opposition benches that this was their goal, and they were uneasy when Lord
Hood took Toulon in the name of Louis XVII in August 1793. Nevertheless, they
came to believe that a monarchy was the most desirable option, since it was most
likely to prove stable and popular with the French people and, in their own
manifesto to the people of Toulon of 29 October 1793, they expressed a preference
for a hereditary monarchy as a long-term solution, despite their unwillingness to be
so specific.84 Having laid claim to a French port, it was necessary to define British
aims more clearly. It seemed that the resistance in France at that time wanted a
hereditary monarchy, and this might therefore provide an effective rallying-point.85
This did not necessarily bind the Cabinet to a restoration policy for the rest of the
war. William Wickham, the British envoy in Switzerland, was instructed not to
commit the government to any particular form of constitution for France in his
negotiations with the constitutional royalists in 1794.86 Another reason for avoiding
clarifying this point was the ministers' desire to use all parties who would help to
attack the Republic—ultra-royalist, constitutional monarchist, or revolutionary
moderate—and their consequent anxiety to offend none of these unnecessarily.
Pitt himself was willing to listen to any solution which might conceivably
hasten peace, and he swung between the opinions of Grenville and Dundas, with
both of whom he was very close.87 Michael Duffy has shown that there was no
significant difference over policy between him and Grenville until late 1796;88 and,
even after this, Grenville and Windham were often able to persuade him to send
82 Ibid., v, 148, Grenville to Thomas Grenville, 16 July 1795; Jupp, Lord Grenville, p.223.
83 See, for instance, BL Add. MS 37845 f. 114, Spencer to Windham, 18 September 1793; see also
Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, pp.599-600.
84 PRO 30/8/334 f. 192v., draft of the Toulon manifesto with Pitt's annotations; see also BL Add. MS
36808 f. 55, Grenville to Lord Bute, 19 June 1795; for doubts concerning defining a preference, see
BL Add MS 34451 f.62v, Auckland to Grenville, 18 May 1793; PRO 30/8/140, Grenville to Pitt, 7
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assurances of help and more substantial aid to the French counter-revolutionary
forces. The views of Grenville and Windham did not always match entirely;
Windham was more insistent on the priority of military and material aid to the
royalists over considerations of the rest of the European theatre of war. By
September 1800, Dundas was having to acknowledge at least five different classes
of opinion within the Cabinet: those who maintained that only a Bourbon restoration
would produce European peace and British security; those who insisted on a
counter-revolution in France but would not stipulate a Bourbon restoration; those
who thought that the Napoleonic government had established itself sufficiently to
warrant treating with it as the de facto power in France; those who would negotiate
with France but only in conjunction with Britain's allies; and those who believed
that it was no longer possible to influence France by armed force and that Britain
should make peace whenever practicable, putting its own interests first.89
It was not, therefore, a Cabinet of pure ideologues who fought the war
against France; it was an administration struggling to find the most realistic practical
solution to an unprecedented problem of international dimensions. Nevertheless, its
antipathy to the French revolutionary system and its desire to replace it with some
other form of government is clear, and thus too its acknowledgement that the war
had an important ideological dimension.
The British war aims were badly flawed in two further ways. First, they
differed from those of the other European powers engaged in the war against France.
In the early part of 1793 Austria and Prussia were much more interested in attacking
France itself and attempting a strike at Paris, than was Britain;90 but as British
ministers became more persuaded of the value of helping the French counter¬
revolutionaries and of the urgency of self-defence, so the rulers of the German
nations became disenchanted with hostility towards France and more concerned to
further their own territorial interests in Poland. Prussian ministers several times
contemplated alliance with France, so little committed to the defeat of Jacobinism
were they. By the time of the formation of the Second Coalition, in 1798, the general
aim was no more than that of re-establishing the general tranquility, and, finally, in
the planning of the Dutch campaign of 1799, objectives were subordinated to
strategy in an effort to achieve unity.91 The British Cabinet disapproved of the
89 BL Add MSS 40102 ff.79-81, memorandum by Dundas, 22 September 1800. This list does not
identify those who held each of these views; a rough guess might suggest that Spencer and Portland
may have fallen into the first category, Grenville into the second, Dundas into the third, Pitt into the
fourth, and Chatham and Camden into the last.
90 See Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, pp.283-4, on the conference at Antwerp on 7 April 1793.
91 Piers Mackesy, Statesmen at War: The Strategy ofOverthrow (London, 1974), pp.30,35, 152.
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Continental Powers using the war to rearrange the map of Europe, and they
deliberately ignored continental politicking over such issues as the partition of
Poland. The territory they themselves wanted was elsewhere, in the East and West
Indies, and in Europe they wanted the status quo ante bellum to be restored.92
Second, Britain had too many objectives not only for their own compatibility, but
also for British resources to fulfil. Pitt and Grenville resented Dutch pressure to send
British ships and seamen when they were sure that the Dutch could find sufficient of
their own men to defend themselves.93 Each time a new expedition was launched,
the pinch was severely felt. George III wrote to Pitt on 14 September 1793, of the
defence of Toulon: 'The misfortune of our situation is that we have too many
objectives to attend to, and our force consequently must be too small at each
place'.94
IV
Inexperienced in military matters and ill-prepared for a conflict on any significant
scale against France,95 the British government tended to be reactive rather than
proactive in its conduct of the conflict. Certainly, as John Ehrman points out, its
commitment and realism increased rapidly from the start of the war, when a mere
1500 troops were sent to Holland and confined to a day's march from their ports,
whereas a year later 40 000 British and German troops were sent under the Duke of
York to take part in the allied attempt to march to Paris 96 With limited resources,
however, and no clear agreement on their objectives, it was natural that ministers
should in general respond to the pressure of events rather than initiate coherent
strategies, despite ambitions to and perhaps delusions of control and leadership of
the allied campaign. They were never so willing (nor, perhaps, so able) as France
was to pay the price of unlimited war by making an absolute effort in terms of
crippling taxation and a conscripted army. They consistently looked, in the 1790s,
for ways in which the French Republic could be destroyed at minimum cost to
Britain. It was a war effort dominated by politicians rather than generals, and the
92 As Windham wrote ruefully to Grenville on 13 February 1795, complaining of Austria's
preoccupation with territorial acquisition, 'Our mouths are unfortunately stopped by our own
proceedings in the West and East Indies' (Dropmore, iii, 19).
93 See, for example, BL Add. MSS 46519 ff.47-9, Pitt to Auckland, 2 March 1793; ibid., 37850
ff.22-7, Grenville to Lord St. Helens, 25 September 1794.
94 J. Holland Rose (ed.), Pitt and Napoleon. Essays and Letters (London, 1912), p.225.
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96 Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, pp.329-331. C.f. Black, British Foreign Policy in an Age of
Revolutions, p. 144.
74
political leadership was not single-minded nor decisive enough to come close to a
'total war' mentality. The desirability of overthrowing the French government,
however, was perhaps a concept as near to one of unlimited war as British
politicians of the time could come, despite their only delayed and partial emulation
of French-style warfare.97 There was, nevertheless, a constant struggle between
tactics of attrition and strategies of attack, for aggression was necessary to overthrow
a government, but the inclination of most ministers was towards enduring the French
frenzy on the Continent until it wore itself out and, meanwhile, pursuing naval
warfare.
Their assessment of the value of British military involvement on the
Continent oscillated, depending on the current circumstances of the war and on their
individual priorities. Lord Auckland, who favoured a war of attrition, wanted the
government to withdraw from all continental exertions except helping Holland
(before its conquest by France in 1795) and Sardinia.98 After the failure of the first
Coalition, in 1795, the consensus was for abandoning all Continental operations and
concentrating on colonial defence and acquisition, and hoping that the Republic
would collapse internally.99 Windham disagreed, as he was always loath to let the
French counter-revolutionaries down and give them cause to despair of aid from
Britain.100 Sir Gilbert Elliot, likewise a protege of Burke's, was dismayed when
Britain evacuated Corsica in 1796, and not (he protested) purely from personal
motives, because he was the British Governor of the island: rather, 'I retain a great
interest in the Mediterranean branch of the war which is more important than it
appears ever to have been thought in London.'101 Grenville maintained that France
could only be beaten by a combination of allied arms and internal revolt.102 Dundas,
on the other hand, was convinced that British troops ought to be used only for efforts
made for strictly British interests which, to him, pointed to colonial operations,103
but, because they were more concerned to defeat Jacobinism than at heart Dundas
was, most other ministers were convinced that France must eventually be defeated
on the continent.
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The most usual strategy was for Britain's small army to lead expeditions on
behalf of the United Provinces (in 1793-4 and in 1799), and otherwise to engage in
continental military efforts through alliance with the other Powers. In 1793 the
British Cabinet had hoped for a system of stable war-alliances which would share
responsibilities for operations and supplies and which would be committed to
continuing the war until a general peace was agreed. As usual, Britain hired large
numbers of German mercenary soldiers to increase its own forces but, even with
these, its total military strength was small, and its main contribution to the
continental military effort was by way of loans and subsidies to the allies. Given the
lack of agreement between Britain and the other European Powers concerning war
aims, these became Britain's most effective instruments of diplomacy. As Grenville
put it, tersely, to Auckland in January 1794, 'The question of Berlin's cooperation
all turns on money.'104
Loans and subsidies, however, were rarely an unmitigated success. Britain
was slow to pay instalments of its subsidies to Prussia, and Austria was slow to
repay instalments of its British loans, and hard feelings were not slow to grow. John
Sherwig shows that Britain did not have inexhaustible resources to be flung at its
demanding allies, and that its ministers had to be shrewdly selective in applying
available money.105 When loans or subsidies were not an option, ministers held out
the bait of prospective territorial gains for the allies' indemnification.106 They tried
hard to accommodate the allies, for the sake of the continuation of the coalition, and
much of the diplomatic correspondence of the decade was simply engaged in the
tortuous process of trying to create and hold a continental alliance together.
This was necessary partly because of a basic distrust between Britain and the
other powers. This had existed before February 1793, but it developed steadily
throughout the decade. Austria, Prussia and Russia were mutually suspicious of each
other's intentions with regard to Poland, Hungary and Turkey, and Britain held itself
in traditional aloofness from its allies' European interests.107 Squabbles meant that
military advantages were not pressed as they might have been, they aggravated splits
within the British Cabinet itself (over the relative merits of different allies' financial
demands) and ultimately they left Britain isolated on the Continent, whether
formally, as in 1797, or in real terms, as in summer 1796.108 In the end, the British
104 BL Add. MS 34452 f.347v., Grenville to Auckland, 16 January 1794.
105 Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder, pp.78-85,114-5.
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ministers continued to cling to hopes of Austria, despite a poor record of reliability
and ongoing frustrations, because Austria was the power which was most constant in
the war against France, next to Britain, and because of the quality and size of the
Austrian army.109
However frustrated they themselves were with the allies, ministers developed
various arguments to justify to MPs their large spending on loans and subsidies.110 It
was traditional British policy to pay mercenaries and allies, because of Britain's
relatively small population and correspondingly small army; moreover, it saved
British lives.111 When Opposition MPs complained about the Hessian troops
quartered on the Isle of Wight, Pitt replied that Parliament had voted supplies to
maintain these soldiers 'with [its] eyes open'.112 The end for which the alliances
were formed was more important than the means that were used to obtain it: as
Canning declared in 1794, ministers 'might with confidence tell the nation, we
require this money, not to support a precarious or ideal balance of power, but to
enable us to defend your government, your property, and your lives, against an
enemy who is waging a war for your utter extermination!'113 Britain's alliances
might not be perfect, but they were better than none at all. Even if British hopes
were not matched by dazzling military victories, simply by engaging the French
armies in battle the allied armies were distracting them from untold acts of
destruction. Also, the expense saved from desisting from alliances would
immediately be lost on much greater home defences that would become necessary if
Britain was France's only enemy.114 Alliances were good for trade at present, and
would enable Britain to press for better peace terms in the future.115 For public
consumption, then, ministers displayed great trust in Britain's allies, although they
also blamed them for Britain's misfortunes in the war when it was convenient to do
so.116
To Dundas, the navy afforded Britain its best security for outlasting the
struggle with France and its best hope for obtaining satisfactory terms at the peace
109 See Duffy, 'BritishWar Policy',passim.
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113 Ibid., xxx, 1320, Canning, 31 January 1794. See also ibid., xxxi, 1294-9, Pitt, 5 February 1795.
114 Ibid., xxxi, 1395, Pitt, 24 March 1795; ibid., xxxiii, Pitt, 4 April 1797. See also ibid., xxxiv, 43-
62, Canning, 11 December 1798.
115 Ibid., xxxiii, 240-1, Grenville, 4 April 1797; ibid., xxxiii, 471, Pitt, 1 May 1797.
116 See, for example, ibid., xxxiii, 1341, Grenville, March 1798.
77
negotiations.117 The navy was required to defend the country from invasion and to
protect and sustain Britain's overseas trade and its far-flung colonies; more
aggressively, it was used to destroy French ships, to blockade French ports
(suffocating trade and rendering the French navy inactive), to prevent neutral ships
from supplying France with military goods or from transporting French goods
elsewhere and to sustain military ventures across the world. Nelson's victory at
Aboukir Bay in August 1798 was crucially important, not just for the safety of
British trade with India, but also because it encouraged Russia's eventual entry into
the war in the following year.118
The navy's role in defending British colonies and acquiring enemy
possessions was perhaps the strategy most vehemently promoted by Dundas. 'It is
my conviction unalterably fixed,' he wrote, 'that either with a view to peace or
war...a compleat success in the West Indies is essential...No success in other
quarters will palliate a neglect there...By success in the West Indies alone you can
be enabled to dictate the terms of the peace.'119 He argued that British overseas
markets were not at present booming and that Britain must acquire new markets, if
possible at the expense of its traditional rival, France (or of Spain or Holland, when
they were later commandeered to fight for France). The West Indian trade supplied
money to finance the British war effort and to subsidize the allies; moreover, it was
only sensible to operate in the West Indies when the British army had had to
withdraw from Europe in 1795. Dundas's anxiety about the West Indian situation
was great, for slave revolts under French revolutionary influence threatened to
deprive Britain, not France, of colonies. He warned that 'the loss of Jamaica in the
present moment and state of the country would be complete ruin to our credit and
put you at once at the feet of the enemy.'120 For strategic reasons, it also seemed to
him important to retain possession of Gibraltar and to capture Malta, thus
maintaining British strength in the Mediterranean.121 Dundas was fearful of
Napoleon's intentions in Egypt towards Britain's trade with India, as was Lord
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Elgin, the British ambassador in Constantinople.122 He saw no need, however, for
the overthrow of the Paris government—his aim was the greatness of Britain and the
diminution of French power, not the destruction of the Revolution.
Lord Malmesbury believed that, once Holland had been conquered by
France, it was 'an act of political duty' for Britain to seize Dutch possessions in
India and retain them until the legitimate Dutch government should be restored.123
Pitt, too, was often persuaded by Dundas's arguments; but Grenville played down
the threat to the colonies and to the Indian trade, and he failed to see the value of
Malta.124 His main concern from a naval point of view was to defend the practice of
regulating neutral shipping against its critics.125 The King, too, was often doubtful of
Dundas's colonial strategies, understanding the necessity of defence and acquisition,
but believing that they diverted troops from more urgent purposes.126
For all the arguments in favour of Continental or maritime warfare, however,
the issue of military interference within France itself was bound to play a substantial
part in the government's discussions on the conduct of the war as ministers came
increasingly to hope for the overthrow of the French revolutionary government,
from mid-1793 onwards. At first they looked for an internal counter-revolution
which, by re-establishing the Bourbon monarchy in France, would eventually lead to
the restoration of general peace in Europe; but it was more realistic to recognize that
external force would be necessary. Interference within France was justified in
Parliament by claims that it was necessary to obtain sufficient security and
reparation for the war from France and that attack was the best form of defence.127
The King was naturally a supporter of the counter-revolutionary cause. On the
capture of Toulon, he wrote: T trust this is the real beginning of a counter revolution
in France, and I am proud that history must admit that the conduct of England has
struck the first essential blow in the cause of religion, law and the rights of
humanity, as well as of every civilized nation.'128
122 BL Add. MSS 37274 ff.45-53, Dundas to Grenville, 13 June 1798; LCGII1, iii, 419-420, 425-6,
Dundas to George III, 28 September and 9 October 1800; BL Add. MSS 40102 ff.89-90,
Memorandum by Dundas, 3 October 1800; PRO WO 1/344 ff. 117-9, Lord Elgin to Dundas, 11
November 1799.
123 Malmesbury Diaries and Correspondence, iii, 241, Malmesbury to Grenville, 3 February 1795.
124 See, for instance, BL Add. MS 40102 f.81v., Grenville to Dundas, 23 April 1800.
125 Jupp, Lord Grenville, p. 158; P.M., xxxi, 1444, Grenville to the House of Lords, 24 March 1795;
BL Add. MSS 38734 ff.325-6, Grenville to Dundas, 29 November 1797. Grenville also published the
Letters ofSulpicius. On the Northern Confederacy (London, 1801).
126 LCGI11, ii, 493, George III to Dundas, 3 July 1796; ibid., 121-2, George III to Dundas, 16
November 1793; ibid., 384, George III to Dundas, 19 August 1795; ibid., 553, George III to Dundas,
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To Windham, 'all blows not aimed at the body of France [were] thrown
away',129 and he used every argument he could think of to induce Pitt and Grenville
to honour their promises of supplies to the French royalists and to commit
themselves further to them. The French royalists could not survive on mere
goodwill, and yet very little would be enough to please them. If Britain meant to win
the war, surely it should utilize whatever help it could find. A counter-revolution
would never be effected by continental campaigns outside France alone, and Britain
must set Austria a good example in its treatment of the French royalists.130 Even if
an attempt to attack France on its own ground failed, the worst that could happen to
Britain was 'a necessity of making peace without accomplishing the object, that can
alone make peace desireable, the overthrow of the Revolutionary Government. But
is not this necessity all but incurred the moment you say, that nothing is ever to be
attempted from hence in the Interior of France?'131
Dundas, however, was willing to use British forces only to establish a secure
communication with the French coast, for the purpose of transporting supplies:
'operations in the interior must be carried on by the French themselves'. This would
leave British troops available for what, to him, were more important purposes.132 He
pronounced himself 'a sceptic on all that subject':
...we have constantly amused ourselves and trifled away the time
in forming fancies about splendid expeditions to act with men [the
French royalists] who did not stand in need of such aid, who, I
truly believe, are infinitely better without it and who would have
found no difficulty in forming as many armies as they pleased...if
we had directed their hopes and expectations solely to that
object.133
Given the Cabinet's lack of united effort in one direction, it is not surprising
that they tended to take an ambiguous attitude towards the French royalists. Most
ministers saw the support of French counter-revolutionary activity as a device to
weaken rather than to defeat France,134 and they were reluctant to stir up
insurrection until they could be sure of supporting it with a concerted allied push
129 Mackesy, War Without Victory, pp.22-3,37, 166; Dropmore, v, 271-2, Windham to Grenville, 10
August 1799.
139 BL Add. MSS 37846 f.56, Windham to Grenville, 24 October 1797; Dropmore, iv, 101,
Windham to Grenville, 22 February 1798; BL Add. MSS 37846 f.75v., Windham to Grenville, 2 May
1799; ibid., f. 170, Windham to Grenville, 1 November 1799.
131 BL Add. MS 37844 f.225, Windham to Pitt, 27 December 1799.
132 BL Add. MS 40102 f.5, Dundas to the Duke of York, 25 July 1795; see also ibid., ff.59-68,
Memorandum by Dundas, 22 July 1800.
133 Dropmore, v, 493, Dundas to Grenville, 20 October 1799; quotation in Fry, The Dundas
Despotism, p.211.
134 See, for example, PRO 30/8/102 f. 119, Pitt to the Earl of Elgin, 16 November 1793.
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into France. French ultra-royalists and constitutional royalists were bitterly opposed,
and the British government was reluctant to support one group more than another.
For this reason, ministers hesitated at first to ally with the emigre French princes,
who, in any case, did not endear themselves to the British government by their
arrogance and refusal to co-operate with the constitutionalists. Nor did ministers
always altogether trust Frenchmen of any political persuasion to oppose any
description of French government more than they opposed a British attack.135
Wholehearted support was denied by the government's willingness to consider
treating with any form of stable French government. Government inefficiency and
uncertainty combined to frustrate counter-revolutionaries intensely, as supplies
failed with monotonous regularity to arrive as promised and the synchronization of
uprisings and aid was never achieved.136 Authority was divided between British
paymasters and French leaders, coordination was poor and skilled direction of
campaigns consequently often failed to materialize. The British more often than not
used the counter-revolutionaries in order to further their own designs, Puisaye being
a notable example of this.137 Until British devotion to the counter-revolutionary
cause matched French revolutionary zeal, it was unlikely to succeed.
Nevertheless, the government's intention while it held Dunkirk, Toulon and
Corsica was to restore civil government to its pre-revolutionary principles; and,
while British aid was usually too little and too late, it was enough at least to help
sustain the French resistance until Napoleon's consolidation of power in 1800.138
Indeed, the resources and attention paid in increasing proportions as the war
progressed to the underground war with France make it one of the major aspects of
the struggle. Because Britain rarely had either a bridgehead or an army of any size in
western Europe, ministers had to rely on military activity among the French
population if the revolutionary government was to be overthrown. The ministry was
135 BL Add. MS 38230 f.220, Auckland to the Earl of Liverpool, 7 July 1795.
136 See, for example, BL Add. MSS 37846 ff. 12-13, Windham to Grenville, 16 December 1795;
Dropmore, iii, 223,William Wickham to Grenville, 19 July 1796.
137 See Maurice Hutt, Chouannerie and Counter-Revolution. Puisaye, the Princes and British
Government in the 1790s (2 vols.: Cambridge, 1983), esp. pp.97, 152-161, 325-7, 525; Michael
Duffy, 'British Diplomacy in the French Wars 1789-1815', in Dickinson (ed.), Britain and the
French Revolution, pp. 134-6. C.f. P.PI., xxxiv, 1272, Canning to the House of Commons, 3 February
1800: 'If we could bring the royalists through by the same efforts by which we were working for our
own advantage, surely it was highly useful, and honourable, and humane, to do so: but we were not
pledged to persevere beyond what we thought prudent on our own account...'. Also BL Add. MS
34453 f. 151, Auckland to Pitt, 18 January 1795.
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in contact for long periods of time with the royalist Puisaye in Brittany and the
constitutionalist d'Andre, and Grenville's agent William Wickham, based in Geneva
but with contacts all over western France, worked extremely hard for the furtherance
of counter-revolution. The Duke of York fired propaganda material in hollow shells
into Valenciennes in the midst of his siege of the town.139 Pitt may or may not have
allowed the bribery of French officials and speculation against the assignat to
encourage the collapse of the Republic, but it is indisputable that increasingly large
sums of money were spent by the British government to support the counter¬
revolution in France. Each time Britain assisted the counter-revolutionary cause in
France, as Ehrman notes, the government was carried a step further towards
endorsing the goal of a restored monarchy.140 For the benefit of MPs, ministers
portrayed the royalists as the 'multitudes of the French nation [who] wanted only
protection and support, to bring them forward to crush that convention, under which
[their] evils had become insupportable.'141 However much ministers began by using
the royalists as simply another weapon in their own war against the revolutionary
government of France, their assistance to the royalists looked like sympathy for their
aims and propelled them further in that direction than they might otherwise have
gone.
Ministers were, at the same time as they tried to formulate a successful war
strategy, preoccupied with unrest at home and in Ireland—so much so at times that it
hindered the effective waging of the war.142 Especially before 1796, the government
seriously feared an insurrection in Britain planned by the radicals in conjunction
with the French Jacobins, and these fears returned in full force with the naval
mutinies at Spithead and the Nore in 1797, keeping the government worried for a
full three months.143 As Michael Duffy writes, 'One of the most unnerving aspects
of the French Revolution for the governments of Europe was the uncertainty of its
popular impact.'144 Events of the war against France became inextricably entwined
with domestic circumstances: John Ehrman remarks that 'the Glorious First of June
139 Hutt, Chouannerie and Counter-Revolution-, Mitchell, The Underground War-, W.R. Fryer,
Republic or Restoration in France? 1794-7 The Politics of French Royalism, with particular
reference to the activities ofA.B.J. d'Andre (Manchester, 1965); Burne, The Noble Duke of York,
p.57.
140 Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, p.582.
141 P.H., xxxi, 414, Dundas, 14 April 1794.
142 Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, pp.340-2, notes that Pitt's anxieties about internal unrest in
spring 1794, and the steering through Parliament of the bill to suspend habeas corpus, caused the
fateful delays in sending essential instalments of the subsidy to Prussia, thus delaying the arrival of
the Prussian troops till they were too late to be of any use that year.
143 See P.H., xxxi, 498-9, Pitt, 13 May 1794.
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owed much of its reception to the damper it put on a French descent: not the least of
its significance was, it seemed, to seal the arrests [of radicals] of May.'145
The government passed legislation to repress sedition—the Traitorous
Correspondence Act (1793), the suspension of habeas corpus (1794-5, 1798-1801),
the Two Acts against Treasonable Practices and Seditious Meetings (1795), and the
Combination Acts (1799-1800). Close surveillance was kept over radical activities,
the small secret service collecting details from magistrates, customs officials and the
post office all over the country. Spies, informers and agents provocateur were used;
radicals were tried for sedition in Scotland in 1793-4 and for treason in England in
1794. The militia was revitalized and new Volunteer Companies were established all
over the country to add to the government's strength in defending the country
against external aggression and internal unrest. Volunteer Corps were sanctioned in
1794;146 the Supplementary Militia Act was passed in 1796; the militia were
introduced into Scotland for the first time in 1797; and the Defence of the Realm Act
was passed in 1798, to collect details of all adult males and the service they could
render the state, thus showing a shift in government policy, as Linda Colley notes,
'from seeking quality support at home to seeking it in quantity.'147 Recruitment for
the army and navy was a constant concern for ministers, and resort had to be made
to crimps, press-gangs, quota schemes and the Militia Volunteers Act of 1799,
whereby militiamen might put themselves forward for foreign service, despite
ordinary regulations restricting their use to their own counties.148 Dundas, however,
was so sanguine that he claimed privately to be hoping for an invasion attempt, in
order to prove to Britain, France and the rest of the world the independence and
invulnerability of Britain.149
Public opinion was taken also seriously by ministers, who had been taught its
power by the Ochakov crisis of 1791. The war was 'marketed' with diligence:
victories were puffed, defeats were excused and strategy was justified.150 The Loyal
145Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, p.401.
146 P.H., xxxi, 89-91, 26 March 1794, 'Plan for Providing more completely for the Security of the
Country'.
147 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (London, 1992), pp.289-290; P.H., xxxiii,
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more militia officers to extend their services to Ireland, a possibility which was sanctioned before the
Act was passed in the autumn of that year. The Marquess of Buckingham had been pressing for his
regiment ofmilitia to be used abroad since May 1798—see Dropmore, iv, 218-227, passim.
149 Dropmore, iv, 48, Dundas to Grenville, 5 January 1798. See also P.H., xxxv, 1089-90, Dundas,
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Associations begun in November 1792 in London were instigated and organized by
John Reeves, but they were welcomed and encouraged by ministers.151 Days of
general fasts and thanksgiving were proclaimed several times a year. Propaganda
was used in an attempt to deceive the French,152 but it was mostly directed at the
British public. The government sponsored a considerable number of pamphlet and
tract writers, spending about £5000 in the 1790s for this purpose. Various ministers
and senior government officials—Pitt, Grenville, Dundas, James Bland Burges,
Canning, Hawkesbury, Loughborough, Windham, Auckland and Long—were
personally involved, either in terms of patronage of writers or by their own writing
for publication. The rhetoric was largely crusading in tone.153
By his own confession, Pitt's forte was economic rather than military,154 and
his ingenuity in public finance was exerted to the full to pay for the war. In 1793
Britain spent £8.137 million on the conflict; in 1796 the figure was £28.254
million.155 New indirect taxes were regularly announced; assessed taxes were raised;
a 'Loyalty Loan' was raised in December 1796; a Voluntary Contribution was
appealed for in 1798 (to which George III himself subscribed £20 000); a new land
tax was established, also in 1798; income tax was introduced in 1799; public loans
were raised to finance the allies; and the National Debt rose swiftly while the
sinking fund deepened. The run on the Bank in early 1797 was the only serious
public scare concerning the government's ability to pull the country through
financially.156
There were, however, constant complaints to that effect from those who
opposed the war and from the manufacturing and merchant communities, and
frequent rumblings of economic distress among the lower orders. Ministers took
steps to reassure them and to refute their arguments. They interfered with grain
imports, exports, and prices; they collected information on its nationwide
151 H.T. Dickinson, 'Popular Loyalism in Britain in the 1790s', in Eckhart Hellmuth (ed.), The
Transformation ofPolitical Culture. England and Germany in the Late Eighteenth Century (Oxford,
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real attack planned for Walcheren.
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production;157 and they insisted on the economic buoyancy of the country despite
the war.158 'Scarcity' was caused by poor harvests, they argued, not by the war, and
it was a mark of Jacobinism to claim otherwise.159 Any inconvenience suffered by
commerce due to the war would have been caused by the Continental conflict in any
case, even if Britain itself were not involved.160 Windham declared that he did not
believe that any MP had deprived himself of anything because of war hardship, and
'he held it as a maxim, that if the rich felt no suffering, the poor also were not likely
to feel any'.161
With respect to the management of Parliament during the war, the Pitt
administration, though frequently constrained by the need to justify every move
before it, was rarely in difficulties. By and large, it had the confidence of MPs, and
they were, if anything, more firmly loyal in the more difficult phases of the
conflict.162 The Foxite Opposition was troubled by internal dissension over the
Regency crisis of 1788-9, the French Revolution, domestic radicalism and the war,
and some of its usual adherents began to drift away to support Pitt after 1791, when
Burke moved to the Treasury benches. The split was gradual and reluctant, but Pitt
and his colleagues did all they could to encourage it, wooing the Duke of Portland
and his followers till eventually they joined the government in July 1794, leaving a
remnant of only 35 to 60 MPs loyal to Fox.163 The government could therefore
usually count on a very comfortable majority.
The strain of conducting the war and of keeping pace with continental events
as well as of the domestic situation told heavily on ministers, however, and while it
was a great triumph for the Pittites to have gained the Portland Whigs, this brought
additional stresses to Cabinet decision-making because of their firmly crusading
opinions. Lady Elliot, after meeting various ministers in the winter of 1796, wrote,
'It appears that they never agree on any point. The jealousy is so great between the
old and the new party that they have no communication.'164 The progress of the war
157 Emsley, British Society and the French Wars, pp.43-5; LCGIII, ii, 352, Grenville to George III, 7
June 1795.
158 See [Lord Hawkesbury], Reflections on the Present State of the Country (London, 1796);
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159 Auckland, Some Remarks on the Apparent Circumstances of the War, pp.55-6; P.H., xxxiv, 1445-
7, Pitt, 13 February 1800; ibid., xxxiv, 1458, Windham, 13 February 1800; ibid., xxxv, 525-7, Pitt, 11
November 1800.
160 P.H., xxx, 1484, Pitt, 6 March 1794.
161 Ibid., xxxi, 1031, Windham, 30 December 1794.
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Britain', p.247; ch. 4 below.
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itself was rarely very encouraging: as Auckland noted morosely in June 1794, 'it is a
sad part of the Consideration that ten victories decide nothing in our favour, but that
one serious defeat would probably carry the French in three weeks to the Borders of
Holland at least.'165 They were often working in the dark, from second-hand reports
of events and conditions, and communications were maddeningly slow.166 The
weather often frustrated carefully planned strategies—Grenville wryly called Sir
Ralph Abercromby 'a second Jonas' who seemed to attract storms at sea, and who
perhaps ought to be thrown overboard.167 When the divisions between the allies,
splits among the French royalists, a lack of proper communication and consultation
between ministers and the military establishment,168 and rows between the army and
the navy169 are also considered, it is clear that the government had no mean task to
perform simply to keep the British war effort moving.
V
In February 1793 Grenville had instructed Auckland that nothing but a French
disavowal of all their offensive decrees, a guarantee that France would make peace
with Austria, Prussia and Sardinia on reasonable terms and the renunciation of all
recent French conquests would be considered by Britain as satisfactory peace terms.
Conciliatory measures concerning the emigres would help the process
considerably.170 The ministry's belligerent stand was gradually worn down,
however, by the domestic and external pressures of unremitting warfare, until peace
negotiations appeared to be a more reasonable option. By late 1794, the course of
the war was discouraging, public opinion was restless and Wilberforce, one of Pitt's
personal friends, had decided that he must press publicly for negotiations.
Nevertheless, ministers held out until the autumn of the following year
before they announced that they were ready to talk with the French government. In
the debate on Wilberforce's second motion for peace, in May 1795, Pitt once more
rejected it, but he hinted that a change might not be far off: 'To look for negotiation
165 BL Add. MS 38229 f.244, Auckland to Liverpool, 23 June 1794.
166 See Minto (ed.), Life and Letters, ii, 276-7, Elliot to Hugh Elliot, 2 October 1794; ibid., 345-6,
Lady Elliot to Lady Malmesbury, 8 June 1796.
167 Dropmore, vi, 233, Grenville toWickham, 20 May 1800.
168 Dropmore, v, 190, Abercromby to Grenville, 24 July 1799; Mackesy, Statesmen at War, pp. 166,
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169Minto, Life and Letters, ii, 232-3, Elliot to his wife, 13 March 1794; BL Add. MS 38735 ff. 142-3,
Spencer to Dundas, 23 September 1798; ibid., 41852 f.70, Grenville to Thomas Grenville, 25 October
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170 BL Add. MS 34447 f.432, Grenville to Auckland, 4 February 1793.
86
at the present moment is premature, though I look to it at no remote period.'171 The
failure of the First Coalition and of the attack on Quiberon, together with financial
strains, the increasing unpopularity of the war at home and the new, more moderate,
French constitution of September, encouraged the Cabinet to offer to negotiate.
Auckland's pamphlet, Some Remarks on the Apparent Circumstances of the War in
the Fourth Week ofOctober 1795, advised ministers to seek peace, if it could be had
from France on honourable terms.172 Windham was appalled. 'The Moment of
Peace is yet, I hope, so far distant,' he wrote to Burke on 17 January 1796, 'that
chance may still do much to save us from so dreadful a catastrophe: I mean of course
Peace with a Jacobin Republic.'173
This was the crucial issue of the debate concerning peace negotiations in the
1790s. How far was it safe to treat with a revolutionary republic, which would
inevitably mean granting it recognition as a valid international state? To government
policy, the question of safety was less one of political philosophy and more one of
territorial security, though that was not always true of individual government
ministers. Ministers never stated categorically that they would not treat with a
republic, but rather that they could not treat with the French Republic so long as it
continued to flout international laws and treaties and therefore to be unreliable so far
as the guaranteeing of peace terms was concerned.174 This allowed them to set
negotiations on foot whenever they themselves judged the situation to be right, both
internally and externally.
George III, once reconciled to the idea of a war in November 1792, remained
inflexibly opposed to negotiating for peace from the outbreak of hostilities in
February 1793, both in order that the Revolution should be completely destroyed
and that Britain should obtain as many colonial gains as possible. He also thought it
humiliating to have Britain's overtures for peace rejected time and time again by the
revolutionaries of France.175 'No disaster can make me think the treating for peace
either wise or safe whilst the French principles subsist.'176 Four days before giving
171 Rhys (ed.), Orations ofPitt, p.91, 27 May 1795.
172 pp.41-6.
173 BL Add. MS 37843 f.94v.
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the Address from the Throne in October 1795 which announced the government's
willingness to negotiate, he made his opinion clear to the Foreign Secretary: 'Unless
the French are thoroughly reduced, no solid peace can be obtained, and no attempt
ought to be encouraged of opening a negotiation, which even has the effect of
destroying all energy in those who ought to look forward to the continuance of
war.'177 The proposal in April 1797 to attempt to re-open negotiations with France
was 'a measure that from the bottom of my heart I deplore'.178 In July 1800, despite
his hostility to the expedition to Ferrol proposed by Dundas, the King told him that,
in his view, 'Anything that will keep off making peace with France till it has an
established Government on which some confidence can be placed is certainly
desirable'.179
The ministry was always anxious that its final peace settlement with France
should be a general treaty, rather than one of several separate settlements between
France and all the other belligerents.180 Ministers knew that the French would
rejoice at the opportunity to pick one Power off after another, isolating Britain in
order to range all its force against it. Both in June 1796 and in June 1800, almost
certain of an Austrian withdrawal and knowing that Britain could not lure Austria
into persevering in the struggle by offering to finance another year's warfare for it,
they determined also to engage in peace talks.181 In any case, Auckland wrote,
Britain was fighting to restore the peace of Europe in general, not to achieve petty
and partial pacifications.182 Thus, the continental alliances involved ministers in
walking a tightrope between urging the European powers to continue in the war and
making sure that they were included in the peace.183
Armistices were also avoided, being viewed by ministers as dangerous and
unprecedented. It was an unfair restriction which would allow France to gain at the
expense of Britain, for if Britain agreed to halt naval hostilities, France and its allies
could replenish their fleets, unhindered by the blockade of their ports. It was certain
to lead to disputes between the two countries as to its exact regulation.184 The
pressure of public opinion and the discouragement of Marengo caused the Cabinet
(from which Dundas and Windham were absent) to decide to agree to an armistice in
177 Ibid., ii, 414, George III to Grenville, 25 October 1795.
178 Stanhope, Life ofPitt, ii, 445, George III to Pitt, 10 April 1797.
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September 1800, but Napoleon refused the British terms, and ministers were instead
persuaded to pursue Dundas's project of an Egyptian expedition.
The government attempted to negotiate peace with France several times—in
March 1796, October 1796 and in July 1797—but ministers, and particularly
Grenville, were pessimistic about the possibility of settlement.185 A proposal of
negotiations from Napoleon at the end of December 1799 was rejected on the
grounds that his government had not yet proved itself to be any more stable than its
revolutionary predecessors. Ministers had also just ratified a new Loan convention
with Austria on 10 December, and they were hopeful that, this time, Britain and
Austria would work in concert to achieve better results by continuing the war
together than by holding talks immediately with Napoleon.186 Peace began to look
more likely, however, as Napoleon consolidated his power;187 and, when the chance
of another coalition looked slim, after the Austrian defeat at Marengo in June 1800,
and the northern powers of Russia, Denmark and Sweden joined together in early
1801 as an armed neutrality against British interference with neutral shipping, it was
not surprising that the new Addington administration of March 1801 aimed for
peace from the start.
Ministers spent much more time arguing that the war should be continued
than justifying their decisions to seek a peace settlement. The leitmotiv running
through all the variations on this theme was that inherent to all the French
revolutionary governments was a spirit of dangerous aggression. This had been
displayed in the decrees of 19 November and 15 December 1792, in the over¬
running of Savoy and the Austrian Netherlands, in the French declaration of war
against Britain and the United Provinces on 1 February 1793, in the ravaging of the
countries that they conquered, in the fact that France had not at any stage sought
peace with Britain and in their refusing the overtures and terms that Britain offered
for peace. They sought to subvert the British constitution and substitute French
democracy for it. The failure of negotiations 'was not to be imputed to his majesty's
ministers, but solely to the unjust and exorbitant views of the enemy', demonstrated
by the irritating language of the French and their evasion of the liberal and just
proposals of the British government.188 Even when Napoleon offered to negotiate at
185 Jupp, Lord Grenville, pp.197, 205-7.
185 Duffy,' BritishWar Policy', pp.388-390.
187 P.H., xxxv, 509, Grenville, 1800; BL Add. MSS 41852 ff.60, 62-3, Grenville to Thomas
Grenville, 23 and 25 September 1800.
188 P.H., xxxii, 1494-7, Grenville, 30 December 1796; Declaration. His Majesty's benevolent
Endeavours to restore to His People the Blessings of Secure and honorable Peace, again repeated
without Success (Westminster, 28 October 1797).
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the end of 1799, ministers were suspicious of his pacific claims.189 Britain's grounds
for war against France, therefore, still held.
It was maintained by ministers that, despite various changes of
administration and constitution, Jacobinism was still alive in the French government.
As Windham explained in May 1795, after the fall of Robespierre, 'The present
boasted system of moderation acquired all its praise only from being contrasted with
the former infamous proceedings of the government.... Compared with other
governments, the government of France was still distinguished for injustice,
violence, and insult'. Malmesbury complained that negotiating with revolutionaries
was entering into uncharted territory: ' I should give them more credit, if the people
with whom we have to deal were like others; but they are not governed by the same
rules and principles, and the causes and effects do not agree when applied to them,
as they would were they like the rest of mankind.'190 Ministers sometimes conceded
that the French government was becoming more 'negotiable',191 but the Jacobin
argument could be resorted to whenever they wanted to revive support for the war.
Despite his private doubts, by 1800, Dundas agreed in public that Jacobinism was
still alive: 'I contend, that this proclamation [the Edict of Fraternity of 19 November
1792] contains the code of the revolution, and that its spirit never has been departed
from.'192 Moreover, peace was highly unlikely to produce a more moderate system
of government in France. The armies would return to France only to stir up the
internal hostilties and to crush what was left of moderation in the country.193
Napoleon Bonaparte's character underlined the continued vitality of Jacobinism in
France, and made negotiating risky. His previous record, ministers claimed, showed
him to be destructive, unreliable, perfidious, unprincipled and insincere.194
Because of the general unreliability of the revolutionary governments of
France and because of the continued activity of Jacobinism in them, government
ministers argued that, even were they to conclude peace with France, it would not be
a real peace in the true sense of the word, for it would be impossible for Britain to
189 Rhys (ed.), Orations of Pitt, pp. 134-5 (10 May 1796), 377 (27 November 1800) 77-80 (26
January 1795); P.H., xxxiii, 1014, Pitt, 8 November 1797; ibid., xxxiv, 1207, Grenville, 28 January
1800.
190 P.H., xxxii, 11-2, Windham, 27 May 1795; MalmesburyDiaries and Correspondence, iii, 548, 10
September 1797.
191 P.PI., xxxi, 1256, Grenville, 27 January 1795; Rhys (ed.), Orations ofPitt, p.125, 9 December
1795.
192 P.H., xxxiv, 1243, Dundas, 3 February 1800; see also ibid., xxxiv, 1456-7, Windham, 14
February 1800.
193 P.H., xxxii, 14, Windham, 27 May 1795; Rhys (ed.), Orations ofPitt, pp.59-60, 30 December
1794.
194P.//., xxxv, 417-8, Windham, 9 July 1800; ibid., xxxiv, 1215-1220, Grenville, 28 January 1800;
Malmesbury Diaries and Correspondence, iv, 52-3,64-6,28 March 1801 and 8 April 1802.
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reduce its navy, demobilize its army, or relinquish its conquests. At best it could
afford only 'a temporary and delusive repose' to Britain, 'a feverish and troubled
slumber, from which we should soon be roused to fresh horrors and insults.'195 Not
only would a so-called peace with France expose Britain to physical attacks, but it
would also clear the way for the more effective transportation of French
revolutionary ideas to the British people, firstly because a negotiation would imply a
formal recognition of the French system of government, and secondly because, in
peace, it would be open to French agents to travel to Britain in numbers and to stir
up sedition and insurrection. Even in 1801 Windham was arguing that though under
Bonaparte's regime democratic principles were no longer operative within France
itself, he was still eager to export them and so throw other countries into turmoil,
ready to be conquered by his armies.196 Negotiation would also tend to depress
Britain's allies and the French counter-revolutionaries. It would inflame French
pride and increase their demands, and it would eventually place the other nations of
Europe at the mercy of Jacobin violence. The Solicitor General found this idea
'disgraceful in the extreme: it was telling our allies that we regarded their interests
only while they were successful; but that the moment they were unfortunate, we
would negotiate without them, and leave them to their fate.'197
Another tactic used by ministers to persuade MPs and public opinion that
the conflict should be continued and peace rejected for the time being, was to
emphasize British and allied successes and to express optimism concerning Britain's
ability to finance and resource the war. Auckland complained in 1797 that the war
was talked of 'as if it had brought upon us a continued series of losses and defeats;
and yet there never [had] been a war in which we have obtained such glory or
success.' Dundas called on MPs who, though admitting triumphs to the navy,
grumbled about the failures of the army, to recall that in all the conquests made for
Britain by the navy, the army too had been gloriously involved; and that the
ministers who had planned the operations of the army had also planned those of the
navy.198 In 1795 Pitt argued that the British situation had improved materially since
the beginning of the war, and he ridiculed the plight of the inflated assignat.
Hawkesbury, in a pamphlet of 1796, argued that there was cause for alarm
195 P.H., xxx, 1326-7, Canning, 31 January 1794; ibid., xxxi, 260, Pitt, 10 April 1794; ibid., xxxi,
1014, Canning, 30 December 1794.
196 Rhys (ed.), Orations ofPitt, pp.84-5, 26 January 1795; P.H., xxxi, 1030, Windham, 30 December
1794; ibid., xxxvi, 107-8,Windham, 3 November 1801.
197 P.H., xxx, 1019, Pitt, 17 June 1793; ibid., xxx, 1283, Pitt, 21 January 1794; ibid., Canning, 11
December 1798; ibid., xxxv, 426, the Solicitor General, 9 July 1800.
198 P.H., xxxiii, 753, Auckland, 30 May 1797; ibid., xxxv, 648, 1068, Dundas, 27 November 1800
and 25 March 1801.
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concerning the increase in the national debt only when national resources were not
also proportionately increasing; since he could demonstrate that this was not in fact
the case, there was no need for anxiety. In 1800 Canning claimed that the presence
of an armed neutrality against Britain was a proof of the envy that its wealth and
comfort inspired in other nations, and Windham maintained that the French were
'bleeding to death', while the British wound was as yet 'skin-deep'.199
When other arguments wore thin, ministers resorted to the voice of authority.
It was the King's responsibility to make war and peace, according to the
constitution, not Parliament's. It was inevitable that the government should know
more about the details of the situation than anyone else could do, and it therefore
was more likely to be correct in its judgement.200 The desire of the British people for
peace was no necessary reason for abandoning hostilities. Ministers took it for
granted that peace was preferable to war to the majority of British subjects, but they
would not believe that the country would wish them to surrender its honour, good
faith and character.201
Periodically, however, ministers sought to negotiate with the French
Republic, and they therefore had to justify the abandonment of their usual, rather
Burkean, arguments against peace, both among themselves and to Parliament. Peace
talks could be used for tactical purposes, whether or not ministers believed a peace
likely to be concluded: they could stop Austria making peace on its own with France
and ceding the Belgic provinces.202 Ministers argued that the French people were
very likely to be desperate for peace, and that they would put considerable pressure
on their government to produce it. If their rulers refused it, the resulting uproar in
France would seriously weaken its government.203 It could be argued, when it suited
ministers, that negotiating itself was harmless, although at other times they might
argue that it was an admission of weakness. Auckland stated his opinion in October
1795 that it was ' the duty of those who conduct the war, to treat for peace whenever
negociation can tend to any probable good,' a comfortably vague stipulation. He
expressed himself more strongly to Pitt. 'My private opinion has ever been that it is
right in War to treat at all times; & that there are few Channels thro which a prudent
199 Ibid., xxxi, 1032, Windham, 30 December 1794; ibid., xxxii, Pitt, 29 October 1795;
[Hawkesbury], Reflections on the Present State of the Country, pp.7-9; P.H., xxxv, 453, Canning, 18
July 1800; ibid., xxxv, 677, Windham, 1 December 1800.
200P.//., xxxi, 682, Hawkesbury, 30 May 1794; Rhys (ed.), Orations ofPitt, p.92, 27 May 1795;
P.H., xxxii, 16-7,Windham, 27 May 1795.
201 Ibid., xxxiii, 417, Pitt, 10 April 1797; see also ibid., xxxv, 940-1, Windham, 8 February 1801.
202 Jupp, Lord Grenville, p. 197; Mackesy, War Without Victory, p. 139.
203 Malmesbury Diaries and Correspondence, iii, 452, Malmesbury to Grenville, 6 August 1797.
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Government may not sound the ground of pacification without risque of mischief &
always with possible advantage.'204
Negotiation could be seen as a useful domestic policy even if it failed to
produce peace with France. At the first announcement of the British government's
willingness to negotiate, in December 1795, Dundas claimed that the British people
were in a safer frame of mind than previously, and that it was now worth risking a
negotiation—encouraged by government actions, they had renounced their interest
in French principles and were indeed wary of them. Poor harvests in 1795 and 1799
inflamed discontent with the continuation of the war, which was a more forceful
motivation. As Pitt explained to the King, it was better to take steps towards peace
before Parliament and the country forced his hand; if they failed, the attempt ought
to convince the public that the ministry was sincere in its desire for peace whenever
it could reasonably and honourably be achieved, and so elicit a wholehearted
national support for the war effort.205 In 1797 ministers were particularly worried
that Britain lacked the financial resources to continue in the conflict. As much as he
disapproved of negotiating, even Grenville was persuaded of its value in April 1797
by this consideration.206 Certainly, by 1801, public anxiety about the war's effects
on British industry, commerce and finance impelled the Addington administration to
seek peace, together with the likelihood that Britain could not form another,
successful coalition with the European Powers against France. Cornwallis wrote to
his brother in November 1801 from Paris, where he had been sent to negotiate the
preliminaries of peace: 'I have long considered peace to be necessary for the
preservation of our Country, and I did not therefore feel myself at liberty to refuse
the mission when it was pressed upon me, altho' nothing could be more disagreeable
to me.'207
The supporters of the Treaty of Amiens viewed it as a peace signed from
necessity, and they did not necessarily approve wholeheartedly of all its provisions.
Pitt had been consulted regularly and had encouraged the new ministry in
constructing it. He had always been the driving force behind the government's
attempts to negotiate with France in the 1790s. Malmesbury said of him that 'even
204 Auckland, Some Remarks on the Apparent Circumstances of the War, p.42; BL Add. MS 34454
f.37, Auckland to Pitt, 30 July 1796. See also Rhys (ed.), Orations ofPitt, pp. 146-7, 6 October 1796.
205 Stanhope, Life ofPitt, ii, 439-440, Pitt to George III, 30 January 1796.
206 Mackesy, War Without Victory, p.120; Dropmore, iii, 310-1, Grenville to George III and Cabinet
Minute, 9 April 1797.
207 National Maritime Museum, Greenwich Piereafter NMM], COR/60, Marquis Cornwallis to his
brother, 10 November 1801; P.H., xxxvi, 40, Hawkesbury, 3 November 1801; ibid., xxxiv, 83,
Addington, 3 November 1801; Dropmore, vi, 439-440, William Wickham to Grenville, 9 February
1801.
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when he declaimed the loudest and with the greatest emphasis for a continuation of
the war, his real and genuine opinion went for peace', because of his preoccupation
with Britain's financial state.208 Now he viewed it as an honourable way out of a
war that was exhausting Britain financially and one which would give Britain time
to renew its strength and forces. Writing to Charles Long on 1 October 1801, to tell
him that the Preliminaries had been signed, he commented: 'The Terms, tho not in
every Point precisely all that one could wish, are certainly highly creditable, and on
the whole very advantageous.'209
Dundas was relatively happy with it because it maintained British supremacy
in India (although he was angry about the surrender of the Cape of Good Hope and
the ambiguous situation in which Malta was left, because of the importance of
British trade routes to India), and he appealed to MPs not to criticize the settlement
too much for the sake of the morale and loyalty of the British people. He himself did
not want 'at the close of [his] political life to appear in open conflict with Mr.
Pitt.'210 Spencer Perceval was shocked at the terms, but he too kept his fears silent
out of loyalty to Pitt.211 Lord Auckland told MPs that the big picture was more
important than the details—Britain had been forced into a just and necessary war
and had come out, having lost nothing and gained several acquisitions.212 Lord
Mulgrave admitted that the treaty was such as to be unlikely to create such regret or
humiliation in France as to provoke it to an early renewal of hostilities, and he
believed that the maintenance of political unity at home was more important than
criticizing the terms of the treaty.213 Lords St. Vincent (now First Lord of the
Admiralty), Moira, Cornwallis and Nelson favoured the peace.214 The King, like
most of these, supported the government rather than the peace itself, which he called
'an experimental Peace', but one that was 'unavoidable'. He had been reluctant
throughout the 1790s to negotiate with France, and he did so now only from a sense
that it was necessary to support the new government. He was still dubious on 5
March 1802 that France would actually sign the treaty.215
208 Ehrmaii, The Reluctant Transition, p.628; Jupp, Lord Grenville, p.280; MalmesburyDiaries and
Correspondence, iv, 50,23 March 1801; ibid., 53,29 March 1801.
209 Mackesy, War Without Victory, p.208; PRO 30/8/102 f. 174, Pitt to Long, 1 October 1801.
210 P.H., xxxvi, 679-686, Dundas, 5 May 1802; ibid., xxxvi, 775-6, Dundas, 13 May 1802;
Matheson, Life ofDundas, p.319.
211 Gray, Spencer Perceval, p.47.
212 Ibid., xxxvi, 703, Auckland, 13 May 1802. See also BL Add. MSS 45279 ff. 123-4, Auckland to
Sheffield, 21 October 1801, for his private doubts.
213 Philip Ziegler, Addington: A Life ofHenry Addington, First Viscount Sidmouth (London, 1965),
p.123; Dropmore, vii, 61-2, Mulgrave to Grenville, 18 October 1801.
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Lord Grenville was adamantly opposed to the settlement. He thought the
government irresponsible and foolish to throw away so many of Britain's conquests,
including the Cape, Malta and Egypt, to allow the British evacuation of all ports in
the Mediterranean and the Adriatic, and to make no provision for the Low
Countries.216 These concessions had been 'lavished as the price of a peace which
neither these nor any concessions can render permanent', for Britain was left without
means to continue the war or to secure itself in peace against the rapacious ambition
of Napoleon, and thus in a more vulnerable position than when it was at war.
Moreover, he could not consider the security of Europe restored until the
revolutionary taint was completely washed away.217 Windham, in the Commons,
fully agreed with him. To him, the Treaty of Amiens seemed 'the death-warrant of
[his] country', and he refused to call it 'an honourable peace', since it was not even a
safe peace. The colonies that had been ceded should not be thought of in mere
physical and economic terms, but also in terms of the esteem and prestige they
brought to Britain and the extent to which Britain was disgraced by losing them;
and, in economic terms, Britain could not rely on its wealth to sustain it in Europe if
it was 'scattering pearls like barleycorns' on such a scale. Like Grenville, he thought
that 'Nothing...can...be more idle than this hope of the extinction of Jacobinism,
either as an instrument to be used by France, should her occasions require it, or as a
principle ever to be eradicated out of any community in which it has once taken
root.'218 Britain had shamefully abandoned its allies, particularly the French
royalists.219
Canning disliked the peace, because Addington had made it, but he said
little, out of loyalty to Pitt. Earl Spencer said that 'no single object of the war had
been obtained, and that [Britain] had sacrificed all means of protection.'220 The Earl
of Minto (Sir Gilbert Elliot) also agreed with Grenville, and visited him to discuss
the issue of opposing the government on the treaty.221 Malmesbury had said in
March 1801 that the measure of making peace at all at this juncture was 'unwise and
weak', because of France's disproportionately strong bargaining position and
continued to oppose it.222 Thomas Grenville also spoke out in the House of
216 Jupp, Lord Grenville, pp.309-310; P.H., xxxvi, 163-170, Grenville, 3 November 1801; ibid.,
xxxvi, 688-697, Grenville, 13 May 1802.
217 Dropmore, vii, 48, Grenville to Dundas, 4 October 1801; BL Add. MS 34455 f.463, Grenville to
Auckland, [1801].
218 P.H., xxxvi, 13-15, Windham, 29 October 1801; ibid., xxxvi, 89, 99, 125-130, Windham, 3
November 1801; ibid., xxxvi, 742,Windham, 13 May 1802.
219 Ibid., xxxvi, 133-8,Windham, 3 November 1801.
220 Ibid., xxxvi, 160, Spencer, 3 November 1801
221 Minto (ed.), Life and Letters, iii, 229, Minto to his wife, 17 December 1801.
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Commons against the peace, and the third Grenville brother, the Marquess of
Buckingham, was of like mind. The Duke of Richmond, still piqued at having been
replaced by Cornwallis as Master General of the Ordnance in 1795, opposed the
treaty and said that peace had only been required because of the incompetent
conduct of the war by ministers.223
The old Pitt administration, split in private on the strategy to be adopted
during the war, had now split in public on the nature of the peace. Windham,
persuaded by the Grenvilles not to mix the question of the restoration of the French
monarchy with the general question of the peace treaty in the debates in the
Commons, yet managed to give an excellent summary of the two main positions on
the war and the peace. The one was aimed primarily against the Jacobin spirit of the
French Revolution, the other against France as a territorially acquisitive power.
Because of this confusion, he said, the country as a whole 'never knew sufficiently
why it was at war', and therefore clamoured for peace incessantly, more than in any
previous war. 'This error has pursued us into peace,' he declared. 'No person who
looked at the causes of war, could have looked at the terms of peace without
alarm.'224 Yet perhaps the Pittites and even Dundas had been closer to the Burkeans
than Windham gave them credit for. They had recognized the menace of Jacobinism
and they had tried to defeat it, not wholly, as he had wanted, but partially, in its
external aspect, in its dealings with the world outside France.
223 Alison Gilbert Olson, The Radical Duke: Career and Correspondence of Charles Lennox, Third
Duke ofRichmond (Oxford, 1961), p. 107.
224 Dropmore, vii, 66-7, Thomas Grenville to Grenville, [23-31 October] 1801; P.H., xxxvi, 747-
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3. Loyalists and War Crusaders
'Thus, happily, the prudence of the administration, co-operating with the energy of
the community, has saved the metropolis from conflagration, and the constitution
from destruction,' Sir George Dallas wrote in 1793.1 H.T. Dickinson, Ian R. Christie
and others have argued that the conservative activists won the ideological contest of
the French Revolutionary period in Britain not just because of the resilience and
popularity of establishment institutions, or government repression of radicals, but in
large part also because of the essential attractiveness of their arguments to the
general public, as opposed to the proposals of the radicals, and because of their
persuasive tactics.2 This chapter will consider the wartime conduct and opinions of
those people in Britain who were not merely part of an acquiescent majority in the
country, but who were 'energetic' in supporting Britain's war against revolutionary
France.3
Philip Schofield and David Eastwood have emphasized the variety and
frequent ambiguity of British conservative thought and propaganda in response to
the Revolution in France and the threat of domestic radicalism.4 The views of
Edmund Burke and of the British government have now been examined, and this
chapter attempts to plot the attitudes of their supporters along the spectrum of
conservative thinking about the the struggle against the French revolutionaries, and
to show how far they were influenced by government policy and by Burke's
opinions. Conservative writers and activists will here be considered under the two
general headings of 'loyalists', those who by and large supported government
policy, and 'crusaders', those who campaigned for a more hardline, Burkean strategy
1 Sir George Dallas, Thoughts upon our Present Situation, with Remarks upon the Policy ofa War
with France (London, 1793), p.5.
2 See, for example, H.T. Dickinson, Liberty and Property (London, 1977), pp.270-318; idem.,
'Popular Conservatism and Militant Loyalism 1789-1815', in Dickinson (ed.), Britain and the French
Revolution, pp. 103-27; idem., 'Popular Loyalism', pp.503-33; Ian R. Christie, Stress and Stability in
Late Eighteenth-Century Britain: Reflections on the British Avoidance ofRevolution (Oxford, 1984);
idem., 'Conservatism and Stability in British Society', in Philp (ed.), The French Revolution and
British Popular Politics, pp. 169-87; J.C.D. Clark, English Society 1688-1832 (Cambridge, 1985).
3 The claim that there was a remarkable surge of popular loyalism in the 1790s is not nullified, pace
RogerWells (Wretched Faces: Famine in Wartime England, 1793-1801 (Gloucester, 1988), p.6), by
the economic tensions of the decade which ensured that general public opinion was unreliable as a
source of government support. Loyalists were, by definition, committed activists, at least for part of
this decade, if not in all cases for all of it—it is not claimed that active loyalism was constant or
consistent throughout the long struggle of the 1790s.
4 Thomas Philip Schofield, 'Conservative Political Thought in Britain in Response to the French
Revolution', Historical Journal, xxix (1986), 601-22; David Eastwood, 'Patriotism and the English
State in the 1790s', in Philp (ed.), The French Revolution and British Popular Politics, pp. 146-68.
See also Donald E. Ginter, 'The Loyalist Association Movement of 1792-93 and British Public
Opinion', Historical Journal, 9 (1966), 179-90.
97
in the war. This division is more accurately represented as a crusading subset of a
loose union of conservative, loyalist forces than as two separate groups, since there
was much overlap of activity and attitudes. Each of these groups is examined in turn,
first in terms of their activities during the war and then with regard to their recorded
and published opinions concerning it.
I
It was necessary for the governing elite, believing itself to be under threat externally
from France and internally from radical activity, to be able to rely upon at least the
passive support of the majority of the British people. For this, they had to enlist the
active support of a significant proportion of the population, who could help them
ensure a general consensus of loyalty and patriotism. The government did not resort
to military conscription or excessive coercion, as the French republic did in order to
enlist support; it preferred to depend upon and, to some extent, to harness voluntary
efforts on its behalf, thus leaving the social and political structure of the British state
unchanged. This was only possible, however, because such active loyalist efforts
were willingly made available.5 It is difficult to tell how many of the British
population were 'loyalist' in this way, as opposed to merely passively loyal,
uninterested, or even hostile, but it is likely that loyalists were to be found in most
sectors of society, seeking to defend whatever benefits—political, economic,
religious or moral—they perceived the present social order to have conferred upon
them against the common menace of Jacobinism.6 French principles threatened the
British social and political hierarchy which, since they protected private property,
loyalists believed to be advantageous to all but the very bottom ranks of society.
These principles were also hostile to the Established Church and to the Christian
religion itself which upheld the political and social system and consoled those who
were least well-off under it, according to loyalists. Judging by events across the
Channel, they were also destructive of public order and morality.
From the time of the royal proclamation against seditious literature of May
1792, loyalists began rallying to support the government.7 In response to the
5Eastwood, 'Patriotism and the English State', pp.150-1,167-8.
6 Emily Lorraine de Montluzin, The Anti-Jacobins 1798-1800: The Early Contributors to the 'Anti-
Jacobin Review' (London, 1988), p. 15. See also Robert R. Dozier, For King, Constitution and
Country: The English Loyalists and the French Revolution (Lexington, 1983), pp.78-9; Colley,
'Whose Nation?', p. 114, on the social composition of Volunteer corps.
7 Though the basis of this movement was already established by the active Church-and-King
opposition to the Dissenting campaign of 1790 for the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts, and
this, in turn, was not a new phenomenon.
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proclamation, though with no direct request from ministers, at least 386 addresses of
gratitude had been sent from cities, towns and counties by September of that year.8
By August, with the overthrow of the French monarchy, pamphlets and newspaper
articles had begun to participate in the demonstration of loyalism; the alarm of
November caused by domestic rioting and French aggression in Europe multiplied
these dramatically.9 On 20 November 1792 the loyalist Crown and Anchor
Association was formed by John Reeves, soon gaining government approval and
encouragement.10 It also attracted many letters of support and offers of help and
emulation from around the country, and within months it had spawned hundreds of
similar societies.11 The loyalists had risen, almost wholly without government
intervention, because of the threat to the constitution posed by British radicalism,
and they were further galvanized and propelled into the public arena by the
exponential increase of the domestic threat caused by French events. It was not until
1 December 1792 that a second royal proclamation called out the militia and
assembled Parliament. Many further loyal addresses were then sent to the King and
Parliament, often boasting thousands of signatures each.12 Far from having planned
such a 'paroxysm of loyalty', ministers were incredulous at their good fortune:
Grenville called it 'little less than miraculous'.13
By January 1793, with the trial and execution of Louis XVI, 'domestic
hysteria was shading into war fever'.14 The Times continually exhorted ministers to
declare war against France throughout December 1792 and January 1793: 'We had
better have them as an open enemy than a perfidious neighbour, which they have
long been,' it advised as early as 6 December, and on 22 January it professed
gladness that matters between Britain and France were 'at length drawing to a very
8 Dozier, For King, Constitution and Country, pp.1, 14-15; the London Gazette, May - September
1792, passim.
9 Gayle Trusdel Pendleton, 'English Conservative Propaganda During the French Revolution, 1789-
1802', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Emory University, 1976), p.341. See also PRO HO 42/22/474-v.,
John Massey to F. Freeling, 22 November 1792.
10 On the vexed question of government involvement in the creation of the Loyal Association
movement, see Michael Duffy, 'William Pitt and the Origins of the Loyalist Association Movement
of 1792', forthcoming in Historical Journal (1995). Duffy uses newly available evidence to show that
the government did not have prior knowledge of Reeves's plans, but that they quickly seized on it and
moulded it in order to answer their own concerns and those of the many demands they had received
for a similar scheme to be established.
11 Dozier estimates that nearly 1500 Loyal Associations, possibly as many as 2000, may have been
established within weeks of the Crown and Anchor Association's formation (For King, Constitution
and Country, p.62). See also Dickinson, 'Popular Loyalism', pp.517-8; Austin Mitchell, 'The
Association Movement of 1792-3', Historical Journal, 4 (1961), 56-77; Ginter, 'The Loyalist
Association Movement'.
12 Dickinson, 'Popular Loyalism', pp.520-1.
13 Murley, 'Origins of the War', p.324; Dropmore, ii, Grenville to Auckland, 18 December 1792.
14 Pendleton, 'English Conservative Propaganda', pp.403-4.
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near crisis.' War against France added patriotism to the loyalists' character, for it
obliged them to defend the King and the British constitution not only against internal
sedition but also against a foreign enemy. Military defeat of the revolutionary armies
would prevent the French from menacing Britain not only on their own behalf, but
also from doing so in conjunction with the British radicals. The war breathed fresh
vigour into the loyalist movement, by giving it a new raison d'etre, and this was to
sustain it when, by the mid-1790s, the domestic radical threat had ebbed. Loyalist
addresses became pro-war effusions: the Sun reported on 1 March 1793 that the
Corporation of Bridport had intimated that its subscription of £1200 'for the
suppressing of Tumults and Insurrections' was now to be 'as loyally applied in
increasing the Bounties to Seamen'.
Since the loyalists' war, like that of the government, was fought on two
fronts, they continued to generate and distribute printed propaganda against radical
doctrines. This propaganda was even more powerful than that written before the
outbreak of the conflict, however, for it could now associate radicalism not only
with the chaos inside France but also with French aggression towards Britain. It
included morality tracts, pamphlets, histories of the Revolution and the war, songs,
handbills, newspapers, periodicals, sermons, novels, plays, poetry and literary
reviews, directed at various classes of readers and far outdoing their radical
counterparts in terms of volume, sales, variety, and social and geographical spread.15
They were sold by booksellers or street-hawkers, or distributed freely or at a greatly
subsidized rate by loyalist societies. Pamphlet production never repeated the peak of
1792, but the invasion crisis of 1797 produced nearly as many new pamphlets (about
370 compared with about 440) in that year.16 Many novels and pamphlets began
with an apologia similar to that which prefaced George Walker's novel, The
Vagabond, declaring their authors' didactic intentions: 'I am aware how
insignificant are my attempts...but perhaps a Novel may gain attention, when
arguments of the soundest sense and most perfect eloquence shall fail to arrest the
feet of the Trifler from the specious paths of the new Philosophy.'17
Some loyalist writers, such as John Reeves, Herbert Marsh and Nicholas
Vansittart, were paid by the Treasury, which seemed even more concerned to defend
15 Dickinson, 'Popular Conservatism and Militant Loyalism', p. 110.
16 Pendleton, 'English Conservative Propaganda', p.172.
17 George Walker, The Vagabond, A Novel (3rd edition, 2 vols.: London, 1799), i, p.vi; see also, for
example, Desultory Thoughts on the Atrocious Cruelties of the French Nation: With Observations on
the Necessity of the War, and a Calm Admonitory Address to all English Jacobins (Bath, 1794), p.iv;
andWilliam Playfair, Thoughts on the Present State ofFrench Politics, and the Necessity and Policy
ofDiminishing France, for Her Internal Peace, and to Secure the Tranquillity of Europe (London,
1793), pp.9-10.
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the ministry's war policies by this means than it had been to crush radicalism before
1793. It does not seem, however, that the government deliberately provoked war
alarms in order to stir up loyalism, for the output of other conservative writers rose
and fell in parallel with government writers throughout the decade. Treasury
pamphlets, and even those written by commission for the loyalist associations, were
only a small proportion of the whole. Writers often felt the need to protest that they
were neither ministerial hirelings nor 'downright jacobins', and that their thinking
was independent.18 Much propaganda was written by minor, local figures-
ministers, schoolteachers, magistrates and civil servants, often involved in their local
loyalist associations—as well as by prominent national names, and pamphlets and
handbills might be reproduced and adapted to serve the needs of different regions of
the country.19 The Sun newspaper was established in October 1792 and controlled
by the Treasury, as was the True Briton\ and the Star, The Times, the World, the
Public Ledger and Woodfall's Diary were subsidized.20 The Observer was also
loyalist, as were many of the provincial newspapers, such as the Caledonian
Mercury, the York Courant and the Leicester Journal.21 Just as individual pamphlets
often took issue with individual radical or anti-war pamphlets, so loyalist
newspapers frequently quarrelled with the reports and leader columns printed in the
opposition papers and, indeed, sometimes with those in other loyalist papers. This
maintained a lively polemic well after 1792, although the newspaper debate was
often conducted among rivals in terms of the accuracy of reported 'facts' as well as
in terms of opinions.22 Popular propaganda reasoned simply and emotively; other
loyalist literature argued in greater complexity and depth.
Loyalists also tried to suggest various tactics to ministers, and for this they
did not rely only upon the indirect means of their propaganda. Magistrates and many
others wrote to the Home Office with their fears and recommendations, sometimes
at great length, on such matters as recruitment, national defence and even
18 Pendleton, 'English Conservative Propaganda', pp.399, 145-6, 357; see, for instance, The Dutch
Expedition Vindicated, with BriefObservations on the Emigrants (London, 1799), p. 16.
19 Part of [Theodore Price], Humble Advice to Sundry Sorts of People, by Job Nott, Bucklemaker
(Birmingham, February 1793) was reprinted from [Theodore Price], Brother Fustian's Advice to the
Inhabitants ofManchester and Salford (Manchester, December 1792).
20 Pendleton, 'English Conservative Propaganda', pp.50-2.
21 Dickinson, 'Britain and the Ideological Crusade Against the French Revolution', in L. Domergue
and G. Lamoine (eds.), Apres 89 La Revolution Modele ou Repoussoir, (Toulouse, 1992), p. 162.
22 See, for instance, The Times of 18 June 1794 on the surrender of Ypres; of 21, 22 and 24 April
1797 on the naval mutiny at Portsmouth; of 20 October 1797 on the failure of the peace negotiations
at Lisle; and the Sun of 9 January 1800 on the government's rejection of Bonaparte's offer of peace
negotiations.
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international strategy.23 Far from requiring the prompting and organization of
government, they frequently stressed the need for the efforts of individuals in the
battle against domestic radicalism and revolutionary France. 'It is almost
dishonourable, at a period like the present,' declared the Sun on 1 March 1793, 'for
any man to be out of active employment in the service of his Country.' Every
individual had it in his power to do some public good, and neglect was a desertion
worse than treason, according to a pamphlet of 1798. Theodore Price's popular 'Job
Nott' pamphlets specifically addressed various classes within the lower orders-
male and female artificers, 'old maids', 'young widows', wealthy inhabitants, house
servants, travellers, manufacturers, overseers of the poor, farmers, and so on.24 They
believed that the British people fell into just two groups—those who fought for their
country and those who fought against it.25
There were various other ways in which loyalists could identify with the
cause of the government. Raising and contributing to subscriptions was one of the
most popular means of demonstrating practical support. Robert R. Dozier has shown
that there were three main subscription drives in 1793: in February and March, for
bounties to encourage naval recruitment, from March to July, for money to help war
widows, orphans and dependants, and, in the winter of 1793-4, for funds to buy
clothing and other items for the British army in Flanders. The 'king's bounty' to
enlisting seamen was £5; in London, it was increased to £13 by the contributions of
the City and various loyalist organizations.26 Loyalist newspapers commended these
efforts and ran their own fundraising schemes. The Sun claimed that its subscription
in aid of war widows and orphans, opened on 28 February 1793, had by 19 March
23 See PRO HO 42/20-50, passim. See also BL Add. MSS 27916, ff.32-53, 'A Letter. To the Right
Hon.ble William Pitt. By a Freeman of Southampton. 1793'; PRO HO 42/24/190-227, Thomas
Parker to Evan Nepean, 21 January 1793; ibid., 42/24/640-1, M. Marchington to George III, 24
February 1793; ibid., 42/29/474-82, William Playfair to Dundas, 24 April 1794; NMM, MEL/2,
letters from William Craig Harborne, 7-9 January 1793, and 'J.S.', 16 April 1791-19 May 1793; ibid.,
MEL/6, letter from Capt. A. Blair, 3 March 1798; ibid., MEL/9, letters from Col. W. Fullarton, Sept.
1796 and 31 July 1798, andWilliam McDowell, 1798.
24 'An Address to the Association of the Parish of St. Martin in the Fields, Formed for the
Preservation of Liberty and Property Against Republicans and Levellers' [1792], in the British
Library collection of songs and broadsides at 648.c.26, f.98; Our Good Old Castle on the Rock: Or
Union the One Thing Needful. Addressed to the People ofEngland (3rd edition: London, 1798), p.5;
[Theodore Price], A Continuation ofmy Last Book, or a Back Front View of the Five HeadedMonster
(Birmingham, 1798), pp.6-7; [Theodore Price], Further Humble Advice from Job Nott (Birmingham,
1800), pp. 1-6.
25 John Somerville, A Short Address to the Yeomanry of England, and Others (Bath, 1795), p.35;
Desultory Thoughts, p.vii.
26 Dozier, For King, Constitution and Country, pp. 105-111. See also PRO HO 42/24/526-v.,
42/25/36, bounties offered by the inhabitants of Ashburton, 16 February 1793, and by the Totnes
Loyalist Association; ibid., 42/27/131-v., 145-v., 42/28/88-9,42/32/203, subscriptions raised by John
Brookfield, 13 November 1793, by Richard Baugh, 14 November 1793, by the Society at the Crown
and Anchor, 19 January 1794, and by the Oracle newspaper.
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1793 raised nearly £5000, 'exclusive of the Ladies' Subscription on the same plan'.
Some pamphlets declared that the profits from their sale would be given to similar
causes, thus encouraging a double loyalty in their potential purchasers.27 Later,
loyalists could donate to the government's Loyalty Loan of 1796 and the Voluntary
Contribution of 1798.28 There were also loyalist meetings, addresses, street
processions, banquets, demonstrations, church services, the singing of 'God Save the
King' at the end of theatre performances, and public ceremonies on days of victory
celebration and at the departures of troops and sailors for the front.
Some loyalists had, even before the outbreak of hostilities, proposed a further
and more radical form of endeavour: military vigilance against both internal and
external enemies. In February 1793, the London Chronicle reported that numbers of
gentlemen living on the south coast of England had formed themselves into mounted
patrols to defend their property against French attack. In March 1794, ministers
permitted the official formation of armed Volunteer companies, to be financed,
again, by public subscription. At first, these were composed almost wholly of the
comfortably-off and socially respected. In 1798, however, with heightened fears of
French invasion, mass enlistment was encouraged. By 1805, the Volunteer force
could boast 450 000 men, the largest organization in Britain.29 There were problems,
for local finance and enthusiasm were not inexhaustible, especially at times when
there appeared to be no tangible threat to combat; and there were uncertainties
among the propertied elite concerning the political wisdom of arming such a number
of ordinary people.30 Moreover, it is likely that many enlisted in Volunteer corps
27 Desultory Thoughts (1794) was one such pamphlet.
28 D.G. Vaisey, 'The Pledge of Patriotism: Staffordshire and the Voluntary Contribution, 1798', in
M.W. Greenslade (ed.), Essays in Staffordshire History (Staffordshire Record Society, 1970), pp.209-
23.
29 Clive Emsley, British Society and the French Wars 1793-1815 (London, 1979), p.38; Dickinson,
'The French Revolution and Counter Revolution in Britain', p.253; J.R. Western, 'The Volunteer
Movement as an Anti-Revolutionary Force', English Historical Review, 71 (1956), 603-14; J.E.
Cookson, 'The English Volunteer Movement of the French Wars, 1793-1815: Some Contexts',
Historical Journal, 32 (1989), 867-891. See also PRO HO 42/29/281-8, William Ogilvie to [Dundas],
[March 1794]; Arthur Young, in The Annals ofAgriculture, xviii (1792), 495; ibid., xxvi (1796), 516-
21; ibid., xxvii (1796), 49-54, 528-38; ibid., xxviii (1797), 177-87, 441-3; idem., The Example of
France A Warning to Britain (4th edition: London, 1793), pp. 139-142; idem., An Idea of the Present
State of France, and of the Consequences of the Events Passing in that Kingdom (2nd edition:
London, 1795), pp.34-6; idem., National Danger, and the Means of Safely (London, 1797); M.
Bentham-Edwards (ed.), The Autobiography of Arthur Young with Selections from his
Correspondence (London, 1898), pp.203-6; James Rennell, War With France the Only Security of
Britain, at the Present Momentous Crisis: Set Forth in an Earnest Address to His Fellow-Subjects, by
an Old Englishman (London, 1794), p. 13; Somerville, A Short Address; Thoughts on the Defence of
These Kingdoms (London, 1796), pp.2-34, 57-81; the Sun, 5 February 1794.
30 Eastwood, 'Patriotism and the English state', pp.159-160; Rev. Samuel Partridge, 'Observations
on aMilitia of Property', in the Annals ofAgriculture, xxi (1793), 513-6.
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less from social conviction than from social pressure to do so.31 Nevertheless,
Volunteering showed the willingness of many loyalists to take to arms to defend the
political and social order which protected their property; it also served as a powerful
weapon of visible propaganda by its drilling, uniforms and parades; and it provided
opportunities for loyalist sermons to be preached and published, especially at
ceremonies for the presentation of colours to individual companies.32 Its use as a
weapon against domestic radicalism was held to be fully as important as its function
of defence against a French invasion: as Sir James Grant of Inverness wrote to the
Duke of Portland in 1798, 'they are fully as proper in the Interior Highlands as on
the Coast—as they counteract the private Wandering disseminators of Sedition'.33
Loyalists could also act as Special Constables during particularly alarming riots,
such as the London 'crimp' riots of August 1794.34
Loyalists practised intimidation on radicals in other ways. They broke up
radical meetings, physically attacked them and their property, prosecuted the
authors, printers and distributors of radical literature, offered rewards for evidence
leading to the arrest of radicals, opposed licences to innkeepers whose public houses
were used for radical meetings, refused to employ radicals, excluded them from
clubs and withdrew custom from their businesses.35 Victimization of suspected
'Jacobins', as Marilyn Morris notes, 'was sanctified by being carried out under the
guise of protecting the King,' and it was encouraged by the lack of legal protection
given to radicals and by the government's prosecution of prominent radicals for
treason and sedition in 1793 and 1794.36 Many people were anxious to dispel any
taint of radicalism cast upon them: the Sun reported on 1 March 1793 that 'the
respectable inhabitants of the Town of Dundee have stood forth in vindication of
their character, against the unjust aspersions of disloyalty, and tendency to riot and
sedition, which have been circulated, on account of the trifling riot that happened
there.' This anxiety could only have been increased by the frequent claims made of
wide national loyalty and unity. The Sun declared that the high numbers of sailors
31 Western, 'The Volunteer Movement', pp.611-2; see also Cookson, 'The English Volunteer
Movement', p.890.
32 PRO HO 42/34/118, Newcastle Military Association, 28 January 1795.
33 PRO HO 50/40, Sir James Grant to the Duke of Portland, 23 February 1798, postscript.
34 John Stevenson, 'The London "Crimp" Riots of 1794', International Review ofSocial History, 16
(1971), 56.
35 Dickinson, 'The French Revolution and the Counter-Revolution in Britain', p.254; idem., The
Politics of the People in Eighteenth-Century Britain (London, 1995), pp.281-2; Mitchell, 'The
Association Movement of 1792-3', pp.67-71; John Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics in
England and Wales, 1790-1810 (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1983), pp. 121-2.
3^ Marilyn Ann Morris, 'The Monarchy as an Issue in English Political Argument During the French
Revolutionary Era', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of London, 1988), pp.193, 221-2; Ehrman,
The Reluctant Transition, pp.391-2.
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enlisting without the use of impressment in Edinburgh 'proved' that the lower as
well as the upper classes were 'deeply impressed' with the justice and necessity of
the war. Still more presumptuously, it claimed in September 1793 that the jury's
verdict against Thomas Muir showed that 'the People in Scotland' would give no
support to Jacobins.37 Earl Fitzwilliam assured the House of Lords in 1794 that 'the
west riding of Yorkshire was unanimous in its sentiments...satisfied with the
measures of government in regard to the war, and grateful for the steps that had been
taken to preserve us from the contamination of Jacobin doctrines.' Lord Gower
claimed in 1798 that the same opinions were held by the whole country.38
II
Robert Hole suggests that Burke influenced popular conservative pamphlets in the
'Rights of Man' debate more in terms of their general standpoint than in terms of
their specific content. Their authors focused on different topics than those Burke
addressed, and they relied less on solid argument and more on emotive appeal.39 His
argument may also be generally accepted in terms of the debate on the war against
revolutionary France for, in their published responses to it, loyalists tended towards
a slightly more crusading line than ministers but one less rigid than that of Burke.
While they often presented the war as an ideological crusade, they also defended the
deviations of ministers from the logic of a strictly crusading strategy. Moreover,
they emphasized issues which were of most direct and immediate concern to the
insular British public, those which would appeal to the emotions of national
chauvinism and individual self-interest, and they paid less attention to the European
questions which in different ways worried both Burke and the government, and to
the philosophical possibilities which caused Burke so much anxiety.40
Before the 1790s an ambivalent attitude towards the French had prevailed
among the British people. French intellectual life and fashions were admired,
particularly by the upper classes, and those who could afford it were keen to travel to
France. There was even some sympathy for the early stages of the French
Revolution among those who would later become staunch supporters of the war
against France. William Playfair, who wrote several loyalist pamphlets, claimed that
37 TheSun, 23 February 1793, 13 September 1793.
38 P.H., xxxi, 675, Earl Fitzwilliam, 30 May 1794; ibid., xxxiii, 1545, Lord Granville Leveson
Gower, 20 November 1798.
39 Robert Hole, 'British Counter-revolutionary Popular Propaganda in the 1790s', in Jones (ed.),
Britain and Revolutionary France, pp.53-69.
40 See Black, British Foreign Policy, p.423.
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against France. William Playfair, who wrote several loyalist pamphlets, claimed that
he had been a member of the French National Guard earlier in the Revolution; and
Arthur Young, who developed crusading opinions after the war broke out, had
earlier published two volumes, entitled Travels in France during the Years 1787,
1788, and 1789, which were broadly sympathetic to the Revolution.41 There was
also, however, a well-established anti-Gallicism at the forefront of British
xenophobia. This had been fostered by military rivalry throughout the eighteenth
century, so that France was seen as the 'natural' enemy of Britain. By the later part
of the century, it was also thought by some that British admiration of French culture
had gone almost so far as to be described as cultural conquest.42 In the Alien Bill
debate on 21 December 1792, the Duke of Leeds said that 'he would always be so
much of an Englishman, as to believe it unlikely that a Frenchman should be a friend
of England.' Lord Abingdon said, a few months later, that 'he was born and bred, as
his ancestors before him were, an Antigallican; that he had lived to be confirmed in
these principles, to find that they were not falsely implanted in his mind'.43 The Sun
declared, in tones of high glee, on 19 March 1793: 'It is glorious, it is animating to
see, that the old antigallican spirit which has so often led the British Arms to fame
and victory is again roused, and that it reigns with increased ardour throughout the
Nation.' It had been widely expected that the French armies would be soundly
defeated by the Duke of Brunswick's offensive campaign in September 1792, and
loyalists were shocked when the reverse occurred. They criticized the German
armies' failure severely, but they agreed that the war between France and Austria
and Prussia was entirely the responsibility of an aggressive France.44
Many of the arguments used by loyalists to defend the justice and necessity
of the British war against revolutionary France were very similar to those used by
ministers, but they were less concerned about France's violations of international
laws and treaties than the government, and more preoccupied by the need to defend
41 Playfair, Thoughts on the Present State ofFrench Politics, p.24; Arthur Young, Travels, During
the Years 1787, 1788, and 1789. Undertaken more particularly with a View of ascertaining the
Cultivation, Wealth, Resources, and National Prosperity of the Kingdom ofFrance (2 vols.: London,
1792); idem., The Example of France A Warning to Britain (first published 1793; 4th edition,
London, 1794), pp.3-4.
42 Gerald Newman, The Rise ofEnglish Nationalism: A Cultural History 1740-1830 (London, 1987),
pp.72-3.
43 P.H., xxx, 160, the Duke of Leeds, 21 December 1792; ibid., xxx, 732, Lord Abingdon, 22 April
1793.
44 William Black, Reasons for Preventing the French, Under the Mask ofLiberty, From Trampling
Upon Europe (London, 1792), p.4; Remarks on a Pamphlet Published as Mr. Fox's Speech, at the
Opening of the Parliament, Including Some Observations on the Nature and Causes of the Present
War (London, 1793), pp.46-7; A Letter to the Right Hon. Charles James Fox; In Which is Proved the
Absolute Necessity of an Immediate Declaration ofWar Against France (London, 1793), pp. 17-9;
[John Jones], Sentiments on a War With France (London, 1793), p.31.
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Britain and its property, constitution, religion and commerce. They were horrified by
the atrocities committed by the revolutionaries, both within France and outside it,
and many, who had previously sympathized with the Revolution or had been
indifferent to it, began to revile it. The massacres of September 1792 appeared to
confirm that anarchy prevailed in France, and the execution of Louis XVI re-
emphasized the brutality and savagery of the revolutionaries. These events
frightened British loyalists and caused them to worry that they and their king might
not be invulnerable to similar treatment. The Times thought that, rather than by
making verbal protests about the French king's execution, 'the combined Powers of
Europe will better speak their regret by the noise of cannon bursting over the heads
of these unparalleled workers of iniquity.' Poems and sermons were composed, and
prints sold, to commemorate Louis, and some loyalists believed that Britain ought
not to see such horrors perpetrated with impunity.45
The poverty and chaos within France was trumpeted, especially in contrast
with the blessings of living under the British constitution, in order to teach the lesson
that the example of France was a terrible warning to Britain and any who sought
speedy political change there-
No religion or laws the vile Jacobins own;
Their God they deny, and their King they dethrone;
To gain their own ends the poor people they cheat,
Then leave them to starve, not a morsel to eat.46
Almost more threatening to loyalists, however, especially after the war had broken
out, were the fact that the French had invaded other states and had 'disorganized' the
political and social order there themselves, and the fear that they might plan to do
the same to Britain. The violence of the French revolutionary system, or
'Jacobinism', was terrible not only because of its example from within France, but
also because the French were actively encouraging radicals elsewhere to follow suit
and, indeed, taking a lead in imposing it on other countries. The Jacobins had failed
to overturn the British constitution by underground methods and had now resorted to
open warfare to achieve the same purpose. Since French principles were now being
45 Murley, 'Origins of the War', pp.53-5; William Laurence Brown, An Examination of the Causes
and Conduct of the Present War with France; and of the Most Effectual Means of Obtaining a
Speedy, a Secure, and an Honourable Peace: Together with some Observations on the Late
Negotiation at Lisle (London, 1798), pp.30-1; The Times, 17 and 18 December 1792, 5 February
1793; [Jones], Sentiments on a War with France, pp.34-5.
46 The Anti-Gallican Songster No. / (London, 1793), p.3; see also Desultory Thoughts, pp.vii-xxv;
The Times, 19 December 1792, on Fox.
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propagated by force of arms (though such conduct was contrary to those principles),
it was necessary to resist them in the same manner.47
The destruction of the continental balance of power by the revolutionaries'
progress of conquest through the states of Europe was also a solid justification for
war. France was greedy for territorial aggrandizement and its armies left
governments in tatters in their wake. Robert Burns wrote: 'As to France, I was her
enthusiastic votary in the beginning of the business.—When she came to show her
old avidity for conquest...I altered my sentiments.'48 While it was admitted that
monarchical France had also been eager to expand its frontiers, it was maintained
that the Revolution inevitably produced war, and war of a more barbaric and
uncivilized nature than before 49 More pertinent, however, was the memory that
France harboured a permanent hatred for Britain, and the belief that this was now
being manifested in various insidious designs to crush it.50 Two of the reasons for
the French invasion of the United Provinces were doubtless to enable France to pose
a greater threat to Britain and its commerce, and to draw Britain into conflict against
France, since it was certain that Britain would go to war to defend its ally,
Holland.51 James Rennell thought it his duty 'to impress on [every Briton's] mind,
that the progress of French arms and influence in Europe must infallibly lead to this
catastrophe', the establishment of a French revolutionary government in Britain.52
47 An Answer from John Bull to Thomas Bull (London, 22 December 1792); Black, Reasons for
Preventing the French, pp. 10-11,40-4; Observations Upon the Present War with France (Glasgow,
1793), p.6; Nicholas Vansittart, Reflections on the Propriety of an Immediate Conclusion ofPeace
(2nd edition: London, 1794), p.51; Brown, An Examination ofthe Causes and Conduct of the Present
War, pp.33-4.
48 Robert Bums, quoted in Arthur Palmer Hudson and Virginia Mary Hudson, "The Coast of France
How Near!" French Invasion and English Literature, 1793-1805', in The South Atlantic Quarterly, xl
(1941), 275; Black, Reasons for Preventing the French, p.10; P.H., xxx, 291-3, Lord Beauchamp, 1
February 1793; ibid., xxx, 1112-1126, Lord Mornington, 21 January 1794; Brown, An Examination
of the Causes and Conduct of the Present War, pp.28-30.
49 [Maurice Morgan], Considerations on the Present Internal and External Condition of France
(London, 1794), pp.7, 13-4, 38-9; Black, Reasons for Preventing the French, p. 11; Herbert Marsh,
The History of the Politicks ofGreat Britain and France (2nd edition, 2 vols.: London, 1800), i, 127-
132,151.
50 One Penny-worth More, or a Second Letter from Thomas Bull to His Brother John (London, 12
December 1792); 'The Englishman and the Frenchman', in Liberty and Property Preserved Against
Republicans and Levellers, A Collection ofTracts, iii ([1792]), 6-7.
51 Black, Reasons for Preventing France, pp.8, 22-5; A Letter to the Rt. Hon. Charles James Fox,
Upon the Dangerous and Inflammatory Tendency ofHis Late Conduct in Parliament (London, 1793),
p.47; NMM, MEL/2, 'Hints on the War', William Craig Harborne to Henry Dundas, 7-9 January
1793; The Times, 4 December 1792.
52 Rennell, War With France the Only Security ofBritain, p. 10, 12; see also Desultory Thoughts,
p.91; [Theodore Price], More Advice from Job Nott (Birmingham, 20 February 1795), pp.6-7; 'The
Plot Found Out. A Dialogue Between Three Members of the Jacobin Club in France', in Liberty and
Property, iii ([1792]), 1-4.
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Loyalist writers therefore defended the British government's sincerity in its
initial attempt to maintain neutrality towards revolutionary France and claimed that
France was the original aggressor. Considering the pains Pitt had taken to achieve
financial stability, it was argued, it was unlikely that he would have chosen to throw
that away out of the desire to fight France. Dr. William Black argued that not to
have resisted French hostility would have been 'to prefer the certainty of dishonour
and the probability of ruin, to the favourable chances of arms and success.' Herbert
Marsh went further, contending that war had not simply been the lesser of two evils;
rather, the government had had no choice at all in the matter, since France had been
the aggressor, showing a markedly belligerent attitude towards Britain and Europe
for months before February 1793 and eventually issuing the declaration of war to
Britain and Holland. Since France was implacably resolved on hostilities with
Britain, prevarication and negotiation could be of no avail; at best they could only
delay the conflict, perhaps until France was yet more powerful.53
In this world, loyalists claimed, war was an unavoidable evil. Since this
conflict was just and necessary, the British people should simply be glad that so
much stood in their favour concerning it.54 In the long term, it would be better for
commerce, not worse, that Britain should go to war than that it should stand by and
let France proceed in its programme of destruction. Indeed, war offered Britain the
opportunity of seizing rich French colonies in the East and West Indies.55 Britain
had ample resources to sustain a heavy conflict, especially relative to the French.56
They declared that there was wide public enthusiasm for the war—'more perfect
assent was never given to any war' —and that it would surely result in great glory for
Britain.57
The general objective of the European war against revolutionary France,
according to British loyalists, was to restore the continental balance of power. This
meant dispossessing France of all its recent conquests and fencing it in inside its old
53 P.H., xxx, 324, the Earl of Carlisle, 1 February 1793; Remarks on a Pamphlet, Published as Mr.
Fox's Speech, pp.26-7; Reasons Against National Despondency; in Refutation ofMr. Erskine's View
of the Causes and Consequences of the Present War (London, 1797), pp.37-47, 79-86; Black,
Reasons for Preventing the French, p.48; Marsh, History, esp. vol. i, pp.iii-xi, xxii; The Times, 17
January 1793; P.H.., xxx, 81-2, Lord Sheffield, 15 December 1792.
54 Observations Upon the Present War with France, pp.3-5.
55 [Jones], Sentiments on a War with France, p. 16; Rennell, War with France the Only Security of
Britain, pp. 14-15; Three Words on the War (Edinburgh, 1793), pp.4-9; James Edward Hamilton, A
Letter to the People of England Upon the Present Crisis (London, 1793); The Times, 8 February
1793.
56 [Jones], Sentiments on a War with France, pp.24-7; William Playfair, A General View of the
Actual Force and Resources of France, in January M.DCC.XCI1I (London, 1793); The Times, 5
February 1793.
57 P.M., xxx, 396, Ryder, 12 February 1793; [Jones], Sentiments on a War with France, pp.21,35.
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boundaries. They also wanted Britain to receive indemnity in return for its
expenditure on the conflict.58 Both of these aims were often couched in terms of the
provision of a security against Jacobinism.59 The most urgent aims of the war for
loyalists were the defence of the British constitution and the defeat of radicalism and
revolutionary principles in Britain. They feared that the radicals were fifth
columnists and national enemies—particularly since they continued to imitate the
French revolutionaries even after the outbreak of war, for instance in the British
Convention held in Edinburgh in October 1793—and that they would be only too
willing to assist a French invasion, in the hope of seeing a republic established in
Britain.60 The most effective way, therefore, of guarding the British constitution and
crushing radical hopes would be by overturning the French revolutionary regime. It
was necessary that a stable government should be established in France, in any case,
if an eventual peace settlement was to be guaranteed. If this was a war of ambition,
the Earl of Mansfield told the House of Lords, 'it is the noblest ambition that ever
actuated the mind of man. Its great object is, to restore the blessings of order and
government to France, and, by that restoration, to secure to ourselves and the rest of
Europe, those blessings which order and government can alone bestow.'61 The
loyalist writers were more divided on the question of whether or not the restoration
of the French monarchy ought to be an objective of the war, reflecting the ministers'
own doubts and disagreements. In response to Opposition accusations that the
ministry harboured this aim, loyalists tended to deny it hotly and to insist that it was
merely a preference, particularly after 1795, when the ministry had expressed its
willingness to treat with any stable government in France.62 When not under
Opposition fire, however, loyalists might advise that the restoration of the Bourbon
monarchy would be the best way of re-establishing peace and stability in France and
Europe.63
Despite this ambivalence, loyalist pamphlets and propaganda did express
their views of the war in terms of a crusade, matching government rhetoric, which
58 Three Words on the War, p.11-12; Dallas, Thoughts Upon Our Present Situation, pp.51-4;
Playfair, Thoughts on the Present State ofFrench Politics, pp.58,65-80; the Sun, 5 October 1795.
59 See the Sun, 27 September 1793; P.H., xxx, 1075, the Earl of Coventry, 21 January 1794.
60 The Times, 12 February 1793; Reasons Against National Despondency, pp. 19-25; The Anti-
Gallican Songster, 1, p. 12.
61 Playfair, Thoughts on the Present State of French Politics, p. 103; [Thomas Richard Bentley],
Considerations Upon the State ofPublic Affairs at the Beginning of the Year 1796 (London, 1796),
pp.59-60; P.H., xxx, 1077, the Earl of Mansfield, 21 January 1794. See also The Times, 19 September
1793.
62 See the Sun, 20, 21, 24 September 1793,5 October 1795; Reasons Against National Despondency,
pp.86-7; P.H., xxxiii, 1321-2, Lord Boringdon, 22 March 1798.
63 Playfair, Thoughts on the Present State ofFrench Politics, p.60; P.H., xxxiv, 1533, Charles Yorke,
21 February 1800.
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was usually more Burkean than the actual opinions of ministers.64 According to the
Sun of 2 November 1793, it was 'a War of Virtue, Order and Religion, against
Crime, Anarchy and Atheism'. 'Let us not deceive ourselves,' The Times was still
warning on 27 September 1797. 'The animosity which the Jacobins of France
entertain against us, is less the consequence of that ancient rivalship which has
existed between both nations, than the necessary effect of that vigorous resistance
which they experience on our part, to their plan of disorganizing the civilized
world.'65 It was a new kind of war in terms of scale, in terms of the aims of the
enemy and, consequently, the aims of Britain itself, and also in terms of the
resources used and means of carrying on the conflict. France fought not to subdue
any particular state or to impose any particular religion, but to dissolve society itself
and to abolish all religion. It was ready to squander all its capital as well as all its
surplus wealth in its cause, and it had called its total manpower into requisition as
well.66
Later in the war, some loyalists began explicitly to deny that it was a war
about opinions, agreeing with Charles Long's 'new era' analysis of the conflict-
that is, that after 1795, the ideological element had largely evaporated, leaving only
the residue of French territorial greed to be dealt with. 'I confess it is not now the
French revolution I dread, but French greatness,' wrote Thomas Bentley in 1798.67
Yet, like the government, the loyalists continued to fight a war against the 'practical
opinions' as well as the 'speculative' opinions of France: a struggle not necessarily
against democracy in France but against the aggression that that democracy ignited
and against the imitation of French democratic principles in Britain 68 They were
always aware that it was a battle for the defence of the British political and social
order, having been loyalists before they were called to be patriots, and they did not
separate this from the conflict against France. They claimed to be the 'real' patriots,
while radical or even reformist 'patriotism' which decried the need for the conflict
was alleged to be a deception and a cover for base desires for a French invasion and
64 Pendleton, 'English Conservative Propaganda', pp.408-9,437, 441; see also ch.2 part IV, above.
65 See also Dallas, Thoughts Upon Our Present Situation, pp.3-4; A Letter to the Rt. Hon. Charles
James Fox...on his Late Conduct in Parliament, p.44; the Sun, 1 March 1793; The Times, 6 March
1794.
66 Desultory Thoughts, pp.79-81, 94; Observations on the Present War with France, p.5; P.H., xxx,
611, Lord Beauchamp, 22 March 1793; The Times, 1 January 1793; Rennell, War with France the
Only Security ofBritain, pp. 10-11; William Playfair, The History of Jacobinism (London, 1795),
pp.628-631.
67 [Thomas Richard Bentley], Considerations Upon the State ofPublic Affairs, at the Beginning of
the Year MDCCXCVllI. Part the First (London, 1798), p.2. See Long, The New Era of the French
Revolution-, ch.2 pt. II, above.
68 The Times, 8 February 1793; P.H., xxx, 1199-1212, Lord Mornington, 21 January 1794. See also
Schofield, 'English Conservative Thought', p.206.
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the establishment of a British republic.69 The French attempts to invade Ireland in
1796 and 1798 amid United Irishmen activity, the continued threat of a mainland
invasion, the naval mutinies at Spithead and the Nore in 1797, and the reappearance
of London Corresponding Society agitation in 1797 and 1798, meant that loyalists
had to maintain their vigilance in the second half of the decade as well as in the
earlier years of the war.70 On 9 November 1796, the Sun expressed a fear that
radicals throughout the country were plotting to join the supplementary militia, in
order to obtain arms which they would then use for their own hostile and unlawful
purposes.
In general, however, loyalist writers usually expressed optimism regarding
not only the final outcome of the war, but also respecting individual campaigns and
expeditions, since they were concerned to vindicate government strategy. The
newspapers were particularly constant in their hopefulness. Over a week after the
evacuation of Dunkirk (which The Times could hardly bring itself to mention), the
Sun still clung to the hope that its capture 'may yet probably be numbered amongst
the acquisitions of the Campaign'. 'It is impossible for the public mind to be more
justly confident of any success, than that which is generally presumed upon the
present occasion,' enthused The Times on the departure of the ill-fated expedition to
Holland in 1799.71 Those at the forefront of the action, by contrast, such as Admiral
Collingwood, were astonished and somewhat disconcerted by the force and energy
France could mount:
...is it not astonishing that the french who we have despised, ruined
in their finances, supplied with great difficulty with stores and
almost all Europe at war with them—shou'd meet us at sea with a
fleet superior to ours—it is leaving too much to fortune &
Chance—great as the skill of Lord Howe is, and we have had
nothing like him—it is not right to oppose us to a force that chance
might give a victory to 72
Others, however, removed from the scenes of battle, often argued that France must
collapse, sooner or later, from the rigours of the revolutionary warfare she pursued,
69 The Times, 12 September 1801, Desultory Thoughts, pp.77-8, 95-6; 'The Bees and Drones', in The
Dog and Bitch, and the Bees and Drones: Fables. With Applications, Moral and Political, adapted to
the Times (Leeds, [1795]), pp.40-56; Reasons Against National Despondency, p.88.
70 See 'The Republicans to the Devil', in The Gentleman's Magazine, Ixiv (June 1794), 558, and also
in Betty T. Bennett, British War Poetry in the Age of Romanticism: 1793-1815 (New York and
London, 1976), pp. 113-5; The Times, 31 May 1797, on the responsibility for the naval mutiny being
attributed to London radicals.
71 The Sun, 17 September 1793, and also 24 September 1793; The Times, 14 August 1799. See also,
for instance, the Sun, 1 March 1793, on the Dutch campaign; the Sun, 17 and 28 September 1793, and
The Times, 25 September 1793, on the capture of Toulon.
72 NMM, COL/14, f.3, Collingwood to the Rev. Alexander Carlyle, 10 June 1794.
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especially because of the depreciation of the assignat and because of the republic's
requisitioning of resources and manpower. 'In a word,' declared The Times, 'we
may describe France as a miserable wretch under the influence of rage, or a burning
fever, which occasions efforts beyond the natural strength, but which terminate by
debility, and finally produce death.'73 British and allied successes were loudly
celebrated as they happened, and constantly listed to cheer and convince doubters.
The European allies might sometimes suffer losses and defeats, but British arms
were always to be praised.74
Those who bore the British arms were particularly honoured. British soldiers,
and particularly British sailors, were almost universally treated favourably in the
loyalist press. British sailors were presented as courageous, honest and full of hearty
common sense, and their commanders added wisdom and prudence to these virtues.
The Royal Navy was Britain's surest defence, equal to whatever calls might be made
upon it. Even during the agony of the mutinies of 1797, the worst that was said of
the great majority of the sailors involved was that they must have been misguided
and deluded.75 British soldiers were described as brave and ultra-loyal subjects of
their King and Country, and the loyalist newspapers took every opportunity to assure
their countrymen at home that they were healthy and in good spirits.76 Britain, in
fact, was crucially important in the European struggle against revolutionary France,
according to the loyalist writers. It had stood in the breach for civilized society,
saving it from the revolutionary torrent, and Pitt was lauded and honoured for his
leading role as 'the Saviour ofEurope' J1 One pamphleteer went so far as to forecast
73 The Times, 11 February 1793; see also Rennell, War With France the Only Security ofBritain,
p. 11; Playfair, History ofJacobinism, p.32; [Bentley], Considerations upon.. .Public Affairs...1796,
pp.25-34.
74 See P.H., xxxiii, 406, J.H. Addington, 10 April 1797; ibid., xxxiii, 1331, the Earl of Romney, 22
March 1798; Brown, An Examination of the Causes and Conduct, pp.68-79; the Sun, 2 January 1800.
See also various poems in Bennett, British War Poetry, e.g. pp. 115-6, 130-2 on the Glorious First of
June; 202-3 on Camperdown; 210-1 on Cape St. Vincent, 221-3 on Aboukir Bay. There is also a
collection of poems and songs celebrating Duncan's victory at Camperdown in 1797 among his
papers in NMM, DUN/19.
75 William Francis Sullivan, The Test of Union and Loyalty: A New Piece, on the Present War with
France, 1795 (Margate, 1795), p.7; the Sun, 21 September 1793, on Lord Hood; P.H., xxxiii, 748,
Lord Romney, 30 May 1797; ibid., xxxiii, 811, Hobhouse, 2 June 1797; The Times, 21 April 1797.
See also poems in Bennett, British War Poetry, pp.216-7,219-20,237,249-50,256-8.
76 [Theodore Price], The Life and Adventures ofJob Nott (11th edition: Birmingham, 1798), 18-19;
The Times, 22 February 1793; the Sun, 7 March 1793, 12 September 1793. See also poems in
Bennett, British War Poetry, pp. 120-1,223-4,233-5, 250-1; and [Mrs. Jane West], The Infidel Father
(3 vols.: London, 1802), iii, 197-8.
77 Thomas Maurice, The Crisis ofBritain: A Poem, Addressed to the Right Hon. William Pitt, on the
Threatened Invasion of These Kingdoms, By the French, in A.D.1798 (2nd edition: London, 1803),
esp. pp.9-12; David Rivers, Thoughts on the Necessity of Prosecuting the War with France with
Vigour and Energy: With Remarks on the Scarcity ofProvisions, and Particularly Bread. In a Letter
to a Friend (London, 1800), p.9.
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that 'France herself, if ever that country can be grateful, will one day own the
obligation [to Britain] as all Europe does now.'78
In examining the conduct of the war, loyalist writers both discussed domestic
tactics and defended international strategy. They clearly feared French republican
emissaries, and they approved of repressive measures to minimize their impact on
the country (the Alien Act of December 1792 and the Traitorous Correspondence
Act of May 1793), and also the legal measures taken to suppress British radical
activity (the suspension of habeas corpus in 1794 and 1798, the Two Acts of 1795,
the Seduction from Duty and Allegiance Act of 1797, the Suppression of Seditious
and Treasonable Societies Act of 1799 and the Anti-Combination Act of 1800).
These might look tyrannical at first sight, it was acknowledged, but they existed for
the protection of the liberty of British subjects. Indeed, Gayle Trusdel Pendleton
estimates that 'Popular opinion would probably have approved considerably more
repressive legislation than Pitt requested', and she notes that measures of
suppression were endorsed in at least 130 different pamphlets.79 The monarchy,
more than ever, was the focal point of conservative ideology. George III symbolized
British stability and rectitude against French republican chaos and violence and,
later, against Napoleonic 'treachery' and 'tyranny'. The loyalist press took great
pride in royal ceremonial during the war, and even greater pride in the active
involvement of members of the royal family in the armed forces.80 A common plea
in loyalist recommendations for dealing with the internal enemy was for a moral
reformation among the British people in general, that British morality might shine
the brighter against French and radical immorality, and that it might be found
deserving of victory over both enemies by God. Many loyalists thus identified
themselves with the existing 'reformation of manners' movement.81
78 [Bentley], Considerations upon...Public Affairs...1796, pp.96-7; see also William Francis
Sullivan, 'Un Petit Morceau; or the year 1795' and 'The Sons of Neptune' in The Test ofUnion and
Loyalty, pp. 11-13,15-16.
79 Desultory Thoughts, p.39; Remarks on a Pamphlet Published as Mr. Fox's Speech, pp.23-4; A
Letter to the Rt. Hon. Charles James Fox, Upon.. .His Late Conduct in Parliament, pp.49-55; the Sun,
24 May 1797, on the naval mutiny and its repression; Pendleton, 'English Conservative Propaganda',
p.284.
80 Vincent Carretta, George 111 and the Satirists From Hogarth to Byron (Athens and London, 1990),
pp.505-513; Morris, 'The Monarchy as an Issue', p.238-82; Linda Colley, 'The Apotheosis of George
III', in Past and Present, 102 (1984), 97-129. I argue (ch. 8) that caricatures generally fit more
usefully into an analysis of public opinion than into one of activist loyalism, but Carretta's argument
here applies equally to loyalist writing. See also The Anti-Gallican Songster, i, 14-15; The Times, 5
February 1793; the Sun, 28 February 1793, 12 September 1793.
81 For the reformation of manners movement, see Joanna Innes, 'Politics and Morals: The
Reformation of Manners Movement in Late Eighteenth-century England' in Hellmuth (ed.), The
Transformation of Political Culture, pp.57-118; Richard A. Soloway, 'Reform or Ruin: English
Moral Thought during the First French Republic', Review ofPolitics, xxv (1963), 110-128; M.J.D.
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Loyalists also called insistently for political unity within Britain behind the
Pitt administration during the war, and they were loud in their disapproval of the
Foxite Opposition in Parliament. Without internal unity, warned Dallas, 'we
shall...perish like other great empires, who fell more from the internal wounds of
civil discord, than the lasting victories of invading enemies.'82 The Foxites were
accused of being secret supporters of the French, of encouraging the radical
movement in Britain, and of fostering discontent among the ordinary people. John
Bowdler, in his list of moral reforms for different classes of people in British
society, disdained to offer any advice to Opposition MPs; it was vain to waste words
on those who were ready to sacrifice the public good to their private ambition, he
said—'their consciences must be seared with a hot iron'. It was unpatriotic to remain
in Opposition during a war, whether or not one agreed with its grounds or necessity,
and it exposed the nation's frailties to the enemy. Such men would be entirely unfit
to replace the present administration, even were it desirable that Pitt and his
colleagues should be dismissed.83
Loyalists called on the one hand for unity, vigour and loyalty from the whole
British population, and on the other for government ministers to do what they could
to promote morale. Several pamphlets claimed that 'a free people, uniting as one
man, for its defence, is invincible'. William Playfair thought that the Allied
governments were too negative, too willing to publicize their defeats and too
hesitant to dispel false reports of French military brilliance.84 Scarcity of grain and
commercial problems were not caused by the war, loyalists maintained. Other
explanations were provided, such as the corrupt activities of monopolists, the divine
wrath presently resting on the nation, a simple supply and demand imbalance, and
the sway held by materialism and luxury over the country. Nicholas Vansittart
pointed out that the Continental war would have affected British trade whether or
not Britain had participated.85 The various financial measures adopted by ministers
Journal, 26 (1983), 159-176. For loyalist concern in the 1790s, see Thomas Lister, Opposition
Dangerous (London, 1798), pp. 19-20; [Price], More Advice from Job Nott, p.4; John Bowdler,
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Repository Tracts in Works (6th edition, 11 vols.: London, 1853), vols, i-iii.
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83 See, for example, A Letter to the Right Hon. Charles James Fox [on the] Necessity of an
Immediate Declaration ofWar, pp.3-4, 12-13; Reasons for National Despondency, pp.18-19, 27-32,
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84 Brown, An Examination of the Causes and Conduct, p.98; Our Good Old Castle on the Rock,
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to pay for the war were defended more or less without complaint. If the country
supported the war, it must be prepared to pay for it and to make retrenchments if
necessary.86
The loyalists were happy to suggest various improvements in the regulation
of the army and the navy. They were not enthusiastic about crimping and the press-
gang. Some tried to resign their readers to making the best of a bad system; others
suggested that a national system of recruiting should be established instead.87
Representations were also made that courts-martial were in need of reform, that
demobilized soldiers and sailors must be paid before being dismissed, and that
young sailors required some form of formal education; but the government's scheme
for building barracks for soldiers in Britain received applause from loyalists, who
were glad that soldiers would be more readily available in the event of civil unrest
but also relieved that they could be kept by themselves, out of trouble.88
As for strategies to be adopted to deal with the French enemy, the necessity
of vigour and resolution were again stressed. The government was advised to 'Strike
home with as little noise and as much energy as possible,—Strike! with as
determin'd Spirit, the Great Chatham did so, and he prosper'd. Such a noble and
resolute Conduct damps the fire of the Enemy'.89 Most loyalist writing, however,
was concerned with defensive measures and with the threat of invasion. Newspapers
periodically reported the sighting of preparations being made on the French coast for
an attack on Britain, either as a diversionary tactic or in real earnest.90 Ireland was a
particular source of worry, especially as it seemed that the invaders would attract
greater support among the local people there—'the whole People will be in motion,
the Causes and Remedies of the Late and Present Scarcity and High Price ofProvisions, in a letter to
the Rt. Hon. Earl Spencer (London, 1800), p.51; Alexander Annesley, Strictures on the True Cause
of the Present Alarming Scarcity ofGrain and Other Provisions, pp.8-10; Vansittart, Reflections
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86 Lister, Opposition Dangerous, pp. 12-27; [Thomas Richard Bentley], Considerations Upon the
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'Plans for Manning the Navy', 16 April 1791,13 February 1793 and 19 May 1793, by 'J.S.'
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& deal destruction, wherever they go', gloomily forecast Lord St. Vincent.91 Dean
Tucker wrote a long piece 'On Invasion' for the Sun, in which he conducted a
detailed estimate of what the French would have to do to achieve a successful
incursion. He concluded that the people of Britain had very little to fear, since the
enterprize was on too large a scale for French technical and financial capabilities.92
The general attitude of loyalists was a mixture of this confidence that a French
invading force would be 'destined to feed the fishes of our seas', but that, none the
less, extensive preparations ought to be made in case the French should make the
attempt and indeed to persuade them not to do so.93 Domestic artillery and cavalry
should be substantially increased, so that the defending forces would be
considerably superior to the invaders; light cavalry forces should also be formed, to
move around the country when necessary; and fishing boats should be armed and
fully manned. More signal towers and ammunitions batteries ought to be built, and
groups of expert marksmen, such as sportsmen and gamekeepers, should be
gathered. The finance and capital of the country ought to be guarded adequately,
since the revolutionaries were men 'whose devotion to wealth, is paramount to all
other obligations.'94
The Royal Navy was the pride and joy of British loyalists, and they
emphasized its importance in the war against France. It was Britain's major
offensive weapon as well as its best defence; it counterbalanced French power on
land; and it allowed Britain to seize enemy colonies.95 The large sums of money
spent by the government on the allies were defended on the grounds that they were a
necessary way to harass and wear France down, and that they were cheap at the
price. Moreover, if the rest of Europe did not band together against France, the
revolutionaries could much more easily defeat each individual nation. The Sun, on
18 September 1793, was particularly optimistic—the union of the allies, it claimed,
was 'indissoluble' —but other loyalists also expressed great confidence and trust in
the allies, more, one suspects, in partisan bombast than in real faith, particularly as
91 See NMM, NEP/5, ff.31-2, Lord St. Vincent to Evan Nepean, 16 April 1799; ibid., NEP/7, f.85,
same to same, 16 May 1799; ibid., COL/14, f.27, Collingwood to Carlyle, 24 August 1801.
92 The Sun, 14 and 15 February 1794.
93 [Bentley], Considerations on...Public Affairs...1798, Part the First, p.65. See also The Times, 27
and 28 December 1797; P.H., xxxi, 979-986, Lord Mulgrave, 30 December 1794; and poems in
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94 Thoughts on the Defence of These Kingdoms, pp.49-53; NMM, MEL/6, Capt. A. Blair to John
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they easily switched to blaming the allies and praising the unique virtues of Britain
as the occasion demanded.96 Against the armed neutrality of 1801, The Times was
defiant, if rueful: 'If the justest league which was ever formed in the history of man
has failed before our eyes, from the selfishness or madness of our Allies, can we fear
that the present Combination, containing in its bosom all the seeds of
dissolution...can long endure?'97
The strategy of interference within France did not receive a great deal of
loyalist comment, but those who discussed it were generally supportive. They
quoted writers on the laws of nations; they argued that France had interfered in
numerous other countries, that attack was the best form of defence, that the ministry
only undertook such a repugnant strategy reluctantly, and that France had shown
itself unfit to take political decisions for itself. In any case, the Sun reminded its
readers, Britain had been invited into France by the French counter¬
revolutionaries.98 Attitudes to the emigres were more mixed. Some approved of the
help given to them by the British government and by individual British subjects;
others thought that they should be employed in the British armed forces, but not paid
levy-money, since they ought to have sufficient other incentive to fight the
Revolution.99 The strategy of giving substantial aid to the counter-revolution in
France received only limited support, however.100
The ministry was loyally defended and upheld against Opposition and anti¬
war criticism. It was insisted that only the present administration could save the
country from the horrors of the French revolution and its armies.101 This did not
mean that loyalists were averse to offering their own criticisms, whether from
genuine frustration or in order to show their own independence and credibility.
Loyalist MPs might claim to vote with the government less because they agreed
wholeheartedly with its measures than because they believed disunity to be
96 Reasons Against National Despondency, pp. 175-6; P.H., xxx, 1314, Powys, 31 January 1794; The
Times, 10 December 1796; P.H., xxx, 1089, Lord Clifden, 21 January 1794; ibid., xxxiii, 1539, 1541,
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97 26 January 1801.
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prejudicial to the war effort.102 The Times, however, came close to questioning the
validity of debate on the war at all when it declared on 20 September 1793 that there
was something very 'presumptuous in knowing better than Ministers what ought,
and what ought not to be done'. It was frequently argued, concerning spectacular
failures such as Dunkirk in 1793 and the Dutch campaign in 1799, that the final
outcome of a campaign should not be considered the main criterion for determining
the wisdom of its strategy, since all sorts of chance elements might combine to foil a
perfectly good plan.103
Except between 1796 and 1797 and after October 1801, when the ministry
was attempting to negotiate a settlement with France, loyalists allowed little of their
natural desire for peace to show in their discussions of the issue, except in private
letters, or in poems and songs which placed the blame for the continuance of the war
squarely on French shoulders.104 They argued that France should initiate talks,
having been the original aggressor, but they expressed grave doubts that the French
government had any intention of doing so.105 It had never expressed any interest in
peace and, even should that change, its word was hardly to be trusted, in view of the
wake of violated treaties and professions trailing behind it. War with all established
governments was inherent to the Revolution, as the infamous decrees of November
and December 1792 had testified, and these had not been repealed. Moreover, the
French continued to hate Britain. The Republic insisted on setting the terms and
arrangements of all negotiations, which was a contradiction in terms and evidence of
its belligerence.106 Loyalist writers and MPs bristled with rage at the 'insolence' of
the French rulers towards Great Britain—particularly the insulting treatment and
102 [Bentley], Considerations on...Public Affairs...1798, Part the First, pp.66-8; P.PI., xxxiii, 189-
90, die Earl of Romney, 27 March 1797; P.H., xxxiii, 606 and 610, Miles Peter Andrews and Sir
Gilbert Heathcote, 19 May 1797.
103 The Sun, 12 September 1793, on Dunkirk; P.H., xxxi, 251-2, Lord Mulgrave, 10 April 1794, on
Toulon; ibid., xxxiii, 587-8, Bryan Edwards, 18 May 1797 on St. Domingo; ibid., xxxv, 981-93, Sir
James Pulteney, 19 February 1801, on the Ferrol expedition; The Dutch Expedition Vindicated;
[Theodore Price], Birmingham in Danger! OfWhich Job Nott Gives Fair Warning (Birmingham, 30
September 1799).
104 PRO 30/12/17/2, ff. 109-112, 117, 121-2, 125, Edward Law to John Law, 4 January 1794, 29
October 1796, 3 May 1797, 27 July 1801; NMM, WYN/102, Admiral Lord Gardner to Admiral Sir
Charles Morice Pole, 7 and 23 August 1797, 2 September 1798; ibid., Sir John Borlase Warren to
Pole, 21 September 1797; ibid., COL/14 ff.22, 24, Collingwood to Carlyle, 17 April and 7 December
1800; 'Ode to Peace', in The Gentleman's Magazine, lxvii (August 1797), 693-4, and also in Bennett,
British War Poetry, pp.200-2.
105 The Sun, 2 October and 14 December 1795, 18 December 1796; Brown, An Examination of the
Causes and Conduct, pp.60-1, 82.
106 Vansittart, Reflections on...an Immediate Conclusion ofPeace, pp.110-6; Desultory Thoughts,
pp.81-2, 107-11; [Bentley], Considerations upon. ..Public Affairs. ..1796, pp.90-4; A General Address
to the Representatives ofGreat Britain, pp.33-4; Three Words on the War, p. 10.
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dismissal of Lord Malmesbury at Paris in 1796107—and they insisted that Britain,
defended by its splendid navy, had no need to make a humiliating peace by bowing
and scraping to such an arrogant and depraved rival. Such a peace had no chance of
lasting. The Earl of Morton 'professed himself exceedingly hurt at the idea of this
country stooping to sue for peace.' The terms suggested by the French rulers at the
negotiations of 1796 and 1797 were utterly unacceptable, particularly the claim that
France should retain, while Britain yielded, all conquests of war. 'God forbid,' wrote
one pamphleteer, 'that this Country should be reduced to such a contemptible state
of imbecility, that we are to part with every muniment against the aggressions of
France, through idle hopes of her friendship, or unmanly terror at her enmity.'108
Because Jacobinism was still a threat—which was still being claimed as late
as 1800109—a stable and dependable peace could not be achieved, and so it was
necessary to press on with vigorous warfare until this was no longer the case. The
governments of the French Republic were too short-lived, and their foreign policy
unacceptably ambitious. 'Hope of peace there is none,' Admiral Collingwood wrote
in February 1799, 'it is impossible to have a peace which wou'd not be more
dangerous to the country than a continuance of the war.' 'If we may not sleep, why
so eager to lie down?' asked Thomas Bentley. It was possible to wage war with
anarchy, but not to make peace with it.110 Moreover, it was naive to believe that if
peace were established the French Republic would collapse internally.111 It would
therefore be both disgraceful and dangerous to negotiate. 'Treat with the
Convention!' expostulated Sir Richard Hill in the House of Commons. 'He would as
soon treat with the Palace of Pandemonium.' To do so would be to acknowledge its
government as legitimate, which would imply that Britain was prepared to submit to
its further demands.112 Only military victory was likely to secure a real peace.
Thomas Lister wrote in 1798 that he believed that 'the war is now impervious to
negotiation, and that peace is only to be purchased by the dear experiment of our
107 'fhe Sun, 4 and 18 November 1796, 26 December 1796; P.H., xxxiii, 424, Thomas Tyrwhitt
Jones, 10 April 1797.
108 P.H., xxxiii, 858, the Earl of Glasgow, 2 November 1797; ibid., xxxi, 962 and 969, Earl Camden
and the Earl of Morton, 30 December 1794; the Sun, 30 December 1796; Reasons Against National
Despondency, p. 167.
1(19 P.H., xxxiv, 1447, Wilberforce, 17 February 1800.
110 The Times, 21 January 1794; NMM, COL/14, f.18, Collingwood to Carlyle, 25 February 1799;
[Bentley]. Considerations on...Public Affairs...1798, Part the Second, pp.45,79-88; [Price], Further
Humble Advice from Job Nott, p.7; P.H., xxx, 1078, the Earl of Mansfield, 21 January 1794; ibid.,
xxxiii, 991-5, Earl Temple, 8 November 1797; the Sun, 2 October 1795.
111 [Morgan], Considerations on the.. .Condition ofFrance, pp.41-2.
112 P.H., xxx, 447, Sir Richard Hill, 18 February 1793; The Times, 15 September 1795; Remarks on
a Pamphlet Published as Mr. Fox's Speech, p.76.
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arms'.113 The ministry's rejection of Bonaparte's offer of negotiations in December
1799 was stoutly defended; the French Consul himself was vilified as ambitious,
unscrupulous and Jacobin, and his government condemned for being as precarious
as its predecessors. 'It is a willing error to think we have refused a Peace,' declared
The Times714
It was counter-productive to show an over-anxiety for peace, therefore, for
this would induce France to make even greater demands at a settlement, as the
experience of other European countries made only too clear. It was not 'moderate' in
ministers to sue for peace if that meant giving up security and honour.115 Indeed,
loyalists suspected that many cries for peace came from those who would delight in
the calamities that a premature peace would bring—radicals who wanted to see
French political influence in Britain.116 Opposition MPs inflamed the people's desire
for peace and used it to smear the administration with charges of corrupt self-
interest.117 Peace ought not to be made merely to pander to public opinion if it was
not otherwise justified. Nor were the hardships of war any reason to negotiate if the
hardships of peace would be greater. 'The inconveniences we have hitherto
sustained,' Sir Henry Mildmay told the Commons, 'are, by no means, commensurate
with the extent of the interests we have at issue'; furthermore, he continued,
'Unparalleled as our external successes have been, they derive additional lustre from
the increasing splendour of our internal opulence', for Britain's resources remained
more than equal to the task of continuing the war.118
Very occasionally, strictures were delivered by war-weary or crotchety
loyalists in Parliament on the Pitt administration's attitude to peace or its handling of
negotiations; and there was some lack of confidence in the new administration under
Henry Addington when it took office in March 1801.119 By and large, however,
these arguments against negotiation changed little over the decade, except for the
113 Lister, Opposition Dangerous, p. 11; Reasons Against National Despondency, p. 185.
114 BriefReflexions on the Correspondence Between Lord Grenville and M. Otto, in Auguast and
September 1800 (London, 1800), pp.5-6; P.H., xxxiv, 1229,1239-40, Lord Boringdon and the Earl of
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periods 1796-7 and 1801-2, when loyalists felt more relaxed about letting their own
desire for peace show, since ministerial policy openly sought at least negotiations if
not a settlement. These attempts allowed loyalists to argue with confidence that the
British government was sincere in seeking peace and that the responsibility for
continuing the conflict rested with France.120 They also, however, felt obliged to
justify these attempts to halt the conflict after so many declarations that it was vital
to continue to wage it vigorously. Those loyalists who subscribed to the 'new era'
theory that, after the fall of Robespierre, the French government had become much
more moderate and stable, could reason that it was no longer necessary to engage in
ideological warfare, for the conflict had again become a traditional eighteenth-
century battle for territorial aggrandizement between Britain and France which could
be ended whenever both sides agreed on a stalemate.121 The Sun trenchantly
criticized Burke for arguing against the ministry's attempts to negotiate with France
in 1796-7, in his Letters on a Regicide Peace, as 'Quixotic', 'intermeddling' and
pernicious to the national interest—though, like the government and other loyalists,
it sometimes reverted to talk of an ideological war against French and British
Jacobins after the peace talks had failed.122 Others simply reasoned that, successful
or not, peace negotiations could be used to rally the nation behind the
government.123
It was recognized by loyalists that a British insistence on an indemnity and
on the liberation of the Belgic provinces from French rule in any peace terms would
cause an obstacle to a settlement, but they maintained Britain's right to demand both
for the sake of its future security. The Times was indignant at the charge of greed
laid by some against this concern:
The War...is not as we have been perfidiously told, 'a War for
Spice Islands and Sugar Colonies.' This is a language not to be
endured. For all men feel it is a War for existence itself, and will
any man who has heard the din of preparation from the shores of
120 Brown, An Examination of the Causes and Conduct, pp.59, 86; Reasons Against National
Despondency, pp. 112-146,171; BriefReflexions on the Correspondence between Grenville and Otto,
pp.3-4; A General Address to the Representatives of Great Britain, p.32; P.H., xxxiii, 863, Lord
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on.. .Public Affairs.. .1798, Part the Second, pp.78-9.
122 See the Sun, 7, 12, 13 and 15 October 1796; and 22 November 1796; see also Brown, An
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France, Belgium, and Holland, say if it be for Martinico or Ceylon
that BONAPARTE meditates the invasion of our shores; if it be for
our Sugars, or our Nutmegs, or our distant Isles that he thirsts and
hungers, or for our very life-blood?124
Some were consequently disappointed by the preliminaries and the eventual
settlement of peace at Amiens and their distinctly lightweight character so far as
indemnification went;125 but many rejoiced full-heartedly in them, praising their
'moderation', and The Times discreetly refused to arbitrate between the divided
views of ministers and ex-ministers.126
III
For most loyalist writers, popular and otherwise, the main inspiration was the
government's presentation of events and its justification of its conduct, a view of
affairs which was considerably coloured by Burke's thinking, yet differing
significantly from it. There was, however, a small minority of pamphleteers and
journalists—some, indeed, who were Treasury-paid—who clearly agreed with
Burke's opinions on the war much more closely than most, and whose writings
reflected his influence much more truly.
While both loyalists and these 'war crusaders' recognized the French
Revolution to be ' the common enemy of all governments, and of all establishments,
religious and civil',127 loyalists, influenced by government doubts and divisions,
were far from certain that the primary object of the war ought to be the defeat and
destruction of the Revolution through the restoration of the ancient French
monarchy. They might have preferred this outcome, but ultimately they were
prepared to treat for peace with any stable form of French government. Burke, on the
other hand, was quite sure of the need for a thorough restoration of the French
monarchical regime, and the crusading pamphleteers were to be found much nearer
124 [Bentley], Considerations upon...Public Affairs...1796, pp.63-9, 94-6; Brown, An Examination of
the Causes and Conduct, p.83; Reasons Against National Despondency, pp. 162-5; [Bentley],
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to his camp than to the government's. The ministry and the loyalists were more
concerned about the secondary, effective principles of the French Revolution than
with its primary, causal principles; that is, they were preoccupied with the impact of
the Revolution on French foreign policy and on British radicalism. Burke and the
war crusaders, although very conscious of these revolutionary products, were
principally fixated by the fear of the original principles of liberty, equality and
fraternity, and with the threat to the social order and to property all over Europe. 'In
nations, as in individuals, principles are the main springs of action,' wrote John
Bowles; 'every thing else that influences human conduct is accidental, and takes its
colour and direction from principles.'128 They thought that these principles could
only be stamped out properly by the removal of the government they had created in
France. As Philip Schofield has noted, most ministers thought that the threat would
be removed if France could be restrained within its old frontiers and British
radicalism suppressed; to Burke and the crusaders, it was necessary to destroy the
whole ideology of the Revolution. '[Burke] was satisfied that ministers aimed to
overthrow the Jacobin system, but unconvinced they were pursuing the most
effectual means.'129
According to H.T. Dickinson, it was the outbreak of war between Britain and
France which 'persuaded the more militant conservatives in Britain that they must
campaign to eradicate the cancer of French principles at their source.'130 Almost to a
man, they had until late 1792 supported the government's policy of isolation,
neutrality and non-interference in French internal affairs, being much more
concerned about the 'Rights of Man' debate in Britain than with the international
situation.131 They were probably alerted to the volatility of Franco-British relations
more directly by the general panic which gripped British loyalists in the winter of
1792-3 than by Burke's pre-war writings. Burke was almost alone in his interest in
international politics and in his foresight regarding the war but, once they were
convinced of its imminence, crusading pamphleteers and politicians were attracted
to Burke's views on it and began to propagate them themselves.132
128 John Bowles, Article IV, A-JR, ii (January 1799), 86-7. See also Eastwood, 'Patriotism and the
English state', p. 149; Article III, A-J R, ii (January 1799), 12.
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Probably most war crusaders, as the most militant of the conservatives, were
connected with the government in one way or another. John Bowles, for instance,
was a paid Treasury writer from 1792: he was paid sums of Secret Service money on
at least two occasions, he was also made a Commissioner of Bankrupts and, in 1795,
he was given one of the five places on the Commission for the sale of Dutch prize
ships. By the mid-1790s, when his writing career was at its height, he had
abandoned the legal profession.133 Arthur Young, agricultural improver and author
of the successful pamphlet, The Example ofFrance A Warning to Britain (February
1793), was patronized by Pitt himself: he was made Secretary to the Board of
Agriculture.134 John Gifford received a Treasury pension and two consecutive police
magistracies, and he probably edited the Treasury-funded True Briton newspaper as
well as the crusading Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine.135 These war crusaders
therefore owed certain obligations to the government. They were probably by choice
also of a more loyalist and patriotic, sometimes even jingoistic, disposition than was
Burke. Nevertheless, they were much more firmly gripped by the ideological aspect
of the war than were most loyalists.136 They clearly had a great deal of sympathy for
Burke's view of the war, one more rigid and less compromising than that of the Pitt
administration, and they were perhaps more prepared to criticize the ministry than
were most loyalists.
Yet neither were they all simple copyists of Burke. They hated the French
Revolution with a passion that could hardly have been manufactured on demand,
and which caused them to develop personal emphases in their writings.137 They
were 'Burke's fellows, not his followers, in the cause'.138
133 Chatham Papers, PRO 30/8, vol.229, pt.2, ff.291a, 292a. These list subsidies to Bowles of £15 on
18 July 1792 and £100 on 10 November 1792. F.292a appears to be a duplicate of the 1792 entries on
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Nevertheless, Bowles never denied that he was a hireling writer, and it is possible that he was paid on
other occasions as well. He also wrote to Henry Dundas in late 1793, reminding the Home Secretary
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IV
The chief grounds for war in crusading eyes were the doctrines of the French
Revolution. 'The French Revolution was necessarily, and not accidentally the cause
of the War,' as the emigre pamphleteer, Jacques Francis Mallet du Pan, wrote.139
The Revolution was unquestionably a source of great political turmoil and violence
within France, but its chief danger lay in the fact that its principles were aimed at a
far wider target: their false and abstract ideas of liberty and sovereignty threatened to
act as a universal solvent to destroy the long-established habits of civil and religious
subordination which formed the strongest ties of society and the very basis of true
freedom by enabling the supreme power in a state to maintain itself with the least
possible degree of coercion. In promoting resistance to and the subversion of all
legitimate authority, French principles invited gross violence and great instability,
which necessitated rule by force; they also must be overthrown by force.140 The
export of these principles all over Europe meant that France must be resisted, not
just because it was the formal aggressor in the war, but because the Revolution
itself, in principle, language and conduct, was hostile towards every other state,
government and legal authority and, it seemed, particularly the British government
and constitution. It was surely not doubted, Earl Fitzwilliam told the House of Lords
in 1794, 'whether the French had made the public profession of doctrines that were
inimical to this and every civilized country. Had they not also made direct war on
our allies? How could it then be said, that they had not been the provokers as well as
the declarers of the war?'141
After it was published in 1797, the war crusaders tended to subscribe to the
Abbe Barruel's conspiracy theory of the French Revolution and the wars it
produced, a theory which fitted well with Burke's own ideas on the genesis of the
Revolution. This was, as Bowles wrote, 'a deep and vast conspiracy against all the
ancient institutions of Europe, civil, political, and religious,' focussed on the French
139 Jacques Francois Mallet du Pan, Considerations on the Nature of the French Revolution; and on
the Causes which Prolong its Duration (Dublin, 1794), p.l.
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Revolution, but instigated decades earlier by the propagation of Voltaire's infidel
philosophy and fed by 'licentious' German writings. Politically, the movement
incited sedition, disturbance and rebellion wherever it could against the existing
authorities.142 When the Revolution eventually burst out, the Jacobins were able to
spread their false principles much more easily and openly. The French Republic took
possession of peoples who accepted the Revolution and declared war on those who
did not. Armed force, therefore, was not the first tactic resorted to; before that came
the stirring of civil discord, the incitement to insurrection, and the weakening and
dissolution of social, religious and moral ties.143 The presence of French agents and
incendiary literature in Britain before war broke out seemed to prove the existence
of the plot, and evidence that it was succeeding was furnished by the British radical
addresses to the National Assembly, the outpourings of propaganda from the radical
presses, the establishment of radical clubs and societies and the experiment of the
British Convention in 1793. Not only were the revolutionary doctrines propagated
earnestly by the French, they were also clearly contagious. Thus, when they had
once been accepted by some British subjects, they became naturalized (and this the
more easily in Britain since they could be seen to derive directly from Lockean
principles) and were energetically promoted by native Britons. Only the creation of
Loyal Associations across the nation had averted catastrophe.144 John Gifford later
defended ministers for their adherence to neutrality until February 1793, as Burke
would not have done, on the grounds that this proved French aggression beyond all
question; but others, such as Bowles and Earl Fitzwilliam, rather chided them for
their slowness to act against France, although they could not claim Burke's
consistency in this, since they had not urged the government to war before its
outbreak.145
142 Abbe Augustin de Barruel, Memoires pour servir a I'histoire du Jacobinisme (1797); [John
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While it was important that the balance of power should be restored in full in
Europe, the chief aim of the war, according to crusaders, must therefore be the
universal defeat of these revolutionary principles. Since the doctrines of the
Revolution had caused its acts of military aggression, explained Gifford, 'it was not
therefore sufficient that we should repel such aggression, that we should drive them
out of the territories of our Ally, which they might re-enter whenever they chose, we
had a right to expect that they should offer us a security against the renewal of those
acts by disclaiming the principles on which they were founded.' Since 'the
principles were avowedly the active aggressors...the cause of hostility', they
themselves must be combated.146 This would ensure the adequate defence of the
British constitution, along with all other legitimate constitutions, and, crucially, it
would entail the downfall of the illegitimate French Revolutionary regime. The
existence of a republican government in France, wrote Arthur Young, was 'the
establishment of eternal hostility against all real liberty, and consequently that of
Britain.' The prevention of the further progress of the revolutionary system would be
entirely insufficient, according to Bowles: 'The malady is not of a nature to admit of
palliatives, and a relapse will be inevitably fatal.'147 He himself, despite a cautious
rider to the effect that Britain could not insist on any specific form of government in
a counter-revolutionized France, was a vociferous advocate of a restored Bourbon
monarchy, maintaining that the whole ancien regime must be re-established (though
it need not return with all its abuses and corruptions), that only a restored monarchy
would be capable of holding it all together, and that the monarchy was the form of
government best suited to the French people.148 Other war crusaders also made clear
their strong preference for a restored monarchy. Gifford believed that the interest of
Europe 'evidently demanded the restoration of the ANCIENT MONARCHY', and
Earl Fitzwilliam was confident that 'By the restoration of monarchy, every thing
would fall again into its place.'149 Others, such as Young and Mallet du Pan,
concentrated on the need for stable government after the destruction of the
146Gifford, Letter to the Hon. Thomas Erskine, pp.84-5,87; see also Mallet du Pan, Considerations,
p.2; [J.C. Hubbard], Jacobinism; A Poem (London, 1801), pp.v-vi, 6.
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Present War with France'", in The Retrospect (London, 1798), p.80. See also Gifford, Letter to the
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Revolution, and refused to commit themselves wholeheartedly to any particular
form.150
To the war crusaders, then, this was very much a war of ideology, and it was
vital to grasp the true nature of the enemy in order to fight it successfully. The
French Revolution, not its military armies, was the primary foe. The Jacobins had
transformed their whole degraded nation into 'a camp bristling with bayonets',
drunk with induced frenzy and bombast.151 Yet their decrees were more dangerous
than the military threat.152 Bowles struggled titanically to describe the energy of the
Revolution and its apparent self-will. Driven by a 'maniacal rage', it was 'like Fire
which can only be kept alive by the constant accession of fresh fuel' and, if Britain
continued to ignore its real causes, it would be no more in that country's power to
resist the Revolution's effects than to combat those of a tornado or earthquake. Even
the revolutionary leaders—including Bonaparte himself—had no power to control it.
It was a torrent rushing behind them and, 'while they seem to drive, they themselves
are driven'.153 Jacobinism, moreover, was not less to be feared at home than abroad:
'your internal enemies are many,' wrote one pamphleteer, 'and are more dangerous,
because suspected but by few, and hard to be distinguished from friends....you
breathe the same air, you dip in one dish, you drink from one cup with traitors'. Just
because they had not yet committed such excesses as their French counterparts had
did not mean that their intentions ought to be under-rated—they would yet imitate
the French Revolution in Britain if they could.154
Uniquely, this was a war of extermination—either the French monster of
anarchy must perish, or all the thrones, governments, society and religion of Europe
collapse. War was essential to the very existence of Jacobinism, and Jacobinism
could fight with weapons unknown to ordinary warfare—the energy of Revolution,
the total material and human resources of the French nation, the lack of any ordinary
restraint or scruple.155 In 1798 Gifford published a pamphlet entitled A Short
Address to the Members of the Loyal Associations, on the Present State of Public
150 Young, The Example ofFrance, p.40; Mallet du Pan, Considerations, pp.69-72.
151 Jacques Fran£ois Mallet du Pan, Dangers Which Threaten Europe (London, 1794), p. 12, 51-4.
See also Young, National Danger, pp.6-7.
152Mallet du Pan, Dangers Which Threaten Europe, pp. 1-2.
153 Bowles, The Real Grounds of the Present War with France (2nd edition: London, 1793), p. 70;
idem., A Third Letter to a British Merchant, pp.8, 53; idem., Farther Reflections, p.9; idem.,
Reflections...at the Close of the Eighteenth Century, pp. 107-8; idem., Reflections on the Political
State ofSociety at the Commencement of the Year 1800 (London, 1800), pp.95-7.
154 The Voice ofTruth to the People ofEngland, ofall Ranks and Descriptions, on Occasion ofLord
Malmesbury's Return from Lisle (London, 1797), pp.7,18-39.
155 Mallet du Pan, Dangers Which Threaten Europe, pp.2-3; A-JR, i (July 1798), 120; idem.,
Considerations, pp.2,17-43; Young, An Idea of the Present State ofFrance, pp. 1-11.
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Affairs, which described a conservative's nightmare vision of Jacobin plans for
Britain, should revolutionary France triumph in the war, listing the names of well-
known radicals (Paine, Home Tooke, Thelwall, Hardy, Muir, and so on) as members
of the Directories to be formed for England, Scotland and Ireland, and the various
measures they would carry through, such as the dispersal of the British navy
between France, Holland and Spain, leaving only a few ships each to England,
Scotland and Ireland.156
Crusaders advocated many of the same strategies for conducting the war
against France and against British radicals as the loyalists did, but, because they
were adamant that the revolutionary government must be overthrown, they also
insisted upon an allied military attack within France itself. They demanded
wholehearted, if not total, warfare from Britain and the allies, since it was a battle
for existence itself: 'if nothing but old plans are pursued on one side, while the other
is actuated by unheard-of principles and exertions, the event may be easily
conjectured,' warned Arthur Young; it was like holding up a feather to a whirlwind.
'It looks like playing with a revolution which threatens to overturn every thing, to
swallow up every thing, which makes no secret of its views, and which every day
acquires new means to realize them,' Mallet du Pan wrote.157 It was therefore
necessary to attack the Jacobins within France itself. 'The Anarchical Monster must
be pierced in his vitals, or he will never be destroyed,' declared Bowles. This was
just and necessary, for France interfered within other countries and their
governments, and this was the only effective and permanent way to guard against
it.158 Colonial expeditions simply wasted troops which could be used more
effectively at the heart of the matter.159 Full support for and use of the French
counter-revolutionary forces were urged, for the crusaders believed that their need
for allied help was mutual. There was no rational prospect that France could be
reduced to order without the efforts of the French people themselves. Bowles
thought that the vast majority of the French population was impatient to be rescued
from the crippling yoke of the Revolution; once given courage by allied support,
156 Gifford, A Short Address to the Members of the Loyal Associations, pp. 17-39.
157 Young, An Idea of the Present State of France, pp.39, 32; Mallet du Pan, Dangers Which
Threaten Europe, pp.8-9. See also The Voice of Truth, pp.4, 6, 10-11; John Bowles, Reflections
Submitted to the Consideration of the Combined Powers (London, 1794), p.2.
158 Bowles, Farther Reflections, p.45; P.H., xxxi, 674, Earl Fitzwilliam, 30 May 1794; Bowles,
Objections to the Continuance of the War, pp.64-6; idem., Reflections.. .at the Close of the Eighteenth
Century, p.16; idem., French Aggression, p.69; Gifford, Letter to the Hon. Thomas Erskine, pp.83-8;
Mallet du Pan, Dangers Which Threaten Europe, pp.54-5,69-75.
159 John Gifford, A Second Letter to the Hon. Thomas Erskine (London, 1797), p.50; P.H., xxxiii,
591, Dr. French Laurence, 18 May 1797—Laurence was in fact here arguing for the retention of
British troops on St. Domingo, but rather because he did not wish Britain to appear weak, having
committed troops there in the first place, a policy of which he disapproved.
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they would rush forth to break their chains.160 The Combined Powers ought
therefore to declare their views and intentions with regard to the counter-revolution
in France, and then to follow this up with decisive military action. They must
recognize Louis XVII (and later, his uncle, Louis XVIII) as the hereditary King of
France. The clergy and nobility must also be protected and helped, since they were
essential to any restoration of the old system in France, both in terms of their places
in the social structure and, in the case of the clergy particularly, of their value in
restoring a sense of morality to the country.161 Mallet du Pan, as befitted a Franco-
Swiss emigre, was more aware of the potential difficulties of this policy than most—
the fears which would grip the French population of allied plundering and of the
return of the abuses of the ancien regime— but he was certain that it was the only
way to defeat the Revolution.162 The allied powers must also learn to follow up their
victories properly, especially those achieved on French territory, for they were too
prone to lose their advantages through failing to reinforce and press on quickly
enough.163
Crusaders were, then, more prepared to differ from ministerial policy than
were loyalists, because of their strong conviction that there was only one strategy
capable of defeating revolutionary France. They treated the government's failures
somewhat more gently, however, than did Burke. They were willing to allow that, if
this was a just and necessary war, ministers were not ultimately responsible for its
success, and they were as much concerned to defend them against Opposition
accusations than they were to press their own criticisms.164
The characteristic by which war crusaders could most easily be distinguished
was that of their attitude to peace negotiations. Again, the crusaders used many of
the arguments rehearsed by ministers and loyalists against peace, but loyalists were
almost always relieved when ministers attempted to treat with the French
government and defended them for doing so. Crusaders' reactions to negotiations
with revolutionary France always ranged from disapproval to horror. To them, the
grounds of war—which were to do with the survival of society and civilization
rather than with the usual petty causes of irritation—still held, and so it was
160 Bowles, Reflections Submitted to the Combined Powers, p.20; also Young, An Idea of the Present
State ofFrance, pp.39-42; Mallet du Pan, Dangers Which Threaten Europe, pp.56-8.
161 Bowles, Reflections Submitted to the Combined Powers, pp. 14-20, 22-33; idem., Farther
Reflections, pp.41,44-5.
162 Mallet du Pan, Considerations, pp.46-9, 66-9.
163 Idem., Dangers Which Threaten Europe, pp.29-47, 59-64; Young, An Idea of the Present State of
France, pp.37-8.
164 The Voice of Truth, pp.42-7; Gifford, Letter to the Hon. Thomas Erskine, pp.63-5; A-JR, iv
(December 1799), 487-8.
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appalling to contemplate an abandonment of the struggle. Jacobinism was still a
threat; by the later 1790s, it might have lost many of its adherents, but many others
were incurable, and every country in Europe was plagued with those who were
infected and those who were its dupes. It had had an amazingly successful ten years
by the turn of the century, having overthrown half the governments of Europe, and it
had no reason to be discouraged. The fall of Robespierre did not herald the dawn of
'moderation' in the Republic, or anything like it—the methods of different French
revolutionary governments might change, but their object remained constant.165 It
ought to be unthinkable for Britain to recognize the French Republic:
Though we cannot controul the course of events, nor direct the
chances of war, yet I cannot foresee any situation to which we can
possibly be reduced, so disastrous as to extort from us an
acknowledgement of the French republic; an acknowledgement
pregnant with such infinite danger as almost to amount to a
political suicide.166
To negotiate with it would hardly be possible, since it operated on such entirely
different principles from the British constitution, and the attempt would be
disgraceful, since France was the original aggressor. Exhaustion was no reason to
give up, for it would produce only 'imperious sovereignty on one side, and
disgraceful submission on the other'. For war crusaders, this must be a war to the
death.167
Despite these views, most war crusaders—Earl Fitzwilliam being a reliable
exception—were at least more willing to contemplate the possibility of peace than
Burke had been, because of their greater concern to defend the ministry. Bowles
argued that ministers were entitled to the plea of necessity in their decisions at
various times to offer to negotiate, since public opinion was so heavily in favour of
such action. In his Reflections at the Conclusion of the War (1801), he urged the
proper use of the defences of the country during peace-time, trying to reconcile the
crusading instincts which warned him that a mere military peace with the
revolutionary Republic would be no true peace, with his loyalty to the ministry
165 Bowles, Reflections...at the Close of the Eighteenth Century, p.17; idem., Reflections at the
Conclusion of the War (London, 1801), pp.60-7; Gifford, Letter to the Earl of Lauderdale, pp.169-
171; idem., A Short Address, to the Members of the Loyal Associations, p. 16; P.H., xxxii, 1179-81,
1185-9, Earl Fitzwilliam, 6 October 1796; ibid., xxxiii, 865-7, 884, Earl Fitzwilliam, 2 November
1797; Mallet du Pan, Dangers Which Threaten Europe, p.2; Young, An Idea of the Present State of
France, pp.18-21, 25-31; idem., National Danger, p.2; The Voice ofTruth, pp.70-3.
166 Gifford, Letter to the Earl of Lauderdale, p. 171. Also Young, An Idea of the Present State of
France, p.47.
167 P.H., xxxiii, 864-5, Earl Fitzwilliam, 2 November 1797; Bowles, Two Letters to a British
Merchant, pp.6-7; Young, An Idea of the Present State ofFrance, p.48. See also P.H., xxxiii, 881,
Earl Fitzwilliam, 2 November 1797.
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which was in the process of concluding the terms of peace. In like manner, John
Gifford advised the retention of the Alien Bill during peacetime, and its vigorous
enforcement.168
As for the eventual settlement of 1801-2, Bowles declared that the ministers
had done very well in embarrassing circumstances; but he was little satisfied with
the so-called peace in prospect. Rejoicing over the two islands which Britain had
been permitted to keep was like a man rejoicing that he had saved a few days'
provisions from a fire which was threatening to burn down his home, for however
honourable Britain's own terms, the balance of power in Europe had been virtually
surrendered. Worse still, the peace had left the French monarchy overthrown.169 Dr.
Laurence was less amenable still, and told ministers that they had laid themselves
open to 'the most serious charge of misconduct' and that the treaty was 'most fatal
to the country'.170
Geoffrey Carnall has suggested that 'What other people were haunted by as
an occasional bad dream, was for [Burke] a habitual nightmare',171 and this is
perhaps a helpful spectrum on which to see British loyalists and crusaders in the
1790s. Very few people, if any, were driven to the same state of desperation by the
French Revolution as Burke was, and consequently few viewed the war with the
same inflexibility. Some of those who knew him well, such as Earl Fitzwilliam and
Dr. Laurence, probably came closest to him in unrelenting crusading opinions.
Bowles, Gifford, Young and other crusading pamphleteers had greater obligations to
defend the ministry's conduct of the war, and probably greater loyalist sympathies of
their own, but they also suffered from the nightmare of a world revolutionized by
Jacobinism badly enough to diverge clearly from the ministerial line in their views
of the aims and nature of the conflict, their ideas of how it should be waged and their
attitudes towards peace. Loyalists, too, were captured by horrible visions, though of
a slightly different nature. Their nightmare was less of a world or even a Europe
revolutionized and more of a Britain in thrall to radical politicians and levelling
economists. A French invasion was a variation on this theme which occurred with
168 Gifford, Letter to the Hon. Thomas Erskine, p. 103; Bowles, Article I, A-JR, i (August 1798), 134;
idem., Reflections at the Conclusion of the War, pp.43, 46, 58; Gifford, Second Letter to Thomas
Erskine, p.39.
169 Bowles, Reflections at the Conclusion of the War, pp.5,7-8,35-7,43.
170 P.H., xxxvi, 145, Dr. Laurence, 3 November 1801; ibid., xxxvi, 674, Dr. Laurence, 12 May 1802;
also ibid., xxxvi, 806-7, Dr. Laurence, 14 May 1802. ForWilliam Cobbett's strong disapproval of the
peace settlement, see A.M. Broadley (ed.), The Journal of a British Chaplain in Paris During the
Peace Negotiations of 1801-2. From the unpublished MS. of the Revd. Dawson Warren, M.A.,
unofficially attached to the Diplomatic Mission of Mr. Francis James Jackson (London, 1913),
p.xxxii.
171 Geoffrey Carnall, Robert Southey and His Age: The Development of a Conservative Mind
(Oxford, 1960), p.9.
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increasing frequency as the threat from domestic radicalism diminished, but this was
a dream which could be banished by the prospect of peace. The visions of crusaders
could only be intensified by such a prospect.
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4. The Opposition to the War (I): The Foxite Whigs
Opposition to the British government's war against revolutionary France fluctuated,
as different groups at different times found it in their interests to be counted part of it
or not. The conflict was actively opposed in a consistent way for three main reasons:
party politics, political idealism and pacifism. These motivations might overlap in
the anti-war reasoning of any individual or group of people, but, while Foxite Whigs
inside Parliament and their sympathizers outside it tended to be motivated by party
political opposition to the conflict, the arguments of radical politicians were
dominated by their desire for 'French principles' to be permitted to spread
unhindered, and the liberal 'Friends of Peace' emphasized the evil nature and
consequences of war. This chapter and the next will examine the views of these
three groups of anti-war activists, leaving the consideration of the more sporadic
demonstrations of popular opposition to the conflict to chapter 8.
By their attitudes to the secession of the Portland Whigs in 1794, to the
French Revolution in general, and to the aims, conduct and cessation of the war, the
Foxites showed themselves to be more concerned to defeat Pitt than to preserve
peace with France. This rather factious party spirit laid them open to charges of
inconsistency when they sometimes tried to argue from principle and whenever the
government began to negotiate for peace. This chapter examines the opinions of the
Foxite Whigs in Parliament and their supporters out-of-doors. It begins, however, by
considering those former allies of Fox, the Portland Whigs, and their journey from
parliamentary opposition to membership of the government because of their support
for the war against revolutionary France.
I
The rapidly changing events during the war against France made choices more
difficult for the Opposition Whigs as well as for the ministry and, if the government
was unclear in its war aims, the Opposition of 1792-4 was clearly divided in its
attitudes to the war itself. Because of its direct impact upon Britain, the conflict
forced a polarization of political attitudes even more sharply than had the
Revolution. It had become a matter of national security and was no longer merely an
issue of personal opinion or sympathy. Fence-sitting was not an option for
Opposition or independent MPs; Jacobin and royalist excesses in France often
appeared to be equally horrifying, but ultimately a choice had to be made. The
problem was complicated for the Whig Opposition in Parliament by the decision
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they had to make over the relative importance of the existence of a parliamentary
opposition and the issue of national security. For some, such as Charles James Fox,
the existence of an opposition in Parliament to the Pitt administration was of such
fundamental importance that it helped to shape their views on the war. For others,
the war and national security came first, and they eventually made the difficult
choice of leaving the opposition benches to support the government.
Fox could not bear the idea of 'suspending opposition for the purpose of
giving strength to Government', even during a war, particularly since the
government was led by William Pitt, who had been used by George III to overthrow
the Fox-North coalition of 1782-3.1 A considerable number of those who remained
with him did so partly because of their eagerness for parliamentary reform—younger
men, such as Charles Grey and Samuel Whitbread—while their less radical elders
continued in opposition for much the same reasons as Fox, having been with him in
Parliament through the struggle for office of 1782-4. Less enthusiastic for
parliamentary reform they may have been (William Adam opposed Grey's motion
calling for it in May 1793), but their hostility towards British or allied interference in
French affairs inexorably led them to condone French republicanism. This, and not
mere military security alone, was at the heart of the split with those who later
became known as ' the Portland Whigs' ,2
These MPs, who at various stages between 1791 and 1794 abandoned their
support of Fox and eventually came to support Pitt, saw the menace to the welfare of
Britain in the 1790s as an essentially different entity to the danger posed by the
influence of the crown in the 1780s. The major enemy then had been the influence
of the Court on British political life, through the King's placing of the young,
inexperienced William Pitt at the head of the government. Now, it seemed to these
Opposition MPs, a greater foe threatened, in the shape of revolutionary principles
armed by Frenchmen and welcomed by British radicals. In the face of these it was
not only prudent, but necessary, to cease fighting the lesser antagonist and to join
forces against the common enemy. To Fox and his friends, on the other hand, the
British war against France was not a struggle against any serious threat, but merely
another symptom of corruption in high places, which remained the real foe. The
Duke of Portland and various other erstwhile allies of Fox therefore had increasingly
less in common with him as the war began to dominate political debate in
Parliament and in the nation at large.
1 BL. Add. MS 47565 f.163, Fox to Adair, 29 November 1792.
2 Frank O'Gorman, The Whig Party and the French Revolution (London, 1967), pp. 129-30, 145.
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In August 1791 Burke published An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs,
condemning the 'new Whig' principles of Fox, Sheridan and their followers and
vindicating the 'old Whig' principles of those who thought as he did about the
Revolution and its excesses. He admitted to his son that in this pamphlet he had
represented the whole of the opposition party as approving of the French Revolution
precisely in order to 'get the better of their inactivity, & to stimulate them to a
publick declaration of, what every one of their acquaintance privately knows, to be
as much their Sentiments as they are yours & mine.'3 Pitt reinforced Burke's
strategy, declaring in Parliament that in the matter of 'fundamental principles', he
was in complete agreement with Burke.4
While conservative Opposition Whigs were attempting to persuade Fox of
the dangers of the French Revolution, the younger members of the party were trying
to gain his sanction for their support for its principles. In April 1792 they formed the
Association of the Friends of the People with the object of campaigning for
parliamentary reform in Britain.5 Fox did not join the society, but, on the other hand,
neither did he disown it. This caused the conservative Whigs great concern. 'I am
very sorry to see that Fox has taken a part in their support, although he has not
signed the Association; but he might just as well have signed it as made the speech
he did yesterday,' Sir Gilbert Elliot wrote to his wife on 1 May.6 By December Fox
was simultaneously a member of the committee of the Loyal Association of St.
George's parish of Westminster and a member of the Society of the Friends of the
Liberty of the Press.7 Nevertheless, conservative Opposition Whigs such as Portland
and Earl Fitzwilliam continued to hope that the increasing violence of events in
France would shock Fox into agreeing with their perspective on the Revolution.8
3 Burke to Richard Burke, 5 August 1791, Burke Corr., vi, 316-7; P.H., xxix, 385, Burke, 6 May
1791; L.G. Mitchell, Charles James Fox and the Disintegration of the Whig Party 1782-1794
(Oxford, 1971), p.169; O'Brien, The Great Melody, pp.463-4, 501.
4P.H., xxviii, 372-3, Pitt, 9 February 1790. For the Foxite view that Pitt had deliberately opposed the
French Revolution in order to split the Whigs, see, for example, James Maitland, 8th Earl of
Lauderdale, Letters to the Peers of Scotland (London, 1794), pp.131, 172-215; the Morning
Chronicle, 28 September 1793; L.G. Mitchell, Charles James Fox (Oxford, 1992), p. 123. For Pitt's
manoeuvring, see Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, ch.6, esp. pp. 184-193.
5 For its founding declaration, membership and address to the British people, see P.H., xxix, 1303-9n.
6 Minto (ed.), Life and Letters, ii, 17-18, Elliot to his wife, 1 May 1792; P.H., xxix, 1312, Fox, 30
April 1792; Mitchell, Charles James Fox, p. 120. See also Malmesbury Diaries and Letters, ii, 454, 9
June 1792.
7 Emsley, British Society and the French Wars, p. 16; Mitchell, The Disintegration of the Whig Party,
pp.206-7.
8 O'Gorman, The Whig Party, p. 101. See BL Add. MSS 45728 ff,136v-7, Auckland to Lord
Sheffield, 24 July 1792, for the musings and hopes of an establishment figure on the possibility diat
Fox might be persuaded to join the government.
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That perspective was not yet clearly defined, an indecision in which the
conservative Whigs were hardly unique. While Thomas Grenville and Fitzwilliam
wanted to suspend systematic parliamentary opposition, but were not convinced that
Britain ought to prepare for war against France, Windham agreed with Burke that
the country should be made ready to defend itself and even perhaps to assist the
Combined Powers on the Continent. Portland himself was prepared to sympathize
with the Austro-Prussian invasion of France, but it was unclear what he thought
about a possible British intervention in the European turmoil.9
By December 1792 they were sufficiently alarmed by the political turmoil
outside Parliament to agree, at least tacitly, with the ministry's calling out of the
militia and summoning Parliament.10 In the debate on the Address of Thanks to the
King, on 13 December, Windham defended the right of a nation to interfere in
another's internal affairs if its own interests were affected. Viscount Stormont went
further and declared his support for the government for the purposes of resisting
French principles. 'I cannot shrink from, or elude that duty [of defending the British
constitution], by saying to myself, "I do not like these ministers; I wish the
administration was in different, and, as I may think, in abler hands",' he told the
House of Lords. 'It is not this or that minister, this or that denomination of men, that
I join upon occasions like this. I range myself under the broad banner of the
constitution.' Lord Fielding followed suit in the Commons. On 31 December Sir
Peter Burrell and the Marquis of Titchfield (Portland's son) supported the ministry
in the Commons debate on the Army Estimates.11 Lord Loughborough accepted the
seals of office of the Lord Chancellorship on 18 January 1793 and, after the
declaration of war in February, Windham and perhaps 25 other Whigs joined some
independent MPs to form a 'Third Party' to support the government in its conflict
against France, while reserving their judgement on other matters and on the actual
conduct of the war.12
These MPs appeared to hope that they differed with the Foxites only on the
war and that this might soon be resolved. They found themselves on the horns of a
dilemma, unable in their position to defend the government's strategy or to attack its
9p.H., xxx, 51, Thomas Grenville, 13 December 1792; O'Gorman, The Whig Party, pp. 108-9.
10 Windham was closely involved with the formation of the Loyal Association at the Crown and
Anchor in November 1792 (Elirman, The Reluctant Transition, p.232 n.l). See also P.H., xxx, 36-7,
540-2, Windham, 13 December 1792, on repressive measures against British radicalism.
11 P.H., xxx, 39-40, Windham, 13 December 1792; ibid., xxix, 1572-3, Viscount Stormont, 13
December 1792; ibid., xxx, 9-10, Lord Fielding, 13 December 1792; ibid., xxx, 191, Burrell and
Titchfield, 31 December 1792. Later in the debate (col. 213), indeed, Titchfield declared that the
ministry ought to have acted sooner.
12 O'Gorman, The Whig Party, pp.117, 126-8; Mitchell, The Disintegration of the Whig Party, p.214.
138
conduct of the war. Some, however, such as Sir Gilbert Elliot and Lord Malmesbury,
had recognized even before the outbreak of war that to remain in awkward
opposition could only be a temporary solution and that it would be necessary to
break with Fox completely and give formal support to the government, because the
issues surrounding the war had become 'truly the just criterion of public conduct and
connection'.13 Elliot unhooked himself in April 1793, declaring himself at the
service of the ministry, and was eventually appointed the British Commissioner at
Toulon in September of that year, after some negotiation and manoeuvring. 'Is it not
childish,' he asked, 'to be finding fault with the mode of carrying on the war at the
very time when we refuse to assist in doing it better?'14 Malmesbury likewise
accepted a diplomatic mission to Berlin in November 1793.
Portland and his followers took longer to overcome their deep-seated distrust
of Pitt, which, like Fox's, dated from the events of 1782-4, and had been reinforced
by their objections to his conduct of the war. They agreed with Burke that the
government's strategy was not nearly close enough to a consciously counter¬
revolutionary line, and they were also unwilling to admit that the difference between
them and the Foxites was one of principle and more than one of interpretation. They
rarely spoke in Parliament, supporting neither Pitt nor Fox.15 Meanwhile, the war
did not end conveniently after one campaign and, in January 1794, Portland and his
followers opted to follow the 'Third Party' formula of separation from Fox and
systematic opposition, granting their support for the war, but no systematic support
for the administration. They were involved in the Volunteer movement from the
spring of 1794; but it was not until July, after lengthy talks and various concessions,
that they were finally persuaded to overcome their dislike of Pitt and their objections
to his war strategy sufficiently to join the administration, having decided that the
ministry required to be stiffened by their greater resolve against revolutionary
principles and activities.16 'If We decline taking our share of responsibility in the
13 P.H., xxx, 160, Earl Spencer, 22 December 1792 is a typical apologia for a Whig now voting with
the government on the war. Minto (ed.), Life and Letters, ii, 103, Elliot to Sir David Carnegie,
January 1793; Malmesbury Diaries and Letters, ii, 499-500, Lord Malmesbury to the Duke of
Portland, 16 January 1793.
14 O'Gorman, The Whig Party, pp. 152-3, 176; Paul Kelly, 'Strategy and Counter-Revolution: the
journal of Sir Gilbert Elliot, 1-22 September 1793', in English Historical Review, xcviii (1983), 330;
Minto (ed.), Life and Letters, ii, 150-2, 157-9, Elliot to his wife, 17 September 1793 (quotation from
p. 159).
15 On both the Portland Whigs' distmst of Pitt and their reluctance to admit substantial divergence
from Fox, see LCGIII, i, 650-2, the Duke of Portland to the Prince of Wales, 21 January 1793. On
their careful support in Parliament for the war but not for the administration, see P.H., xxx, 413-4, the
Duke of Portland, 12 February 1793; ibid., xxx, 1245-7, Windham, 21 January 1794—and see also
Malmesbury Diaries and Letters, ii, 508, 8 November 1793, on Portland; BL Add. MSS 47569 ff.30-
1, Thomas Grenville to Fox, 29 December 1793; Mitchell, Charles James Fox, p. 133.
16 O'Gorman, The Whig Party, pp.178, 186, 192.
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present moments the danger with which this Country and all the Civilised World are
threatened must be unavoidable and greatly increased,' wrote Portland.17 In the
reconstructed administration Portland himself became Home Secretary, Windham
joined the War Office, Fitzwilliam became Lord President of the Board of Trade,
Lord Spencer took up the Privy Seal and Lord Mansfield was made a Cabinet
Minister without portfolio. Various other marks of favour and patronage were also
conferred on the Portland Whigs and, with regard to policy, Portland received
assurances that the British government aimed at the restoration of the French
monarchy.18
II
The seceders were regretted rather than condemned by Fox. He wearily told his
nephew, Lord Holland, that he would prefer to retire from politics altogether, but
that 'this could not be done, and there therefore remains nothing but to get together
the remains of our party, and begin, like Sisyphus, to roll up the stone again, which
long before it reaches the summit, may probably roll down again.' Some of his
remaining followers were less forgiving, and angrily denounced the Portland
Whigs.19 The traffic within Parliament, however, though hardly equal, was by no
means one-way. The Foxite party also received support in opposition from a few
former Pittites who were hostile to the war, such as William Smith, who was a
member of the Friends of the People and who had been instrumental in arranging
Pitt's talks with Maret in December 1792.20 The Marquis of Lansdowne, not
previously an admirer of Fox, fell out with Pitt over his non-inclusion in the Cabinet
and opposed him over the war, and by late 1792 he and his son, the Earl of
Wycombe, had decided to throw in their lot with Fox. Lord Holland, who reported
this, also thought that Earl Fitzwilliam was a gain of doubtful value to Pitt because,
17 Quoted in ibid., p. 196.
18 Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, p.414; O'Gorman, The Whig Party, p. 196.
19 Lord John Russell (ed.), Memorials and Correspondence ofCharles James Fox (4 vols.: London,
1853-7), iii, 65-6, Fox to Lord Holland, 9 March 1794. See also BL Add. MSS 47569 ff.56v.-7, Fox
to ?, 2 January 1795. For examples of Foxite anger towards the secessions, see the anonymous open
letter to Loughborough, published as A Letter to the Greatest Hypocrite in His Majesty's Dominions
(1794); also P.H., xxx, 1240-1, Sheridan, 21 January 1794.
20 Richard W. Davis, Dissent in Politics 1780-1830. The Political Life of William Smith, M.P.
(London, 1971), pp.51-102; Murley, 'Origins and Outbreak', p.264. O'Gorman, The Whig Party,
pp.253-4, lists other MPs who were not recognized to be associated with Fox but who often voted
with him during the 1790s. See also the anonymous pamphlet headed Reasons Against Refusing to
Negotiate with France. By an Approver of the Measures of Administration, During the Former
Periods of the War (London, 1800)—whether or not this title was merely a rhetorical device, war-
weariness surely provoked widespread discontent with the Pitt administration.
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although after his breach with the rest of the Cabinet over Ireland in March 1795 he
continued to support the war and oppose reform, he also assisted the Opposition
with his hostility to the government's Irish policy, the expansion of the militia and
on the conduct of the war.2i The Duke of Grafton, William Wilberforce and Henry
Duncombe all opposed the government at various times on the issue of the war.
Moreover, though Fox might restrain himself in public over the issue of the split, he
was now free to express himself on the war without the restraint of moderation
previously required to retain the support of the Portland group.22
The Foxite rump was a relatively small group of MPs—Frank O'Gorman
estimates it at some 66 MPs, less than half of the old opposition group, and L.G.
Mitchell describes it as 'no longer an opposition but a pressure group'. Fox realized
in 1794 that, even so, all was 'not quite in harmony' within it and that increased
party spirit would have to be fostered through the experience of the split with the
Portland Whigs.23 John Ehrman notes that it had been only over the past decade that
organized and consistent opposition to government was becoming recognized as
legitimate, by way of the turmoil of 1782-4 and the Dissenting campaign of 1790 for
the repeal of the Test Acts. If this is so, it may be that opposition to the British war
against revolutionary France was a significant factor in the formation and
consolidation of the institution of a party of opposition in Parliament. In his attitudes
to the French Revolution, and to the aims and conduct of the war, Fox led his
followers in a campaign marked still more by hostility to ministers than by
opposition to the conflict itself. 'This war must grow to be disliked by all classes of
people, as much, or more than the American war,' he wrote in October 1794, 'and
we may profit, as a party, by such an opinion becoming prevalent.'24
Many of the Foxite Whigs were inclined to support the French, partly
because of personal connections with France. Fox himself had visited Paris several
times, and he had links with many of the leading members of French society who
had come over to England at the end of the American War, and particularly with
those liberal noblemen who were involved in the early stages of the Revolution,
such as the Vicomte de Noailles, vice-president of the National Assembly in 1789,
and the Marquis de Lafayette. His supporters also had links with the envoy of the
21 Henry Richard, Lord Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party During My Time (2 vols.: London,
1852), i, 43-4,75-6; Mitchell, Charles James Fox, p. 137.
22 Mitchell, The Disintegration of the Whig Party, pp.227-30; Minto (ed.), Life and Letters, ii, 18,
Elliot to his wife, 1 May 1792.
23 O'Gorman, The Whig Party, pp.129, 253; Mitchell, Charles James Fox, p. 141; Russell (ed.),
Memorials and Correspondence, iii, 66, Fox to Holland, 9 March 1794.
24 Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, pp.54-6; Russell (ed.), Memorials, iii, 89, Fox to Holland, 5
October 1794.
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National Convention in London, M. Chauvelin, in 1792-3—Sheridan visited him
twice in Portman Square to explain Foxite views to him.25
Fox was enchanted with the Revolution in its initial stages. He responded to
it more emotionally and less intellectually than Burke did, joyfully welcoming its
acclamation of freedom and its condemnation of despotism. He associated the events
of the Revolution in France with those of the Glorious Revolution in England a
century earlier, with the American Revolution and (if not explicitly) with the Whig
struggle of 1782-4, seeing only its attack on despotism and corrupt Courts and not its
tendency towards an unstable democracy.26 He continued to support the more
moderate Girondin party when the Jacobin violence which so dismayed him was
propelled into the ascendancy in Paris.
Before the outbreak of the British war with France, therefore, the Foxite
Whigs and their supporters defended the Revolution not only within France but also
with regard to its international consequences. They argued that France was anxious
to preserve peace with Britain and that it was in too great a state of turmoil to be in a
position to harm its powerful rival. It invaded only the territories of its declared
enemies.27 The Foxites regretted the Austro-Prussian war of 1792 against France,
and sympathized with France. Although they were shocked by the events of August
and September in France, they were delighted by the retreat of the Duke of
Brunswick and the Prussian army.28 Fox wrote to Lord Holland that 'no public event
not excepting Saratoga & York Town, ever happened that ever gave me so much
delight. I would not allow myself to believe it for some days for fear of
disappointment.'29 In December 1792 Samuel Whitbread urged the administration to
recognize the French Republic formally, since not to do so was an unnecessary act
of hostility. Fox argued that Britain should have interfered in the conflict to mediate
between the belligerents, out of sympathy for the defensive war France was
waging.30
25 Mitchell, The Disintegration of the Whig Party, pp. 154-6, 168; idem., Charles James Fox, pp. 109-
10, 158-9; Newman, The Rise ofEnglish Nationalism, p.92; Murley, 'Origins and Outbreak', p.295.
26 Mitchell, Charles James Fox, chs. 6, 8.
27 P.H., xxviii, 332-5,346-8, Fox, 5 February 1790; ibid., xxx, 327, Lauderdale, 1 February 1793; the
Morning Chronicle, 10 January 1793, on the Spanish treaty of neutrality with France; BL Add. MS
47571 f.23v., Fox to Holland, 23 November 1792.
28 Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, p.226.
29 BL Add. MS 47571 f. 17v, Fox to Holland, 12 October 1792. See also ibid., ff.20-v., Fox to
Holland, [November 1792].
30 P.H., xxx, 103, Whitbread, 15 December 1792; ibid., 60, Fox, 14 December 1792. Two years
earlier, Earl Stanhope had even urged alliance with France—ibid., xxviii, 898, Stanhope, 26
November 1790.
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War against France was grossly unpalatable to these Whigs, and they
declared that it was both unnecessary and undesirable. It was unnecessary because
France posed no danger to Britain. French revolutionary opinions had made very
little progress in Britain, and French arms were directed elsewhere. Peace with the
world was necessary to domestic tranquillity, and the extent of radical opinion
would only be inflamed by war. Moreover, war might accelerate the circumstance
which ministers were apparently so eager to prevent: the aggrandizement of France,
and at British expense.31 As for the question of Dutch security, the Whigs were
scornful that the French breach of the Scheldt should constitute a serious ground for
war. Protection of their river was a Dutch affair: the British alliance could not be
expected to stretch to cover such a trivial issue, which would undoubtedly result in a
long and arduous conflict. It was in any case not even in the Dutch interest to go to
war for such a cause, and Britain ought not to force them into it.32 Erskine reminded
the Commons of the horrors of warfare for the soldiers involved—the disease, the
damp, the lack of fresh provisions—and of the burdensome and unpopular taxation it
involved at home.33 Britain was unprepared for war, according to the Morning
Chronicle. 'We see a great deal of that kind of bustle, which gives countenance to
jobbing, and none of the alacrity and vigour which indicate war,' it reported on 21
January 1793.34
It was therefore demanded by the Foxites that Britain should negotiate with
France to maintain peace between them. Fox himself proposed a motion to this
effect in the Commons on 15 December 1792, and the speeches and writings of his
followers after this regularly sought to demonstrate the emptiness of government
arguments against such a proceeding—despite the fact that Fox may well have
known, through Sheridan's communications with Chauvelin, that secret negotiations
31 Comments on the Proposed War with France, on the State of Parties, and on the New Act
Respecting Aliens (London, 1793), pp.22, 60-78; War with France! or, who pays the reckoning? In
an Appeal to the People ofEngland! Repentance may come too late! (London, 1793), p.22; P.H., xxx,
57, Erskine, 13 December 1792; ibid., xxx, 68, Fox, 13 December 1792; ibid., xxx, 220-3, Fox, 31
December 1792; ibid., xxx, 294, the Earl of Wycombe, 1 February 1793; ibid., xxx, 297-8,
Whitbread, 1 February 1793; ibid., xxx, 322, Stanhope, 1 February 1793. See also the protests against
the war given by the Marquis of Lansdowne, the Earl of Lauderdale and Earl Stanhope to the records
of the House of Lords on 1 February 1793 in P.H., xxx, 334-8.
32 P.H., xxx, 11-12, Wycombe, 13 December 1792; ibid., xxx, 25, Fox, 13 December 1792; P.H.,
xxx, 222, Fox, 31 December 1792; ibid., xxx, 299-300, Whitbread, 1 February 1793; Comments on
the Proposed War with France, pp.5-12; War with France! pp.21-2; the Morning Chronicle, 10
January 1793.
33 P.H., xxx, 97-9, Erskine, 15 December 1792. See also Hervey Redmond Morres, The Crisis. A
Collection ofEssays written in the years 1792 and 1793 (London, 1794), pp.53, 77; Charles James
Fox, A Letter from the Right Honourable Charles James Fox, to the Worthy and Independent
Electors of the City and Liberty ofWestminster (London, 1793), pp.21-30.
34 See also the Morning Chronicle, 9, 11,16, 18, 19 January and 12 February 1793.
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were under way and that it was therefore unnecessary to demand that a British
minister should be sent to Paris to negotiate.35 There was an effective pledge for the
fulfilment of whatever might be agreed upon in a negotiation, wrote the author of
Comments on the Proposed War with France (1793), 'because France can have no
interest but to get rid of the frightful burthen of her foreign war, and to look to her
deranged internal affairs, which will soon fix and fascinate all her regards.' The
Morning Chronicle agreed that France sought only the friendship of Britain, and
censured Grenville's cold treatment of Chauvelin. William Adam argued that,
should the negotiation fail, it would at least have convinced the British public of the
government's sincerity in going to war only as a last resort. The Marquis of
Lansdowne suggested that it might help to save the life of Louis XVI.36
The Foxites did not divide Parliament on the announcement of the outbreak
of hostilities, but they continued to argue that the conflict was unnecessary.
Lauderdale thought that Britain ought to have welcomed the Revolution in France as
the downfall of a government characterized by restless intrigue and love of warfare,
and as a development that surely augured well for international commerce.37 They
were adamant that the French, harried by German armies and anxious about their
domestic state, had not wanted war with Britain and that it could have been avoided
by negotiation. Their declaration of hostilities had simply been a pre-emptive strike
after clear evidence of British hostility, such as the British refusal to mediate
between France and the German powers in June 1792, the recall of Gower from
Paris, the violation of the 1786 commercial treaty, the Aliens Act and the expulsion
of Chauvelin from London.38 By 1796 Fox had brought the argument full circle to
35 P.H., xxx, 80-1, 125-6, Fox, 15 December 1792; ibid., xxx, 123, Sheridan, 15 December 1792;
Murley, 'Origins and Outbreak', p.340; Black, British Foreign Policy, p.429. Black also comments
(p.431) that the repeated calls of the Foxites for negotiations jeopardized the chance of a British
envoy being sent to Paris, since this would have had to have been an unofficial mission in order not to
upset the other European powers.
36 Comments on the Proposed War with France, pp.32-3; the Morning Chronicle, 15, 17, 18, 21,31
January 1793; P.H., xxx, 78, Adam, 14 December 1792; ibid., xxx, 148-9, Lansdowne, 21 December
1792. See also P.H., xxx, 84-5, Grey, 15 December 1792; ibid., xxx, 95-6, Erskine, 15 December
1792; ibid., xxx, 137-8, Sheridan, 20 December 1792; ibid., xxx, 222-3, Fox, 31 December 1792.
37 Lauderdale, Letters to the Peers ofScotland, pp. 17-27.
38 For example: Benjamin Vaughan, Letters, on the Subject of the Concert of Princes, and the
Dismemberment ofPoland and France, By a Calm Observer (London, 1793), pp.366-72; A Letter to
the Greatest Hypocrite, p. 14; Horatius Publicola, The Prospect Before Us!!! Or the State ofFrance in
the Month of August, 1794; in Reply to Montgaillard's State of France: to which are added,
Reflections on the Expedience and Necessity of an Immediate Peace with the French Republic
(London, 1794), pp.37-9; James Workman, An Argument Against Continuing the War (London,
1795), pp.3-7; O'Bryen, Utrum Horum? The Government; or, the Country? (5th edition: London,
1796), pp.32-8, 42-51, 55; The Evidence Summed Up; or a Statement of the Apparent Causes and
Objects of the War (London, 1794), pp. 12-26; [Ralph Broome], Strictures on Mr. Burke's Two
Letters, addressed to a Member of the Present Parliament. Part the /4«7(London, 1796), pp. 10-13 ;
144
claim that the lack of allied success in the war proved that its cause must have been
'radically defective'.39
The Foxites' basic rationale for opposing the war was their hostility towards
Pitt himself. On 12 December 1792 Fox had declared that 'there was no address at
this moment that Pitt could frame, he would not propose an amendment to, and
divide the House upon'.40 At the same time, the Whigs posed as a high-minded
group of men, above such factious party spirit, and only concerned with the welfare
of their country. Fox declared in May 1794 that he would do all in his power to
persuade the people to demand peace, 'but if a headstrong, rash, ignorant, or haughty
minister should plunge us into a war, then we must do the best we could to get out of
it; and to keep up our respectability to the rest of the world, supplies must be
granted'.41
If there had been no defensive necessity for Britain to go to war against
France, ministers must have had another purpose for it. This notion was built up by
some Foxites until it assumed the proportions that the conspiracy theory of the
French Revolution beloved of the war crusaders was later to do. The Opposition
theory of the war was that it was a despotic crusade waged by the absolute monarchs
of Austria and Prussia against the newly-born republic of France, and it was deeply
shameful that Britain had aligned itself with the cause of despotism rather than with
that of liberty. Benjamin Vaughan, a member of Lansdowne's circle, had provided a
detailed description of this autocratic crusade in his Letters, on the Subject of the
Concert of Princes, and the Dismemberment of Poland and France, By a Calm
Observer (1793), which had been published first as a series in the Morning
Chronicle between 20 July 1792 and 25 June 1793. As early as 25 July 1792 he had
asked: 'are they [Austria and Prussia] not acting upon a deep plan, long concerted,
and profoundly secret?...a conspiracy (which will eventually become one against the
whole human race) is begun, such as was never begun before...a revolution, as
extraordinary as that of France, is under issue'. Vaughan did not implicate the
British government as a full and deliberate member of this conspiracy, but he
warned against allowing Britain to become associated with such wickedness, albeit
unwittingly 42 Fox and his followers, nursing old political grievances against George
War with France! pp.7-18; Erskine, View of the Causes and Consequences, pp.28-36, 41-53; P.H.,
xxx, 431-2, Fox, 18 February 1793; ibid., xxx, 702, Sheridan, 25 April 1793.
39 P.H., xxxii, 1201, Fox, 6 October 1796.
40Malmesbury Diaries and Correspondence, ii, 475, 12 December 1792.
41 P.H.., xxxi, 655, Fox, 30 May 1794.
42 Vaughan, Letters on the Concert ofPrinces, p.79. See also his Two Papers by the Calm Observer,
not printed in tire collections ofhis letters extractedfrom the Morning Chronicle (Fondon, 1795), re¬
publishing letters first printed in August and September 1792. For other Foxite denunciations of the
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Ill and anxious to emphasize their credentials as traditional Whigs who were hostile
to the corruption of executive power, developed this idea. In it they saw an
explanation for the revolutionary violence of August and September 1792: the
despots of Europe had harassed the Revolution into perversity. From the beginning
of the war they declared that, encouraged by Burke and his writings, Britain had
intentionally joined a 'Crusade of Kings', not a war of the people.43
If the Continental coalition were to be successful, the Opposition claimed,
the war would destroy the balance of power and civilization in Europe, just as
loyalists believed that war was necessary to preserve them. 'I cannot help
thinking...of the dreadful state of things in Europe, and the real danger which exists,
in my opinion, of the total extinction of liberty, and possibly of civilization too, if
this war is to go on upon the principles which are held out,' Fox wrote to Holland in
April 1794. Vaughan warned that if the allies defeated France, they would surely
savagely plunder it and the rest of Europe, and would become an evil confederate
power of gross proportions, a danger to mankind. Another pamphleteer pointed out
that an allied victory would result in furious disputes concerning the spoil due to
each nation, the jarring interests of indemnification claims, and the discontent and
disunity of the French people forced to settle under their conquerors' terms—a clear
recipe for a future war.44 The Whigs were particularly alarmed by the joining of the
tyrannical Turkish Empire to the struggle against France in 1798.45
German 'Concert of Princes', see P.H., xxx, 27-8, Fox, 13 December 1792; ibid., xxix, 1574,
Stanhope, 13 December 1792; ibid., xxx, 121-3, Sheridan, 15 December 1792; the Morning
Chronicle, 30 September 1793; 'The Genius of France' in Bennett, War Poetry, pp.98-100; Morres,
The Crisis, pp.45-84 (but see pp. 168-78, where he executes a volte face and shows great approval of
the allied campaign and its purposes).
43 Considerations on the French War, in which the Circumstances Leading to it, its Object, and the
Resources ofBritain for Carrying it on, are Examined, in a Letter, to the Rt. Hon.ble William Pitt, By
a British Merchant (London, 1794), pp.22-4. See also Mitchell, Charles James Fox, pp. 124, 129-30;
P.H., xxx, 372-3, Fox, 12 February 1793; ibid., xxx, 428-31, Fox, 18 February 1793; ibid., xxx, 1467,
Whitbread, 6 March 1794; William Fox, The Interest ofGreat Britain, Respecting the Present War
(2nd edition: London, 1793), pp.2-3; Daniel Stuart, Peace and Reform, Against War and Corruption.
In Answer to a Pamphlet, written by Arthur Young, Esq., entitled 'The Example ofFrance, a Warning
to Britain' (2nd edition: London, 1794), pp.116, 56-7; Samuel Waddington, Remarks on Mr. Burke's
Two Letters 'On the Proposals for Peace with the Regicide Directory ofFrance' (London, 1796),
pp. 10,34; Erskine, View of the Causes and Consequences , pp.26,69; Thomas Erskine, speech at the
trial of John Home Tooke (1794), in James Ridgway (ed.), The Speeches of the Hon. Thomas Erskine
when at the Bar, on Subjects Connected with the Liberty of the Press, and against Constructive
Treasons (4 vols.: London, 1810), iv, 116-9; A Retrospect; Illustrating the Necessity ofan Immediate
Peace with the Republic ofFrance (Margate, 1796), pp. 16-17; theMorning Chronicle, 27 December
17%; 'To die Continental Despots' in Bennett, War Poetry, p.91.
44 Russell (ed.), Memorials, iii, 72, Fox to Holland, 25 April 1794; Vaughan, Letters on the Concert
of Princes, pp. 190-208, 231-44; Considerations on the French War, pp.36-7. See also P.H., xxx,
1470, Whitbread, 6 March 1794; P.H., xxxiv, 1366-1373, Fox, 3 February 1800; ibid., xxxii, 1504,
Bedford, 30 December 1796. On the destruction of civilization and 'taste' as a result of such an allied
victory, see Lady Holland, quoted in Gerald Newman, 'Anti-French Propaganda and British
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The Foxites mocked all government attempts to convince them that there
were other and justified reasons for the war. They played hard on the ministers'
difficulty in defining the specific objects of the war.46 They pressed ministers to
admit that the real aim of the British government and its allies was to re-impose the
monarchy on the French people, especially after Lord Hood's declaration in favour
of Louis XVII at Toulon in September 1793. This was something that the despotic
Combined Powers had no right to do and in which Britain, with its long tradition of
liberty, ought to have no role.47 'We who banished the race of Stuart, are fighting to
restore the race of Capet, we who reformed the national religion and rejected popery,
are fighting to continue its abuses!' one pamphleteer wrote.48
So eager were Opposition MPs and writers to exonerate France from war-
guilt that they seemed to be almost pro-French and disloyal to their own country.
Unwilling to change their analysis of the continental war once it appeared likely that
Britain would be drawn into it, and seeing an opportunity to heap further
opprobrium on all courtly corruption, they presented the British government as an
accomplice to the continental villains, in which scenario France clearly emerged as
the hero. They publicly condoned those revolutionary excesses which privately
caused them real distress.49 They accused conservatives of exaggerating the extent
of these, and claimed that there were understandable excuses for them. One of the
most popular explanations was that the Revolution had unleashed so immense a
supply of energy, previously pent-up under absolutist oppression, that it could not
immediately be brought under control. It was regrettable, but only natural, that those
Nationalism in the Early Nineteenth Century: Suggestions Toward a General Interpretation',
Victorian Studies, 18 (1975), 398-9.
4:5 Russell (ed.), Memorials, iii, 281, Fox to Richard Fitzpatrick, 1798; the Morning Chronicle, 27
January 1800.
46 P.H., xxxiv, 1520-5, Tierney, 28 February 1800. See also ibid., xxx, 444, Adam, 18 February
1793; ibid., xxx, 1022, Fox, 17 June 1793; ibid., xxx, 1252, Fox, 21 January 1794; ibid., xxxi, 663,
the Duke of Bedford, 30 May 1794; ibid., xxxi, 1372-5, Fox, 24 March 1795; [Broome], Strictures on
Mr. Burke's Two Letters, pp. 17-18; Russell (ed.), Memorials, iii, 34.
47 The Morning Chronicle, 18, 19, 27 September 1793 , 25 July 1797, 20 August 1799;
Considerations on the French War, pp.27-35; Col. Norman Macleod, Considerations on False and
Real Alarms (London, 1794), pp.5-9; Russell (ed.), Memorials, iii, 71-2, Fox to Holland, 25 April
1794.
48 Considerations on the French War, p.34. See also Charles James Fox, The Celebrated Speech of
the Honourable C.J. Fox, with Proceedings of the Meeting at the Shakespeare Tavern, on Friday,
October 10, 1800, Being the Anniversary ofhis First Election for Westminster (London, 1800), pp.
11,17-18; P.H., xxx, 1293, Stanhope, 23 January 1794; the Morning Chronicle, 13 September 1793.
49 See BL Add. MSS 47571 ff. 11-19, Fox to Holland, 20 August 1792, 3 September 1792,
[September 1792], 12 October 1792, on the abolition of the monarchy and the September massacres
in France—he wished the French 'were like our old friends the Americans, & I should scarcely be
afraid for them' (f.14, 3 September 1792), and he could see no 'shadow of excuse for this horrid
massacre' (f. 16v., [September 1792]). See also P.H., xxx, 145-6, Fox, 20 December 1792; the
Morning Chronicle, 22, 24,25, 28 and 29 January 1793; Mitchell, Charles James Fox, p.124.
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who had suffered such inhumanities at the hands of royal despotism should have to
vent their fury when it became possible for them so to do.50 The execution of Louis
XVI was mitigated, it was argued, by the fact that only a minority of Frenchmen had
supported it. Britain had deposed or executed various monarchs, such as Mary,
Queen of Scots, Charles I and James II, and also various wives of Henry VIII.51 In
any case, the unbearable pressure brought to bear upon the fledgling republic by the
hostile armies surrounding it was surely another factor to be taken into account, and
the Foxite Whigs thus laid some of the blame for the atrocities at the feet of the
continental allies and Britain itself. They also pointed out that the human rights
record of the allies, and other nations with which Britain was associated, was by no
means clean. French excesses were no justification for Britain to wage war against
the Revolution; as one writer asked, 'why are We to be punished for Their
crimes?'52
In their opposition to the war, the Foxites spoke often of the strategic
advantages and superior resources they supposed France to possess over those of
Britain and its allies. One reason for this, they explained, was the revolutionary state
of France, which freed its treasury from dependence on ordinary fiscal limitations
and allowed it to wage war with the whole capital of the nation.53 'What a spectacle
of energy does not the Republic of France display at this moment!' enthused the
Morning Chronicle of 13 September 1793.
The animating cause in which they are engaged has so roused and
invigorated their minds, that what they could never accomplish
under the reign of Despotism, they now achieve—they shew
themselves a match for all the world. Such ever will be the result of
a contest for Freedom.54
50 The Retort Politic on Master Burke; or, a Few Words en Passant: Occasioned by his Two Letters
on a Regicide Peace. From a Tyro ofhis own school, but of another class (London, 1796), pp.58-9;
O'Bryen, Utrum Horum? p.29; Waddington, Reply to Mr. Burke's Two Letters, pp. 19-28;
Lauderdale, Letters to the Peers of Scotland, p.69; Thomas Erskine, speech at the trial of Thomas
Hardy, in Ridgway (ed.), Speeches ofErskine, iii, 458.
51 Vaughan, Letters on the Concert ofPrinces, 311-20.
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ii, 330-1, 352-3; the Morning Chronicle, 1 November 1793; Vaughan, Letters on the Concert of
Princes, p.355.
53 Considerations on the French War, p.43; [William Wilson], A Dialogue Upon the Two Bills Now
Depending in Parliament, Relative to the Rights of the People (London, 1795), p.32; P.H., xxx, 415,
Stanhope, 12 February 1793; ibid., xxx, 1228-33, Sheridan, 21 January 1794; ibid., xxx, 1287-91,
Stanhope, 23 January 1794.
54 See also Williams, Rights of the People, pp.40-4, 67-8; Publicola, The Prospect Before Us!!!
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1794; ibid., xxxi, 1201, Grey, 26 January 1795; the Morning Chronicle, 25 September 1793.
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On the other hand, Britain's national debt was immense and, while revenue from
commerce had been expanding steadily, this had been paralysed by the war, which
further drained British funds by the huge loans and subsidies paid to the allies, while
ministers continually promised the people that French finances were in such a state
of collapse as to make the end of the war imminent. 'Pitt, I really believe, is weak
enough to think that the French cannot go on much longer, and they, on the other
hand, have but too good grounds for thinking that we cannot,' Fox wrote to Holland
in February 1796.55
Beyond this, however, the Foxites actually appeared to delight in allied
reverses, and to indulge in grim unsurprise at British failures. In part this was due to
their obsession with hoping for the fall of the ministry, which might possibly be
produced by sufficiently bad military performances. The Morning Chronicle
reported on 27 September 1793, with more than a hint of suppressed pleasure, that it
was more than likely that America would join the war on the French side if it
continued into 1794. The Cambridge Intelligencer published a 'Translation of the
Hymn for the Feast celebrated at Paris on account of the Re-capture of Toulon'. Of
the British expedition to Noirmoutier in September 1795, Fox wrote:
Violent as the wish may sound I had much rather hear that they
were all cut to pieces than that they gained any considerable
success, for in the latter case the war may be prolonged to the utter
destruction of both countries and to the total extinction of all
principles of liberty and humanity in Europe. I think nothing can
show the complete infatuation of our Government so much as this
desperate expedition, which I believe as well as hope has not the
smallest chance of success.56
Furthermore, his enthusiasm for Napoleon was capacious; and, as Frank O'Gorman
has remarked, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Fox was really hoping for a
French victory over the allies.57 Moreover, he and his party did little to allay
55 Considerations on the French War, pp.48-63; Russell (ed.), Memorials, iii, 130, Fox to Holland,
18 February 1796. See also Williams, Rights of the People, pp.48-60; The Retort Politic on Master
Burke, pp.32-5; Sir Philip Francis, The Question as it Stood in March 1798 (2nd edition: London,
1798), pp.20-2; O'Bryen, Utrum Horum? pp.7-11; P.H., xxxi, 992, Bedford, 30 December 1794;
ibid., xxxi, 1056-8, Fox, 30 December 1794; ibid., xxxi, 1301-2, Fox, 5 February 1795; ibid., xxxii,
166-7, Fox, 29 October 1795; ibid., xxxii, 735-6, Fox, 15 February 1796; ibid., xxxii, 1468-9, Fox, 30
December 1796; the Morning Chronicle, 18 December 1795.
56 The Cambridge Intelligencer, 18 January 1794, also printed in Bennett, War Poetry, pp. 103-5; BL
Add. MS 47572 f.81, Fox to Holland, 10 September 1795; O'Gorman, The Whig Party, pp.212-3. See
also BL Add. MSS 47569 ff. 14-v, Fox to Adam, 18 September 1793, on the fall of Dunkirk; and
Cecil Price (ed.), The Letters ofRichard Brinsley Sheridan (3 vols.: Oxford, 1966), ii, 77, Sheridan to
his wife, 20 September 1797, although here Sheridan professes to 'hate the thought' of 'coming into
office'.
57 LCGIII, iii, p.xiii; O'Gonnan, The Whig Party, p. 182.
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suspicions of francophilia. Erskine pleaded in vain that 'a man may be a friend to the
rights of humanity and to the imprescriptible rights of social man, which is now a
term of derision and contempt, that he may feel to the very soul for a nation beset by
the sword of despots, and yet be a lover of his own country', for he spoke the words
in the defence of a radical politician—an accused traitor—in the treason trials of
1794. Fox, Sheridan, Erskine, Grattan, the Duke of Norfolk, Whitbread, Lord John
Russell and Grey were all willing to testify on behalf of Arthur O'Connor at his
treason trial in 1798; Fox also supported Gilbert Wakefield and Lord Edward
Fitzgerald, put on trial for sedition and treason respectively; the Whig Club was said
to sponsor mass rallies and intemperate toasts; and many of them boycotted
Parliament from 1797 to 1801, during a time of national crisis. According to Gayle
Trusdel Pendleton's survey of English conservative literature in the 1790s, of 714
pamphlets which discussed the Opposition unfavourably, 230 mentioned their
associations with France and 507 accused them of using reform as a mask for
destroying national institutions. They were 'feared as the most respectable (and
therefore potentially successful) vehicle of French principles'.58 The King wrote to
Pitt in April 1797 about the recent Budget debate in Parliament: 'I think Mr. Fox's
attempts to aggravate the difficulties must, if any further proof was necessary,
convince every impartial man that from personal pique at me and my Administration
he is become an open enemy of his country.'59 Fox and his associates did not
actually want to see the defeat of their country but, as J.G.A. Pocock has written,
they 'spoke as if they expected it—as if the shortcomings of the regime ensured that
it would and should fail'.60 In their enthusiasm for republican France, moreover,
hyperbole sometimes caused them to think the unthinkable: 'Much as I deprecate the
idea of a conquest,' wrote William Williams, 'I so entirely differ with Mr. Burke,
that I would rather ten thousand times see my country a department of France, than a
province of any other nation.'61
As often as they complained about the evil international consequences of
such a despotic crusade as they described this conflict to be, for Britain and for
Europe, Opposition writers and MPs tried to score party political points against the
government by exposing what they represented as the bad effects of the war upon
Britain's internal circumstances. 'Pittism' became acliched term of abuse denoting a
58 Erskine, speech at the trial of Thomas Hardy (1794), in Ridgway (ed.), Speeches of Erskine, iii,
457; Pendleton, 'English Conservative Propaganda', pp.296,302,477.
59 LCG1II, ii, 566, George IE to Pitt, 27 April 1797.
60 J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce and History (Cambridge, 1985), p.286.
61 William Williams, A Reply to Mr. Burke's Two Letters on the Proposals for Peace with the
Regicide Directory ofFrance (London, 1796), p.34.
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system of misrule dating back to Pitt's entry to power in late 1783. In the present
instance, as in the American conflict, the government was charged with 'gambling
with its people' in kindling a blaze of deceived popular hysteria for a war they were
waging in order to corrupt the liberal British constitution for their own personal
gain, rather than for the defence of the nation.62 The real domestic object of the war
was the extension of the influence of the crown, by the expansion of patronage in
new contracts and posts, and this was the reason for their inability to inform the
public of the specific object of the conflict.63 It was also the issue which caused the
greatest hysteria in the opposition press: 'THE EXCESS OF THIS INFLUENCE IS
THE CAUSE!-THE INCREASE OF THIS INFLUENCE IS THE OBJECT OF
THEWAR!!!' screamed one pamphlet.64
The ministry was charged with robbing the British people of their civil
liberties. 'I am convinced that in a very few years this government will become
completely absolute, or that confusion will arise of a nature almost as much to be
deprecated as despotism itself,' Fox, in depressed mood, told Holland in 1795. 'But
why do you not hear complaints?' Sheridan asked ministers in the Commons in
1801. 'You have gagged the people, and bound them hand and foot; and then you
say, look how quiet they are.'65 The alarms raised in November 1792 had been
whipped up on purpose in order to prepare the public mind for repression and war.66
62 Vaughan, Letters on the Concerts of Princes, pp.229-30; Lauderdale, Letters to the Peers of
Scotland, pp.9, 224-43. See also The Evidence Summed Up, pp.3-12; War with France! pp.3-5,22-6;
Fox, The Celebrated Speech...at the Shakespeare Tavern, pp.8-9; Thomas Bigge, Considerations on
the State ofParties, and the Means ofEffecting a Reconciliation Between Them (2nd edition: London
[1790s]), p.18; Erskine, View of the Causes and Consequences, pp.8-11; Thomas Erskine, speech at
the trial of James Perry, James Gray and Mr. Lambert (1793), in Ridgway (ed.), Speeches ofErskine,
ii, 430-2; Workman, An Argument Against Continuing the War, p.46; A Retrospect, p.8; Letters from
Simkin the Second to his brother Simon, in Wales (London, 1796), pp.9-14; P.H., xxx, 418,
Lauderdale, 12 February 1793; ibid., xxx, 1236-9, Sheridan, 21 January 1794; ibid., xxx, 1109, J.
Courtenay, 30 December 1794; ibid., xxxi, 1228, T.W. Coke, 26 January 1795; ibid., xxxi, 1060-1,
Fox, 30 December 1794; ibid., xxxi, 1347-8, Fox, 24 March 1795; ibid., xxxi, 1445, Lansdowne, 30
March 1795; ibid., xxxv, 516-7, Sir Francis Burdett, 11 November 1800; the Morning Chronicle, 28
September 1793, 10 October 1795.
63 O'Bryen, Utrum Horum? p.52; P.M., xxxi, 957, Fox, 17 June 1794; ibid., xxxi, 1388-9, Fox, 24
March 1795; ibid., xxxii, 48, Lauderdale, 5 June 1795; Some Account of a Very Seditious Book,
Lately Found Upon Wimbledon Common, By One of His Majesty's Secretaries of State. With a
Commentary, By the Rt. Hon. Gentleman, and Notes by the Editor (London, 1794); Plowden, A
Friendly and Constitutional Address, pp. 1-2,6; 'A New Irish Song' and 'A New Song, To Spend All
Our Cash in theWars', both in the British Library Collection of songs and broadsides at 648.C.26.
64 War with France! p.23.
65 ibid., iii, 124-5, Fox to Holland, 15/17 November 1795; P.H., xxxv, 934, Sheridan, 2 February
1801. See also Stuart, Peace and Reform, pp.6-9; Plowden, A Friendly and Constitutional Address,
pp.13-35; P.H., xxxiv, 1226-7, Bedford, 28 January 1800; Mitchell, Charles James Fox, p.130.
66 P.H., xxx, 164-5, Lansdowne, 26 December 1792; Williams, A Reply to Mr. Burke's Two Letters,
p. 14; Thoughts on a Peace with France; with some observations on Mr. Burke's Two Letters, on
Proposals for Peace with the Regicide Directory (London, 1796), p.6; Erskine, View of the Causes
and Consequences, p. 19.
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In the Traitorous Correspondence Bill of March 1793 ministers infringed the liberty
of commerce of British subjects.67 Reformers and radicals—or, as Fox put it, 'those
who differ in opinion from [ministers]'—were 'persecuted' and put on trial for
treason or sedition, and some were transported to Botany Bay.68 Habeas corpus was
regularly suspended, 'a most harsh measure', from 1794 onwards: 'to secure the
constitution, you have violated it,' wrote one pamphleteer.69 The 'Two Acts' of
1795, the Treasonable and Seditious Practices Act and the Seditious Meetings Act
were passed, according to Fox, in order to silence the public outcry which would
otherwise result from the government's activities.70 Complaints were made
concerning the loan to Austria made by ministers in 1796 between parliamentary
sessions, and therefore without Parliament's consent.71 The Opposition did not find
the restraint on civil liberties acceptable even during the naval mutinies of 1797.72
In justification of their assertions that the public angst of late 1792 had been
deliberately promoted by the administration and that the government's repressive
measures throughout the decade were unnecessary and therefore reprehensible, the
Foxites maintained that Burke and those who agreed with him were yielding to
hysteria and irrationality concerning the extent of the radical threat within Britain.73
Nothing had been proved to support the ministers' assertions of insurrection and riot
in late 1792, claimed Sheridan. Dennis O'Bryen claimed that it was a 'libel against
the people' to think that there was any considerable number of people who wanted
to change the 'genuine' British constitution. The public conception of 'French
principles' had been grotesquely manipulated into the notion that all reformers
wanted to level all property and institute economic equality.74 Some Opposition
67 P.H., xxx, 583-6, Fox, 21 March 1793.
68 BL Add. MS 47565 f.45, Fox to Holland, 5 October 1801; ibid., 47571 ff.61-v„ Fox to Holland, 17
September 1793; ibid., 47571 ff.97v.-8, Fox to Holland, December 1793; P.M., xxxi, 409, Fox, 17
April 1794.
69 P.H., xxxi, 514, Fox, 16May 1794; Considerations on the French War, p.32.
70 LCGIll, ii, 425-6, the Duke of Portland to the King, 16 November 1795, on the public meeting
held by the Whigs to campaign against the Two Acts, at which Fox spoke.
71 TheMorning Chronicle, 23 December 1796; P.PI., xxxii, 1297-1310, 1346, Fox, 13 December
1796; Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder, pp.78-85.
72 P.H., xxxiii, 812, Smith, 3 June 1797.
73 Considerations on the French War, pp.8, 12; 'Whitehall Alarmed! And a Council Called!'
[1792/3], in the British Library Collection of songs and broadsides at 648.C.26. Sir Brooke Boothby
described Burke as parading about 'in old fashioned gothic armour as the champion of I know not
what feudal chivalry...', in his Observations on the Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, and on
Mr. Paine's Rights of Man (London, 1792), p.80. On the small number and lack of power and
influence of genuine republicans in Britain, see also Bigge, Considerations on the State of Parties,
pp.37-8.
74 P.H., xxx, 524-33, Sheridan, 28 February 1793; O'Bryen, Utrum Horum? p.64; Bigge,
Considerations on the State ofParties, pp.25-6, 50; Erskine, View of the Causes and Consequences,
pp.15, 20. On the falsity of the 1792 insurrection alarm, see also the Morning Chronicle, 23 February
1793 and 9 September 1793 (on the Scottish riots).
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writers went so far as to claim that Burke was directly responsible for Britain's entry
into the war, while the Morning Chronicle quickly blamed the loyalist Association
for the Preservation of Liberty and Property.75 As for the very few extreme radicals
in Britain, the Foxites warned the government that war only encouraged them. 'War
is the parent of Discontent, and Discontent is the nurse of Revolution. A continuance
of hostilities will produce the times which Mr. Burke describes, and then, as in
France, it will be too late to Reform,' warned Daniel Stuart.76
Because of the hysterical view they believed ministers to have of the reform
movement in Britain, and because of the illiberal use they claimed ministers to be
making of the war at home, Opposition writers were anxious about not only the
international consequences of an allied victory, but also the domestic results. If
Britain should emerge victorious, its ministers might be irremediably corrupted by
their despotic Austrian, Prussian and Russian allies. In such an event, it was also
unlikely that the ministry would fall, and the increased crown influence of war-time
would not diminish and might even increase, because greater patronage might be
available through new colonies conquered during the war 77 To avert these evils, the
remedy proposed by the Opposition, alongside a speedy settlement of peace, was a
reformation of manners. This was a common cry in the 1790s, but in Foxite party
terms it stood for the eradication of corruption in high places. Mr. Curwen told the
Commons in 1797 that
He was not for a change of administration, which should have only
for its object the putting one man into the place of another. The
country would gain nothing by such a change. The change must be
total, not of men, but of system. The immense influence of
government must cease.. .78
Fox was represented as a 'martyr of liberty' in contrast to the corrupt ministry and
Court: as Stuart put it, 'He undauntedly struggled to avert the calamities of war; he
did not succeed: But he succeeded in what was of much more immediate importance
75 For Burke's part in Britain's entry to the war, see The Evidence Summed Up, p.27; [Broome],
Strictures on Mr. Burke's Two Letters, pp.3-9; Waddington, Reply to Mr. Burke's Two Letters, p.33.
For the APLP's responsibility, see the Morning Chronicle, 12, 23 February 1793.
76 P.H., xxx, 547, Fox, 28 February 1793; Stuart, Peace and Reform, pp.105, 136. See also P.H.,
xxx, 1086, Lauderdale, 21 January 1794; ibid., xxxi, 666, Bedford, 30 May 1794; [Wilson], Dialogue
upon the Two Bills, pp.33-40; O'Bryen, Ulrum Horum? pp.69-70, 65; Erskine, View of the Causes
and Consequences, pp.59-62; Bigge, Considerations on the State ofParties, pp.44-5; R.H.M. Buddie
Atkinson and G.A. Jackson (eds.), Brougham and his early friends. Letters to James Loch 1798-1809
(3 vols.: London, 1908), i, 211,William Bryce to James Loch, 18 December 1800.
77 Vaughan, Letters on the Concert ofPrinces, pp.211-7, 258-9; BL Add. MSS 47571 ff.98-v., Fox to
Holland, December 1793.
78P./L, xxxiii, 602, John Christian Curwen, 19 May 1797. See also ibid., xxxiii, 191, 193-4, the
Marquis of Lansdowne, 27 March 1797;Williams, A Reply to Mr. Burke's Two Letters, pp.4-7.
153
perhaps, in shielding the remaining liberties of the English people.'79 More
explicitly, they bayed for the removal of the Pitt administration from office and its
replacement by Fox and his friends.
It is evident that the war was usually simply the context in which they made
their calls for a change of ministry. Fox wrote in 1800 to Grey that 'the incapacity of
Ministers, rather than peace with Denmark or with France &c. ought to be the point
principally pushed out of doors, and, to a certain degree too, within.'80 Lauderdale's
Letters to the Peers ofScotland called upon all his readers to
determine, after a due consideration of the respective conduct of
the present Ministry, and of that great statesman, whether the
talents requisite to save the country are to be found in the
enlightened wisdom, in the capacious mind and prophetic spirit of
Mr. Fox, or in the miserable policy, the time-serving expedients
and wretched subterfuges of the present Cabinet.81
'If the country, indeed, consider the administration of the right honourable
gentleman to be a blessing,' Fox told the Commons in the debate on the rupture of
negotiations in December 1796, 'they must take their choice between the
continuance of that blessing and the restoration of peace.'82 Coleridge, writing in the
Morning Post, declared that 'Peace and the present Ministry are incompatible
circumstances.'83 1797 was clearly a tense year, and the high-point for such
demands; in that year also a letter was addressed to the Earl of Moira by five MPs
who generally voted in support of the ministry, professedly backed by 'a
considerable number' of other MPs, enclosing an address to the King which was
79 Stuart, Peace and Reform, p. 120. See also O'Gorman, The Whig Party, p. 165; P.H., xxxiii, 605-6,
M.A. Taylor, March 1797; O'Bryen, Utrum Horum? pp.97-101.
80 BL Add. MS 47565 f,17v„ Fox to Grey, 1800.
81 Lauderdale, Letters to the Peers ofScotland, pp.313-4; see also Francis, The Question as it Stood,
pp.2-3.
82 P.H., xxxii, 1472, Fox, 30 December 1796. See also ibid., xxxii, 19-21, Fox, 27 May 1795; ibid.,
xxxiii, 190-1, the Earl of Moira, 27 March 1797; ibid., xxxiii, 609, Benjamin Hobhouse, 19 May
1797; ibid., xxxiii, 876, Lansdowne, 2 November 1797; Lauderdale, Letters to the Peers ofScotland,
pp.258-64; [Wilson], A Dialogue Upon the Two Bills, pp.23-5; Workman, An Argument Against
Continuing the War, pp.87-9; 'A New Song. By Captain Morris', in The Cambridge Intelligencer, 4
October 1794, printed in Bennett, War Poetry, pp. 125-8.
83 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 'On Peace. I. Incompatible Circumstances', in the Morning Post, 2
January 1798, printed in David V. Erdman (ed.), The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge
(16 vols., general editors Lewis Patton and Peter Mann: Princeton and London, 1970ff.), iii, 10. See
also Davis, Dissent in Politics, p. 102, onWilliam Smith; O'Bryen, Utrum Horum? pp.62-3,72-3,81-
116; Plowden, A Friendly and Constitutional Address, p.54; PRO HO 42/40/115ff., address of the
Mayor, Aldermen and Liverymen of London to George III, 23 March 1797.
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highly critical of Pitt and his conduct of the war, both of which Moira passed on to
George III.84
Motions were moved in Parliament specifically calling for the dismissal of
Pitt himself.85 Another tactic was to call for Parliament to be resolved into a
Committee on the State of the Nation, to inquire into Britain's circumstances under
the present government86 Such calls continued to be made even after Pitt and his
Cabinet had resigned in February 1801.87 Sheridan affected indignation when it was
suggested that the Opposition's motivation for criticizing the ministry might be party
politics and the desire to taste power: 'It is too much to see such men, covered
equally with crime and shame, besmeared at once with blood and mire, erect their
crests, and boldly demand support from the country, because they have endangered
it, and attempt to proscribe as factious traitors, those who have fruitlessly
endeavoured to save it.'88
Clearly, much of the Foxite argument against the war with revolutionary
France was motivated largely by party politics. Some of it, however, could be
recognized as a principled opposition to war in general or to the type of war being
waged by the British government. Fox himself was genuinely convinced that the
cause of the French Revolution was glorious, even when it was sullied by
violence.89 These arguments, however, were usually used simply to enhance the
Foxite case.
The arguments against war in general were not difficult to make. It was
always a great evil, Opposition writers and MPs pronounced. 'Do we not recollect
the horrors we all felt at the news of the battle at Paris on the tenth of August, and
the massacres on the third and fourth of September?' asked one pamphleteer. 'Yet
THESE ARE NO OTHER THAN MATTERS OF COURSE IN WARS!' Wars were
perhaps inevitable in former, savage ages, 'But now, in these civilized and
84 LCGlll, ii, 585-8, the Earl of Moira to the King, 2 June 1797. The five signatories to the letter to
Moira were Sir George Shuckburgh-Evelyn, Sir John Sinclair, Bryan Edwards, Sir Christopher
Hawkins and Joseph Foster Barham.
85 Ibid., xxxiii, 183-5, the Earl of Suffolk, 27 March 1797; ibid., xxxiii, 595-6, Harvey Christian
Combe, 19 May 1797; ibid., xxxiii, 735-44, 766-9, the Duke of Bedford, 30 May 1797; ibid., xxxiii,
1313-20, the Duke of Bedford, 22 March 1798; ibid., xxxv, 697-710, Thomas Tyrwhitt Jones, 4
December 1800.
8f> Ibid., xxxi, 1408-9, Fox, 24 March 1795; ibid., xxxi, 1434-9, Guilford, 30 March 1795; ibid.,
1449, Lansdowne, 30 March 1795; ibid., xxxii, 902-911, Grey, 10 March 1796; ibid., xxxv, 405-10,
Charles C. Western, 9 July 1800; ibid., xxxv, 602-16, Tierney, November 1800; ibid., xxxv, 871-5,
Earl Fitzwilliam and the Earl of Suffolk, amendment to the Address of Thanks, 2 February 1801.
87 Ibid., xxxv, 1051-1067, Grey, 25 March 1801; ibid., xxxv, 1169-79, the Earl of Darnley, 20 March
1801.
88 Ibid., xxxii, 1255, Sheridan, 2 November 1796.
89 See, for example, BL Add. MSS 47571 ff.28v.-9,35-v„ 85v.-6, 96-8, Fox to Holland, 14 June, 1
August, 7 November, December 1793.
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enlightened times, war can always be avoided with honour by a state powerful like
England.' Indeed, war hindered the progress of civilization.90 It ought never to be
engaged in 'until after every effort and speculation have been employed to repel its
approach,' censured Erskine. Fox told the Commons that war was detrimental to the
general morality and humanity of the peoples involved; it calloused their hearts and
minds to a state of indifference to cruelty and horror.91 Those who supported the war
were reminded also of the hardships it produced for ordinary people. It was easy,
claimed the Duke of Bedford, for ministers to expend other people's blood and
treasure, untouched by their distresses. Many poems and songs were published in
opposition journals and periodicals lamenting the sorrow of war-widows 92
In the present case, the Opposition argued that war was no answer to the ill-
effects, imaginary or otherwise, of the French Revolution on Europe. Like religion,
politics ought not to be propagated by the sword. Force could not ultimately achieve
a desirable state of affairs. It was hardly beneficial to 'cut [Frenchmen's] throats to
prevent their dying of rot'. Moreover, as the Duke of Bedford pointed out in the
debate on the government's rejection of Bonaparte's offer to negotiate in January
1800, as long as the conflict lasted, France was not likely to become more stable and
peaceful.93
Furthermore, any intentions the British government had to interfere within
France and its form of government were regarded as unjustifiable. No state, the
Foxite Whigs argued, had the right to interfere in another. They were unconvinced
by Burke's justification of interference in France by the law of civil vicinity, in his
Letters on a Regicide Peace.94 The civil case, argued Ralph Broome, presupposed
an established rule of law which laid down what was and what was not a nuisance,
and this was decided by a judge and based on past experience. The case of the
French Revolution was entirely new, and it remained to be seen if the republican
government of France was more injurious to its international neighbourhood than the
previous government; moreover, there was no impartial judge between nations as
90 War with France! pp.26-9. See also Thoughts on a Peace with France, pp.7-8; Sir Nathaniel
William Wraxall, The Correspondence Between a Traveller and a Minister ofState, in October and
November 1792; Preceded by Remarks Upon the Origin and the Final Object of the Present War; as
well as upon the Political Position ofEurope in October, 1796 (London, 1796), pp.24, 33-4, 46, 57-
80.
91 Erskine, View of the Causes and Consequences, p.l 14; P.H., xxxi, 404-5, Fox, 17 April 1794.
92 P.H., xxxi, 993-4, Bedford, 30 December 1794; poems in Bennett, War Poetry, pp. 179-181, 153-
4, 156, 253, 267-9. See also The Retort Politic Upon Master Burke, p.28; Morres, The Crisis, p. 124;
P.H., xxxii, 1499, the Earl of Derby, 30 December 1796; ibid., xxxv, 538, Jones, November 1800;
xxxv, 699-700, Jones, 4 December 1800.
93 Williams, Rights of the People, p.65; P.H., xxxiv, 1223, Bedford, 28 January 1800. See also
Vaughan, Letters on the Concert ofPrinces, pp.324,334.
94 See p.23 above.
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there was between individuals. Even if the interference were undertaken for the good
of France, it was still a violation of principle, and it also might furnish other, less
unselfish, nations with warrants for abuse.95 A stable French government could be
achieved only if France was left in peace by hostile troops and its government
approved, both in theory and in practice, by its own people.96 Opposition writers
were quick to point out the inconsistency involved in complaining that the French
were seeking to spread their own opinions on government to Britain and at the same
time planning to 'carry fire and the sword into the heart of France' in order to
impose another form of government upon it by force.97
Moreover, it was impossible to wage war, either effectively or with justice,
against principles or opinions. Opinions could only ever be advanced or made to
retreat by appealing to people's minds. 'Let us endeavour to prevent the rising of the
sun, or to stay the swelling of the ocean, for the material world is in some degree
subject to the control of mechanical force,' wrote Broome; 'but the intellectual
world scoffs at the weak attempt which would limit its operations by the coarse and
clumsy restrictions of bolts, and chains.'98 A war against opinions would become a
'war of extermination', or total war, a phenomenon inimical to civilization.99
This line of argument did lay the Foxite Whigs open to a charge of
inconsistency, as Pocock points out: it was difficult for them to take successfully the
moral high ground of insisting that wars of principle should not be fought, since they
clearly favoured the ideology of the French above that of the allies and ignored or
excused French aggression in Europe. They too often identified French principles
with all that was good in philosophy and humanity:
If these are the men [i.e. true Jacobins] who are to be extirpated
everywhere, and especially in France, I am sure it will be
impossible, unless those who feel it their interest to extirpate them,
95 [Broome], Strictures on Mr. Burke's Two Letters, p.53; Vaughan, Letters on the Concert of
Princes, pp.ii, vi-vii. See also Thoughts on a Peace with France, pp.33-5; The Retort Politic on
Master Burke, p.53; P.H., xxxi, 396-8, Fox, 17 April 1794; ibid., xxxi, 618, Fox, 30 May 1794.
96 Vaughan, Letters on the Concert ofPrinces, pp.xv-xix; Considerations on the French War, p.29.
97 O'Bryen, Utrum Horum? p.60; also Erskine, speech at the trial of Thomas Hardy, Ridgway (ed.),
Speeches ofErskine, iii, 433; P.H., xxx, 1254-5, Fox, 21 January 1794; ibid., xxxi, 141-7, Stanhope,
4 April 1794.
98 Williams, A Reply to Mr. Burke's Two Letters, p.51; [Broome], Strictures on Mr. Burke's Two
Letters, pp.16, 19, 20. See also War with France! p.31; Waddington, Reply to Mr. Burke's Two
Letters, pp.15-16; Stuart, Peace and Reform, pp.102-3; Erskine, View of the Causes and
Consequences, pp.57-8; Macleod, Considerations on False and Real Alarms, pp.18-21; P.H., xxxii,
172-3, Fox, 29 October 1795; the Morning Chronicle, 23 September 1793.
99 Considerations on the French Wars, p.36; P.H., xxx, 364-5, Fox, 12 February 1793. See also
[Broome], Strictures on Mr. Burke's Two Letters, p.21; Thoughts on a Peace with France, p.4;
Erskine, View of the Causes and Consequences, p.69,P.H., xxx, 1254, Fox, 21 January 1794; ibid.,
xxxi, 657, Fox, 30 May 1794; ibid., xxxi, 659, Bedford, 30 May 1794.
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also feel themselves strong enough to destroy humanity, truth,
philosophy, nay, the Heavens themselves.100
This was also awkward because of the violence and terror and blatant illiberality
with which 'French principles' were increasingly associated. Fox, in a speech to the
House of Commons in April 1793, tried to get round the problem by turning the
argument back on the allies: 'If, as he feared, this war was undertaken against
principles, let us look to the conduct of Germany, Russia and Prussia and, if the
spirit of chivalry was so alive amongst us, see if there were no giants, no monsters,
no principles against which we had better turn our arms.'101 The Opposition also
pointed to the example of Poland, which Russia, Austria and Prussia had
shamelessly invaded and plundered and partitioned for their own advantage, and
they asked where the guarantee was that the allies would not commit similar
atrocities within France? Why was Britain interfering in France because of its
violence towards other countries when she had not acted to halt the progress of the
allies in Poland?102 The Foxite Whigs complained also about allied 'war crimes'
against the earlier revolutionaries Lafayette and Dumouriez, both Whig heroes of the
Revolution.103 In the end, however, with the rise of the autocratic rule of Napoleon
Bonaparte and his demonstrated lack of respect for representative government such
as that of the Swiss cantons, some who had previously supported Fox in his
campaign against the war felt compelled to declare their sympathies against
Napoleonic France and ceased their hostility to the British war, now antigallican if
not anti-Jacobin. The Whiggish poets William Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor
Coleridge, William Blake and Robert Southey are four of the best-known of these.
Wordsworth later wrote:
I disapproved of the war against France at its commencement,
thinking—which was perhaps an error—that it might have been
avoided; but after Buonaparte had violated the independence of
Switzerland, my heart turned against him, and against the nation
that could submit to be the instrument of such an outrage.104
100 Pocock, Virtue, Commerce and History, p.285; Publicola, The Prospect Before Us!!! pp.89-90.
101 P.H., xxx, 724, Fox, 25 April 1793.
102 Stuart, Peace and Reform, pp. 110-1; Thomas Holcroft, A Letter to the Right Honourable William
Windham, on the Intemperance and Dangerous Tendency of his Public Conduct (London, 1795),
p.37; P.H., xxx, 440, Grey, 18 February 1793; ibid., xxx, 452, Sheridan, 18 February 1793; ibid., xxx,
997-8, Fox, 17 June 1793.
103 P.H., xxx, 1479, Fox, 6 March 1794; ibid., xxxi, 30-7,43-5, 52, General Fitzpatrick, Fox, Smith,
17 March 1794; ibid., xxxii, 1349-57, 1365-9, Fitzpatrick, Fox, 16 December 1796.
104 Quoted in Robert Greacon, 'Wordworth as Politician', in Muriel Spark and Derek Stanford (eds.),
Tribute to Wordsworth (London, 1950), p.213. Wordsworth's change of heart is revealed in his
autobiographical poem, The Prelude (1805, 1850); see also E.P. Thompson, 'I lunting the Jacobin
Fox', Past and Present, 142 (1994), 135-6.
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Coleridge wrote of how he, too, had 'blessed the paeans of delivered France, And
hung my head and wept at Britain's name', until he had heard the lament of
'Freedom...From Bleak Helvetia's icy cavern sent'.105 Blake's 'The Four Zoas'
reports the Satanic degeneration of Ore (the spirit of French revolutionary liberty)
into a serpent which joins 'the stars of Urizen in Power' (the Continental despots),
symbolizing Napoleon's crude seizure of power on 18 Brumaire 1799, abandoning
all pretence at representative government.106 Southey, too, was disillusioned by the
coup d'etat: 'Damn the French!' he wrote to a friend in January 1800, '— that came
heartily from the depths of a Jacobine heart.' Southey was never reconciled to Pitt's
ministry, but he took up a minor appointment under the Addington
administration.107
III
A major Opposition tactic was criticism of the government's conduct of the war.
Sometimes they simply grumpily listed French successes, failed British and allied
campaigns and sums of money spent to date and made gloomy prognostications for
the success of the allied war in the light of these facts. Francis Plowden urged his
readers not to listen to glowing ministerial reports of allied success, but to ask
relatives or friends in the army or navy for true assessments.108 The Opposition also
made a great deal of individual campaigns that failed, such as the French recaptures
of Dunkirk and Toulon and the expeditions to Quiberon in 1795, Holland in 1799
and Ferrol in 1801. The ministry was further criticized for the ease with which the
French fleet might have invaded Ireland in December 1796, had not foul weather
thwarted them. The Foxites found fault with the British capture of Toulon before it
105 S.T. Coleridge, 'France. An Ode' (1798), 11.41-2, 64-6, in The Poetical Works o/S.T. Coleridge
(Chandos Classics edition: London), pp. 135-8. See also his 'Recantation' (1798); and Thompson,
'Hunting the Jacobin Fox', p. 124, on his renouncing friendship with the radical John Thelwall in
1801.
106 William Blake, 'The Four Zoas', especially Night Vllb, in Geoffrey Keynes (ed.), Blake.
Complete Writings with Variant Readings (Oxford, 1969), p.338; David V. Erdman, Blake. Prophet
Against Empire: A Poet's Interpretation ofthe History ofHis Own Times (New York, 1991), pp.316-
7.
107 Quoted in Geoffrey Carnall, Robert Southey and His Age. The Development of a Conservative
Mind (Oxford, 1960), p.55. On all four poets, see also Iain Robertson Scott, '"Tilings As They Are":
the Literary Response to the French Revolution 1789-1815', in H.T. Dickinson (ed.), Britain and the
French Revolution 1789-1815 (London, 1989), pp.229-49.
108 Lauderdale, Letters to the Peers ofScotland, pp.114-7; Plowden, A Friendly and Constitutional
Address, pp.45-7. See also Thoughts on a Peace with France, pp.8-11,22-3; P.H., xxx, 1076, the Earl
of Derby, 21 January 1794; ibid., xxx, 1100-4, Col. Tarleton, 21 January 1794; ibid., xxx, 1243-4,
Sheridan, 21 January 1794; ibid., xxxi, 1048-9, Fox, 30 December 1794; ibid., xxxi, 1351-3, 1379-
1382, Fox, 24 March 1795; ibid., xxxii, 159-61, Sheridan, 29 October 1795; ibid., xxxii, 596-7, Fox,
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was evacuated, because of its association with counter-revolution, and because of
the expense of defending it. Generally speaking, however, they were only able to
criticize government strategy after the event, when ministers were able to argue that
such criticism was easy to make with hindsight. Delays and incompetence were
severely censured, and the responsibility was always laid at ministers' feet, never
with the British forces or their commanders.109 The Morning Chronicle's opinion of
the Dunkirk fiasco was typical:
Whatever may be the issue, no blame can be imputed to the Duke
of York. The expedition to Dunkirk was not of his suggesting. It
was a measure imposed upon him by express orders from home,
against his own better judgement, devised in presumptuous
ignorance, and balked of the promised means of execution.
Even when the British troops or fleets won victories, the Opposition complained that
the advantages were squandered by an administration inept in matters of strategy.110
Like loyalists, the Opposition seemed bewildered by the naval mutiny, which
seemed to be 'inconsistent with the brave, generous and open character of British
seamen', but, unlike loyalists, they were sure that 'the country were to look to the
ministers for the great cause of all this', for not having provided sufficiently good
conditions for the sailors.111
109 On Dunkirk, see: the Morning Chronicle, 12 September 1793; P.H., xxxi, 240, Maitland, 10 April
1794. On Toulon, see: the Morning Chronicle, 16, 24, 26 September 1793; Lauderdale, Letters to the
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Another constant Opposition complaint was the expense of the war. They
mentioned national debt increases in tones of horror, and predicted ruin for Britain if
another war should arise before there had been time to heal the nation's finances
from the ravages of the present one. The government was condemned for the weight
of taxes it was imposing on the lower classes.112 The conflict also robbed essential
British agriculture of farm labourers, pressed into the navy or the army, and great
numbers of them killed.113 It dried up commerce and drove British manufacturers
out of business and labourers out of work.114 The greatest extravagance complained
of by Opposition MPs, however, was the subsidies and loans granted by the British
government to its allies. Fox forecast in 1794 that when other powers saw Prussia's
successful blackmailing of the British ministers to provide money in return for its
armies, they would do likewise and Britain would end up bearing the whole cost of
the war. 'Had members known how accurate this prediction was to prove,' remarks
John Sherwig, 'perhaps more than thirty-three of them would have voted in favour
of Fox's motion to deny the subsidy.'115 Fox and his supporters complained that the
King of Prussia and the Austrian Emperor were not to be trusted to fulfil their
military obligations or to repay loans fully and on time. 'Our allies,' observed
Lansdowne in March 1795, 'appeared to be allies only for the purpose of taking our
money.'116
On the possible invasion of Britain by the French, Opposition writers and
MPs divided their comments between doubts that the government had provided
112 Thoughts on a Peace with France, p. 11; Fox, The Celebrated Speech...at the Shakespeare
Tavern, pp.ll-12;F>.H., xxx, 1483, Fox, 6 March 1794; ibid., xxxi, 1354-9, Fox, 24March 1795. See
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October 1799; ibid., xxxiv, Holland, 14 February 1800; ibid., xxxv, 436-9, Tierney, 18 July 1800;
ibid., xxxv, 1422, Sheridan, 18 May 1801; ibid., xxxv, 1427, Jones, 18 May 1801; the Morning
Chronicle, 19 September 1793, 9 August 1799, 10 September 1799; 'A New Song', in The Courier,
27 December 1800, printed in Bennett, War Poetry, pp.251-3.
161
adequately for the defence of the country and patriotic certainty that the British
people would be more than a match for any invading force. The author of The
Evidence Summed Up (1794) believed that unemployment, poverty and social
division meant that Britain was ill-prepared to meet a French attack and might have
to use foreign mercenaries to protect its own beloved constitution. The Morning
Chronicle ridiculed the batteries being erected around the coast as ineffectual and
indeed counter-productive, since they would require too many men to operate them,
which would weaken the land forces.117 Sir Philip Francis, on the other hand,
thought that, 'Under any administration, the spirit of the people is sufficient to repel
and defeat a direct attack.' Nevertheless, if the French merely kept Britain in
suspense with the threat of invasion, that might well ruin Britain, through the
expenditure of vast sums on preparations against false threats.118 Dennis O'Bryen
solved the equation by arguing that a French invasion could never succeed against
an armed and united British people, but that while the country remained torn by
discontent and division under the Pitt administration, it was in grave danger from
any such attack.119 Certainly, the Foxites would have assisted in the defence of the
country had an invasion occurred. Fox told Grey in 1799 that he did not want to
cooperate until an invasion actually arose, so that the government might not have
any further encouragement for their repressive measures, but that in the event all
who were able should exert themselves 'to the utmost' against the French.120
Sheridan spoke on 20 April 1798 in support of a spirited and united opposition to
any French invasion, earning the rather stiff thanks of Pitt—George III, having heard
earlier of Sheridan's intention to speak in this vein, had instructed Pitt not to
welcome his support too warmly: 'any compliments would disgust friends, and
certainly are not necessary; indeed, I should wish some intimation might be made
that this change of language was very late.'121
Since the Opposition could not criticize the armed forces, because of the
patriotic attitude they wanted to display, they raised constitutional matters
concerning them instead. They argued that British Dissenters and Roman Catholics
ought to be permitted to become officers in the army and navy, since they had long
117 The Evidence Summed Up, p.37; the Morning Chronicle, 12 October 1796. See also P.M., xxxiii,
201, Sheridan, 28 March 1797.
118 Francis, The Question as it Stood in March 1798, pp.2, 23. See also P.H., xxxii, 1213-5,
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March 1797; the Morning Chronicle, 25 September 1797, 10 August 1799.
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shown their loyalty to their country in times of national crisis, and now that French
and Irish Catholics were being employed by the government in this capacity.122
Second, they complained that ministerial measures to strengthen home defence, by
increasing the numbers of the militia and by instituting the Volunteers, were
unconstitutional and might prove to be the beginnings of a standing army, the
traditional Whig symbol of court corruption. When only the propertied were
'enlisted' in the Volunteers, the Opposition worried about the strengthening of the
aristocracy at the expense of the people and of the crown. When the Volunteers were
widened in 1798 to include all able-bodied men, aristocratic members of the
Opposition complained that the landed classes had been deprived of their traditional
privilege of raising their own local defence forces. Ministers were accused of raising
the alarm of invasion simply in order to be able to increase the number of troops
within Britain. These fears were further substantiated by the erection of barracks to
house regular army troops on duty within Britain.123 The voluntary subscription
which was established to pay for the Volunteers was opposed because it would lead
to social intimidation and invidious personal distinctions and because it was
unconstitutional.124 Rather, it was suggested, a new tax should be imposed, to be
levied on placemen and the holders of sinecures.125 Third, the Opposition claimed
that keeping foreign soldiers within Britain was also unconstitutional and also might
lead to the formation of a standing army. This issue was raised by the temporary
installation of Hessian troops in barracks in Hampshire and on the Isle of Wight in
1794, and by the employment of French emigre regiments in the British army.126
This Opposition tactic, however, laid its users open again to the charge of
double standards and, in consequence, of engaging in factious party politics. In order
to be able to criticize Pitt and his Cabinet on as many grounds as possible, they
wanted to be able both to oppose the war altogether, for the various reasons already
122 P.H., xxxi, 609-13, Sheridan, 26 May 1794; ibid., xxxi, 614, Fox, 26 May 1794.
123 Bigge, Considerations on the State ofParties, pp.24-5; P.PI., xxx, 473-7, Taylor, 22 February
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outlined, and to find fault with the way in which ministers conducted it. Criticism of
the conduct of the war in its first year had the added appeal of being a potential
means of retaining the support of the Portland Whigs. Fox wrote to William Adam
on 18 September 1793 about the evacuation of Dunkirk:
...if it was thought foolish before the failure, what must it be now?
Would it be impossible to get our old friends to act with me at least
with respect to the conduct of the War? I sometimes think not...127
It was not necessarily inconsistent to complain that the war was both undesirable and
badly managed; but it was difficult to complain quite so much as the Opposition did
about the conduct of various campaigns in a war with which they were supposed to
disagree altogether, without being found guilty of criticizing for its own sake. The
Morning Chronicle of 22 February 1793 summarized well Whig thinking on the
war, including in a nutshell doubts of the necessity of the war, claims to patriotism,
criticism of ministerial management and calls for a change of administration:
However we may have got into the war, the war must be supported.
This country cannot, must not see the French extend their maritime
frontier through the whole Dutch territory; but if we are to avert
this fatality, we must begin by addressing the Crown to remove the
Ministers, whose imbecile councils, in bringing us into the
calamity, give us no confidence in their talents to conduct it.128
In all their criticisms of the government's conduct of the war, then, the Opposition
tried to substantiate their claim that 'Pittism' was a system of misrule and corruption
which ought to be dismantled and replaced with the untainted rule by Foxites.
Peace was constantly demanded by the Foxites, who did not support the
continuance of the conflict at any stage in the 1790s. If there had been a justifiable
motive for going to war in the defence of the United Provinces, they argued, the
British government ought to have made peace with France after the French troops
had been evacuated from Holland in 1793.129 War was a greater evil and a greater
source of evil than peace with revolutionary France, since either failure or success
was dangerous to Britain's welfare. Defeat would establish a great military republic
in the heart of western Europe, hostile to Britain, while success would destroy a
valuable market for British manufactures and strengthen the bastions of European
127 BL Add. MS 47569 f.15, Fox to Adam, 18 September 1793. On the poverty of army pay and
conditions, see the Morning Chronicle, 27 September 1793,7 October 1795.
128 See also P.H., xxx, 1267-1271, Fox, 21 January 1794.
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1075, the Duke of Norfolk, 21 January 1794; ibid., xxxi, 970, Derby, 30 December 1794.
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despotism. Even a humiliating peace would be better than further military disasters
and infamy. 'We have sacrificed much to experiments of war,' stated the Morning
Chronicle wearily on 25 October 1799; 'why may we not sacrifice a little to
experiments of peace?'130
The Foxite Opposition was adamant that the French government sincerely
desired peace. Peace was too great a blessing for it to refuse, for it would allow it to
restore order and peace within the nation. If France refused to make peace, it would
throw the whole responsibility for the war upon itself, divide its own population, and
strengthen the resolve of the British people against it. Violent speeches were made
in both the French and British legislative assemblies and these should not be seen as
reliable barometers of attitudes towards peace.131 Opposition writers and MPs found
nothing objectionable in Napoleon's offer to negotiate in December 1799, and
claimed that it was a sincere offer of peace talks. Even if he were a military despot,
it must be in his interest to consolidate his gains and allow France a respite by
settling a peace; and it was impossible to know that he was insincere in his offer
without testing it by participating in the negotiations he suggested.132 Fox was sure
that the French people were anxious for peace and that this must influence their
rulers.133
The Opposition claimed to be convinced that public opinion in Britain was
also very largely hostile to the war and eager for peace. Once the eyes of the people
had been opened to the corrupt purposes of ministers in fomenting great public
alarm immediately previous to the war and in carrying the country into war—
whether this awakening had come abruptly by way of the treason trials, or gradually,
through experience of the war—they had begun to desire peace, although they might
not voice this, through fear of a repressive government. Fox wrote to Holland in
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June 1794 that he believed that 'the country is heartily tired of the war, but men dare
not shew themselves'.134Financiers, monied men, manufacturers and labourers alike
reprobated it from the beginning for its adverse effects on commerce and
industry.135 'It is said, as a proof of the popularity of the War, that 1500 recruits
were raised last week in Manchester,' reported the Morning Chronicle of 22
February 1793. 'Alas! is it not rather a proof, that the war has already suspended the
looms of Manchester?'136
Another staple Opposition argument for peace was that Britain was unlikely
to be able to conquer France or to achieve a counter-revolution there, and it was
therefore not worth continuing in the attempt. Britain was in danger of making the
same mistake as it had in the American war, that of underestimating the enthusiasm
and commitment of the republican people for their new government, and the French
people had considerably more resources and experience of arms than had the
Americans. 'The pillars of the globe are not more durable than the Republic of
France,' declaimed William Williams.137 No single army could defeat that of
France, according to Col. Norman Macleod, and the allies were too divided and
unco-ordinated to solve the difficulty together. Furthermore, not only did France
have a powerful army but it had become an armed nation. Britain's small force,
often abandoned by its allies and threatened by neutral nations, could expect to
make little military impact upon it, at least until it too became a militarized nation,
totally dedicated in every aspect of its resources to fighting and winning the war.138
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Britain, said Lansdowne, had become a 'Don Quixote' figure, fighting a crusade
against the French windmill.139 Sometimes, whether arguing ad hominem for the
sake of party gain, or whether in all sincerity, members of the Opposition confessed
that they no longer approved of the French system, but they claimed that Britain had
no chance of changing it and should therefore abandon the conflict.140 It was better
to make peace before Britain was beaten into it.141
The Foxites extolled the blessings of peace, and declared that all objections
to negotiations were vapid. If the French government was untrustworthy, atheist and
cruel how much better were Britain's allies and other associates or, indeed, past
French governments? It had nothing to do with the fact that it was a republic.142 The
instability of the French government was no excuse for refusing to negotiate, for it
was unlikely to become more stable during the continuation of a war. Moreover, this
and other objections could no longer consistently be urged by ministers after they
had first sought negotiations in 1796—indeed, Fox pointed out in 1794 that Pitt had
held talks with Maret and Auckland with Dumouriez in early 1793, before the
outbreak of the war.143 Negotiations by themselves could do no harm, and might
even strengthen Britain's fighting position.144 According to Whigs, Burke and other
supporters of the war only argued against negotiating with France because they
realized that their arguments against peace itself were so weak and insubstantial.145
Fox argued that Britain ought to initiate negotiations because it was the aggressor,
and because it was the weaker party and ought to acknowledge this.146 Britain's
alliances were no reason to hold back from negotiating, since the other powers
139 P.H., xxxi, 459, Lansdowne, 30 April 1794.
140 P.H., xxxiii, 1535-8, Lansdowne, November 1798; ibid., xxxiv, 1052, Tierney, 7 June 1799.
141 The Evidence Summed Up, pp.33-4; O'Bryen, Utrum Horum? p.35; P.M., xxxi, 1059, Fox, 30
December 1794.
142 Vaughan, Letters on the Concert of Princes, pp.379-88; Workman, A Letter to the Duke of
Portland, pp.21-45; Waddington, Remarks on Mr. Burke's Two Letters, p.7; Morres, The Crisis,
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26; Letters from Simkin the Second, pp.26-7; John Thelwall, Sober Reflections on the Seditious and
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concerned were rarely hindered by such scruples from negotiating when it suited
them.147 The object of obtaining Belgium for Austria was considered to be an
inadequate reason to break negotiations and continue the war in 1796, especially
since it was highly doubtful whether the Emperor would be grateful for the return of
the province.148
The Foxites were sceptical of the government's sincerity in offering to
negotiate for peace after December 1795: 'How could we then be so weak as to
expect, that a most subtle, insulted, and enraged enemy, would believe what we do
not believe ourselves, and what no man of common sense ever did, or to the end of
the world will believe?' asked Erskine. Ministers had 'peace in their mouths, while
they made preparations for war,' according to Grey. This again seems inconsistent
with their anti-war stance and frequent demands for negotiations, and motivated by
party. Wilberforce rebuked them for this cavilling in December 1795, arguing that
any demonstration of willingness to treat on the part of the government ought to be
welcomed.149 Foxites criticized the administration's strategies in negotiating and in
setting up negotiations as calculated to delay and to frustrate the French—the lack of
full negotiating powers held by Lord Malmesbury in 1796; his return as the British
envoy in 1797, although it was known that the French distrusted him; the use of the
title of King of France in referring to Provence; the continual reproaching of France
as the initial aggressor. The government was wholly to blame for the rupture of
negotiations in November 1796, according to the Foxites; they accepted that the
French had broken off the talks in October 1797, but argued that they had been
provoked by British behaviour.150 Ministers were charged with making excuses to
carry on a war which kept them in power. Their reasons for not negotiating were all
self-generating: they required a stable enough government in France, enough
147 BL Add. MSS 47565 ff. 10-11, Fox to Grey, 1800; ibid., 47565 ff.34-5, Fox to Grey, 1 December
1800.
148 P.H., xxii, 1485, 1488-9, Fox, 30 December 1796; Francis, The Question as it Stood in March
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149 Erskine, View of the Causes and Consequences, p.92; P.M., xxxii, 716-7, Grey, 15 February
1796; ibid., xxxii, 576, Wilberforce, 9 December 1795. See also ibid., xxxii, 572-4, Sheridan, 9
December 1795; ibid., xxxii, 593, 597-8, Fox, 9 December 1795; ibid., xxxii, 606, Lauderdale, 10
December 1795; ibid., xxxii, 729, Fox, 15 February 17%; the Morning Chronicle, 9, 14 December
1795; Williams, A Reply to Mr. Burke's Two Letters, p.24.
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1798, pp.12, 14; Erskine, View of the Causes and Consequences, pp.93-4, 96; Strictures on the
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security and enough indemnity to give them confidence that a settlement would be
adhered to.151
'I am convinced that this ministry cannot make any peace without incredible
sacrifices,' wrote Fox in February 1796, privately conceding French as well as
British obstinacy. 'The minds of the two Governments are so hostile to each other,
and their mutual diffidence so rooted, that it must be next to a miracle, if they can
agree till absolute necessity forces them.'152 Nevertheless, he and his supporters
insisted that if peace were to be made, it would be necessary to conciliate the
French. Britain must acknowledge the French Republic and restore all its conquests
as the price of peace, though some conceded that France should also renounce some
of its conquests.153 All Britain's conquests should be viewed 'as dust in the balance'
compared with the blessings of peace. 'The strong position which France has
obtained, and the necessity to which England has reduced herself from the war, must
be expected to be felt in the peace,' Erskine warned. Such concessions might
disgrace ministers, but they would not humiliate the country.154 The Morning
Chronicle of 15 August 1797 argued that the spirit of peace was more important
than the details, for terms
are only the pretences for war. The real cause lies in the ambition,
in the injustice, in the malignant passions of those to whom the
affairs of states are committed....The negociation for peace
becomes a contest for terms. Mr. Pitt has nothing to offer but
terms. He must prove that he is sincere by the extent of his
concessions; he must purchase the oblivion of his injuries by the
magnitude of his compensation.
Along with peace, Opposition writers also demanded the restoration and
security of domestic civil liberties, such as the repeal of the acts against seditious
meetings, the cessation of the persecution of radicals, a free press, religious
toleration and parliamentary reform.155 It was insisted that peace with France would
151 Vaughan, Letters on the Concert ofPrinces, pp.352-4; The Evidence Summed Up, p.34;Williams,
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152 Russell (ed.), Memorials, iii, 130, Fox to Holland, 18 February 1796.
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not produce the adoption of Jacobinism in Britain, since the features of the
Revolution which had made Jacobinism feared and hated—its economic levelling,
its atheism and its violence—had been too universally condemned to be adopted
elsewhere, and because France, after the fall of Robespierre, no longer sought to
spread its revolutionary doctrines.156
On the whole, the Foxites were pleased with the treaty of Amiens. They were
delighted that the war had been stopped by an inglorious peace, having achieved
none of the objects for which it had been claimed to be fought. 'The Triumph of the
French government over the English does in fact afford me a degree of pleasure
which it is very difficult to disguise,' Fox told Grey.157 The navigation of the
Scheldt had not been closed again; Savoy, Holland and Belgium had not been
rescued from revolutionary France; the government of France had not been restored
to a monarchical form; in short, Europe was not 'delivered' from the French
Revolution.158 'The worse the conduct of the late Ministry the more excusable an
inglorious Peace, and Vice Versa,' Fox wrote; 'the approbation of such a Peace as
this is the most decided condemnation of them.'159
In general, therefore, the Foxites sanctimoniously mixed approval of the fact
of peace with resignation to such peace terms as had been accepted. As Sheridan
summed up, damning the settlement with faint praise:
This, Sir, is a peace which every man ought to be glad of, but no
man can be proud of. It is a peace involving a degradation of the
national dignity, which no truly English heart can feel with
indifference. It was a peace, which the war had a tendency to lead
to, as its necessary result. The war was one of the worst wars in
which this country was ever engaged: and the peace is, perhaps, as
good as any man could make, under the circumstances in which the
country was placed.160
The peace had been made too late to prevent much of the evil of war or much French
aggrandizement, but it was better to be made now than later still.161 The Earl of
Carnarvon joined disappointed supporters of the war in condemning the terms as
wholly inadequate to the safety and glory of Britain. He told the House of Lords that
156Workman, A Letter to the Duke ofPortland, pp.46-75.
157 BL Add. MSS 47565 ff.51-v., Fox to Grey, 22 October 1801. See also Russell (ed.), Memorials,
iii, 345, Fox to Thomas Maitland, 1801.
158 William Belsham, Remarks on the Late Definitive Treaty ofPeace, Signed at Amiens (London,
1802), pp.2-3.
159 BL Add. MS 47565 f.48v„ Fox to Grey, 12 October 1801.
160 P.H., xxxvi, 17, Sheridan, October 1801. See also ibid., xxxvi, 72, Fox, 3 November 1801.
161 Ibid., xxxvi, 73-82, Fox, 3 November 1802; ibid., xxxvi, 177, Bedford, 3 November 1801; ibid.,
xxxvi, 666, Jones, 5 May 1802; ibid., xxxvi, 699-70, Norfolk, 13 May 1802; ibid., xxxvi, 722,
Darnley, 13 May 1802; ibid., xxxvi, 738, 13 May 1802; ibid., xxxvi, 817-25, Sheridan, 14 May 1802.
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'our negociators [had] ineffectually surrendered the interests of the country'.
Lansdowne also had reservations about the concessions Britain had made, and he
thought that another war was probable before too long.162
IV
In pressing their views on the war, the Foxites relied on a combination of
parliamentary opposition and the press, backed by any other support they could
persuade. The opposition press was heavily used throughout the decade, although it
was never so successful as the conservative press in terms of sheer volume of output
and distribution. London newspapers which remained faithful to the Whigs were the
Morning Chronicle, the Telegraph, the General Advertiser, the Gazetteer, the
Courier and the Morning Post. Parliamentary speeches of Opposition MPs were
well circulated—Fox's published speeches and Erskine's pamphlet, A View of the
Causes and Consequences of the Present War with France (1797) sold particularly
well, Erskine's View going through nine editions in its first week and forty-eight
editions altogether.163 Opposition pamphlets sometimes replied directly to pro-war
tracts, especially those written by Burke, though Daniel Stuart's Peace and Reform
(1794) was addressed in reply to Arthur Young's The Example ofFrance a Warning
to Britain (1793), and, not to be outdone in pedantry, the historian William Belsham
wrote two pamphlets in point-by-point reply to Herbert Marsh's loyalist accounts of
the causes of the war. Like conservative propaganda, opposition publications were
designed to reach different levels of readership, ranging from handbills and short,
pithy tracts to lengthy, densely argued pamphlets.164
Opposition writers and MPs often called for the public to make the
goverment aware of their disapproval of the war. The Morning Chronicle of 12
January 1793 published a very early call to public action against the war: 'If the
people are foolishly supine on this occasion, they may thank themselves for the
162 Ibid., xxxvi, 188, Carnarvon, 3 November 1801; ibid., xxxvi, 712-7, Carnarvon, 13 May 1802;
NMM, DUC/7, Lansdowne to Admiral Sir John Duckworth, 19 October 1801.
163 Pendleton, 'English Conservative Propaganda', pp.50-2, 167; Morris, 'The Monarchy as an
Issue', p.275 n.3; J.E. Cookson, The Friends ofPeace. Anti-war Liberalism in England, 1793-1815
(Cambridge, 1982), p. 147.
164 See the 'Cheap Repository Tract'-style dialogue between a deceived wealthy gentleman and a
right-thinking mechanic published in the Morning Chronicle of 26 September 1793, ostensibly very
conservative but subtly subversive, ending with the mechanic putting his social superior right. See
also William Belsham, Remarks on a Late Publication, Styled the History of the Politics ofGreat
Britain & France (London, 1800); idem., Reply to the Rev. Herbert Marsh's Vindication ofa Late
Work, Styled a History of the Politics ofGreat Britain and France (London, 1801). For examples of
replies to Burke's Letters on a Regicide Peace, see The Retort Politic on Master Burke (1796),
Letters ofSimkin the Second(17%); A Reply to Mr. Burke's Two Letters(\19G).
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burdens which must be the inevitable consequence. When the war is once entered
into, it will be too late to deprecate its effects.'165 The Opposition Whigs also
cooperated with some activities organized by Friends of Peace. Indeed, the petitions
against the war in 1795 and against the 'Two Bills' as part of a malevolent 'war
system', and the Addresses to the throne requesting peace and the dismissal of
ministers in 1797 were initiated by the Foxites and supported by the liberals locally.
'BRITONS, JUSTIFY IT NOT!' wrote 'Horatius Publicola'. 'UNITE TO SOLICIT
AN IMMEDIATE PEACE!' He assured his readers that the King could not neglect
so just a petition. Some calls for action were phrased as threats to ministers,
motivated more by factious party politics than by a primary desire to stop the war.166
In Parliament the Foxites were a small but vocal minority—'but though
weak, we are right, and that must be our comfort,' Fox told Holland in March
1794.167 His view of the importance of maintaining a parliamentary opposition—to
prevent the 'euthanasia of absolute monarchy'—had shaped his views on the war,
and he defended the right of MPs to express 'their loyalty and zeal, by the
introduction of topics that must create a difference of opinion' in wartime.168 They
continued to divide Parliament even when they had no chance of defeating Pitt,
ostensibly to record their opinions and their efforts to halt the conflict, but also to
maintain a sense of party and perhaps to win over some war-weary Pittites.
Yet they were forced to admit the defeat of this tactic. In 1797, Fox and
many of his parliamentary supporters seceded from Parliament in protest at their
lack of impact on government policy. Whithread, Tierney and Smith remained at
Parliament, attending more regularly than ever and continuing to criticize
government war policy; Sheridan often turned up and others drifted back; but Fox
himself stayed away until 1801. It was a move he had contemplated as far back as
April 1795, and it is hard to resist the conclusion that he enjoyed the privacy he was
afforded by the secession.169 He explained to his supporters in 1800, somewhat
165 See also Reasons Against Refusing to Negotiate, pp.30,31-4.
166 Publicola, The Prospect Before Us!!! p. 110. See also pp. 18-20 above; Strictures on the
Overtures ofPeace, pp.33-4; A Retrospect, p.26; the Morning Chronicle, 14 January 1793 (on the
Common Council of London), 20 September 1793 (on the petition from Glasgow).
167 Russell (ed.), Memorials, iii, 71, Fox to Holland, 18 March 1794. Note, however, that Sheridan
felt able to use his influence to get the son of a friend a posting on a British warship: 'If ever there
was a Lad formed to play the Devil with the French at Sea it is the Bearer James Goddard.' (Price,
Letters ofSheridan, ii, 12, Sheridan to J.W. Payne).
168 Fox quotes from Hume on the party system in Russell (ed.), Memorials, iii, 88-9, Fox to Holland,
5 October 1794. On opposition in wartime, see P.H., xxxi, 93-4, Fox, 25 March 1794; ibid., xxxiii,
20-1, Fox, 3 March 1797; also the Morning Chronicle, 7 October 1796.
169 Russell (ed.), Memorials, iii, 105-6, Fox to Holland, 12 April 1795. See also ibid., 133, Fox to
Holland, 16 September 1796. L.G. Mitchell argues that politics had never been of the first importance
to Fox, and that after 1794 he increasingly lost interest in Parliamentary activity and political affairs
(Charles James Fox, esp. pp. 134-5).
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disingenuously, that his views appeared to be unacceptable, but that he was too old
to change them, and so he would remain in seclusion from Parliament. Erskine
assured them that Fox would return to Westminster whenever he thought he had any
chance of success.170 'Always remember,' Fox told Grey in the same year, on
Grey's request that he attend a debate on the Irish union, 'that the original ground of
retiring was not the questions likely to be agitated were unimportant, but that our
attendance in Parliament upon them was useless, and because useless in some
measure hurtful as tending to deceive the country into an opinion that the House of
Commons was still a place in which it was worth while to try the effect of argument
and reason.'171 Lord Holland thought that the secession was less successful than it
might have been because it was not complete and because it was overshadowed
almost immediately by the naval mutinies, but that it disconcerted Pitt and deprived
him of a lever with the King who could be less easily persuaded that measures were
either impossible or necessary because of Parliament.172
J.E. Cookson comments that this move, contrary to what might have been
expected, set the Whigs back into conventional opposition strategies, firmly based
around Westminster and making little effort to exploit popular protests against the
war.173 Perhaps this was so because Fox was increasingly disillusioned with public
willingness to protest against the war and against the government. At the beginning
of January 1795, as the petitioning movement gathered momentum, he wrote with
some excitement at the prospect of such a show of strength in the country.174 In
November 1795 he thought that the 'higher classes' of British society were
disappointingly universal in their support of Pitt's repressive measures, but that he
and his party were popular among the lower classes.175 During the secession,
however, he despaired of the public 'spirit'. In 1801 he wrote to Grey: 'till I see that
the publick has some dislike (indignation I do not hope for) to absolute power, I see
no use in stating in the House of Commons the principles of Liberty and Justice.'176
On the other hand, as Mitchell points out, his lack of activity and interest almost
certainly discouraged others from initiating or supporting anti-war petitions and
meetings.177
170 Fox, The Celebrated Speech...at the Shakespeare Tavern, pp.18, 20-1.
171 BL Add. MS 47565 f.24, Fox to Grey, 1800. See also ibid., 47569 ff.99-100, Fox toWilberforce,
21 February 1799, for remarks in a similar vein.
172 Holland, Memoirs, i, 91-2;Mitchell, Charles James Fox, pp. 149-50.
173 Cookson, Friends ofPeace, p. 162.
174 BL Add. MSS 47569 ff.54-6, Fox to ?, 2 January 1795.
175 Russell (ed.), Memorials, iii, 126, Fox to Holland, 15/17 November 1795.
176 BL Add. MS 47565 f.38, Fox to Grey, 1801. See also Emsley, British Society and the French
Wars, p.64.
177Mitchell, Charles James Fox, p. 145; see also Cookson, Friends ofPeace, p. 197.
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From 1792-5 Fox opposed the war in Parliament, for much of this time
hoping to persuade the Portland group to rejoin him in opposition to the ministry,
which remained more important to him than opposition to the conflict itself.
Between 1795-7 this was supplemented by appeals to the country to demonstrate
wide hostility to the war. He gave up hope of both in 1797 and, while other
Opposition writers and MPs persevered with the anti-war struggle throughout the
decade, Fox retired to St. Anne's Hill in sulky retirement until the approach of peace
in 1801.
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5. The Opposition to the War (II): Radicals and Friends of Peace
If Opposition writers and MPs were hostile to the war largely because they were
hostile to William Pitt, radical politicians and the liberal 'Friends of Peace' had
different concerns which led them to oppose it no less vehemently, but usually with
little or no cooperation from each other or from the Foxites. Radicals opposed it
because they were sympathetic to the French Revolution and because they wished to
see its doctrines spreading unhindered; they also criticized it for imposing great
hardships on many ordinary people. Their arguments were more consistent and less
weighed down by opposition for opposition's sake than those of the Foxites, but
they also used the war to further their primary concern to demand parliamentary
reform and, in particular, the extension of the franchise. The Friends of Peace were
the group who most singlemindedly opposed the war itself, both because of moral
and religious objections to war in general, and because of the injustice they
perceived in the British grounds and conduct of this particular conflict. The
opposition to the war within Parliament has been considered in the previous chapter;
this chapter expands on anti-war attitudes by examining the views of these extra-
parliamentary activists.
I
The radicals were hostile to the conflict against France mainly because they
supported the French Revolution. They admired its heroism and defended its
purpose:
The People of France had for many centuries groaned under the
most horrible despotism that the human imagination can
conceive...To overthrow this villainous combination of the FEW
against the liberty, property, and happiness of the MANY, in the
year 1789, the whole Nation actuated as it were by one general
impulse, rose up, 'hurled the Tyrant from his throne', and
established the RIGHTS OF MAN.1
It appalled them to see an attempt to overturn this great triumph, and they ardently
supported revolutionary France in its struggle against Austria and Prussia in 1792.
Delegates and addresses were sent by radical societies to encourage the National
Convention, and clothing, shoes, blankets and ammunition were sent to help the
1 [Daniel Isaac Eaton], Extermination, or an Appeal to the People of England on the Present War,
with France (London, 1793), pp.4-6. See also Yang, 'The British Debate on the French Revolution',
pp.253-320, passim.
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'soldiers of Liberty'. The LCS address to the National Convention underlined this
support:
Warm as are our wishes for your success, eager as we are to behold
Freedom triumphant, and Man everywhere restored to the
enjoyment of his just rights, a sense of our duty as orderly Citizens
forbids our flying in arms to your assistance; Our government has
pledged the National Faith to remain neutral. O shame! But we
have entrusted our King with discretionary powers, we must
therefore obey. Our hands are bound, but our hearts are free, and
they are with you....But the King of Great Britain will do well to
remember that this country is not Hanover—should he forget this
distinction, we will not.2
Sheffield radicals staged a massive demonstration to celebrate Brunswick's defeat in
September, roasting a whole ox, quartering it, and taking it through the town to be
given to the poor and the debtors in jail, cheered by a crowd and cannon-fire; and an
effigy of the Duke was executed on Kennington Common in London.3 The French
victory at Jemappes and Dumouriez's entry into Brussels in November and
December 1792 respectively stimulated celebrations in Perth and Dundee.4
In the autumn and winter of 1792 the radical societies of Britain grew and
multiplied rapidly. The London Corresponding Society, a middle-class and artisan
group founded in January 1792, had 295 members by October, 648 by November
and about 800 by December. The revived Society for Constitutional Information and
the Society of the Friends of the People were supported by men of property who
subscribed to reforming or radical views. Some societies were in contact with each
other, and 160 delegates representing eighty Scottish societies met in Edinburgh at a
'National Convention' in December 1792.5 The reports sent home by French envoys
of the Paris National Convention implied that the British government would be
unable to oppose the French Republic's strategy in Europe, such was the enthusiasm
in Britain for radical opinions, and the myth gained currency in Paris that Britain
2 The full address is printed in Albert Goodwin, The Friends of Liberty: the English Democratic
Movement in the Age of the French Revolution^London, 1979), pp.501-3. See also the addresses of
the Friends of the People at Newington and at Aldgate in G.S.Veitch, The Genesis ofParliamentary
Reform (2nd edition: London, 1965), pp.363-6; and the address of 'The English, Scotch, and Irish
resident in Paris' to the National Convention, in J.G. Alger, 'The British Colony in Paris,1792-3', in
the English Historical Review, xiii (1898), 6734.
3 Clive Emsley, 'The Impact of the French Revolution on British Politics and Society', in Crossley
and Small, The French Revolution and British Culture, p.41; Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition,
p.216; Carnall, Southey, p. 18. See also a handbill 'In the Cause of Liberty' (Stockport, 25 August
1792, and Glasgow, 1792), in PRO HO 42/21/703; and the resolutions of the Warrington Amicable
Society for Free Representation and Political Information, 3 November 1792, in PRO HO 42/22/258-
60, esp. no.7.
4Kenneth J. Logue, Popular Disturbances in Scotland, 1780-1815 (Edinburgh, 1979), pp.149-152.
5 Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, pp.215-7.
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was on the verge of a highly successful revolution of its own. To some extent the
pre-war optimism of the British radicals themselves supported this view. The
London Chronicle of 12 November 1792 reported the LCS as having addressed the
National Convention with the message: 'Frenchmen, you are already free, but
Britons are preparing to be so.' Other declarations to the Convention and the Jacobin
Club of Paris assured the French that the British people would not allow their
government to go to war. This was not just a deliberate attempt to deceive the
French; the Edinburgh radical William Peddie wrote in the same month to a friend,
'I am of opinion with you, that it must end in a Republic. The soldiers will not fight
against a Republic, but should they, France will send over 80 000 to help us.'
Handbills and pamphlets were published in Britain, arguing against a war against
France on the basis of the hardships and misery it would cause.6
In fact, however, although much more numerous and well-organized than
ever before, British radicals were only a small minority of the population, and were
not well co-ordinated. Many societies were quite small and short-lived; Dissenters,
Whigs, and working-class societies had very little contact with each other; local
issues often preoccupied provincial societies; and few had a degree of hostility to the
existing order approaching that of the revolutionaries in France—the great majority
called for reform rather than for revolution. The general public alarm of early
December stimulated by the government's summoning of Parliament and calling out
of the local militia showed how weak the support for radicalism really was in Britain
and how ready the population was to rally to the call for loyalism.7
When war broke out between Britain and France, the radicals in Britain
continued to support the Revolution in France against the allied powers of Europe,
which now included Britain. They approved of Jacobinism and defended it
throughout the decade in their publications.8 Atrocities were explained by the
enormity of the cataclysm: 'It could not be expected,' wrote Joseph Towers, 'that so
enormous a system of civil, ecclesiastical, and aristocratical tyranny, as that of
which the old government was composed, could be so completely overturned,
6 On French reports concerning British radicalism, see Murley, 'Origins and Outbreak', p. 153; Price,
Letters of Sheridan, 7, Sheridan to Dundas, 9 May 1794. British radical views quoted from the
London Chronicle, 12 November 1792, cited in Emsley, British Society and the French Wars, p. 14;
Morris, 'The Monarchy as an Issue', p.93; PRO HO 102/7, William Peddie to Robert Purvis, 21
November 1792, quoted in Murley, 'Origins and Outbreak', p.175. See also War! (Sheffield,
Nottingham, 20,31 December 1792); [Ann Jebb], Two Penny-worth of Truth for a Penny; Or a True
State ofFacts: With an Apologyfor Tom Bull in a Letter to Brother John (London, 1793).
7 H.T. Dickinson, British Radicalism and the French Revolution 1789-1815 (Oxford, 1985), pp. 12-
13; Murley, 'Origins and Outbreak', pp.169-171,323-5.
8 See, for example, William Fox, On Jacobinism (London, 1794); John Thelwall, The Rights of
Nature (2 vols.: London, 1796).
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without very violent convulsions.' William Fox's Thoughts on the Death of the King
of France (1793) did not condone the execution of Louis XVI, but it argued that it
was a totally unjust cause of war. Those who executed him had been simply the last
link in a long chain of events, of which the real initiator had been the old
government itself, by its injustice and abuse of power.9 In the following year he
wrote a pamphlet defending and applauding the decree of the National Convention
to liberate slaves in the French West Indies. In it, he wrote:
Had the French been left in the undisturbed possession of that
Freedom they had so gloriously obtained; had they been suffered
quietly to pursue their wise and benevolent principles, little would
this, or any of their other measures, have needed a defence from
me. Their best and effectual defence, would have been the
beneficial effects they would have produced. This was well known
by those whose interest it was that those effects never should take
place.10
Thelwall, indeed, tried to question whether there was any link at all between the
violence and the Revolution itself. 'If the excesses cannot be proved, either logically
or experimentally, to have been connected with the principles, coincidence of time is
nothing to the purpose, and the one cannot be said to have produced the other.'11
Like opposition writers and MPs, radicals blamed the war on Pitt and the Combined
Powers of Europe, and they criticized its counter-revolutionary objects. The radical
lecturer at Sheffield on the fast-day of 1794 claimed that the war being waged
against France was a kind of spiritual persecution, which often advanced rather than
hindered good causes, such as the establishment of Christianity.12
9 [Joseph Towers], A Dialogue Between an Associator and a Well-Informed Englishman, on the
Grounds of the Late Associations, and the Commencement of a War with France (London, 1793),
pp.22-4;William Fox, Thoughts on the Death of the King ofFrance (London, 1793).
10William Fox, A Defence ofthe Decree ofthe National Convention ofFrance, for Emancipating the
Slaves in the West Indies (London, 1794), p.8.
11 John Thelwall, Sober Reflections on the Seditious and Inflammatory Letter of the Right Hon.
Edmund Burke, to a Noble Lord. Addressed to the Serious Consideration of his Fellow-Citizens
(London, 1796), p.69, 85-6,95; [Towers], A Dialogue, pp.21-2; [Jebb], Two Penny-worth of Truthfor
a Penny, pp.6-7.
12 Fast Day at Sheffield. A Serious Lecture Delivered at Sheffield; February 28, 1794. Being the Day
Appointed for A General Fast; to which are added A Hymn and Resolutions (4th edition: London,
1794), pp.8-9. For other radical writings which argued along the lines of opposition reasoning that the
war was an evil crusade waged by Pitt and the continental despots to overturn the French Revolution,
see: William Fox, The Interest ofGreat Britain, Respecting the French War{2nd edition: London,
1793 and 5th edition: London, 1793); idem., Thoughts on the Impending Invasion of England
(London, 1794), p.3; idem., A Defence of the War Against France (London, 1794); [Towers], A
Dialogue, pp.35-43; Joseph Towers, Remarks on the Conduct, Principles, and Publications, of the
Association at the Crown and Anchor, in the Strand, for Preserving Liberty and Property Against
Republicans and Levellers (London, 1793), in Tracts on Political and Other Subjects, Published at
Various Times (3 vols.: London, 1796), iii, 284; [Mrs. Barbauld], Reasons for National Penitence,
Recommended for the Fast, Appointed February XXVIII, 1794 (London, 1794), pp.9-20; [Eaton],
Extermination, pp.6-8; John Lovett, H[air].D[resser]. The Citizen of the World (London, 1793),
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Radicals therefore continued to support the French armies, now fighting
against those of their own country. They toasted 'the Armies of Liberty' and used
French revolutionary phrases, songs and symbols—fa ira, the Marseillaise, trees of
liberty, Jacobin oaths, the title of 'citizen' and the denunciation of tyrannical kings.
They used the title 'Convention' for the Edinburgh meeting in November -
December 1793, and imitated French procedures and terminology in it.13 They
insisted that the British government ought to recognize the French Republic
formally: William Fox argued that denying its existence could not prevent it from
existing and that, by making war against it, the government was recognizing it de
facto.14 Wordsworth's The Prelude recalled his mixed feelings after the French
victory at Hondeschoote on 8 September 1793:
Exulted, in the triumph of my soul,
When Englishmen by thousands were o'erthrown,
Left without glory on the field, or driven,
Brave hearts! to shameful flight. It was a grief,—
Grief call it not, 'twas anything but that,—
A conflict of sensations without name...15
Robert Southey wrote in October 1799 to Humphry Davy of his joy at continuing
French success: 'Massena, Buonaparte, Switzerland, Italy, Holland, Egypt, all at
once! the very spring-tide of fortune! It was a dose of gaseous oxide to me, whose
powerful delight still endures.'16
Ministers, according to radicals, exploited the conflict in order to suppress
civil liberties in Britain. They believed that they were suffering an English 'reign of
pp.18-21; The Voice of the People, <fee. (printed for R. Lee), p.5; Warning to Tyrants (printed for R.
Lee), p.2; The Rights ofPrinces (printed for R. Lee), p.2; The Blessings ofWar (printed for R. Lee),
p.4; A Political Dictionary for the Guinea-Less Pigs, or a Glossary ofEmphatical Words Made Use
ofBy That Jewel ofa Man, Deep Will in his Administration, and His Plans for Yoking and Putting
Rings in the Snouts of those Grumbling Swine, who raise such Horrid Grunting, when Tyrannical
Winds Blow High, pp.8-9; Joseph Gerrald, A Convention the Only Means ofSaving Us From Ruin. In
a Letter, Addressed to the People of England (London, 1793), pp.39-59, 66; John Thelwall, The
Rights ofNature (2 vols.: London, 1796), ii, 13-31; Thelwall, Sober Reflections, pp.51-67; Holcroft,
A Letter to the Right Honourable William Windham, on the Intemperance and Dangerous Tendency
of his Public Conduct (London, 1795), pp.6-7, 33; S.T. Coleridge, 'On the Present War', in
Condones ad Populum or Addresses to the People (Bristol, 1795), printed in Patton and Mann (eds.),
Works ofColeridge, i, 54-8; idem., 'The War Not a Crusade', in the Morning Post, 6 August 1800,
printed in Erdman (edWorks ofColeridge, iii, 240-2; William Blake, Europe. A Prophecy (1794), in
Keynes, Blake, pp.237A5; 'The Incarnate Devil's Garland, an excellent new song' and 'A New Song.
Written by a Dutch Sans Culotte' [1794], both in the Madden Collection, Cambridge University
Library.
13 Emsley, British Society and the French Wars, p.24.
14 Fox, The Interest ofGreat Britain (2nd edition), p. 16.
15Wordsworth, The Prelude (1850), x, 285-90.
16 Carnall, Southey, p.48.
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terror' under Pitt, 'the English Robespierre'.17 In June 1795 the LCS reprobated the
war's sole purpose of annihilating the liberties of France and Britain. Trade and
commerce would recover after the war, but, warned Mrs. Barbauld,
the stab, which our liberties have suffered, is not susceptible of so
speedy and effectual a remedy. It is the very nature of all arbitrary
power to be felt lightly and gently in its first approaches, till by
degrees it becomes, instead of an object of delight, and image of
terror. The serpent is gathering together its venom, while we are
amusing ourselves with its docility and tameness.18
The radicals at the Sheffield Fast-Day gathering in February 1794 passed resolutions
stating that the government's policies of quartering Hessian troops temporarily in
Britain and of building barracks around the country were a menace to British liberty:
the Hessians might at any time be let loose upon British subjects, and the barracks
might be designed to house more foreign mercenaries for the same purpose.19 Daniel
Isaac Eaton reported that a Hessian soldier had stabbed an Englishman in a street
quarrel, and inferred that they had all been brought over 'to cut the throats of
Englishmen'.20 The LCS resolutions of April 1794 included two against the
employment of French emigres in the British armed forces for the same reason, and
against impressment into the forces.21 Wordsworth and Coleridge reprobated the
government's use of spies and informers, and the suspension of habeas corpus.22
John Thelwall saw the violent interruption of his lectures in Yarmouth and
elsewhere in 1796 by naval press-gangs as merely a symptom of the malady.
Something was rotten in the state of Denmark: 'I cannot but conclude that the brutal
conspiracy...originated with higher authorities that the commanders of two or three
frigates and sloops of war. The system of terror is still to be supported.'23
17 Clive Emsley, 'An Aspect of Pitt's 'Terror": Prosecutions for Sedition During the 1790s', Social
History, vi (1981), 155. At least, said Thelwall, 'the French Robespierre was no apostate' (Sober
Reflections, p.75). For an example of popular radical complaint about Pitt, see A Full, True, and
Particular Account of the Birth, Parentage and Education, Life, Character and Behaviour of that
most notoriously notified Malefactor Willy Pitto [1790s],
18Account of the Proceedings at a General Meeting ofthe London Corresponding Soceity, convened
by public advertisement, and held in an inclosed field, behind the Long Room, Borough Road, St.
George's Fields, on Monday, the 29th ofJune, 1795 [London, 1795], p. 12 no.3; [Barbauld], Reasons
for National Penitence, p.32. See also Eaton, Extermination, pp.11-16, 28-31; The Blessings ofWar,
pp.4-5; Thelwall, Sober Reflections, pp.70-4.
19 Fast Day as Observed at Sheffield, p. 11, resolutions 4-7.
20 Daniel Isaac Eaton, Politics for the People, 11:7, 15 March 1794, quoted in Erdman, Blake, p.278.
21 P.H., xxxi, 492-3.
22 Alan G. Hill (ed.), Letters of William Wordsworth. A New Selection (Oxford, 1984), p. 17,
Wordsworth toWilliam Matthews, 8 June 1794; Coleridge, 'On the PresentWar', pp.60-2.
23 John Thelwall, An Appeal to Popular Opinion, Against Kidnapping & Murder; Including a
Narrative of the Late Atrocious Proceedings, at Yarmouth. Second edition, with a Postscript;
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If the continental despots were successful in their war against France, having
already crushed the Polish revolution, according to radical commentators, they
might next turn upon England, the home of revolutionary ideas through Locke and
later political thinkers, including Burke himself. 'England is their native land, here
they may be deemed indigenous, in France only exotic, and whether suffered to
remain; or whether the hand of violence tears up the new planted offshoot, the
mother plant still remains,' explained William Fox.24 Daniel Isaac Eaton also feared
such an outcome: 'Then Britons! be assured, that in fighting against France, ye are
fighting against yourselves, that if the liberties of France are lost, your own, such as
they are, will not long survive.'25
The allied war effort, however, was deemed ultimately hopeless by radical
writers. The dreadful power of France had been demonstrated in the first campaign,
which had crushed the government's hopes of defeating it quickly. It could not be
assumed that Britain would always be victorious by some fixed law of nature.
France was never easily subdued, and it had been strengthened immeasurably by the
enthusiasm of the people for their new freedom. Britain, marching from defeat to
defeat, from rash projects to acute losses, ought to be moved to caution by these
repeated warnings, instead of which the government was convinced that the French
struggle was the last convulsion of an exhausted state. This, warned Mrs. Barbauld,
seemed somewhat wishful and unrealistic in the light of the evidence. Another
pamphleteer ridiculed the ministers' conduct of the war: 'We govern this war as an
unskilful man does a casting-net, if he has not the right trick to cast the net off his
shoulder, the leads will pull him into the river.—I am afraid we shall pull ourselves
into destruction.'26 Radicals mocked British and allied military failures.27 The
lecturer at the Sheffield Fast-Day in 1794 compared 'the leagued Despots' to the
kings who conspired against 'the immortal Joshua': 'yet all could not overcome him,
but victories upon victories he gained, and in one campaign not less than thirty-one
kings he slew.'28 Even if the allies were to succeed in exterminating every
Frenchman, they would find that it was not possible to extinguish opinions. British
containing a Particular Account of the Outrages at Lynn and Wisbeach (London, 1796), pp.6, 52.
E.P. Thompson, 'Hunting the Jacobin Fox'.
24 William Fox, The Interest of Great Britain, p. 10. See also his Discourse on National Fasts,
Particularly in Reference to that ofApril 19, 1793, on the Occasion of the War Against France (3rd
edition: London, 1793), pp.8-9; [Towers], A Dialogue, pp. 19-21.
25 [Eaton], Extermination, p.9.
26 Fox, Thoughts on the Impending Invasion, pp.3, 6-7, 13; [Barbauld], Reasons for National
Penitence, p.22; Mast and Acorns: Collected by Old Hubert (printed for Daniel Isaac Eaton), p.5.
27 [Eaton], Extermination, p.29; [John Still], Fraternity, Humanity, Peace (London, 1795), pp. 1,2-3.
28 Fast Day as Observed at Sheffield, pp.6, 11. See also The Blessings of War, p.2; Gerrald, A
Convention the Only Means ofSaving Usfrom Ruin, pp.63-5; [Eaton], Extermination, pp. 17-18.
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ministers ought to have learned the lesson from the American War, said Coleridge,
that 'a war against a nation of patriots must be as unsuccessful and calamitous, as it
is iniquitous and abominable; that rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God; and that
they therefore who struggle for freedom fight beneath the banners of
omnipotence.'29
The government was further castigated for the war by the radicals because of
its expense and its adverse effects on trade and living standards. 'Whence are we to
derive any compensation for the increase of taxes, the loss of trade, and the decay of
our manufactures?' asked Joseph Towers.30 The Birmingham Corresponding
Society told the Society for Constitutional Information in November 1793 that 'Mr.
Pitt's "War of Humanity'" had 'almost utterly annihilated our Trade in the Town' ,31
Daniel Isaac Eaton was indignant that 'such enormous subscriptions' had been
raised for the French emigres 'at a time when an immense body of our own Poor are
absolutely starving'; but, he added sarcastically, 'the Poor of England are not
NobleUP Joseph Gerrald criticized the government for squandering the increased
revenue from war taxation on three new boards (for India, agriculture and exchequer
bills) while industry was crippled 32 Thomas Holcroft condemned Windham for his
refusal to believe that the poor felt any hardship from the war. Windham had ignored
the slaughter and bereavement of war, the unemployment, low wages, high prices,
high taxes and high poor relief contributions. In times so full of terror and dismay,
Holcroft asked, 'will men suffer to be told that the war is not felt? Is it possible that
a perversion of truth and reason so incredible as this can be real?'33 'Famine' was
unknown, wrote one pamphleteer, where there was no war, for nature was never so
severe as to refuse to supply people's real needs. He linked this with Pitt's decision
in 1793 to forbid the export of corn to France and concluded that he was attempting
to starve both France and Britain into submission.34 Coleridge reprobated Arthur
29 Fox, Defence of the War, pp. 11-16; S.T. Coleridge, 'All for the Best', in the Morning Post, 19
April 17%, printed in Erdman (ed.), Works ofColeridge, iii, 241-2.
30 [Towers], A Dialogue, p.47. See also A Political Dictionary for the Guinea-Less Pigs, pp.9-10;
The Address of the British Convention, Assembled at Edinburgh, November 19, 1793, to the People of
Great Britain (London, 1793), pp.22-3; the Address of the LCS on 20 January 1794, in P.H., xxxi,
481; Coleridge, 'On the Present War', pp.59-60,68-70.
3' Quoted in Emsley, British Society and the French Wars, p.30.
32 [Eaton], Extermination, p. 12 n.; Gerrald, A Convention the Only Means ofSaving Us From Ruin,
pp.62-3.
33 Holcroft, Letter to Windham, pp.38-41. For Windham's remark in the House of Commons, see
p.85.
34 The Wrongs ofMan (printed for R. Lee), pp.2-3. See also [Richard Lee], The Rights ofSwine. An
Address to the Poor (London, [1795]), pp. 1-2; An Address to the English Nation: with a Slight Sketch
of the Existing Grievances, and a Recommendation to Petition with Vigour, as a Means ofObtaining
a Repeal ofPitt and Grenville's Bills (London, 1796), pp.6-7; A Political Dictionary for the Guinea-
Less Pigs, pp. 12-13.
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Young's opinion that the scarcity was a mark of divine chastening on the nation
rather than a direct result of an unjust and unnecessary war.35
War was, to radicals, a game for kings, princes and their ministers and one
that ruined ordinary people. 'Despots delight in war, to them 'tis sport, A Royal
Game—their subjects lives the stake.' War was fought, according to 'John Lovett,
Hair Dresser', 'to have thousands, and tens of thousands, of the subjects of this
country put to death, and all for the pride and etiquette of courts.' Courtiers, said the
Sheffield lecturer, delighted in children's toys (ribbons, stars and garters) and
nicknames (titles). One pamphleteer suspected that the government had entered the
conflict simply because the Duke of York, 'anxious to make a splendid parade of his
great military talents', had cried out for a war. Joseph Gerrald surveyed the wars of
the eighteenth century to show that 'they might have been avoided by negociation,
instead of being decided by arms; that they arose, not from the jarring interests of
two peoples, but from the ambition and avarice of courts, and, that at the end of each
war, the situation of the people was always much worse than at the beginning of
it.'36 The Blessings ofWar, one of the selections of 'Extracts from Pigott's Political
Dictionary' printed for Richard Lee, bitterly defined 'Life' as 'a state of existence to
be sacrificed by the lower orders of society whenever kings and ministers think
proper—witness the reeking plains of Flanders.'37 Radicals lamented the
degeneration of the British people towards 'slavery'. Coleridge printed in the
Morning Post of 11 April 1796 two Remonstrances from Wilkes and the City of
London to the King in 1775 against the 'tyrannical measures' pursued against
America, and asked 'Where has the spirit of the Citizens of London fled, and why do
they not NOW address the Throne in similar language?'38
Sometimes these sentiments could be phrased as direct condemnation of the
King or even threats addressed to him. William Fox was anxious to explain that he
did not question the King's prerogative to make war, but that he wished to discuss
35 S.T. Coleridge, 'Review of a Pamphlet by Arthur Young Entitled "The Question of Scarcity
Plainly Stated'", in the Morning Post, 27 March 1800, printed in Erdman (ed.), Works ofColeridge,
iii, 238.
36 The Blessings of War, p.2; Lovett, The Citizen of the World, p.9; Fast Day as Observed at
Sheffield, p.4; The Rights ofPrinces, p.7; Gerrald, A Convention the Only Means ofSaving Us From
Ruin, pp.7-8, 8-38; Thomas Bentley, A Warning to Britons of All Ranks; Especially the King, the
Parliament, and the Clergy (6th edition: London, 1794).
37 The Blessings of War, p.3. See also A Political Dictionary for the Guinea-Less Pigs, p.7; An
Address to the English Nation, pp.6-7; French Famine (1795); Thelwall, The Rights ofNature, ii, 8-
11; S.T. Coleridge, Fire, Famine, and Slaughter. A War Eclogue (1796); 'The Age of War', in the
Courier, 8 Nov. 1798, printed in Bennett, War Poetry, p.215.
38 S.T. Coleridge, in the Morning Post, 11 April 17%, printed in Erdman (ed.), Works ofColeridge,
iii, 205-8. See also Thelwall, The Rights ofNature, ii, 6-7; Mast and Acorns, p.7; [Still], Fraternity,
Humanity, Peace, p.2.
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the effects of the present war, including the possibility that the King might never be
able to involve Britain in another war after it. The Union Star, a Dublin news-sheet,
was less reverent: 'Are the continental wars you engender and provoke to destroy
mankind, no wrong?' it asked George III. In The Song of Los, Blake blamed the
King as the villain whose policy resulted in 'famine from the heath'. Sometimes the
King himself was protected from direct attack in radical publications by the use of
the 'evil ministers' argument; but his coach was physically attacked while he
travelled to open Parliament on 29 October 1795, and it had to be bullet-proofed for
the following year.39
Yet the radicals opposed the war not just as a symptom of political
corruption and injustice, but also as an evil in itself. They insisted that there was no
such thing as 'natural enemies' and, as Richard Price had done in his 1790
Discourse on the Love of Our Country, they extolled the virtues of universal
brotherhood.40 'The wolf is the natural enemy of the lamb; the vulture of the dove',
explained one pamphlet. 'By instinct they are so. They must live; but one people can
never be the natural enemy of another, unless we consider mankind in the same
savage light as the vulture and the wolf.' A nation was just one member of the
family of the human race, and it could flourish only within the harmony and welfare
of the whole. War was 'altogether a solecism in commercial politics' especially; it
was also 'unworthy of rational Beings, and utterly repugnant to...the Christian
Religion' ,41 It was particularly odious when it was waged against opinions; it was
persecution and, as such, detestable. This was particularly significant to British
radicals, who believed that they along with the French revolutionaries were being
persecuted for their opinions by the British government.42 It could not be a means of
justice, according to Thelwall, since might was not necessarily right: it was rather a
means of revenge, desolation, conquest, ambition, plunder, corruption, murder and
oppression.43
Since warfare was evil, soldiering was an evil profession and likened to a
butcher's trade in human beings. 'Soldiers have no privileges, no rights, no feelings
of humanity to guide them to action, no sentiment of regard for their fellow-men!
39 Fox, Thoughts on the Impending Invasion, p.3; the Union Star, no.l, undated, quoted in Morris,
'Monarchy as an Issue', pp. 178-9; ibid., pp. 113-4, 152-3; Blake, The Song ofLos (1795), 6:9, 15-22,
in Keynes, Blake, p.247; A Letter from a Chancellor, Out of Office, to a King in Power (London,
1795); Roger Wells, 'English Society and Revolutionary Politics in the 1790s: the case for
insurrection', in Philp (ed.), The French Revolution and British Popular Politics, p. 189.
40 Richard Price, A Discourse on the Love ofOur Country (London, 1790), esp. pp.2-9.
41 The Voice ofthe People, pp.2-3; Fast Day as Observed at Sheffield, pp.7, 11:1.
42 Thelwall, Rights ofNature, i, 67, 86.
43 Thelwall, The Rights ofNature, ii, 7-8. See also Holcroft, Letter to Windham, pp.32-3.
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They are a distinct order, kept apart, that all sensibility, all sympathy for the
sufferings of others with them may be extinct.'44 Southey wrote of a soldier as a
man made in the image of God, but moulded by his life of labour into 'a mere
machine of murder'. He had less sympathy for their officers. On hearing in 1796 that
a friend of his had become a soldier, he wrote that military officers 'are the most
ignorant impertinent and debauchd members of this execrable state of society.'45
Nevertheless, despite their harsh words for the soldiers' profession, radicals
pitied them as ordinary men who had been bribed or forced into a dangerous
position. Like the Foxite opposition, the radicals criticized the government's conduct
of the war, but they did this more consistently with their hostility to the war than the
Foxites did. Much of their anti-war protest was based on its effects on ordinary poor
people, and their main specific criticism related to individual policies which inflicted
hardship on these people: in particular, the treatment of soldiers. Perhaps, since most
general sympathy went to sailors rather than soldiers, the radicals were consciously
supporting the underdog at the same time as condemning his profession: hating the
sin but loving the sinner. Coleridge published excerpts from soldiers' accounts of
campaigning life in The Watchman, emphasizing the misery of cold and danger,
fever, inept and corrupt medical staff, Austrian atrocities and allied plundering.46
Better conditions were demanded for soldiers, especially after demobilization.47 The
system of recruitment by crimps and the press-gang, and their methods of promising
glamour, offering bribery, promoting alcoholism and resorting to kidnapping, were
all condemned.48 Radicals were also convinced that sailors were not necessarily so
loyal to the government as conservatives claimed. John Gale Jones claimed to have
spoken to a naval officer, who had told him that sailors were motivated more by the
sense of danger or fear of punishment than by loyalty, that for them it was only a job
and that they did not think about the justice of the cause in which they fought. The
Navy to them was not 'the wooden walls of Britain', but
44Mast and Acorns, p. 13; quotation from The Blessings ofWar, pp.5,6-8; Morris, 'The Monarchy as
an Issue', p. 160.
45 Robert Southey, 'The Soldier's Funeral', printed in Bennett, War Poetry, pp.231-2; 25 September
1796, quoted in Carnall, Southey, p.38. See also his poem, 'The Battle of Blenheim' (1798), printed
in Bennett, War Poetry, pp.245-7.
46 Coleridge, 'Interesting Narration relative to the Campaign of 1794 and 1795', and'Farther
Particulars Relating to the Campaign of 1794 and 1795'in the Watchman, 19 and 27 April 1796,
printed in Patton (ed.), Works ofColeridge, ii, 238-41, 282-4. See also Robert Merry, 'The Wounded
Soldier', printed in Bennett, War Poetry, pp.242-5.
47 The Blessings ofWar, p.5; [Still], Fraternity, Humanity, Peace, p. 1; Ask, and You Shall Have, or.
The Source of Public Grievances and Their Remedies Pointed Out (London), p.3; Revolutions
without Bloodshed; or, Reformation Preferable to Revolt (London, 1794), p.3.
48 The Wrongs ofMan, p.7; The Blessings of War, pp.3, 5; Revolutions without Bloodshed, p.3;
Thelwall, An Appeal to Popular Opinion, PRO HO 42/37/129, report on Thelwall's lectures, 25
October 1795.
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a floating hell, consisting of an assembly of huge, unwieldy,
wooden castles, well stored with artillery, gun-powder, chain shot,
cannon balls, grape shot, bombs, hand grenades, slugs, leaden
bullets, sharp-angled pieces of iron, flints, glass, old rusty nails,
salt-petre, brimstone, combustible cannisters, and every engine of
destruction that will do execution. Most of the sailors who conduct
and manage these useful machines, are torn in force from their
wives and families, to assist monarchs in executing this only and
universal object of their whole lives, viz. the extermination of the
human species.49
The government was also criticized by radicals for its appointment of public
Fast Days. Morality ought not to be conflated with wicked governmental interest.
The idea of the rich fasting was ridiculed, and it was pointed out that many of the
poor fasted of necessity and not as a religious observance.50 A fast, remarked
Coleridge, was made up of 'Prayers of Hate to the God of Love—and after these, a
Turbot Feast for the rich, and their usual scanty morsel to the poor, if indeed
debarred from their usual labour they can procure even this.'51 Radicals constantly
demanded peace, and they questioned whether ministers were sincerely working
towards it52 The LCS general meeting in June 1795 petitioned the King:
We conjure you, Sire...to put an immediate period to the ravages
of a cruel and destructive war, and to restore to us that Peace and
Tranquillity, which is so essentially necessary for YOUR OWN
PERSONAL SECURITY, AND FOR THE HAPPINESS OF THE
PEOPLE!53
49 John Gale Jones, A Sketch ofa Political Tour (London, 1796), quoted in Morris, 'Monarchy as an
Issue', pp. 169-70.
50 Fox, A Discourse on National Fasts, pp. 1-3, 6, 15; idem., A Discourse, Occasioned by the
National Fast, February 28, 1794 (London, 1794), pp. 12-16; Bentley, A Warning to Britons of all
Ranks', idem., Seasonable Advice to all People ofPower, or wealth (London, 1793); [Mrs. Barbauld],
Sins ofGovernment, Sins of the Nation; or, A Discourse for the Fast, Appointed on April 19,1793. By
a Volunteer (2nd edition: London, 1793); [Barbauld], Reasons for National Penitence-, Fast Day as
Observed at Sheffield, pp.5, 10-11, 11:3, 12; Polemophilus Brown, A Sermon, Preached on the Day
ofGeneral Fast, February 27, 1799 (1799); Coleridge, 'Essay on Fasts', in the Watchman, 9 March
1796, printed in Patton (ed.), Works of Coleridge, ii, 51-6; 'Verses On Seeing the Military
Association Going to Church on the Fast-Day in their Uniform', in the Courier, 14 March 1799,
printed in Bennett, War Poetry, p.236; 'Song on the General Fast' (1795), in the Madden Collection,
Cambridge University Library.
51 Coleridge, 'On the PresentWar', pp.65-7.
52 William Fox, On Peace (London, 1794); Towers, A Dialogue, p.38; idem., Remarks on the
Conduct of the Association, p.284; [Barbauld], Reasons for National Penitence, pp.25-8; The Rights
ofMan (printed for R. Lee), pp.4-5; The Address of the British Convention, p.23; S.T. Coleridge,
'Review of the Motions in the Legislature for a Peace with France', and 'Copy of a Hand-Bill', in the
Watchman, 1 March 17%, printed in Patton (ed.), Works ofColeridge, ii, 16-22,47-8.
53 Account of the Proceedings at a General Meeting of the London Corresponding Society.. .on
Monday, the 29th ofJune, 1795, p. 10.
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The objects of the war had either already been gained or were impossible to
accomplish;54 and there was no excuse for not negotiating.55
The radical movement ebbed and flowed between 1792 and 1795. After its
first high-tide in 1792, the alarm during the winter 1792-3, the rise of the loyalists
and the outbreak of war pushed it back into caution and relative quiet.56 Some
radicals emigrated to America; the membership of the popular societies declined,
and some disappeared altogether; likewise, there was a fall in the circulation of
radical publications, and some of their newspapers closed.57 By the autumn of 1793,
however, the ebb-tide began to flow again. The LCS held a mass meeting at
Hackney in October, and Thelwall began to hold his first public lectures. The first
British Convention was held in Edinburgh in November and December and, despite
its closure by the authorities, radicals seemed to gain courage in the face of
repression. The Scottish sedition trials of 1793-4 resulted in the conviction of Muir,
Fysshe Palmer, Skirving, Margarot and Gerrald, but the English treason trials of
1794 acquitted Hardy, Home Tooke, Holcroft, Thelwall and others.58 The arrest of
these men and the convictions and transportations obtained in Scotland subdued the
societies again; yet, in 1795, grain shortages and high prices encouraged a new wave
of radical action. John Gale Jones, John Binns and Francis Place were prominent in
the LCS, which held further 'monster meetings', and Thelwall resumed his lecture
tours. The 'Two Acts' of December 1795, however, while hardly implemented, had
a marked effect on radical activities in terms of their restrictions on meetings and
publications, and the popular radical movement was gradually suppressed or driven
underground for the rest of the decade.59
Nevertheless, the LCS still had a membership at the end of 1796 a third
greater than it had had in 1793, and Clive Emsley remarks that 'its general
correspondence, its ambitious ventures, and the spies' reports of 1796 do not suggest
an organisation in a state of collapse or despair.' Parish meetings were exempt from
54 S.T. Coleridge, 'The War', in the Watchman, 17 March 1796 (taken from the Morning Post, 9
March 1796), printed in Patton, Works ofColeridge, ii, 108-9; Fox, On Peace, pp. 1-2.
55 Gerrald, A Convention the Only Means, pp.67-9; S.T. Coleridge, articles in the Morning Post, 2,4,
6, 7, 8, 10, 22, 25 January 1800, printed in Erdinan (ed.), Works ofColeridge, iii, 64-8, 73-91, 114-7,
125-130.
56 This relative quiescence, however, masked continued subversion, such as the use of loyal
Associations to profess loyalty but urge reform—see Donald Ginter, 'The Loyalist Association
Movement of 1792-93 and British Public Opinion', Historical Journal, ix (1966), 179-90.
57 Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, p.392. See also Dozier, For King, Constitution and Country,
pp.89-102.
58 Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, pp.393-7; Dickinson, British Radicalism, pp.21-2,38.
59 Clive Emsley, 'Repression, "Terror", and the Rule of Law in England During the Decade of the
French Revolution', English Historical Review, 100 (1985), 813.
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the terms of the Seditious Meetings Act, and some radicals used those.60 Some
United Scotsmen were arrested in late 1797, some United Englishmen in Manchester
and some divisions of the LCS in April 1798, and, in October 1799, a group of men
in Margate trying to sail for France, who included John Binns and Arthur O'Connor.
Father James Quigley was also among them, carrying a letter to the French
Directory, encouraging invasion; he was convicted of treason and executed.61 John
Thelwall warned in 1796 that, despite a cowed appearance, the radical movement, or
'the manly spirit of Britain', 'is not dead but sleepeth', and that should it be
provoked by further tyrannical outrages, either the old champions of the cause would
'resume their neglected arms', or others would step forward to take their place.62
Against this must be balanced those who, like Wordsworth and Coleridge,
reluctantly stopped opposing the war after the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte. The
radicals' reactions to the peace of Amiens in 1802 was probably mixed: the war had
ceased, but they had suffered a decade of hounding and suppression. Thomas Hardy
wrote to Napoleon in 1802, 'Now peace reigns on earth and this is the work of
Frenchmen.'63
The anti-war activities of the radicals centred on trying to rouse and use
popular discontent. Indeed, their anti-war activism was simply another strand of
their reformist strategy. They used food riots, probably not in the way that anxious
conservatives imagined—by hoarding grain to force disturbances—but at least to stir
people up and to impress public opinion with a sense of discontent.64 In a similar
manner, they sought to make political capital out of public war-weariness and
hostility to the war. Poverty, unemployment, crimping and pressing, and food
shortages were the main grounds on which they opposed the war in publications
after 1793, and it is accepted that 'throughout the 1790s, but particularly in the years
1792-6, distress was a major recruiting agent for the radical cause'.65 The British
radical movement was small and without political power, so it had to depend on the
moral force of public opinion. Since the war was an almost universal experience, it
60 Ibid., pp. 812-3.
61 Emsley, British Society and the French Wars, p.68.
62 Thelwall, Sober Reflections, p. 10. See also Philp, 'The Fragmented Ideology of Reform', pp.74-5.
63 Emsley, British Society and the French Wars, p.92.
64 Emsley, 'The Impact of the French Revolution', pp.47-8; Bohstedt, Riots and Community Poltics,
p.171.
65 Dickinson, British Radicalism, p.9. See also Bohstedt, Riots and Community Poltics, pp.92-3; and
Stevenson, 'The London "Crimp" Riots', 40-58, on the radicals' exploitation of existing discontent
due military recruitment. David Eastwood rightly notes, however, that the radicals did not succeed in
sufficiently politicizing poverty to threaten the conservative order seriously, partly because of
conservative counteraction in the form of substantially higher poor rates (Eastwood, 'Patriotism and
the English State', pp. 162-3; c.f. Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics, pp.59-60,201).
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helped the radicals, as Mark Philp suggests, to develop a language of protest that
was widely understood.66 Sometimes these demands became conflated by rioting
crowds or bill-posters, so that they cried for peace and bread 'or a King without a
head'.67 The Annual Register for 1797 shows that in March 1797, 'most of the
counties, cities and towns of the kingdom petitioned his Majesty for the removal of
ministers, and the consequent restoration of peace'. In the same month, the LCS sent
a circular to its provincial correspondents, proposing simultaneous nationwide
meetings to call for these same demands. One was held in Nottingham, but the
London meeting, in July, was closed by the Bow Street magistrates.68
Some radicals used the war as a direct means of demonstrating the de facto
involvement of the people in government policy and urging their active participation
in making that policy. Mrs. Barbauld's pamphlets on Fast Days made the connection
between national guilt and the responsibility of each individual in the nation for the
deeds of the nation. William Williams made a similar point. When their British
ancestors put the power of making war and peace in the hands of their executive
government, he explained, it was a delegation of trust, not an absolute authority
conferred, because the people themselves bore the burden of blood and money
required. Therefore, 'the people are competent to judge. Ministers should fairly state
the whole case to them, they have then done their duty; and, be the result what it
may, they are blameless.' Government ought to be participated in by all. The LCS
boasted at its mass general meeting of June 1795 that the British people were
beginning to rouse themselves and would refuse to allow 'an insolent
Administration' to continue in its corruption and slaughter. It warned them,
however, 'not to fall into those fatal errors which have so frequently misled our
ancestors, nor rest your expectation on that delusive phantom—a Change of
Ministers!...YOUR CHIEF, PERHAPS YOUR ONLY HOPE, IS IN
YOURSELVES!'69 Coleridge argued that, in such a time of national crisis, 'every
66 Mark Philp, 'The Fragmented Ideology of Reform', in Philp, The French Revolution and British
Popular Politics, pp.62, 66, 89.
67 Emsley, 'The Impact of the French Revolution', p.53; see also Bohstedt, Riots and Community
Politics, p.92.
68 Ibid., p.50; idem., British Society and the French Wars, p.63.
69 [Barbauld], Sins ofGovernment, Sins of the Nation; [idem.], Reasons for National Penitence, esp.
pp.5-6;Williams, A Reply to Mr. Burke's Two Letters, p.49; Account of the Proceedings at a General
Meeting of the London Corresponding Society...on Monday, the 29th ofJune, 1795, pp.5-7. See also
Gerrald, A Convention the Only Means of Saving Us From Ruin, pp.1-4, 71-116; Thelwall, The
Rights ofNature, i, 3-6, 13-45; idem., Sober Reflections, pp.26-7.
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one ought to consider his intellectual faculties as in a state of requisition', for 'all
may benefit society in some degree' in this way.70
Some radical pamphlets and meetings applauded the efforts of the Foxites in
Parliament for 'supporting the public in opposing the war.'71 Others criticized them
roundly for merely charging the ministry with a feeble prosecution of the war,
instead of refusing to cooperate with voting for supplies, and demanded that they
secede, instead of laying themselves open to the accusation of guilt by association.72
The press was also used by radicals to give voice to anti-war sentiments. The
Analytical Review, the Monthly Review and the Critical Review were radical
periodicals, contributed to by Mary Wollstonecraft, William Blake, William Godwin
and Thomas Paine, among others.73 Gayle Trusdel Pendleton argues that, with
regard to pamphlet literature, radicals seem to have made less effort than
conservative propagandists to cater for the market at the lower end of the social
scale. Mark Philp claims that this is relative, for their publications were more
accessible to a mass audience than ever before.74 In terms of the war debate, it seems
probable that, while there were some radical handbills, posters and pamphlets aimed
directly at the lower orders, they relied more on stirring up existing discontent by
word of mouth, personal activism, demonstrations, petitions and meetings.
Sometimes radicals went so far as to try to persuade soldiers to their political
views—Edinburgh radicals were arrested in autumn 1792 for distributing seditious
medals to soldiers, it was widely believed that radicals had a hand in instigating the
naval mutinies of 1797, and a young man was hanged in Bolton in September 1801
for trying to seduce two dragoons from their duty.75
Radicals had traditionally assumed the character of 'true' patriots,
associating themselves with the mythical history of Anglo-Saxon freedom and a
Norman oppression continued still by the present governors of Britain. A handbill
published in Sheffield and Nottingham in December 1792 arguing against going to
war was signed 'Sydney', associating itself with the seventeenth-century radical
Algernon Sydney and the radical interpretation of the Glorious Revolution which
Burke's Reflections had been at pains to refute—that of the triumph of the
70 S.T. Coleridge, 'A Moral and Political Lecture' (1795), in Patton and Mann (eds.), Works of
Coleridge, i, 5.
71 Lovett, Citizen of the World, pp. 16-17,32; Fast Day as Observed at Sheffield, p. 11: 8,9.
72 Gerrald, A Convention the Only Means ofSaving Usfrom Ruin, pp. 118-9.
73 de Montluzin, The Anti-Jacobins, p.2.
74 Pendleton, 'English Conservative Propaganda', p. 164; Philp, 'The Fragmented Ideology of
Reform', p.70. For examples of radical anti-war handbills, posters, etc. found in Norwich in 1793, see
PRO HO 42/27/174-92, Joseph White to Evan Nepean, 16 November 1793.
75 Murley, 'Origin and Outbreak', p. 177; Bohstedt, Riots and Community Poltics, p. 143.
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sovereignty of the British people over their governors.76 During the war, radicals
continued to appropriate this character. Mrs. Barbauld inveighed against 'a species
of patriotism, which consists in inverting the natural course of our feelings, in being
afraid of our neighbour's prosperity, and rejoicing at his misfortunes. We should be
ashamed to say,' she insisted, '...our neighbours are weakening themselves by a
cruel war, we shall rise upon their ruins.'77 Another pamphleteer argued that people
should be ready to understand the cause of other nations and acknowledge their own
defects.78
The radicals lost support, however, because they had gained a pro-French
and therefore anti-British image. This was, of course, principally because Britain
was at war with France, and radicals supporting France appeared to be anti-patriotic,
but it was ironic that, as Gerald Newman points out, their patriotic label had been
gained earlier in the century by their denunciations of aristocratic imitation of
French fashions and their consequent and-French associations. Clearly, their anger
had always been directed against the elite, just as it was now in their opposition
towards war against the anti-aristocratic French Revolution, but the superficial
message of anti-France had suddenly become pro-France, and it was a severe
handicap to their success in Britain.79 Their tendency to alternate between
republican rhetoric, in support of the French revolutionaries, and declarations
supporting the British monarchy, which reflected their reforming background and,
probably, the actual views of most radicals in Britain, produced understandable
confusion among loyalists as to their real intentions.80 They claimed, however, that
conservatives deliberately distorted their case.81 As Gregory Claeys argues, they
were now associated with 'an economic programme which threatened the progress
of the commerce and polished manners which had exalted Britain.'82
Radicals had mixed feelings about a possible French invasion. Often their
rhetoric seemed to look forward to such an event, but it is unlikely that many would
have supported it in reality. The Sheffield Iris was unsympathetic to the French
76 War! (Nottingham, 31 December 1792; Sheffield, 20 December 1792 in PRO HO 42/23/633). See
also 'To the Inhabitants of Nottingham', signed 'Hampden', in the British Library collection of songs
and broadsides at 648.C.26.
77 [Barbauld], Sins of Government, Sins of the Nation; pp.22-3. See also Eaton, Extermination,
pp.19-23; Address of the British Convention, pp.5-12.
78 The History of a Good Bramin. To Which is Annexed, an Essay on the Reciprocal Contempt of
Nations, Proceeding from their Vanity (printed for Daniel Isaac Eaton: London, 1795), pp.7, 10, 15.
79 Newman, The Rise ofEnglish Nationalism, pp.230-1.
80 Morris, 'The Monarchy as an Issue', p.89.
81 See, for example, [Towers], A Dialogue, p. 14; The Blessings of War, p.l; Blake, 'Europe. A
Prophecy', 12:26-31, in Keynes, Blake, p.243.
82 Claeys, 'The French Revolution Debate and British Political Thought', 61, 74-5. See also
Dinwiddy, 'Interpretations of anti-Jacobinism', pp.41-2; Murley, 'Origin and Outbreak', pp.vii-viii.
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forces. The meeting of the LCS broken up by Bow Street Magistrates on 19 April
had been discussing what they should do if the French landed; many thought they
ought to help the Volunteers, and one prominent member was reported as having
argued that the Society should help to repel them, because they seemed 'more
desirous of establishing an extensive military despotism, than of propagating
republican principles'.83 On the other hand, Gilbert Wakefield and others warned the
government that invasion would not pose the French with much of a problem. John
Gale Jones, on the day the Two Acts were passed, said that, in the present
circumstances, 'should the French invade our Coasts, I would not take up a Musket
to oppose them. I would not assist the French to invade this Country, nor would I
resist them; for if I am to be a Slave, it matters not whether I be the slave of an
English, or of a French Tyrant.'84 Others, particularly the United Irishmen, but also
some radicals in the large towns and cities of the mainland, were ready to join the
French and were impatient for their arrival.85
While the radicals often called for an end to the war, chiefly because of their
support for the French Revolution, but mainly based on the grounds of the hardships
it caused the labouring poor, their primary aim remained political reform. The
resolutions taken by the Sheffield radicals in February 1794 began by denouncing
the war, but ended by declaring that 'the People have no remedy for their
Grievances, but a REFORM IN PARLIAMENT—a Measure which we determine
never to relinquish, though we follow our Brethren in the same Glorious Cause in
BOTANY BAY.' If the British constitution really was the envy of the world and the
masterpiece and model of liberty, or even halfway there, argued Joseph Towers, a
war would not be necessary to defend it against attack. The resolutions adopted by
the LCS on 29 June 1795 at St. George's Fields demonstrated that, although 'the
Friends of Reform [were] indeed the Friends of Peace', the war to the radicals was
just one of the many distresses brought upon the people by a corrupt government, if
a major one, and that it was only likely to be halted by parliamentary reform, the
panacea for all these ills.86
83 Emsley, British Society and the French Wars, pp.68-9; idem., 'The Impact of the French
Revolution', p.55.
84 GilbertWakefield, A Reply to the Bishop ofLlandaff(1798), quoted in Emsley, British Society and
the French Wars, pp.69-70; Fox, Thoughts on the Impending Invasion, pp. 12-16; PRO HO
42/37/454, John Gale Jones, 18 December 1795. See also Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics,
p.191.
85 See, for example, PRO HO 42/40/325, possibly an oath of the United Englishmen, swearing 'as far
as in me lies.. .to assist the French in landing to free this country'.
86 Fast Day as Observed at Sheffield, p. 11 no. 11; Towers, Remarks on the Conduct of the
Association, p.288; Account of the Proceedings at a General Meeting of the LCS, pp.12 nos.1-3,
pp. 13-14. See also An Address to the English Nation, Revolutions without Bloodshed; or,
Reformation Preferable to Revolt (London, 1794); Ask and You Shall Flave, p.l; copy of a speech
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Ultimately, radical activists were more concerned with making war on
political 'tyranny' in Britain than with opposing the government's war against
France. They began by opposing the war out of sympathy for the French Revolution
and in the context of their hostility to conservative ideology, but their interest in it
became more instrumental as time passed and as their opportunities to persuade
people of their views on it became more limited, with government restrictions on
their activities. The 'Friends of Peace', on the other hand, opposed the government
chiefly because they opposed the war against revolutionary France.
II
The 'Friends of Peace' were a group of liberal men spread throughout the country
and, although they were not a formally constituted body, they had formed a network
over previous years by their association in opposing various issues such as clerical
subscription to the Thirty-Nine Articles, the Test and Corporation Acts, the
American War and the slave trade, and by ties of family, friendship, religion,
intellect, profession and business. Based mainly in London and in the north of
England, but with contacts nationwide, they formed the real leadership of the anti¬
war protest. Many of them were Dissenters, hostile to what they saw as a Pittite
'Tory' high-church party, although some were liberal Anglicans; most were 'rational
Christians', stressing the importance of the mind, reasoning and human potential
above faith, emotion and human sinfulness, but Evangelicals were also involved.
They supported the parliamentary Opposition Whigs, but while the link was
strengthened by bonds of friendship and obligation, it was strained by the suspicion
of the Friends of Peace that the liberalism of the Whig MPs was superficial. They
opposed the war from two main standpoints: on grounds of morality and religion
they opposed war in general, and they had specific ideological and practical
objections to this conflict against France in particular.87
Various supporters of Pitt joined the liberal protest against the war at one
point or another. William Smith has already been mentioned as one who changed to
consistent and ardent support of Fox because of the war, and the Duke of Grafton
did the same.88 William Wilberforce, the slave trade abolitionist, was a more
celebrated example. A close friend of Pitt, he refused to join the Foxites in their
given by the radical James Besey at Sandringham on 19 October 1795, in PRO HO 42/36/190-1;
Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics, p. 144.
87 Cookson, The Friends ofPeace, pp.1-3, 5, 14-15, 20. This section relies heavily on Cookson's
work.
88 See, for example, P.H., xxx, 1409-10, Grafton, 17 February 1794.
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condemnation of the causes of the war, but his antipathy to armed conflict in
general, and pressure on him as a renowned humanitarian, led him to call for
negotiations in 1795.89 Mitchell has written, in the context of the split of the Whig
party, that 'the issue of the war had so neatly divided up politics, that few politicians
would have the agility to leap from one side to the other'.90 Wilberforce was one of
those few. The end of 1795 brought a government pledge to seek negotiations
whenever it was consistent with British honour, and this, together with a conviction
that the responsibility for the failure of the 1796 and 1797 peace talks was French,
allowed him to support ministers again with a clear conscience, although he was,
unsurprisingly, accused of cowardice and inconsistency by other anti-war
protesters.91
To these 'Friends of Peace', men of liberal views, war was a power-game
between small ruling elites which brought no benefit to the mass of society which
might outweigh its horror and distress. Peace and harmony between nations were not
only desirable but entirely possible, if only governments would subjugate their own
ambitions to the furtherance of the good of their people. As Cookson remarks, the
Friends of Peace lived at a time when the brutality and misery of war had plumbed
new depths, yet they had a vision of a world without the 'sinful and hazardous
enterprise' of war.92 Christian arguments demonstrating that war was intrinsically
wrong were predominant in the anti-war protests, giving the Friends of Peace the
moral high ground in the debate. These were based firstly on fundamental Christian
beliefs, which Evangelicals tended to stress. As a God of love, God had commanded
men not to kill one another, but rather to love their enemies. War was directly
contrary to the order and harmony of His creation, and therefore unnatural in man,
showing him at his worst. To wage war was flagrantly to disobey God as well as a
cause of great suffering in human society. It might be used by God for purposes of
89 See P.H., xxxi, 1016, Wilberforce, 30 December 1794; ibid., xxxi, 1237, Wilberforce, 26 January
1795; ibid., xxxii, 1-9, Wilberforce, 27 May 1795. For pressure on him to vote against the war, see,
for example, R.I. and S. Wilberforce (eds.), The Correspondence of William Wilberforce (2 vols.:
London, 1840), i, 107-112, Stanhope toWilberforce, 5 December 1794;' Sonnet toW. Wilberforce',
in the Cambridge Intelligencer, 28 February 1795, printed in Bennett, War Poetry, p. 148. Jeremy
Bentham wrote to him in September 1796, suggesting that either he or Wilberforce should volunteer
to be sent to Paris to negotiate (R.I. and S. Wilberforce (eds.), Correspondence ofWilberforce, i, 139-
148).
90 Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, p.380; Mitchell, The Disintegration of the Whig Party, p.228.
91 See, for example, An Appeal to the Moral Feelings of Samuel Thornton, Rowland Burdon,
Hawkins Brown, Esq.rs, and to Every Member of the House of Commons who Conscientiously
Supports the Present Administration. In a Letter to William Wilberforce, Esq. (London, 1797), esp.
pp.38-9.
92 Cookson, The Friends of Peace, p.30; Archibald Bruce, A Serious View of the Remarkable
Providences of the Times: and a Warning as to the Public Sins, Dangers, and Duty of British
Protestants (Glasgow, 1795), p. 13.
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national judgement and chastening, but the correct response was not the continuation
of fighting, but the settlement of peace and the reform of the abuses in society which
had offended Him, such as the slave trade.93
Second, rational Dissenters usually emphasized arguments based on a
particular Christian view of the universe, using history and nature as well as biblical
exegesis. They argued that men lived in an ordered universe in which a benevolent
God was in complete control, and in which human society ought to progress
continually. As men's knowledge of the created universe extended further and
further, so also would they advance in virtue and happiness, since by means of their
powers of reason, they would understand what was good for them and what was not.
God Himself was actively intervening to assist the progress of good, and so evil
would eventually be eliminated by the cooperation of human reason and divine
wisdom. War was therefore an eradicable evil, however much its horrors pointed to
the contrary, and it would ultimately be rejected altogether by men.94 John Raithby
explained it thus:
There may be certain periods in the moral and physical existence of
the world, in which, from concurrent causes, opinion becomes
irresistible; and it is when, in such eventful periods, a momentary
policy is opposed to its gigantic progress, that the usual connection
between causes and effects seem to be disordered, and that the
politician, who has failed to develope those causes, is dismayed
and lost in the tremendous confusion.
The Rev. Vicesimus Knox, Master of Tunbridge School and Rector of Runwell and
Ramsden Crays, Essex, agreed that war retarded human progress and that, while it
was understandable in 'native barbarians', because of their lack of culture,
knowledge and religion, it was unacceptable that 'a state justly pretending to all the
polish of cultivated manners, and professing the purest Christianity' should wage
war—it was 'mischievous, flagitious, and detestable, without one alleviating
circumstance.'95
93 Cookson, The Friends ofPeace, pp.32-3.
94 Cookson, The Friends ofPeace, pp.5-6,31; Gilbert Wakefield, Remarks on the General Orders of
the Duke of York to his Army, on June 7, 1794 (London, 1794), pp. 19-20; Letter to Wilberforce,
pp.29-30.
95 John Raithby, Peace. Reasons Why Terms of Peace Should be Offered to the French Nation.
Addressed to the Inhabitants of Great Britain, through the Medium of their Representatives in
Parliament (London, 1795), p.66; Vicesimus Knox, Preface to ' Antipolemus; or, the Plea of Reason,
Religion, and Humanity, Against War. A Fragment; Translated from the Latin of Erasmus' (1795), in
Works (7 vols.: London, 1824), v, 417. See also Raithby, Peace, pp.55-6; Jasper Wilson [i.e. Dr.
James Currie], A Letter, Commercial and Political, Addressed to the Right Honourable William Pitt;
in which the Real Interests ofBritain, in the Present Crisis, are Considered, and Some Observations
are Offered on the General State of Europe (2nd edition: London, 1793), pp.67-9; Wakefield,
Remarks on the General Orders, pp.6-7, 31-3.
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While Evangelicals underlined the depravity of the human race and the long-
term need for improvement, and rational Christians stressed the corruption of the
powerful and the need for immediate reforms, both were agreed that war was a
social and moral evil which was fundamentally wrong. In its origins, wrote Raithby,
it was unjust, because it was founded in superior power; its progress was terrible,
stealing life; and its consequences were hateful, because they did not distinguish
vice from virtue.96 It was an offence against the moral universals of society which
linked the individual with the state, and the state with the international community.
The Friends of Peace emphasized the moral responsibilities of states and hoped that
international law would one day be instituted in the course of society's progress. Just
as individual murder had already become unacceptable to society, so the mass
murder of warfare would surely then become intolerable to the international
community.97 'How must a superior being pity or deride ants of the same ant-hill,
armed with weapons of death, and destroying each other by thousands and tens of
thousands, when separated by a straw or a puddle, in a dispute for a grain of wheat
or a particle of dust, with space enough around them for all, and in the midst of
abundance!' wrote Knox.98 Anti-war poetry stressed the misery of war and the
advantages (commercial, political and, above all, domestic) of peace.99
The liberals were opposed not only to war in general, however, but also to
this particular war, as unnecessary and unjust. Most admitted that, while aggressive
war was inexcusable, a nation had the right to act in self-defence, although even this
narrow definition of a 'just war' was rejected by some 'high' pacifists (including
many Quakers) who argued that no war was justifiable or lawful. Those who
allowed that defensive war could be justifiable rehearsed many of the same
96 Raithby, Peace, pp.8-9. See also Five Minutes Advice to the People of Great Britain, on the
Present Alarming Situation ofPublic Affairs: in which the good policy of immediate hostilities with
France is candidly investigated. By a Citizen ofLondon (London, 1792), p.6; A Speech, in which the
Question of a War with France is Stated and Examined. By a Lover of his Country (Birmingham,
1793), pp.iii-iv, 6-7; The Crisis Stated; or Serious and Seasonable Hints Upon War in General, and
Upon the Consequences of a War with France (Edinburgh, 1793), pp.4-5; J.H. Williams, Two
Sermons Preached on the Public Fasts ofApril 1793, and February 1794 (London, 1794), pp.33-64;
Considerations on the Principal Objections Against Overtures For Peace with France (London,
1795), pp. 1-2; 'Effects of War', in the Cambridge Intelligencer, 16 November 1793, printed in
Bennett, War Poetry, pp.96-7.
97 Cookson, The Friends ofPeace, pp.36-7.
98 Vicesimus Knox, 'The Prospect of Perpetual and Universal Peace to be Established on the
Principles of Christian Philanthropy' (1793), in Works, vi, 364.
99 'Ode toWar', in the Cambridge Intelligencer, 13 September 1794; the Watchman, (2 April 1796),
144-5; 'Poor Mary!', in the Monthly Mirror, (January 1798), 42; Thomas Adney, 'Sonnet', in the
European Magazine, (June 1800), 471; 'Peace Preferable to War', in ibid., (October 1793), 301;
'Peace More Desirable than War', in ibid., (October 1793), 301 (another translation from the Latin
from which the preceding poem was taken); 'Anticipation', in the Cambridge Intelligencer, 24
October 1795. These poems are all printed in Bennett, War Poetry, pp. 123-4, 174-5, 208, 248-9, 87,
90, 156-8, respectively.
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arguments as Foxite Whigs and radicals to demonstrate that the British war against
revolutionary France was not defensive, and that Britain and its allies were
perpetrating an unnecessary aggression on France.100 They also argued that it was
doubly criminal, since it was intended to thwart the progressivism of the French
Revolution both within France and throughout Europe.101 Britain's connection with
Europe was used to contend that war was undesirable, but liberals also insisted that
it was neither necessary nor beneficial that Britain should fight Europe's battles for
it. !°2
After the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte to power in 1799, it was less easy to
argue that the war was unjust, and anti-war arguments focused on the lack of
necessity for the continuation of the conflict, emphasizing that the issues on which
the 1796 and 1797 negotiations had foundered were different from the original
causes of the war. The State and Church establishments were attacked for hypocrisy
in waging and supporting the war: it was not really a war fought against opinions,
nor for national security, nor for the saving of Christianity in France (many did not
allow that the Roman Catholic French Court had been truly Christian in any case),
but, they claimed, one waged for selfish profit and wealth with immorality and
corruption. They condemned the use of the Church to reinforce government policy
by way of public days of fasting and thanksgiving.103
The liberals also reprobated what they perceived to be the unjust conduct of
the war by the British government. Gilbert Wakefield protested that British cruelty
and atrocity in prosecuting the war was worse than French violence, and that the
British government ought to remove the plank from its own eye before it sought to
remove the speck in the eye of the French government. The execution of one
individual (Louis XVI), he suggested, was hardly less terrible than Pitt's alleged
scheme to starve 25 million men, women and children by refusing to export British
corn to France. Another pamphleteer criticized the object he supposed the allies to
have of partitioning France, the encouragement of civil discord within France by
100 See Raithby, Peace, pp. 10-52,57-60; Five Minutes Advice, pp.9-16; A Speech, pp. 15-19;Wilson,
Letter to Pitt, pp.34-44; Wakefield, Remarks on the General Orders, p. 19; David Hartley, Argument
on the French Revolution (Bath, 1794), pp. 17-34.
101 The Crisis Stated, pp.7-9; Raithby, Peace, pp.40, 49-50; Hartley, Argument on the French
Revolution, pp. 14-16,35-9,43-5.
102 Raithby, Peace, pp.4, 6-7; P.H., xxxi, 1236, Wilberforce, 26 January 1795; ibid., xxxii, 8-9,
Wilberforce, 27 May 1795.
103 Knox, Preface to'Antipolemus', pp.419-22; idem., 'The Spirit of Despotism' (1795), in Works, v,
225; P.H., xxxiv, 1538-9, Smith, 28 February 1800; The Crisis Stated, p. 18; Williams, Two Sermons,
pp.v-viii, 1-29.
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Britain's support of the counter-revolutionary cause and the alleged forgery and
circulation of assignats within France by Pitt.104
The bad effects of the conflict on Britain were further adduced by Friends of
Peace to support their case against it. One of their principal arguments, chiefly since
it drew support from other quarters of the anti-war lobby, was that the war would
have a ruinous effect on the British economy. 'This country,' asserted the Duke of
Grafton in 1795, 'was so shaken that nothing but peace could restore it.' The conflict
impoverished honest merchants and industrious manufacturers, it overloaded the
community with taxation, it threatened the security of Britain's lucrative colonial
possessions and it aggravated the substantial inequality in the distribution of
property 'by enriching a race of harpies, contractors, commissaries and stock¬
jobbers' at the expense of what the liberals regarded as the virtuous, enterprising and
valuable middle classes of society. The flat rate of the 1799 Income Tax was
especially attacked for its failure to take any account of individual financial
circumstances, thus falling more heavily on the productive classes of society, rather
than upon the non-productive, ostentatious rich.105 Emsley reports that 'In
Nottingham the anti-war party took its stand almost entirely on economic grounds,
making practically no comment on the Revolution in France.'106 The Friends of
Peace also attacked the war for aggravating periods of 'scarcity' due to harvest
failure, since it was necessary to send a certain amount of grain to the army and
navy, and since the war disrupted the importation of foreign grain. They often failed
to match the chronology of price movements to their arguments, and their statistics
were often either faulty or insufficient, but they made good rhetorical capital from it.
'Let others talk of glory; let others celebrate the heroes, who are to deluge the world
with blood,' wrote William Frend; 'the words of the poor market woman will still
resound in my ears, We are sconced three-pence in the shilling, one-fourth part of
our labour. For what?'107
The war also vastly increased the National Debt and seriously unsettled
confidence in public credit, with greater repercussions than ever before, according to
liberals, because of the increased volume of British commerce, because of the fear
104Wakefield, Remarks on the General Orders, pp.8, 20-4; Letter to Wilber/orce, pp.30-5.
105 P.H., xxxii, 200-1, Grafton, 29 October 1795; Five Minutes Advice, 6-7, 18-19; Cookson, The
Friends of Peace, pp.75-83. See also A Speech, pp.7-8, 10-14; Knox, 'The Spirit of Despotism',
pp.213-5; The Crisis Stated, p. 14; R.I. and S. Wilberforce (eds.), Correspondence of Wilberforce, i,
95-99, Dr. James Currie toWilberforce, 23 April 1793.
106 Emsley, British Society and the French Wars, p.31.
107 William Frend, Peace and Union Recommended to the Associated Bodies of Republicans and
Anti-Republicans (2nd edition: Cambridge, 1793), appendix ii, pp.65-7; idem., Scarcity ofBread. A
Plan for Reducing the High Price of this Article, in a Letter Addressed by William Frend to William
Devaynes, Esq. (London, 1793), pp. 1-5; Cookson, The Friends ofPeace, pp.68-9.
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that France might actually attack Great Britain itself in this conflict, and because of
the alarm caused by the suspicion that numbers of Britons entertained pro-French
sympathies and might assist an invasion attempt.108 Domestic economic growth was
therefore retarded and economic stability threatened by an unproductive and
destructive use of both labour and capital, in this Smithian analysis. Economic
disaster was gloomily predicted by the liberals throughout the 1790s, until in 1801
work was published which convincingly demonstrated that Britain had achieved an
impressive rate of growth during the eighteenth century and was showing no signs of
economic collapse, even in the midst of an expensive war. Nevertheless, they
gathered support from industrial and trading interests in the north of England which
were badly hit by the effects of the war.109
Friends of Peace lamented the increase in the numbers of soldiers and sailors.
Knox maintained that 'the whole of the military system is much indebted for its
support to that prevailing passion of human nature, pride.' It encouraged the
ambition and vanity of members of the squirearchy, who became captains and bribed
volunteers to enlist in order to further their own careers of sycophancy. Wakefield
reminded his readers that the occupation of a soldier was largely made up of 'rapine,
blasphemy, blood, and carnage,' which was incompatible with a Christian's
profession. To Wilberforce, the involvement of so many of the population in
military life was 'a very serious evil, tending to hurt essentially the morals of the
people, and to detach them from the habits of civil life; and though no present
consequences might be felt, yet very material ones might, at some distance of time,
follow.'110 The system of recruiting by means of crimps and the press-gang was
naturally also deplored by them. William Frend forecast riots if the system was not
abolished, and Knox thought the practice little better than slavery, hiring and selling
'images of God... to do the work of butchers'.111
Cookson sees the expression of the grievances of a non-elite as the source of
the intensity of much anti-war argument.112 Like the Foxites and radicals, the
Friends of Peace attacked what they claimed was corruption in high places, but they
108 William Morgan, Facts Addressed to the Serious Attention of the People of Great Britain
Respecting the Expence of the War, and the State of the National Debt (London, 1796); [William
Roscoe], Thoughts on the Causes of the Present Failures (London, 1793); Wilson, Letter to Pitt,
pp. 1-32, 71-2.
109 Cookson, The Friends ofPeace, pp.55-64, 25-6.
110 Knox, 'The Spirit of Despotism', pp.250, 252; Wakefield, Remarks on the General Orders,
pp.29-30; P.H., xxxii, 6, Wilberforce, 27 May 1795.
111 Frend, Scarcity ofBread, p.6; Knox, 'The Spirit of Despotism', pp.202-3.
112 Cookson, The Friends ofPeace, pp.26-9, 151. The argument becomes increasingly clear in the
1803-15 phase of the conflict, when northern manufacturing interests were much more involved in
the anti-war campaign. See also Knox, 'The Spirit of Despotism', p.243.
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broadened it to include not only government ministers but also all within the
governing classes of society. Peace, they claimed, was not sincerely sought after by
these people, because the war was too profitable for them. 'Armaments, reviews,
drums, flags, crowds, and acclamations, are the hacknied stage-tricks employed to
cover a measure which will not bear a cool examination.' Knox suggested that they
were devoted to 'the preservation of their own power, nominal honours, and
pleasures, at all events, though it cost the poor citizen many of his comforts; and the
poor soldier his limbs or his life; and the public its security or its opulence', and that
their worship of fashionable pleasure left them with no time for public Christian
worship or motivation. He also attacked the government's repressive legislation and
their use of spies and military barracks around the country as an assault on civil
liberty.113 Dr. Currie (alias 'JasperWilson') was kinder to Pitt than most, applauding
his financial reforms and support for parliamentary reform and the abolition of the
slave trade in the 1780s, and attributing his present 'weaknesses and failures' to his
long duration in power. Others were inclined to side with the Foxites and radicals,
criticizing Pitt for his apparent abandonment of liberalism in an unprincipled pursuit
of power and self-aggrandizement.114
Liberals called, therefore, as many conservatives did, for a moral reformation
alongside peace. Wilberforce later wrote of Pitt, 'If only he had tried to "govern by
principle", he would have succeeded. And then the whole British body politic would
have been cleansed and strengthened. Even so great a cataclysm as the French
Revolution would have left it unshaken.'115 Branded unpatriotic for their refusal to
support the war, they insisted on a public right to challenge the government
concerning the justice and necessity of the conflict.116 William Roscoe, the Leeds
anti-war campaigner, wrote of a moral patriotism that differed from blind and ugly
bigotry:
Every pretended patriot, every proud and ignorant individual, can
cry out for war, and urge on his neighbour to the work of
destruction; but where is the man who will oppose himself to the
national madness?...He who would dare to attempt this is indeed a
patriot....The truth is, that a patriot must be a virtuous man, and a
113 The Crisis Stated, p.4-6; Knox, 'The Prospect of Perpetual and Universal Peace', pp.358-62;
idem., 'The Spirit of Despotism', pp.226-7. See also Knox, 'The Spirit of Despotism', pp. 139-403;
Raithby, Peace, pp.4-6; An Appeal to the Moral Feelings, pp.1-13; P.M., xxx, 1409-10, Grafton, 17
February 1794.
114Wilson, Letter to Pitt, pp.61-3; Cookson, The Friends ofPeace, pp.15-16, 147-150.
115 Quoted in Robin Blackburn, The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery: 1776-1848 (London, 1988),
p. 152. On peace and a moral reformation, see for example Knox, 'The Spirit of Despotism', p.258;
Raithby, Peace, p.54.
116 A Speech, p. 14; Raithby, Peace, pp.2-4,57; Five Minutes Advice, p.20; The Crisis Stated, pp. 14-
17,22-3.
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virtuous man will not commit or encourage injustice for the sake
either of himself or others.117
War was worse than the dangers of negotiation or peace. Britain could not
conquer France, it appeared, and it should therefore seek peace as soon as possible
instead of provoking the enemy to still greater wrath and vengeance. Peace would
also halt the progress in violence of the Revolution and allow France to stabilize and
become a valuable neighbour once again. Perhaps, suggested Wilberforce to the
House of Commons, after the suspicion that the allies wanted to divide France
among them was removed by an offer of negotiation with the French government,
the French people might become 'more and more alienated from their rulers, whilst
groaning under the calamities of a war continued by their obstinacy, and the
alienation would even extend to the convention itself', while the British government
could only increase in popularity with its own people. There was much more to lose
by continuing the war, and much less to gain, than by pursuing peace.118
Every opportunity should therefore be taken to negotiate peace. 'Is it
discussion of opinions we fear? and war the remedy!' exclaimed David Hartley of
Bath. 'The obvious imputation from such affectation of timidity, would be, a charge
of conscious deviations from the national interest, which the alarmists were anxious
from unostensible motives to conceal.' Wilberforce argued at the end of 1794 that
the worst of French Jacobinism was spent, and it should no longer be used as an
excuse for not negotiating. France was beginning to display signs of moderation
once more. 'He thought it a very important duty in every war,' he told the Commons
in May 1795,
not only to take care that in the commencement it was just and
necessary, but to look out also from time to time, for every opening
which might be given for the conclusion of it; to see whether the
original motives for it continued—whether our country, whether
that of the enemy, whether the state of other powers, and the
general circumstances of the times, made it still needful to pursue
the path we were treading.119
Even if the government of France was still unstable, that was no reason not to hold
talks with it. That was an argument morally false, according to Raithby, for it was an
117 Henry Roscoe, The Life of William Roscoe (London, 1833), pp.298-9, 431-3. See also Raithby,
Peace, pp.1,32-3.
118 Raithby, Peace, pp.74-6; Considerations on the Principal Objections, pp.4-18, 21-30; Wilson,
Letter to Pitt, pp.49-50; P.H., xxxi, 1025-6, Wilberforce, 30 December 1794. See also P.H., xxx, 453,
Smith, 18 February 1793.
119 Hartley, Argument on the French Revolution, pp.4-5; P.H., xxxi, 1016-7, Wilberforce, 30
December 1794; ibid., xxxiii, 2,Wilberforce, 27 May 1795.
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obvious pretext—Britain never considered the stability of the Turkish government
when treating with it, despite its permanent instability.
Hitherto we have been content with the usual idea of security in
making peace, that is, that neither party would break the treaty, till
[it] squared with their ideas of policy to do so. Now we are to be
satisfied with nothing short of abstract ideas of security, and have
the indecency to censure the French for perfidy, before we have a
single instance of it to produce.120
Another pamphleteer pointed out that if the French rulers had enough influence to
persuade their people to endure a war they disliked, they would surely be able to
persuade them to maintain peace.121 The dangers of risking the insecurity due to an
unstable French government were hardly as great as those involved in continuing the
war, argued Wilberforce. 'He was ready to allow that an extensive peace
establishment was a great evil; but surely it was speaking of it in too strong terms to
put it on a level with a state of actual war.'122 Continuing in an unjust and
unnecessary war was more humiliating than offering to negotiate.123
In any case, Friends of Peace argued, it was highly unlikely that a counter¬
revolution would be accomplished in France by war. British resources might be
great, but those of France, energized by its Revolution, were superior. The British
government must understand that the great majority of French people were
unwavering in their support for their republican form of government—not even the
executions of successive rulers had caused them to change their minds—and armed
force was impotent against such strength of opinion. Indeed, such opinion was likely
to grow only more stubborn in the face of attack, so that counter-revolution, if it was
possible under any circumstances, would only occur in peace. Madness was not to
be coerced by force but might be persuaded by mildness and indulgence.124 Success,
maintained William Smith in 1800, had eluded Britain: 'It was idle to consider how
many islands we had captured, or what new possessions we had acquired: the
question was, had we gained the object of the war? What that object was, it would
120 Raithby, Peace, pp.72-3.
121 Considerations on the Principal Objections, p.21.
122 P.PI., xxxi, 1023, Wilberforce, 30 December 1794.
123 Raithby, Peace, p.54; P.PI., xxxi, 1022, Wilberforce, 30 December 1794; ibid., xxxi , 1234,
Wilberforce, 26 January 1795.
124 Raithby, Peace, pp.61-4, 67, 74, 76; P.PI., xxxi, 1234-6, Wilberforce, 26 January 1795;
Considerations on the Principal Objections, p.v. See also Wilson, Letter to Pitt, pp.50-5; Wakefield,
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be no easy matter to determine, but whichever of the various objects that had been
stated was the true one, we were as far from it as when war was first declared.'125
While some Friends of Peace were inclined to believe that the French
Revolution was part of the general progression of the world towards enlightenment
and harmony, they did not sympathize with the French armies as did the Foxites and
radicals. Wilberforce was far from being a Foxite, although he sometimes joined
forces with them, and while he might have wanted peace with France he continued
to advocate war against Jacobinism at home. He opposed the withdrawal of British
troops from St. Domingo in 1797 because it would be ceding ground to French
republicanism in a war which the British government now appeared to be willing to
end. He also supported the government's decision in 1800 to refuse negotiations
with Bonaparte, if privately and reluctantly, because he thought it better to wait for
the result of the Austrian negotiations with him.126 Others protested their attachment
to the British political order, perhaps in an attempt to gain a better hearing for their
recommendations. One writer introduced his pamphlet with the explanation that
although he advised a policy of seeking peace with France,
he was not an admirer of French principles, or an approver of
French proceedings....On the contrary, he has contemplated with
almost uninterrupted disapprobation, every proceeding of the
French people since the month of July 1789, and every principle
from which those proceedings were deduced, or upon which they
have been defended.127
The Friends of Peace were also prominent in encouraging the Volunteer Corps at
the time of the 1798 invasion scare (and again in 1803-5), since they believed that
self-defence was wholly justified. They served in the Volunteers themselves, wrote
essays in their favour and preached sermons to them.128
The practical tactics of the Friends of Peace were those best adapted to
channelling the diverse strands of hostility to the war. One of the most successful
was the development of the concept of a 'war interest' and a 'war system'. It was an
all-purpose charge against the government under which various complaints and
interest groups could unite—Foxite Whigs, radicals (as they used anti-war protest in
their own campaign for political reform, so perhaps they themselves were used),
industrial and trading interests hard-hit by the conflict, Dissenters who thought
125 P.H., xxxv, 647, Smith, November 1800.
' 26 Blackburn, The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, pp.151, 153; R.I. and S. Wilberforce (eds.),
Correspondence ofWilberforce, i, 209-10,Wilberforce to J. Hare Naylor, 5 July 1800.
127 Considerations on the Principal Objections, p.iv. See also Five Minutes Advice, pp.3, 17-18.
128 Cookson, The Friends ofPeace, pp.163,166-9.
203
themselves unfairly ostracized from the ecclesiastical and political order and
ordinary people who wanted to protest against high prices and shortages of grain.
This was an adept way of focusing their various sectional grievances against the war
and the establishment.129 Town corporations (such as Norwich and Nottingham),
county meetings (such as those of Northumberland, Durham and Yorkshire) and
Dissenting and Methodist chapels which were sympathetic were harnessed to the
cause and used to propagate anti-war views.130 Anti-war chapels used national Fast
Days not to protest against the establishment by non-observance of them but rather
as a platform from which to voice anti-loyalist sympathies. This was 'the one war
ritual' which they could 'easily convert to their [own] purposes' without fear of
government repression.131 Public meetings were held, and occasionally the liberals
attempted to convert loyalist meetings to their views. Petitions for peace were
virtually impossible in the fervently loyalist atmosphere of the early years of the
decade, but they were organized in 1795, 1797, 1801, when there was greatest
discontent with the war. The Yorkshire petitions of 1801 gathered some 30 000
signatures.132
The liberal press, one of the most powerful weapons available to the Friends
of Peace, was also used to great effect. The Whig and radical London newspapers
and periodicals provided the basis of liberal pre-eminence in the press, and there
were dozens of liberal provincial papers and periodicals, including the Manchester
Herald, the Sheffield Register, the Leicester Herald and the Leeds Mercury. There
were many liberal and Dissenting printers, booksellers and publishers in the capital
and throughout the country, and there was a great wealth and breadth of talent and
intellect in the anti-war camp, with such writers as Thomas Erskine, Mrs. Barbauld,
Gilbert Wakefield and Henry Brougham. Letters and book reviews were published
in newspapers, and even cautious editors could be selective with material.133
With quiet persistence, the Friends of Peace began a campaign against the
war in the 1790s that would continue and develop greatly in the post-Amiens phase
of the conflict.134 They harnessed various political, religious and commercial groups
to their support whenever they could, including the political opposition groups of
Foxites in Parliament and radicals outside it. The hostility of both Foxites and
radicals to the war was largely instrumental, thinly veiling ulterior motives. By
129 Ibid., p.29.
130 Ibid., pp. 153
131 Ibid., p. 134.
132 Ibid., p. 190.
133 Ibid., pp.84-113, 131-4.
134 See ibid., pp,173ff.
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means of their religious and moral primary opposition to the war itself, however, and
their great skill in channelling many diverse protests against the Pitt administration
into an anti-war discourse, the Friends of Peace took the real leadership of the
campaign against the British government's war against revolutionary France.
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6. The Churches: Political Preaching, Patriotism and
Pacifism
Reacting against a previous relative neglect by historians of political thought in the
eighteenth century, J.C.D. Clark, Robert Hole and John Brims have recently
emphasized the continued importance of religion to the great majority of the British
people in the eighteenth century, and they have shown that religious arguments
contributed significantly to the political debates of the period. Nancy U. Murray's
work in particular demonstrates that English ministers of religion took a great interest
in the French Revolution and in its British repercussions, and that their reactions to it
played a part in the rise and fall in the influence of their different church
denominations.1 This chapter considers the theological-political responses to the war
of churchmen of different British denominations.
It has been shown in previous chapters that religious arguments were used by
laymen both to support and to oppose the British government's war against
revolutionary France. Conservative writers of the 1790s not only endlessly repeated
religious doctrines and reasoning enjoining submission and loyalty to the government,
'as a last, fine-meshed net to catch those who had eluded the looser weave of the
secular arguments',2 but they also justified the war in religious terms. Influenced by
Burke, by probably a majority of British clergymen, and later by the Abbe Barruel and
Professor John Robison, they argued that the atheist Republic posed a threat to the
institutions and teachings of religion in Britain and throughout Europe. While religion
was perhaps less used by radicals than by conservatives to validate their constitutional
theories, both radicals and Friends of Peace used religious arguments to oppose the
war, claiming that armed conflict was fundamentally in breach of the spirit and
teachings of Christianity; some, indeed, opposed it primarily because of their religious
convictions.
Religious polemic on the war was generally used by loyalist and pacifist
laymen in combination with political arguments and mostly in a supporting role. By
1 J.C.D. Clark, English Society 1688-1832: Ideology, Social Structure and Political Practice during
the Ancien Regime (Cambridge, 1985); idem., Revolution and Rebellion: State and Society in
England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Cambridge, 1986); Robert Hole, Pulpits,
Politics and Public Order in England, 1760-1832 (Cambridge, 1989); idem., 'English Sermons and
Tracts as Media of Debate on the French Revolution, 1789-99', in Philp (ed.), The French
Revolution and British Popular Politics, pp. 18-38; John Brims, 'The Covenanting Tradition and
Scottish Radicalism in the 1790s', in T. Brotherstone (ed.), Covenant, Charter and Party. Traditions
of revolt and protest in modern Scottish History (Aberdeen, 1989); Nancy U. Murray, 'The Influence
of the French Revolution on the Church of England and Its Rivals', unpublished D. Phil, thesis,
(University of Oxford, 1975). See also Emma Vincent, 'The Responses of Scottish Churchmen to the
French Revolution, 1789-1802', Scottish Historical Review, 73 (1994), 191-215.
2 Hole, Pulpits, Politics and Public Order, p. 101.
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contrast, sermons preached by churchmen on the subject of the conflict usually
emphasized a theological reading of the situation and made less attempt to persuade
their audiences with secular political reasoning. The theology and political theology,
of various colours, were not new, as the widespread use of them by lay writers
testifies; but the warfare of the 1790s, and the urgency and breadth of its impact upon
society, were unprecedented in British experience. It seems likely that ordinary local
ministers would have been more concerned with the war than with the French
Revolution itself (as distinct from the general issues of domestic loyalty and
submission which the Revolution highlighted). The diary of 'the Country Parson', the
Rev. James Woodforde, has much more to say about the practical effects of the war
on an ordinary churchman's life and work than it does about the Revolution, which
seems to have disturbed him greatly only in so far as it harmed the French King and
Queen.3 The war, indeed, affected almost everyone in the country, with its long
duration, its demands for human and material resources and its threat of a French
invasion.
Churchmen therefore rushed to apply well-established theological principles to
it and to lead their congregations and readerships in what they believed to be sound
Christian thinking and responses. Questions such as the moral and theological
justifications for war and patriotism were raised and answered, and eternal issues
were emphasized in the light of the cruelties of war. The nature of the conflict, and
such grounds for it as related to religious and moral issues, were discussed in terms of
a theological understanding of the nature of God and of man, and in terms of a
political theology of society, the State and the international community. The conduct
of the British government's war effort was rarely examined. As in the controversy on
the Revolution, so in the argument over the war: the responses of churchmen to the
war did not constitute a new debate on it, but simply another layer of national
discussion, another language of discourse.4 By appointing several Thanksgiving and
Fast Days each year to be nationally observed, the government displayed its concern
to benefit from both the propaganda potential of the vast network of loyalist preachers
across the country, and the public legitimation of the war which theology could
provide. This chapter examines the wide support given by the Established Churches
for the war and the varying opinions of Dissenting ministers, based on their political
theology and its application to the war, and the attitudes and actions this led them to
urge upon their congregations.
3 Hole, 'English Sermons and Tracts', p. 18; John Beresford (ed.), The Diary ofa Country Parson: the
Reverend James Woodforde, 1758-1802 (5 vols.: Oxford, 1924-31), iii, 124, 146, 280, 281, 396,
397-8; ibid., iv, 2-4, 12, 21-2.
4 Hole, Pulpits, Politics and Public Order, p.7; idem., 'English Sennons and Tracts', pp.30-1.
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I
The theology, political theology, and ecclesiastical and political concerns of
Established Church ministers in England and Scotland led most of them to accept the
inevitability of war in the present world and to support the British government in
fighting the present one against revolutionary France, and to call for religion, virtue,
loyalty, patriotism and endurance to be practised by the British people in response.
Liberals, Evangelicals and Methodists within the Established Churches, however,
were sometimes less vocal in their support, and a small minority expressed opposition
to the war.
The theological doctrine most important to the understanding of Establishment
ministers concerning the war against revolutionary France was probably that of divine
Providence, 'the firm and deep foundation of true religion'.5 God ruled over the
world, not remaining remote or aloof from its affairs, but intervening according to His
will and purposes. The Rev. Dr. Alexander Carlyle of Inveresk wrote in 1794: 'The
Almighty governs the world, not merely by general laws, but by constant
superintendence and frequent interposition', and he illustrated this from the history of
the Jews and of Christianity.6 As for the nature of man, most Establishment preachers
emphasized his fallen condition. He had been created in the image of God, and so
given high dignity; but man's refusal to submit to God and His demands had marred
God's image in him and made him capable of gross sin. Sin was 'the cause of all
national evils, and if persisted in by any people, will provoke the Almighty to cause
his soul to depart from them,'7 Because God was actively interested in and intervened
in human affairs, it was natural that rebellion against Him should result in
chastisement. In the case of nations, this usually came in such forms as weak and
unstable government, irreligion, economic depression and war.8 National repentance
5 Charles Moss, A Sermon, Preached Before the Honourable House of Commons, at the Church of
St. Margaret, Westminster, on Wednesday, March 7, 1798, Being the Day appointed by His
Majesty's Royal Proclamation, to be observed as a Day ofSolemn Fasting andHumiliation (London,
1798), p.7.
6 Alexander Carlyle, National Depravity the Cause ofNational Calamities, a sermon from Jeremiah
6:8 (Edinburgh, 1794), p.3. See also Thomas Hay, A Sermon Preached Before the Honourable House
of Commons, at St. Margaret's, Westminster, on Thursday, January 30, 1794: Being the day
appointed to be observed as the Day of the Martyrdom ofKing Charles I (London, 1794), pp. 15-16;
A Sermon, Composed for the Late General Fast, Observed on the Eighth of March, 1797. By a
Minister of the Church ofEngland (London, 1797), pp.2-6; William Magee, A Sermon, Preached in
the Chapel of Trinity College, Dublin, on Thursday, the 16th day ofFebruary, 1797, Being the Day
Appointedfor a National Thanksgiving on Account of the Providential Deliverance of this Kingdom
from the Late Threatened Invasion (Dublin, 1797), pp.5-13; Richard Valpy, A Sermon, Preached
August 13,1798, Before the Reading and Henley Associators, the Woodley Cavalry, and the Reading
Volunteers, at the Consecration of the Colors of the Reading Association (Reading, 1798), pp.5-6.
7 Hole, 'English Sermons and Tracts', p.33; quotation from Carlyle, National Depravity, p.9.
8 Alexander Carlyle, The Love of Our Country, explained and enforced in a sermon from Psalm
137:5,6 (Edinburgh, 1797), p. 14.
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in such dark times was not only possible, but necessary, in order to regain God's
favour. Texts such as Jeremiah 18:8 were quoted: 'If that nation, against whom I have
pronounced, turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil that I thought to do unto
them.'9
War in general was defended on two counts by Establishment clergy. Firstly,
it was simply a fact of life after the Fall. Wars would not 'cease in all the earth' until
the second coming of Christ; they were part of the general suffering and misery of
human life caused by sin, and they could not be eradicated until sinful human beings
were no more and the new heaven and the new earth were established.10 Second,
while some wars were waged from 'a variety of sinister and unrighteous motives',
others, particularly those undertaken in self-defence, were just and necessary, and
Christians need feel no shame for being involved in them.11 'God not only gave us
life and property,' argued William Vincent,
but implanted courage in our breast, as well as other qualities of the
mind; and if our life or property is in danger, we have the same right
to defend them against the enemy who would kill us, as against the
wild beast which would devour us....I am persuaded no command
of God forbids, no precept of the Gospel condemns, military service
in the cause of justice.12
Since God was active in society, religion was essential in order to please Him
and to ensure the social and political well-being of any state. Moreover, as 'the great
cement of society', religion could go further than the law, reaching men's inward
thoughts as well as their outward actions, restraining the wicked and encouraging the
9 John Erskine, The Fatal Consequences and General Sources ofAnarchy: a discourse on Isaiah 24:1-
5 (Edinburgh, 1793), pp.41-2; Thomas Hardy, Fidelity to the British Constitution, the duty and
interest of the people (Edinburgh, 1794), p.36.
10 Valpy, Sermon Before the Reading and Henley Associations, p.4; William Agutter, The Faithful
Soldier and the True Christian; and the Miseries ofRebellion: Considered in Two Sermons, Preached
at the Parish Church ofAll-Saints, Northampton, September 9th, 1798 (Northampton, 1798), p.8.
11 John Hampson, Observations on the Present War, the Projected Invasion, and a Decree of the
National Convention for the Emancipation of the Slaves in the French Colonies (Sunderland, [1793]),
pp.5-6. See also J. Morgan, A Sermon Preached in the Parish Church of Towcester, on Thursday,
29th November, 1798, the Day Appointed by His Majesty, to Return Thanks to Almighty God, for
our Recent and Important Successes in Distant Seas and Elsewhere (Towcester, 1798), pp.29-30;
Thomas Home, A Sermon, Preached Before the ChiswickMilitary Association, on Sunday, Sept. 2,
1798 (London, 1798), pp.3-6.
12 William Vincent, 'A Sermon Delivered in the Church of St. Magnus, London Bridge, November
25; and in the Church of Allhallows the Great and the Less, Thames Street, December 16, 1798;
Before the Associated Volunteer Companies, in the Wards of Bridge, Candlewick, and Dowgate', in
Sermons on Faith, Doctrines, and Public Duties (2 vols.: London, 1817), i, 290-1. See also Samuel
Horsley's charge to his diocesan clergy of Rochester in 1798, quoted in Hole, Pulpits, Politics and
Public Order, p. 170.
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good. Human nature was so corrupt that government alone was unable to restrain it.13
'When men agree to cast off the fear of God, they will seldom long accord in any
thing else,' warned John Newton. The Rev. Dr. Thomas Somerville of Jedburgh
stated that 'without religion...no civil government can be maintained or supported'.14
Preachers therefore thought themselves justified in discussing political subjects
from the pulpit. Robert Hole remarks that 'Most agreed in practice that, whilst it was
improper for their political opponents to do so, their own views were so
quintessentially truthful they were not out of place.' Richard Watson, Bishop of
Llandaff, told the clergy of his diocese in 1798 that it was necessary for them to
beware of 'wicked Teachers, who are creeping in among the common people, and
attempting, by profane writings and evil communications, to unchristianize the
world'. Some bishops voiced concern at the numbers of non-resident clergy in their
dioceses, and the consequent loss of sound political influence in the parishes
concerned.15 The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland regularly assured the
King of its clergy's undeviating perseverance in their exertions to preserve sound
doctrine and to advance genuine piety, for the benefit of public order. Even those,
such as the Evangelical, John Erskine, who acknowledged that ministers did not have
the detailed facts necessary to advise politicians, insisted that they should emphasize
'3 Carlyle, Love of Our Country, p.23; J.E. Bradley, Church, Clergy and Counter-Revolution in
England, 1789-1800 (a paper presented at the annual conference of the American Society for
Eighteenth-Century Studies at New Orleans in April 1989), p. 11. See also Thomas Hay, A Sermon
Preached Before the Honourable House ofCommons, at St. Margaret's, Westminster, on Wednesday,
January 30, 1793: Being the day appointed as the Day of the Martyrdom ofKing Charles I (London,
1793), p. 12; idem., Sermon...on ...Thursday, January 30, 1794, pp. 17-19; William Knox, A
Sermon, Preached Before His Excellency the Lord Lieutenant, on Thursday the 29th November, 1798,
Being the Day Appointed for a General Thanksgiving to Almighty God (Dublin, 1798), pp. 10-12;
Hole, Pulpits, Politics and Public Order, pp. 134-5, 137.
14 John Newton, Motives to Humiliation and Praise. A Sermon, Preached in the Parish Church of
St. Mary Woolnoth, Lombard-Street, on December 19, 1797. The Day of General Thanksgiving to
Almighty God, for Our Late Naval Victories(Londoi\, 1798), p. 16; Thomas Somerville, The Effects
of the French Revolution (Edinburgh, 1793), p.89. See also Thomas Hardy, The Importance of
Religion to National Prosperity (Edinburgh, 1794), p. 12; Spencer Madan, A Sermon Preached Before
the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, in the Abbey Church ofWestminster, on January the 30th, 1795,
Being the day appointed to be observed as the day of the Martyrdom of King Charles I (London,
1795), pp. 18-19; William Laurence Brown, The Influence of Religion on National Prosperity. A
Sermon, Preached in the West Church, Aberdeen, March 10th, 1796. The Day Appointed for the
General Fast (Edinburgh, 1796), pp.5-38; idem., 'A View of the Present Times, with Regard to
Religion and Morals', appendix to John Leland, A View of the Principal Deistical Writers that have
appeared in England in the last and present century (5th edition, 2 vols.: London, 1798), ii, 498-506;
Vicesimus Knox, 'The Spirit of Despotism', p.384.
13 Hole, Pulpits, Politics and Public Order , p.145; Richard Watson, 'A Charge Delivered to the
Clergy of the Diocese of Landaff, in June 1798', in Miscellaneous Tracts on Religious, Political, and
Agricultural Subjects (2 vols.: London, 1815), i, 148-52, 134-5. On non-residency, see Dropmore,
iv, 55-6, Charles M. Warburton to [the Marquis of Buckingham], 12 January 1798; ibid., vi, 6,
Grenville to Pitt, 4 November 1799, on a letter to Grenville from the Bishop of Lincoln. See also the
loyal address of the bishop and clergy of London andWestminster printed in the London Gazette, 10-
12 July 1792, and that of the archbishop and clergy of the archdiocese of Canterbury in ibid., 14-17
July 1792.
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the general maxims of virtue and prudence which ought to guide the actions of
politicians.16 Such political preaching was held to be especially necessary at a time of
national emergency or when the King appointed special Thanksgiving and Fast Days
to be observed nationwide.17
Establishment ministers were influenced not only by these theological and
political-theological positions, however, but also by three current fears that they held
concerning Church and State. Like other conservatives in the 1790s they were fearful
of political insurrection and domestic anarchy, and they believed that it was better to
err on the side of caution, repressing anything which might lead to the subversion of
law and authority and clinging to the emblems and products of civilization as they
knew it. Since man was fallen and imperfect, restraint was necessary. Hole shows
that discussion of various forms of government and legitimate means of changing a
government disappeared from political-theological discourse very quickly after the
French Revolution erupted and were replaced by a greater emphasis on order and
control.18
Second, they were anxious that the relationship of Church and State might
change at the expense of the influence of the Established Church. The Dissenters'
unsuccessful campaign in 1787-90 to have the Test and Corporation Acts repealed,
and full toleration granted, nevertheless called into question the relationship of the
Church of England with the State. Murray comments that the triumph of the
Established Church was by no means a foregone conclusion in 1787: the second
House of Commons vote on repeal, in 1789, lost by only twenty votes. The fears
inspired by the French Revolution among the landed interest achieved a defeat for
repeal of 294 votes to 105 in 1790, but the Anglican clergy could not know how long
such support for them would last, and they were thus encouraged to support the
government loudly throughout the 1790s to prove their crucial importance to it.19 The
Church of Scotland was legally independent of the State, unlike the Established
Church of England, but the Moderate party in the Kirk, dominant in the General
Assembly for so much of the eighteenth century, was increasingly feeling the heat of
16 See, for example, the Assembly's 'Answers to the King's Letters' in The Principal Acts of the
General Assembly of the Church of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1798, 1799); John Erskine, Fatal
Consequences, pp. 10-11. See also Robert Boucher Nickolls, The Duty ofSupporting and Defending
Our Country and Constitution: A Discourse, preached at Middleham, in the County of York,
February 10, 1793, On the Prospect ofa War (York, 1793), p.i.
17 W.L. Brown, The Spirit of the Times Considered. A Sermon, Preached in the English Church at
Utrecht, February 13, 1793, the Day Appointed by the States for the General Thanksgiving, Fasting
and Prayer (London, 1793), pp. 10-11; idem., 'A View of the Present Times', pp.473-4; P.H., xxxi,
1257, the Bishop of Llandaff, 27 January 1795. See also Carlyle, Love ofOur Country, p.2; Andrew
Hunter, A Due Attention to the Public lnsitutions ofReligion Recommended (Edinburgh, 1793).
18 Hole, Pulpits, Politics and Public Order, p.97, 128 and passim.
19 Murray, 'The Influence of the French Revolution', pp.21-2,310.
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the Evangelical (or 'Popular') attack and advance, and they felt justified in looking for
government assistance in return for their public support of the government.20
Third, ministers feared for the acceptance of Christian theology itself
throughout British society. The rationalism and deism of Enlightenment philosophy
seemed to be at the root of the dislocation in France, and the Revolution's atheism and
confidence in man's inherent reason, virtue and perfectibility directly challenged
Christian belief. 'The contest, in the present day,' wrote William Laurence Brown, 'is
not between one particular form of religion and another, but between the existence of
any religion whatever, and the total extirpation of it'.21 Many believed that political
reform and religious free-thinking went hand-in-hand; overt worship of reason in
Paris and Paine's blasphemous attacks on Christianity drew the cry of 'the Church in
danger', rallying even Evangelicals within the Establishment.
These fears, combined with the political theology of Establishment
churchmen, determined their views on the French Revolution, on loyalty to the
government and on the war. Many churchmen did not condemn the Revolution
immediately: like many others in Britain, they underwent a tidal change in their
attitudes towards it. William Robertson, Moderator of the General Assembly from
1762-80, at first denounced Burke's Reflections as 'ravings', and Thomas Somerville
called them 'the ranting declarations of aristocratic pride'.22 Thomas Hardy wrote of
the Scottish ministers' initial response to the Revolution: 'We saw a great people
reclaiming the inheritance of men, and boldly aspiring to be free.'23 Their idea of 'the
inheritance of men' was substantially more limited than that of the radicals, however,
and, for this reason, they did not think themselves inconsistent when they changed,
around 1792, to denounce what the Revolution had become. By then it could no
longer be regarded as moving towards a moderate, constitutional monarchy as many
of them had hoped.24 Others were happy to assume that the Revolution was divine
retribution for the French having taken the American side in the War of
Independence,25 while others still reacted with hostility almost immediately. William
Jones, the curate at Nayland, Suffolk, famous for his 'John Bull' letters of 1792,
denounced the French Revolution publicly in 1789, as did George Home, the Dean of
20 See BMC 8357, John Kay, 'Faithful Service Rewarded' (1793).
21 Hole, 'English Sermons and Tracts', pp.29-30, 35; idem., Pulpits, Politics and Public Order,
pp. 143-4; Brown, 'A View of the Present Times', p.492. See also Brown, ibid., pp.473-4.
22 Quoted in J.D. Brims, 'The Scottish Democratic Movement in the Age of the French Revolution',
unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Edinburgh, 1983), pp.75, 59.
23 Thomas Hardy, The Patriot (Edinburgh, 1793), p.4. On England, see Hole, Pulpits, Politics and
Public Order, p.99.
24 Somerville, Effects of the French Revolution, pp. 1-7, 13.
25 Murray, 'The Influence of the French Revolution', pp.26-7.
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Canterbury Cathedral. Bishops Samuel Horsley and Beilby Porteous privately
recorded their antipathy in early 1790.26 From late 1792 onwards, however,
Establishment clergy were largely united in their condemnation of the Revolution for
its violent overthrow of Church and State, and for its assault on public and private
morality.27
Given their fear of popular disorder and revolt, their anxiety concerning
Church-State relations and their condemnation of the theories and practices of the
French Revolution, Establishment churchmen were largely loyal to the government.
'From what I can learn,' Dundas told Pitt in 1794, 'the [Scottish] clergy with very
few exceptions are all right in their dispositions.'28 Resolutions and addresses were
passed throughout Britain at the national, presbytery or diocesan, and parish levels;29
loyalty was preached; and radical tendencies among parishioners were checked if
possible. Preachers defended not only the British constitution but also the current
26 Hole, 'English Sermons and Tracts', p.19; idem., Pulpits, Politics and Public Order, pp.161-2.
27 See, for instance, Hampson, Observations on the Present War, pp.27-9; [Robert Nares], A Short
Account of the Character and Reign ofLouis XVI (London, 1793), p. 17; Samuel Horsley, A Sermon,
Preached Before the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, in the Abbey Church ofSt. Peter, Westminster, on
Wednesday, January 30, 1793: Being the Anniversary of the Martyrdom of King Charles the First.
With an Appendix Concerning the Political Principles ofCalvin (2nd edition: London, 1793), pp.22-
5; Edward Vernon, A Sermon Preached Before the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in the Abbey Church
ofSt. Peter, Westminster, on Thursday, 30 January, 1794, Being The Anniversary of the Martyrdom
ofKing Charles the First (London, 1794); Brown, 'A View of the Present Times', pp.475-8; Watson,
'Charge to the Clergy of Llandaff', pp.143-4; Henry Gabell, A Discourse Delivered on the Fast-Day
in February 1799, in the Church ofSt. Lawrence, Winchester (2nd edition: London, 1799), pp.5-24;
William Vincent, 'A Sermon Preached Before the Honourable House of Commons, at the Church of
St. Margaret, Westminster, on Tuesday, June 1, 1802, Being the Day Appointed for a General
Thanksgiving', in Sermons on Faith, Doctrines, and Public Duties (2 vols.: London, 1817), i, 328-
33.
28 Chatham Papers, PRO 30/8/157/1/144, quoted in Pry, The Dundas Despotism, p. 179. See also
Richard Munkhouse, A Sermon, Preached in the Church ofSt. John Baptist, Wakefield, on Thursday,
November 29th, 1798; Being the Day Appointed for a General Thanksgiving to Almighty God
(London, 1799), pp.28-30.
29 See those from the clergy of Leeds, Aberbrotheck (Arbroath), Penport, Oxford, London and
Westminster, Glasgow, Gloucester, Bangor, Hereford, Dorchester, Dundee, Horsham, Canterbury,
York, Bath and Wells, St. Asaph, Worcester, Carlisle, Bristol, St. David, Lichfield and Coventry,
Peterborough, Llandaff, Rochester, Fordoun, Lincoln, Southwell, Hamilton, Ely, Norwich,
Cleveland, Salisbury, Dingwall, Durham, Hull and the East Riding, Chester, St. Andrews, in the
London Gazette for July - August 1792. In 1793, also in the London Gazette, the following bodies of
clergy are recorded as having sent loyal addresses: the presbyteries of Deer, Duns, Elgin, Lauder and
the General Assembly. After the attack on the King on 29 October 1795, loyal addresses were received
from Establishment clergy in Glasgow, St. Andrews, Paisley, Dundee, Lichfield Cathedral, the
Church of St. Peter (Westminster), Dunblane, Perth, Aberdeen, Irvine, Turriff, Wigton, Lanark,
Hamilton, Dunfermline, Lauder, Kirkcaldy, Worcester, Hereford, Ely, Bangor, York, Bristol,
Rochester, Winchester, St. David's, Chester, Ayr, Fordyce, Fordoun, Dunkeld, Tain, Carlisle,
Peterborough, Chichester, Gloucester, Llandaff, Selkirk, Inverness, Stirling, Strathbogie and
Stranraer. In 1796: St. Asaph, Bath andWells, Durham, Exeter, Aberbrotheck (Arbroath), Cupar and
Forfar. In 1800: the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, Lichfield, London and
Westminster, York, Canterbury, Ely, Bristol, Durham, Cleveland, Peterborough, Chichester,
Hereford, Llandaff, Exeter, Gloucester, Rochester, St. Asaph, Winchester, Bath and Wells, Worcester,
Bangor, St. Davids, Norwich, the East Riding, Salisbury, Chester and Lincoln.
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administration and its policies, and they argued that political reform might well be
possible later, at a more opportune time, so benevolent and virtuous was the present
government.
The war against revolutionary France was interpreted by Establishment
churchmen from both Burkean and purely theological standpoints. Burke's writings
greatly influenced the view which saw the French Revolution as particularly
concerned to destroy religion and ecclesiastical institutions and, thereby, all social
restraint and public order.30 Most of the rest of Burke's analysis was also accepted.
The French revolutionaries were described as inherently evil men ('enthusiasts in
wickedness', Dr. Thomas Home insisted), propagating principles destructive of all
civilization and harmony.31 The conflict was therefore ideological in nature. Britain
was fighting to defend all right and just principles of religion, society and
government. It was, said Robert Nares, 'a War to assert your Right to do your Duty,
and obey the Will of God.'32 Most Establishment ministers had little difficulty in
arguing that it was a just and necessary war: it had been undertaken in self-defence
against revolutionary armies with a mission to subvert all order, government, religion
and property in Britain and throughout Europe by force.33 The General Assembly
regularly declared to the King their 'full approbation of this necessary exertion of
30 Hole, Pulpits, Politics and Public Order, p. 151-2.
31 Home, Sermon Before the Chiswick Military Association, p.7. See also Hampson, Observations
on the Present War, pp. 10-11, 58-60; idem., A Sermon Preached in St. John's Chapel, Sunderland,
on Friday, April 19, 1793, Being the Day Appointedfor a General Fast (Sunderland, 1793), pp. 11-12;
Nickolls, The Duty ofSupporting and Defending Our Country and Constitution, pp.i-ix, 6-12; John
Owen, Righteous Judgement. A Sermon Preached in the University Church of Great St. Mary's,
before the Hon. Sir W. Ashurst, Knt. on the 11th March 1794, Being the Day ofAssize (Cambridge,
1794), pp. 16-17; Thomas Rennell, Principles of French Republicanism essentially founded on
Violence and Blood-Guiltiness, A Sermon, preached on Sunday, the 26th October, 1793, in the
Cathedral Church ofWinchester, Occasioned by the Murder ofHer Most Christian Majesty (Winton,
1793), p.27; Brown, 'The Spirit of the Times Considered', pp. 18-23.
32 Robert Nares, Man's Best Right: A Solemn Appeal in the Name of Religion (London, 1793),
pp.45-7. See also Vincent, 'Sermon on June 1, 1802, for a General Thanksgiving', pp.326-7;
Munkhouse, Sermon on November 29th, 1798, for a General Thanksgiving, pp.46-7.
33 Hampson, Observations on the Present War, pp.6-9, 15-16, 36-41; idem., Sermon on April 19,
1793, for a General Fast, pp.12-13, 15-16; Nickolls, The Duty of Supporting and Defending our
Country and Constitution, dedication, p.30; William Jackson, A Sermon, Preached Before the
Honourable Society ofLincoln's Inn, on Wednesday, February 25,1795; Being theDay appointed by
His Majesty's Proclamation for a General Fast (Oxford, 1795), pp.6-8; Moss, Fast Sermon Before the
House of Commons, pp.21-2; Valpy, Sermon Before the Reading and Henley Associations, pp.22-5;
Samuel Clapham, A Sermon, Preached at Great Ouseborne, on Tuesday, the 19th ofDecember, 1797,
Being the Day Appointed by His Majesty for a General Thanksgiving, to Almighty God, for our
Naval Victories (Leeds, 1798), pp.8-22; J. Gardiner, A Sermon Delivered at the Octagon Chapel,
Bath, on Thursday, Nov. 29, 1798, Being the Day Appointed for a General Thanksgiving (Bath,
1798), pp.12-13; David Rivers, Thoughts on the Necessity of Prosecuting the War with France with
Vigour and Energy: With Remarks on the Scarcity ofProvisions, and Particularly Bread. In a Letter
to a Friend (London, 1800), pp.8-15; Vincent, 'Sermon Before the Associated Volunteer Companies';
P.H., xxxi, 1279, the Bishop of Durham, 27 January 1795. See also Hole, Pulpits, Politics and
Public Order, pp. 149-50.
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public force'. Richard Watson, who, as late as 1795, was voicing doubts in the
House of Lords concerning the justification for the war, published his view in 1798
that, since the French had refused to make peace in 1796 and 1797, their threat
towards Britain had been made plain and the war had become just and unavoidable.34
Preachers called also, however, for reflection and meditation on current affairs
in the light of Scripture, for a proper discernment of 'the signs of the times'. It was
important, insisted William Jackson, to learn 'not from the imaginations of our own
hearts, but from the word of God, the fit estimates which humility and piety will lead
us to make', concerning European events.35The opposition was often described in
terms of spiritual enmity, the embodiment of hostility and evil, against which only
steady virtue and faithfulness could prevail.36 The Rev. J. Clowes, rector of St.
John's Church, Manchester, urged upon his congregation the importance of
recognizing the truth and reality of the world invisible: 'Thus the destruction which
now threatens us, is a double destruction; it is the destruction both of our bodies and
of our souls...For it is a contest of the folly which rejects a GOD, against the wisdom
which acknowledges him...'.37 Many subscribed to the conspiracy theory first hinted
at by Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France in 1790 and developed by the
Abbe Barruel and by Professor John Robison of Edinburgh University in 1797, of the
French Revolution having been hatched by continental philosophers plotting against
the Christian religion. Bishop Randolph of Oxford, according to Robert Hole, 'was
exceptional among the establishment in being somewhat sceptical about it.'38 Some,
34 'Address to His Majesty on the subject of the present War' (1794) in the Acts of the General
Assembly (Edinburgh); P.H., xxxi, 1258, Watson, 27 January 1795; Richard Watson, An Address to
the People ofGreat Britain (London, 1798), p.l 1.
35 Jackson, Sermon Before the Honourable Society of Lincoln's Inn, p.5. See also Owen, Righteous
Judgement, pp.18-19, 23-5; Brown, The Spirit of the Times Considered.
36 Compare Ephesians 6:12: 'For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities,
against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high
places.'
37 J. Clowes, The Protection-Mark, or a View of the Principles Most Conducive to National and
Individual Security, at this Most Important Crisis, Considered in a Sermon Preached at St. John's
Church, Manchester, on Wednesday the 27th ofFebruary, Being the Day Appointedfor a Public Fast
(Manchester, 1799), pp.7-10. See also William Agutter, Observations on the General Fast of the Year
1796 (London, 1796), p. 12; Weeden Butler, Philanthropy, Religion, and Loyalty, the Best
Characteristicks ofa Christian Soldier. A Sermon, Addressed to the Armed Association of the Parish
ofSaint Luke, Chelsea, and to the Inhabitants at Large, on Sunday, 8th July 1798 (London, 1798),
pp. 10-18.
38 See John Robison, Proofs ofa Conspiracy Against all the Religions and Governments ofEurope,
Carried on in the Secret Meetings ofFree Masons, Illuminati, and Reading Societies—collectedfrom
good authorities (Edinburgh, 1797); Hole, Pulpits, Politics and Public Order, p. 154. See also, for
instance, James Thompson, The Rise, Progress, and Consequences of the New Opinions and
Principles Lately Introduced into France, with Observations (Edinburgh, 1799); Watson, Address to
the People ofGreat Britain, p.27.
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displaying a degree of paranoia, thought that the Dissenters and Methodists were also
participants, for the sake of destroying the power of the Established Churches.39
The doctrine of Providence was applied to the war by almost every sermon
preached on it. 'I am grieved to observe,' wrote the Rev. Thomas Robinson, 'that the
attention of many is fixed only on second causes; as if the War ought not to be
considered in the light of a dispensation from God, since it may have originated from
the wrong administration of our public affairs.'40 The conflict had begun and would
only end at the instance of God. Charles Moss explained that human passions often
required strong and painful correctives, which were applied by the Providence of God
to save individuals and nations from self-inflicted ruin.41 'Methinks all Europe, or
what we call Christendom, is a great Augean stable,' John Newton wrote to William
Wilberforce. 'God has sent His scavengers into it; and when they have performed the
dirty work according to His will, He will let them know that while they thought they
were only pleasing themselves, they were doing what He appointed to be done.'42
Furthermore, God controlled not only the beginning and end of the conflict, but also
its procedure. The Form of Prayer appointed for the Fast Day on 8 March 1797,
acknowledging the defeat by stormy weather of the French attempt to invade Ireland,
thanked Him for 'what appears to us a Providential Interference—when the Winds
and Storms, fulfilling Thy Word, dissipated that mighty Armament, which threatened
the Peace of our Sister Kingdom' ,43
It was a short step from this to claim that God was on Britain's side. 'In thy
name we wish to set up the banners, which we now solemnly dedicate to thy service
and to thy glory,' prayed Richard Valpy, in his capacity as chaplain to various loyal
associations and cavalry and Volunteer corps in Reading. 'Should the enemy assail
our country, O strengthen us with thy divine influence. Go before our hosts in a pillar
39 Murray, 'The Influence of the French Revolution', pp.58-9, 75-6; Hole, Pulpits, Politics and
Public Order, pp. 170-2.
40 Thomas Robinson, A Serious Exhortation to the Inhabitants ofGreat Britain with Reference to
the Approaching Fast (first published Leicester, 1795; this edition, Edinburgh, 1797), p. 10. See also
Newton, Motives to Humiliation and Praise, pp.7,27-35; A Sermon, Composedfor the Late General
Fast, pp. 1-7; Brown, 'A View of the Present Times', p.480.
41 Moss, Fast Sermon Before the House of Commons, p. 11. See also Jackson, Sermon Before the
Honourable Society of Lincoln's Inn, pp.9-11; Rivers, Thoughts on the Necessity of Proscuting the
War with Vigour, p.8; Hay, Sermon Before the House of Commons (1794), pp.29-30.
42 Magee, Sermon in the Chapel of Trinity College, Dublin, pp. 14-15; R.I. and S. Wilberforce
(eds.), The Correspondence of William Wilberforce (2 vols.: London, 1840) i, 158, Newton to
Wilberforce, 21 April 1797.
43 A Form of Prayer To Be Used In all Churches and Chapels...upon...the Eighth of March next,
being the Day appointed by Proclamation for a General FAST and Humiliation before Almighty God
(London, 1797), p.9.
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of cloud by day, and by night in a pillar of fire.'44 Many saw Britain as the new
Israel, God's favoured nation. The Rev. John Hampson of Sunderland, preaching on
the reign of good King Hezekiah, a time when Israel was threatened by the ferocious
Assyrian troops of Sennacherib, asked his congregation:
Is there any man so blind as not to perceive the parallel? or can
anything be more congenial than the language of this blasphemous
Assyrian and that of our modern Reformers upon the Continent?
Judea was invaded in the reign of one of its best princes, and in the
moment of its prosperity. This Country was never more wisely and
mildly governed, nor was it ever so prosperous as on the eve of the
present war.45
The identification of Britain with Old Testament Israel was also taken seriously, at
least as a tool of propaganda, by the highest religious and secular authorities. When
George III went to St. Paul's Cathedral in December 1797 to offer thanks for the
naval victories gained by the British fleet, the parallel was made visual. Military
banners captured from the defeated French were brought to the Cathedral by the King
to testify to God's goodness to Britain in direct imitation of David, King of Israel,
who had once laid the spoils of his victories before the Lord in the Temple at
Jerusalem.46
Many Establishment ministers believed that the Providential purpose of the
war was to chasten an immoral and irreligious France and, by so doing, to serve a
warning to the rest of Europe.47 Following Scriptural precedent, however, many also
thought that France was being used as the divine scourge for the rest of Europe, while
44 Valpy, Sermon Before the Reading and Henley Associations, pp. 1-2. See also Hardy, Fidelity to
the British Constitution, p.34; Rennell, Principles ofFrench Republicanism, p. 19.
45 Hampson, Sermon on April 19, 1793, for a General Thanksgiving, p.8. See also Valpy, Sermon
Before the Reading and Henley Associations, p. 18; John Moir, Irreligion the Stigma ofOur Public
Profession, and the Source ofOur National Calamities. A Sermon, preached the 27th of February,
1799, in the Parish Church of St. Dionis, Backchurch, Langbourne Ward (London, 1799), pp.5-6;
Madan, Sermon Before the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, pp. 19-20; Richard Munkhouse, A Sermon,
Preached in the Church of St. John Baptist, Wakefield, December 19th, 1797, On occasion of a
General Thanksgiving to Almighty God (London, 1798), pp. 15-17; Magee, Sermon in the Chapel of
Trinity College, Dublin, pp.28-9; Gardiner, Sermon at the Octagon Chapel, Bath, pp. 13-32; Morgan,
Sermon on 29th November, 1798, to Return Thanks, p.5; W.H. Reynell, Two Sermons Preached to
a Respectable Congregation at Hornchurch, in the County ofEssex (London, 1798), p.9; Alexander
Black, National Blessings Considered and Improved, in a Sermon, preached on Thursday, November
29, 1798 (Edinburgh, 1798), p.39; Vincent, 'Sermon on 1 June, 1802, for a General Thanksgiving',
pp.341-2. See also Murray, 'The Influence of the French Revolution', p.30; Colley, Britons, pp.28-
30, 43-4.
46 This was spelled out in the Form of Prayer To Be Used In all Churches and Chapels
throughout.. .England and Wales.. .upon.. .Tuesday, the Nineteenth of December next, being the Day
appointed by Proclamation for a General Thanksgiving to Almighty God (London, 1797), p.6.
47 Hampson, Sermon on April 19, 1793, for a General Fast, p. 14; Rennell, Principles of French
Republicanism, pp.3-4, 26; Nares, Man's Best Right, pp. 15-16; Brown, 'A View of the Present
Times', p.484; Vincent, 'Sermon Before the House of Commons', p.350.
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suffering punishment for its own iniquities.48 This seemed a sufficient explanation for
Britain's lack of military success in the war, and it in turn was explained by Britain's
own immorality and irreligion.49 William Agutter listed perjury, blasphemy, duelling,
'notorious sedition and secret treason', 'the want of subordination in all ranks of
society' and neglect of religion as some of the sins rife within Britain which made it an
object of the divine wrath. John Newton added persecution of Methodists, the
oppression of native peoples in British colonies, national pride and vanity, and the
slave trade (in which, as he admitted, he had once played a very active part).50
With these views on the war, most Establishment churchmen had no hesitation
in calling for religion, virtue, loyalty and patriotism to be practised by the British
people. The British ought to be grateful to God for their peculiar status as his favoured
nation, which secured to them social harmony and blessing through their constitution,
and it was insisted that 'A people eminently distinguished by the favour of heaven,
ought certainly to be a religious people.'51 Churchmen called for fasting, repentance
and reformation, since it was clear to them that many in Britain fell far short of these
virtuous standards.52 Fast Days were appointed by the King and his Privy Council,
and were an established part of British war efforts in the eighteenth century. As J.E.
Cookson has written, 'There may well have been no other occasions when the
Anglican establishment was so fully mobilized on behalf of the state', nor, it may be
48 Henry-Reginald Courtenay, A Sermon, Preached Before the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, in the
Abbey-Church, Westminster, on Wednesday, February 25, 1795, Being the Day appointed by His
Majesty's Proclamation for a General Fast (London, 1795), p. 10. See also William Agutter,
Deliverance From Enemies, A Groundfor Thanksgiving. A Sermon, preached on the Day ofGeneral
Thanksgiving, December 19th, 1797, in the Chapel of the Asylum for Female Orphans (London,
1798), pp. 13-14; Brown, The Influence of Religion on National Prosperity, p.43; A Sermon,
Composedfor the Late General Fast, pp.8-17.
49 Moir, Irreligion the Stigma ofour Public Profession, and the Source ofOur National Calamities,
p.7. See also Jackson, Sermon Before the Honourable Society of Lincoln's Inn, pp.12-13; Moss,
Fast Sermon Before the House of Commons, pp.12-13, 16; Newton, Motives to Humiliation and
Praise, p.6; Reynell, Two Sermons, p.22; James Landon, A Sermon Preached Before the University
of Oxford, at St. Mary's, January 30, 1800 (Oxford, 1800), pp.26-7. On Britain's lack of military
success, see Hampson, Observations on the Present War, pp.55-7; Moss, Sermon Before the House
of Commons, pp. 14-15, 17; Shute Barrington, A Fast Sermon for February the 27th, 1799, from
Isaiah, Chapter x, verse 5 (London, 1799), pp.7-8.
50 Agutter, Observations on the General Fast of the Year 1796, p.8; Newton, Motives to
Humiliation and Praise, pp.7-25.
51 Agutter, Deliverance from Enemies, pp.3-4, 12-13; quotation from Black, National Blessings,
pp.27-8. On the superiority of Christianity to revolutionary political doctrines, see also Nares, Man's
Best Right, Nickolls, The Duty of Supporting and Defending Our Country and Constitution, p.ix;
Watson, Charge to the Clergy of Llandaff, pp. 148-52; Hampson, Sermon on April 19, 1793, for a
General Fast, pp.9-10; idem., A Sermon Delivered on Thursday the 1st ofJanuary, 1801, Before the
Sunderland Loyal Volunteer Infantry (Sunderland, 1801), pp.20-4; Hay, Sermon Before the House of
Commons (1794), p.25; Reynell, Two Sermons, pp.10-12.
52 Reynell, Two Sermons, p.8; Moir, Irreligion the Stigma of Our Public Profession, pp.9-12;
Clapham, Sermon at Great Ouseborne, pp.23-5.
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added, the Presbyterian establishment in Scotland.53 Ministers pointed to instances in
Scripture where God withdrew His wrath and prevented disasters from happening to
people in response to their repentance and fasting, such as the Ninevites under the
influence of Jonah's preaching, and drew the conclusion that similar measures now
might stay the divine chastening presently upon Britain.54
Unsurprisingly, churchmen were among the most vocal of the loyalists
anxious about Britain's moral state in the late eighteenth century. The propertied
classes, it was insisted, must set a good example, and they should observe religious
principles in their government of the country, warned by the example of the 'woeful
effects' of the irreligion of the philosophers and people of fashion in 'a neighbouring
country'.55 Evangelicals and Methodists in particular vigorously criticized the
irreligion and extravagance of the upper classes.56 Gerald Newman has seen an
'Evangelical anti-conspiracy' in this movement for moral reformation: 'The "reaction
against the French Revolution" was genuine enough, but it also marvelously
camouflaged those moral revolutionaries who, following John Brown, had thirsted
for decades to transform, nationalize, level, and make uniform their country's
institutions.'57 It seems more likely, however, that while some may have enjoyed
having a self-righteous dig at the elite, most of the preaching against upper-class
idleness and conspicuous over-consumption was rooted in simple moral outrage.
Establishment churchmen, orthodox, high, or Evangelical, feared rather than favoured
social levelling. Given their belief that religion was crucial to the upholding of the
social order and public peace, and that the war was the result of divine wrath, their
concern for the political, moral and religious purity of the population caused ministers
great anxiety, and many taught that 'virtuous and moral behavior was not only
necessary for survival and victory, but was the patriotic obligation of every British
subject'. Only a few could help their country by fighting for it or by advising its
rulers; everyone could help it by practising religion, loyalty and virtue.58
53 Cookson, The Friends ofPeace, p. 134.
54 Robinson, A Serious Exhortation, pp.4-6, 17-18; Newton, Motives to Humiliation and Praise,
pp.26-7. See also A Sermon, Composed for the Late General Fast, pp.20-1; Clowes, The Protection-
Mark, pp. 19-20; Courtenay, Sermon Before the House of Lords', Barrington, Fast Sermon for
February the 27th, 1799\ Correspondenceof Wilberforce, i, 157, Newton to Wilberforce, 21 April
1797.
55 Brown, 'A View of the Present Times', p.496; Carlyle, Love of Our Country, p.24; Hunter, A
Due Attention.
56 Murray, 'The Influence of the French Revolution', p.282, 285; William Stafford, 'Religion and
the Doctrine of Nationalism in England at the Time of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars',
Studies in Church History, 18 (1982), 386-8; Erskine, Fatal Consequences, p.25; Hardy, Importance
of Religion, pp.14, 24-32.
57 Newman, The Rise of English Nationalism, p.235.
58 Quotation from Soloway, 'Reform or Ruin', p. 120; Murray, 'The Influence of the French
Revolution', pp.167-8, 287-8. See Hugh Blair, 'On the Love of Our Country', (Edinburgh, 1793), in
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Having called for diligence in religion and virtue, then, most Establishment
ministers also preached loyalty, both as a motivation to virtue and as a particular
virtue.59 It was the duty of every good British citizen not only to practise Christianity
faithfully, but also 'to abhor the opinions and conduct of the fanatical sect [of French
revolutionaries], and to oppose them to the utmost of his power', and 'to strengthen
the hands of government by yielding a willing and ready obedience to his lawful
superiors' ,60 The blessings of living under the British constitution were underlined,
and it was explained that, in return for the protection of their lives and property, men
owed submission and obedience to the government.61 Radicalism, rebellion and
revolution were regularly condemned, and the point was heavily emphasized that
ordinary people rarely benefited from them and often suffered as a result. Richard
Munkhouse went so far as to insist that the common people had 'no immediate
concern' with matters of political administration, and that they ought not to interfere
with or even discuss them, since they were 'alike far beyond the sphere of their
action, and above the reach of their comphrehension'.62 While Church of England
ministers by and large encouraged the establishment of Sunday Schools as a method
of civilizing and restraining the lower orders, many ministers of the Church of
Scotland thought them a dangerous innovation promoted by itinerant preachers {alias
political and religious radicals) for the propagation of their evil ideas.63
The monarchy was almost certainly supported by all Establishment ministers.
Common texts for their political sermons were Proverbs 24:21: 'Fear thou the Lord,
and honour the King, and meddle not with them that are given to change' and 1 Peter
Sermons (5 vols.: London, 1818), v, 143-6; Carlyle, Love of Our Country, pp.15, 21-2. David
Eastwood, 'Patriotism and the English State', pp. 165-6, suggests that Evangelical war-time charity
was sometimes stimulated by fears of popular unrest and intended to placate popular discontent.
59 See Agutter, The Faithful Christian and True Soldier.
60 Brown, 'The Spirit of the Times Considered', pp.23,32.
61 Hay, Sermon Before the House of Commons (1793), p. 17; Black, National Blessings, pp.5-20;
Watson, Charge to the Clergy ofLlandaff p.142; Munkhouse, Sermon on December 19th, 1797, for
a General Thanksgiving, p. 11; Gardiner, Sermon at the Octagon Chapel, pp.8-9; Brown, 'A View of
the Present Times', pp.494-6.
62 Munkhouse, Sermon on November 29th, 1798, for a General Thanksgiving, p. 19. See also 'The
General Assembly's dutiful Address to His Majesty, on the subject of the present War' (1794), and
'Addresses to His Majesty on the present Situation of Public Affairs' (1798), in The Acts of the
General Assembly, P.H., xxxi, 1260-1, Watson, 27 January 1795; Watson, Charge to the Clergy of
Llandaff, pp.143, 135-6.
63 For Church of England support of Sunday Schools, see: Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, p.61;
Murray, 'The Influence of the French Revolution', p.273; Hole, Pulpits, Politics and Public Order,
pp.139, 167. For Church of Scotland disapproval, see: Fry, The Dundas Despotism, p. 181; Murray,
'The Influence of the French Revolution', pp.204-5; BMC 9435, John Kay, 'Modern Moderation
Strikingly Displayed or a Ministerial Visitation of a Sabbath Evening School' (1799); 'Declaratory
Act' against unqualified ministers and preachers, 'A Pastoral Admonition...to all the People under
their Charge', and the report against 'Vagrant Teachers and Sunday Schools' (effectively banning all
Sunday Schools held under the auspices of the Church of Scotland), in The Acts of the General
Assembly (Edinburgh, 1799), pp. 12-14, 38-42,42-5.
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2:17\ 'Honour all men. Love the brotherhood. Fear God. Honour the King'. Sermons
were still being preached before the Houses of Commons and Lords respectively on
30 January in 1786-91 and 1793-5 to commemorate the so-called 'martyrdom' of
Charles I, thus reinforcing the value attached to the monarchy by the Church of
England.64 The clergymen appointed to preach before MPs and peers in 1793-5 did
not miss the opportunity to draw the parallel between the execution of Charles I and
that more recently of Louis XVI, and to emphasize the heinousness of the crime of
regicide.65
Finally, along with religion, virtue and loyalty, Establishment ministers
exhorted their congregations to practise patriotism. Religion and loyal national unity
were the aims and fruits of true patriotism, said Nickolls, expounding Psalm 122:3
('Jerusalem is builded as a city that is compact together, whither the tribes go up...').
'Our Jerusalem demands and deserves our prayers: she looks to you, her dutiful and
virtuous sons, to maintain her cause against those of her family who have gone over
to the enemy.'66 Hugh Blair of Edinburgh and Alexander Carlyle of Inveresk both
preached sermons entitled On the Love ofour Country after Richard Price's famous
discourse of 1789, arguing the very opposite to his exhortation to world citizenship; to
love the French as much as the British, scorned Blair, would be like loving strangers
as much as one's own wife and children. British subjects had excellent cause to
rejoice in and be proud of their country; God had planted these feelings of special
concern and care for those around them in men's breasts, and it was unnatural to deny
them.67 Prayers were said to supplicate God for British victory: '...convince our
enemies that we are thy people; and that thine arm, stretched out, can set at naught the
most daring designs against our peace.'68 In their efforts to inspire patriotism,
ministers spoke to people's emotions as well as to their minds, appealing to all that
might tug at them—family, tradition, religion, the desire for glory, fear of French
64 The anniversary was missed in 1792 and 1796-9 because Parliament was still in recess on 30
January in those years, but interestingly it was also missed in 1800, although Parliament was sitting
over 30 January that year, and the practice appears to have been more or less discontinued after that. It
is interesting that a sermon was preached on 30 January 1800, but before a congregation at Oxford
University instead (Landon, Sermon Before the University ofOxford)', perhaps the practice was also
continued elsewhere.
65 Horsley, Sermon Before the Lords Spiritual and Temporal (1793); Vernon, Sermon Preached
Before the Lords Spiritual and Temporal (1794); Madan, Sermon Before the Lords Spiritual and
Temporal (1795); Hay, Sermons Before the House ofCommons (1793, 1794, 1795).
66 Nickolls, The Duty ofSupporting and Defending our Country and Constitution, pp.16-19.
67 Blair, Love of our Country, p.129. See also Hampson, Sermon Before the Sunderland Loyal
Volunteer Infantry, pp.17-20; Valpy, Sermon Before the Reading and Henley Associations, pp.21-2,
25-7; Hole, Pulpits, Politics and Public Order, p.149. For lay use of these religious arguments, see
Stafford, 'Religion and the Doctrine of Nationalism', pp.388-95.
68 A Form ofPrayer...General Fast (19 April 1793), pp.6, 7. See also Rennell, Principles ofFrench
Republicanism, p.22.
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depredations, the threat of judgement, personal pride.69 Some ministers even spoke of
the war as a blessing: James Landon, Charles Moss and William Agutter believed that
the magnitude of the cataclysm had awoken Britain from its state of slumber in moral
decline and ingratitude for its assets, and that the war had isolated Britain from the
French disease. 'As salt preserves meat from putrefaction,' wrote Agutter, 'so War
has been our preservation against moral contamination: it has been our bulwark and
protection.'70
In the names of religion, virtue, loyalty and patriotism, then, ministers called
civilians and soldiers alike to endurance while the war lasted. Those who remained at
home were urged to pay their taxes willingly: a Briton's religious faith and political
liberty ought to be even more important to him than his property, according to
Munkhouse.71 They sympathized with those who suffered most from the 'scarcity' of
grain and high prices, but they denied that these had been caused by the war. Prayers
were said for the return of plenty, and the better-off were urged to economize on
luxuries and to help the poor by making nutritious food cheaply available to them.72
Ministers praised highly those who enrolled in the militia, the Volunteers or the
regular armed forces. Heaven's highest places, encouraged Carlyle, were reserved for
those 'who have deserved well, or have died in the service of their country'.73
Sermons were preached before Volunteer companies, often at services of dedication of
a corps' colours, to exhort them to conduct themselves in faith and patriotism and with
valour, and to commend them to the rest of the community.74
69 See, for instance, Rennell, Principles of French Republicanism, pp. 19-20; Nares, Man's Best
Rights, p.48; Agutter, The Faithful Christian and the True Soldier, p. 18; Munkhouse, Sermon on
December 19tli, 1797, for a General Thanksgiving, pp.51-2n. Thomas Maurice, The Crisis ofBritain:
A Poem, Addressed to the Right Hon. William Pitt, on the Threatened Invasion of These Kingdoms,
by the French, in A.D. 1798 (1st edition, 1798; 2nd edition: London, 1803); Morgan, Sermon on
29th November, 1798, to Return Thanks, pp. 18-22.
70 Landon, Sermon Before the University of Oxford, pp.24-5; Moss, Fast Sermon Before the House
of Commons, p. 14; Agutter, An Address to Every British Subject, p.3.
71 Munkhouse, Sermon on December 19th, 1797, for a General Thanksgiving, pp.41-2. See also
Somerville, Observations on the Constitution, pp. 16-17.
72 A Form of Prayer...General Fast (13 February 1801), p.6; Rivers, Thoughts on the Necessity of
Prosecuting the War with Vigour, pp. 16-20.
73 Carlyle, Love of our Country, p.33. See also Moir, Irreligion the Stigma of our Public
Profession, pp. 17-18; Morgan, Sermon on 29th November, 1798, to Return Thanks, p.23.
74 See, for example, Butler, Philanthropy, Religion, and Loyalty (1798); Vincent, 'Sermon Before
the Associated Volunteer Companies' (1798); Valpy, Sermon Before the Reading and Henley
Associations (1798); W. Branch Johnson (ed.), 'Memorandoms for...': The Diary Between 1798 and
1810 of John Carrington, Farmer, Chief Constable, Tax Assessor, Surveyor of Highways and
Overseer of the Poor, of Bramfield in Hertfordshire (London and Chichester, 1973), pp.34-5, 29
November 1798; Hampson, Sermon Before the Sunderland Loyal Volunteer Infantry (1801). The Rev.
Samuel Partridge is an example of earlier doubts among some of the conservative sector of the
population in general, in his opposition to the formation of a nationwide Volunteer scheme because
of the threat it might pose to the authority of the crown and government and to the liberty of the
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Congregations and readers were encouraged to prepare for, but not to be
afraid of, a French invasion. Ultimately, ministers claimed to place their faith in God
to deliver Britain from such an incursion, but they pointed also to the public spirit of
the nation, shown both in the courage and skill of the navy and home defence troops
and in the general population and their love for their country.75 Bishop Horsley told
his clergy not to participate themselves in armed service, either with the regular army
or with the local militia, simply because they were not likely to make good soldiers.
They would do more good in the event of an invasion by supervising the evacuation
of the weak and helpless and the livestock and by helping to destroy buildings in the
path of the enemy. They should 'level the Musquet or trail the Pike' only in a dire
emergency.76
For all their apparent bellicosity in their loyalty to the government and in their
hostility to revolutionary France, Establishment ministers, like the great majority of
the population, were eager to see the restoration of peace and they reminded their
listeners of the principle of loving one's enemies 77 Many were delighted with the
peace settlement at Amiens, thinking, as William Vincent did, that they had 'lived to
see a great nation renounce Christianity and embrace heathenism; and again revert
from heathenism, to submit once more to the empire of the Gospel'.78 Evangelicals
were particularly pleased, since they believed that Catholicism had been irreversibly
overthrown in France, making clear the war for 'pure religion' once the madness of
official atheism had passed, and they expressed great optimism for the future of
Christianity in France until Napoleon's Concordat with the Pope was signed in
1803.79 There were some who voiced anxiety, however. The Bishop of Rochester did
not think that a real peace could last for any length of time, since the strength of
French power by the settlement contained in it 'the seed and germ of everlasting
wars'. He dreaded 'the revival of the spirit of Jacobinism in this country', pointing to
people, should its power be abused ('Observations on a Militia of Property', in The Annals of
Agriculture, ed. Arthur Young, xxi (1793), 513-6).
75 See Hampson, Observations on the Present War, pp.47-52; Watson, Address to the People of
Great Britain, pp. 177-20; Munkhouse, Sermon on December 19th, 1797, for a General Thanksgiving,
pp.2-6, 12-14,40-1.
76 Quoted in Hole, Pulpits, Politics and Public Order, p. 170. The idea of even this level of
involvement 'hurried and affected' ParsonWoodforde 'a great deal indeed' (Beresford (ed.), Diary ofa
Country Parson, v, 329, 6 August 1801).
77 Agutter, Deliverance from Enemies, pp. 15-16. See also Correspondence ofWilberforce, i, 202-4,
the Dean of Carlisle toWilberforce, 21 January 1800.
78 Vincent, 'Sermon Before the House of Commons' (1802), pp.325-7; Murray, 'The Influence of
the French Revolution', p.355.
79 Murray, 'The Influence of the French Revolution', pp.279-281.
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a symptom of it in those who urged Britain to concede much in order to pacify
France.80
Liberal churchmen, Evangelicals, and Methodists within the Established
Churches all tended, if sometimes reluctantly, to retreat from protests and demands for
ecclesiastical and political reform during the war—the liberals because of the
association of religious liberalism and radicalism with political radicalism, and
Evangelicals and Methodists because of their own conservative reactions to the threat
to religious and secular authority posed by the armies of revolutionary France.81
Sometimes the patriotism of Evangelicals and Methodists was qualified, however.
They, more than orthodox churchmen, claimed to place their trust in the prayers of
Christians and the mercy of God rather than in the British government and its fleets
and armies. As William Stafford explains, their strong sense of sin worked for
obedience to the government but against national pride: 'because of man's wickedness
the state is essential; but characteristically their pride in their native land is reduced by
their sense of its depravity.'82 Evangelicals such as John Newton, Thomas Scott and
Thomas Gisborne, while basically loyalist, were nevertheless suspicious of the war,
because all war was harmful and destructive and because this war was undertaken in
alliance with corrupt papal monarchies in part to restore Roman Catholicism in
France.83 They also continued to press for reforms such as the abolition of the slave
trade and to acknowledge that moderate political reform was needed and should be
carried through at a more opportune time.84 It seems clear, however, that, in human
terms, the Methodists could not have contained popular political radicalism to the
extent that revolution was avoided in Britain because of them, as Halevy suggested:
they were simply too few in number to have been effective in this way all over
Britain.85
80 AH., xxxvi, 179-182, the Bishop of Rochester, 3 November 1801.
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It is also true that a minority of Establishment ministers opposed the British
wars against revolutionary France in the 1790s. The Rev. J.H. Williams, vicar of
Wellsbourn in Warwickshire, was not convinced that the political state and order
either of Europe or of Britain had warranted it, and he pointed out that even if it was
favoured by general consent, it was not true that the opinion of the majority was
always right. War caused gross damage to the morals of individuals and of nations: it
attacked piety, fostered hatred, threatened loyalty to the government and King and was
generally hostile to the spirit of the gospel.86 Vicesimus Knox also opposed the war
until late 1795 (when he became convinced that the French were the real aggressors),
deeming it unjust and unnecessary and, like all wars, hostile to Christian teaching and
national morality and integrity—'as well might oil and vinegar coalesce as war and
Christianity' ,87 The Rev. J. Bradley Rhys wrote a tract arguing that 'War, at all times,
and in all cases, is absolutely unlawful for Christians.' Even Richard Watson, the
Bishop of Llandaff, told the House of Lords in 1795 that he considered 'the justifiable
occasions of going to war to be few, very few, indeed', and he thought that Britain
ought to have attempted to mediate between France and the German powers in
1792.88
These ministers sometimes thought that religion was being used for secular
political purposes, and they were indignant. They disagreed with the obligation they
felt themselves under to display political loyalty and, in particular, to conduct Fast Day
services for the support of the war. Knox said that this was an odious rendering of
religion subservient to secular ambition, and J.H. Williams deeply resented 'the not
being suffered to do our own business in our own way.'89 It was wrong to go to war
for the sake of religion, according to Knox and Watson, even if the French were
attempting to destroy Christianity. It would be better to try to convert them than to kill
them.90
86 J.H. Williams, Two Sermons Preached on the Public Fasts of April 1793 and February 1794
(London, 1794), pp.22-64.
87 See Hole, Pulpits, Politics and Public Order, pp.222-3. Vicesimus Knox, 'The Prospect of
Perpetual and Universal Peace to be Established on the Principles of Christian Philanthropy' (1793),
in Works (7 vols.: London, 1824), vi, 351-70; idem., 'Preface' to 'Antipolemus; or, the Plea of
Reason, Religion, and Humanity, Against War. A Fragment; Translated from the Latin of Erasmus'
(1795), in Works, v, 405-30; idem., 'The Spirit of Despotism', in Works, v, 199-203, 249-254, 284-
351, 390-3. Quotation from 'The Spirit of Despotism', p.391.
88 J. Bradley Rhys, An Answer from some Passages in a Letter from the Bishop ofRochester to the
Clergy, upon the Lawfulness ofDefensive War, By A Clergyman of the Church of England (London,
1798), p.6; P.M., xxxi, 1258-68, the Bishop of Llandaff, 27 January 1795.
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1795.
225
Nevertheless, the great majority of Establishment churchmen remained loyal to
the government and supported it in its war against revolutionary France, for reasons
of theological doctrine, ecclesiastical concerns, political inclination and social identity,
and they constituted a major instrument of propaganda in encouraging their
congregations and readership to do likewise.
II
Although rational Dissent declined in England in the 1790s, both in numerical terms
and in terms of the fears it held for the orthodox Establishment,91 Evangelical Dissent
enjoyed considerable growth, both in England and in Scotland. Between 1788 and
1794, 1872 Dissenting meeting-houses were registered in England and 610 Dissenting
licences to preach were granted at quarter-sessions. Between 1795 and 1801, the
figures were 3378 and 1318 respectively.92 'Dissent' in Scotland is more accurately
divided into 'Secession' (Burghers, Anti-Burghers, Relief Church and Reformed
Presbyterians) and 'Dissent' (Episcopalians, Roman Catholics, Baptists,
Independents and Methodists), reflecting the distinction between those churches
which split from Established presbyterian government only after 1690 and retained
some degree of similarity in terms of doctrine and church government, and those
which had never been part of it and which were organized along quite different lines.
Seceders constituted about 10% of the Scottish population—nearly 150 000—
Episcopalians many fewer, supporting only forty priests and four bishops in 1784,
Catholics numbering around 30 000 in 1800 (also with forty priests and only two
bishops), and the others perhaps 4000 in total, of whom the Baptists probably formed
the majority. Rational Dissent actually grew in Scotland in the 1790s, with the first
Unitarian congregation established in Montrose in 1792, and spreading to Dundee,
Forfar and Arbroath in 1795.93
Denominational politics were even more significant in determining the attitudes
of Dissenters to the war than they were in forming those of Establishment ministers.94
Many were, despite their dislike for what they believed to be a powerful and corrupt
91 Murray, 'The Influence of the French Revolution', pp. 153-4, 160.
92 Ibid., p.201; Deryck Lovegrove, 'English Evangelical Dissent and the European Conflict 1789-
1815', in W.J. Shields (ed.), Studies in Church History, (Oxford, 1983), xx, 263.
93 Brims, 'The Covenanting Tradition', p.51; idem., 'The Scottish Democratic Movement', p.38; G.
Struthers, History of the Rise, Progress, and Principles of the ReliefChurch (Glasgow, 1843), p.408;
A. Bellesheim, History of the Catholic Church of Scotland (4 vols.: Edinburgh and London, 1887),
iv, 262.
94 See Hole, 'English Sermons and Tracts', pp.32, 33-4; Wells, 'English Society and Revolutionary
Polities', pp.197-200.
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Establishment, sufficiently disturbed by the political and religious radicalism of some
within their own sect or denomination or of those in rival sects to give limited support
to the political and religious authorities during the war. The identification of the
Establishment with government policies, however, tempted others to woo the support
of political dissenters and, in so doing, they became more politically nonconformist
themselves. In the case of the New, or Kilhamite, Methodist Connexion, this meant
splitting away from the Church of England and the Methodist body within the
Establishment.95
The opinions of Dissenting ministers on the war were also greatly influenced
by the fact that they were often viewed with suspicion by the government and treated
as scapegoats by the Established Church. Sir William Murray of Ochtertyre told the
Duke of Atholl that the assessment to be drawn up of the political sympathies of
people living in his district would have all Dissenters marked 'S' for suspected
democrat, except those known personally to be loyal. Michael Fry cites a comment of
Henry Dundas along the same lines: 'The established clergy are as well as I could
wish, I would be happy if I could say the same with regard to those not of the
establishment, or of the people under their charge.'96 The Baptist minister Robert Hall
objected to 'the extreme tenderness' shown by Bishop Horsley towards the
overthrown Catholic Church of France when viewed alongside 'his malignity towards
dissenters'.97
In fact, however, a majority of Dissenters were not gratified by the French
Revolution after its initial stages.98 John Young, anti-Burgher minister of Hawick,
like so many others, had been deeply disappointed by the degeneration of the French
Revolution into violence, through the dissolution of the National Assembly, the
Constitutional Assembly, which had 'acted as so many children', to the Convention,
which was 'an assembly of bloodsuckers, who seemed to feast themselves with the
miseries of their fellow-men.'99 The Revolution became particularly abhorrent when it
renounced Christianity. Some were convinced that the conspiracy theory of the
95 Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, pp.142, 161-2; Murray, 'The Influence of the French
Revolution'; Vincent, 'Responses of Scottish Churchmen'.
96 Quoted in Brims, 'The Covenanting Tradition', p.51; Fry, The Dundas Despotism, p.182.
97 Robert Hall, An Apology for the Freedom of the Press, and for General Liberty. To which are
prefixed Remarks on Bishop Horsley's Sermon, Preached on the Thirtieth ofJanuary last (2nd edition:
London, 1793), p.xiv. For a good example of Establishment suspicion that Dissenting loyalty was
only skin-deep, see Rivers, Thoughts on the Necessity of Prosecuting the War with Vigour, pp.4-6.
See also Hole, Pulpits, Politics and Public Order, pp. 171-2.
98 Hole, 'English Sermons and Tracts', p.25; Murray, 'The Influence of the French Revolution',
p. 185.
99 John Young, A History of the Commencement, Progress, and Termination of the Late War
Between Britain and France (Edinburgh, 1802), p.2.
227
Revolution was true,100 and even the politically radical Dissenters of the Analytical
Review 'found unacceptable what [they] judged to be the flippant and irresponsible
manner in which French philosophers dismissed Christianity out of hand'. Even most
Unitarians were part of a pious and strict nonconformist religious culture and believed
that fundamental religious and moral principles should be taught to the masses.101
Nor were Dissenters as unwilling to prove their loyalty as the government
often assumed. Leading Seceding ministers in Scotland met with Robert Dundas, the
Lord Advocate, to assure him of their desire to smother radicalism in their
congregations and clergy. Two loyal addresses were later sent by the Burghers,
prompting Robert Dundas to remark that 'It has been with too much reason hitherto
believed that the great body of these seceders, and the majority of their pastors, are as
hostile to the state as to the religious establishment.' John Young and Alexander
Shanks, the latter the Burgher minister of Jedburgh, were two extremely able
pamphleteers who wrote for the conservative cause.102 Scottish Episcopalians could,
after their Relief Act of 1792, be relied upon to support the state; but Seceders also
defended the constitution and preached the importance of religion, submission and
patriotism.103 'Give none occasion to the world, who observe you,' admonished
Alexander Shanks, 'to call you an ill-humoured and ill-principled sectary, disaffected
to the welfare and prosperity of that country in which you are fed and protected.'104
Thus, their sermons had a two-fold purpose: to persuade their Seceding hearers and
readers to be peaceful, blameless subjects in order to improve the reputation of the
churches; and to convince anyone else who might read them, particularly anyone in
authority, that Seceders were neither seditious nor even worthy of suspicion.
English Dissenters also regularly sent loyal addresses to the King, made public
statements of their loyalty and investigated allegations of radicalism among their
numbers.105 Dr. Abraham Rees, referring to Nelson's victory at the Nile in August
1798, wrote:
100 Hole, 'English Sermons and Tracts', pp.29-30. See also John Young, Essays on the Following
Interesting Subjects (Glasgow, 1794), pp.7ff.
101 Brian Rigby, 'Radical Spectators of the Revolution: the Case of the Analytical Review', in
Crossley and Small, The French Revolution and British Culture, p.69.
102 Fry, The Dundas Despotism, p.183; Brims, 'The Covenanting Tradition', p.52. See also the
London Gazette for 8-12 May 1798 and 23-27 September 1800 for the Burgher addresses.
103 Young, Essays, pp.3, 15-17; [Archibald Bruce], A Serious View of the Remarkable Providences
of the Times (Glasgow, 1795), pp.65-71.
104 Alexander Shanks, Peace and Order Recommended to Society (Edinburgh, 1793), p.8.
105 See, for example, the London Gazette for 21-23 June 1792 (Sion College), 30 June-2 July 1792
(Protestant Dissenters of the city of Worcester), 8-11 September 1792 (Bishops and clergy of the
Scottish Episcopal Church, the synod of Lothian and Tweedale), 18-22 December 1792 (Jews of
Liverpool); in late 1795, after the attack on the King on 29 October, Sion College and Roman
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I shall only add in this connection, that the late victory on the coast
of Africa, so important in itself, so beneficial in its consequences,
and so honourable to all who were engaged in achieving it, will
bring to our grateful recollection the glorious first of August, which
has long been celebrated as the aera of theaccession of his Majesty's
family to the throne of these realms, and by none of his Majesty's
most loyal subjects more sincerely and more joyfully than by
PROTESTANT DISSENTERS. 106
Of conservative political sermons published in England between 1789 and 1802,
Roman Catholics seem to have produced more than Protestant Dissenters: Gayle
Trusdel Pendleton has traced 98 and 51 respectively.107 Dissenting preachers, like
their Anglican counterparts, emphasized the necessity of religion to the moral and
social order, since a belief in God and the after-life imposed a restraint on people's
actions in the present world. i°8
With regard to the war itself, Britain was again sometimes pictured as the new
Israel, God's favoured nation,109 but more often the conflict was interpreted by
Dissenters as the divine chastening of Britain and Europe for their irreligion and
immorality. Archibald Bruce claimed to see God's hand at work, using the war as a
scourge not only on Britain in general, but also on the Established Church of Scotland
in particular, for its sinfulness—its spiritual tyranny, its considerations of interest and
its elevation of human laws and customs above the precepts of Scripture— and he
referred to the Moderates as 'a popish, prelatical, and malignant party, which hath too
often prevailed over the better part'.110 Fasting, repentance, prayer and faithfulness to
the teaching of Scripture were therefore necessary if real peace was to be restored.
'We need repentance and reformation,' warned Rees, 'and whilst the war is
prolonged, we shall not be exempt from fear and danger.'111
Catholics, Quakers, Dissenting Ministers, Jews and Protestant Dissenters of the north. See also
Lovegrove, 'English Dissent and the European Conflict', pp.266-7.
106 Abraham Rees, The Privileges of Britain. A Sermon, preached at the Meeling-House in the Old
Jewry on Thursday the 29th ofNovember, 1798, being the day appointedfor a General Thanksgiving
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Many Evangelical Dissenters in fact maintained 'an almost complete silence on
political matters', according to Deryck Lovegrove. James Bradley discovered no
sermons on political topics published by any English Dissenters in 1796-7.112 Rather
than engage in political discussions and become embroiled in party allegiance, many
Evangelicals chose to embrace millenarianism and, as a result, to plunge into intense
evangelistic work. Not all millenarian interpretations of the French Revolution and its
aftermath were as wild and fantastic as those of Joanna Southcott of Exeter, or those
of the naval officer Richard Brothers, who prophesied the fall of the British monarchy
if the war was continued, announced himself the Prince of the Hebrews and
commanded George III in God's name to hand over his crown and authority.113
Other, more cautious and scholarly, studies were published, meditating on the
likeness of the present convulsions to the events that Scripture predicted would
surround the second coming of Christ.114 James Bicheno of Newbury published at
least six works on this subject between 1793 and 1817, adapting his interpretation of
biblical prophecy to events as they came to pass.115 Most, however, as Lovegrove
comments, restricted themselves to expressing 'the more circumspect if somewhat
imprecise conviction that Christ's reign was rapidly approaching' 316
Missions, foreign and domestic, became very popular in the wake of the
French Revolution. The decline of papal power in Europe, together with the collapse
of French power overseas, presented a great opportunity for missionary enterprise,
and Dissenters were very actively involved in this work.117 In 1792 the Baptist
Missionary Society was formed by William Carey, followed in 1795 by the London
Missionary Society, in 1798 by the Glasgow Missionary and in 1801 by the Scottish
Missionary Society.118 Greville Ewing and Charles Stuart, associates of Robert
Haldane, the thorn in the flesh of the Church of Scotland, began to publish their
Missionary Magazine in Edinburgh from July 1796, which enjoyed a Scottish
circulation of five or six thousand; its English counterpart, also a product of the
1790s, was the Evangelical Magazine. Domestic missions were engaged in by
Independents and Baptists in England, Charles Simeon and Rowland Hill embarking
112 Lovegrove, 'English Dissent and the European conflict', pp.265-6, 276; Bradley, Church, Clergy
and Counter-Revolution, p.6. See also Hole, Pulpits, Politics and Public Order, p. 147.
113 Hole, Pulpit, Politics and Public Order, p. 103.
114 Idem., 'English Sermons and Tracts', pp.27-8.
115 Lovegrove, 'English Dissent and the European Conflict', p.268. See James Bicheno, The Signs
of the Times: or the Overthrow of the Papal Tyranny in France. The Prelude ofDestruction to Popery
and Despotism, But ofPeace to Mankind (4th edition: London and Edinburgh, 1794); idem., A Word
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117 W.R. Ward, Religion and Society in England, 1790-1850 (London, 1972), p.44.
118 The Church [of England] Missionary Society was established in 1799.
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on long and arduous preaching tours, and by the Relief Church and the Haldane
brothers in Scotland. The Haldanes established the Society for the Propagation of the
Gospel at Home in 1797, James especially travelling long distances to preach the
gospel throughout the most remote regions of Scotland. He began to set up
independent Sunday Schools on his second tour of Scotland, after the pattern of those
of John Campbell in Edinburgh, and these soon spread to most of the principal towns
in Scotland, as well as to many smaller places.119 Unions to organize itinerant
preaching were increasingly established after 1795, and Dissenting ministers and
students in Huntingdonshire paid evangelistic visits to the French prisoners of war
held there.120 Sometimes gospel tracts were distributed which made direct reference to
the war, such as one published in Yarmouth in 1798, entitled An Alarm to the Public,
and a Bounty Promised to Every Loyal Subject, Who Will Come Forward to Repel
the Enemy. Arms and Accoutrements Provided For Every Man, Gratis. At first sight it
appears to be a simple piece of government recruiting propaganda, but it is quickly
apparent from the texts printed beside each exhortation that it is rather a pamphlet
recruiting for the army of Heaven.
It must also, however, be noted that even the loyalty of politically conservative
Dissenters was, at best, qualified, and that a significant proportion of Nonconformists
held anti-war views. By its very nature, Dissent was anti-establishment, and some
ministers were quite open about their liberal or radical political views. Mark Wilks, the
Norwich Baptist minister, reminded his audience in 1791 that 'Jesus Christ was a
Revolutionist', and he went on to express the view that 'the French Revolution is of
God, and that no power exists or can exist, by which it can be overthrown'. Robert
Hall warned in 1793 that 'if the state of things continues to grow worse and worse, if
the friends of reform, the true friends of their country, continue to be overwhelmed by
calumny and persecution...the sun of Great Britain is set for ever.' James Bicheno
and Archibald Bruce also defended the French Revolution as a battle for civil and
religious liberty, and Bruce condemned the Loyal Associations as 'guilty of an outrage
on the constitution of their country, as well as on the rights of their fellow-subjects',
for intimidating people into acquiescing in their views and measures, and often
causing disturbances of the peace in the process.121 John Young of Hawick was
119 Rowland Hill, Journal of a Tour through parts of Scotland (London, 1799); Harry Escott, A
History of Scottish Congregationalism (Aberdeen, 1960), p.55; James Haldane, Journal of a Tour
through the Northern Counties of Scotland and the Orkney Isles (Edinburgh, 1798); Alexander
Stewart, Account ofa Late Revival in a part of the Highlands ofScotland (Edinburgh, 1800).
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231
attacked, not only by his own congregation, but also at presbytery and Synod levels
for his politically conservative views, expounded in his Essays on the Following
Interesting Subjects (1794). On the other hand, Hutchison of Paisley was attacked by
some in his Relief Church congregation for his enthusiasm for the rising liberties of
France and his hostility to British attempts to crush them.122 Niel Douglas, also of the
Relief Church, held reforming if not radical views, and he, together with James
McEwan of Dundee, and the Anti-Burgher ministers of Methven, Kilmarnock and
Montrose, attended the Edinburgh Conventions of 1792-3. The Burgher ministers of
Selkirk, Shotts and Stow were on the list of political contacts ofWilliam Skirving, the
secretary of the Edinburgh Association of the Friends of the People, and Hislop of
Shotts was also a delegate to the first Convention. Several Seceding ministers in Perth
took a prominent part in the reform movement and there, as in Paisley, Relief Church
buildings were often used as meeting-places for radical reformers. Other Seceding and
Dissenting ministers, such as Cross of St. Ninians and Anderson of Kilsyth, if not
overt supporters of political reform, were known to be sympathetic to its cause.
Unitarian preachers such as Joseph Priestley, Richard Price and Thomas Fysshe
Palmer were well known advocates of reform.123
Not all Dissenting ministers, therefore, supported the armed struggle against
revolutionary France, and a significantly higher proportion of them openly opposed it
than was the case in the Established Churches. It was argued that war was directly
contrary to the teachings and spirit of Christianity and to the interests of civilization.
Bruce held that 'the approved citizen of Zion is one who shutteth even his ears from
hearing of blood', which was the pietistic line favoured by Quakers and anti-war
Baptists.124 Lovegrove comments that, far more common from Dissenters than
expressions of support for the loyalist cause, 'were remarks of an entirely neutral
character conveying only a sense of the horror of war and a belief that in the midst of
the contemporary state of political upheaval and crisis the Christian's duty was to pray
Genuine Principles of Seceders, respecting Civil Government; the Duty of Subjects; and National
Reformation: and a Vindication of their Conduct in reference to some late Plans and Societies for
Political Reform; and the Public Dissentions of the Time. Proposed and Read in a Meeting of the
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123 Niel Douglas, Thoughts on Modern Politics (London, 1793); William Kirkland, 'The Impact of
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Chalmers, Robert Haldane, and Niel Douglas', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Edinburgh,
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for the return of peace and to do good wherever possible'.125 Rational Christians,
who argued that war retarded the progress of human civilization and enlightenment,
appealed to the doctrine of Providence and its indication that God willed only the best
for mankind, and they taught that this could only be achieved by a cooperation of
human effort with divine assistance.126 They did not always follow Richard Price and
William Godwin in rejecting all sentiments of patriotism, but they often argued from
love of country to love of mankind in general, rather than stopping at the shores of
Britain as Establishment ministers often did. Partial affections were necessary only as
concessions to man's weakness and limitations, and they ought to produce general
benevolence in those who held them.127
The main reason why some Protestant Dissenters objected particularly to the
war against revolutionary France was their unshakeable anti-Catholicism.128 They had
been thrilled by the overthrow of the Catholic Church in France: as James Bicheno put
it, appearances seemed to indicate 'that this will be a fatal stroke to the Papal
usurpations and to the reign of despotism'. He interpreted this very specifically as the
slaying of the first Beast mentioned in the book of Revelation. Britain had actually
allied itself with the dragon (the power of Rome, now vested in the German Empire as
the erstwhile Holy Roman Empire) and the second beast (the Capetian royal family of
France) to restore this first beast to power, and it was therefore fighting on entirely the
wrong side in this Armageddon.129 'And are we\—protestants\ — a free and
enlightened people! —engaged as principals in a war, the immediate tendency of
which, if successful, is to keep popery and priestcraft from falling, and to support
idolatry, persecution, and despotism?' he asked in horror.130 Archibald Bruce took
the same view, looking back with longing to the days of the Protestant alliance of
Britain, Holland and Prussia.131 'In such days of shaking and alarm,' he warned,
Protestant nations can only be safe by stedfastly maintaining the
reformation they have attained... It is not in joining in affinity with
the people of these abominations, it is not in attempting to prop up
the crumbling heaven-struck towers, but in flying to the greatest
distance from the falling and burning city, that the safety of any
Protestant nation will in the event be found.132
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Some Establishment publications had criticized Roman Catholicism and applauded its
downfall in France,133 but such hostile millenarianism came mainly from Dissenters.
For these reasons, then—that all war was an evil, that this war was being
fought in support of Catholicism and that it was a war in opposition to liberty—some
Dissenting churchmen insisted that Britain ought to repent and withdraw from the
war. 'If we are leagued with Antichrist, and his fraternity of despots, for the support
of tyranny and corruption, against the Providence of God, which has determined their
overthrow, our ruin, unless we immediately withdraw ourselves, and amend our
doings, is inevitable,' warned Bicheno.134 They protested against the use of fasting to
encourage political loyalty: it was not the task of true servants of God to amuse their
congregations with 'courtly panegyrics on the excellency and purity of our
government in church and state' and 'virulent invectives against their neighbours,
whose sentiments, about public measures, may differ from their own'.135 Instead,
they used Fast Days to preach their own conviction that the war was unjust and
unnecessary, which, as Cookson points out, explains why there was so little non-
observance by Dissenters. Lay and clerical Dissenters played a very active role in the
anti-war movement throughout the decade, and Cookson concludes that, 'Of all the
strongholds of anti-loyalism, the Dissenting congregations were the most difficult to
vanquish and disperse.'136 Expressed antipathy to the war was not the norm even
among Dissenting churchmen, but it was much more common among them than it was
among Establishment ministers.
Ill
Four main factors influenced the attitudes of British ministers of religion to the war
against revolutionary France: theology, political theology, ecclesiastical politics and
political ideology in response to the French Revolution. In terms of theology, most
believed in a doctrine of divine sovereignty and Providence, and in the fallen-ness of
human nature. Whereas this led orthodox Establishment churchmen, by and large, to
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accept the inevitability of warfare and the possibility of some causes of war to be
looked upon with divine favour, it led some Evangelicals and Methodists, inside and
outside the Established Churches to preach the necessity of repentance and withdrawal
from the sin of armed conflict. Rational Dissenters who believed in the perfectibility of
man also argued that war was regressive and contrary to the divine will.
With respect to political theology, most ministers believed that the teaching of
sound religious principles was of great importance to the well-being of the state. Many
orthodox Establishment ministers and many radical Dissenters, Evangelical and
Rational, interpreted this in such a way that they saw their present specific role in
politics as being to teach a particular political ideology and its practical implications in
response to the French Revolution, its principles and the war waged against it by the
British government, and this issued in loyalist and anti-war teaching respectively.
Some Evangelicals, on the other hand, seem to have preferred to allow the inculcation
of sound religious doctrine to do its own work in forming the politics of their
congregations; they made it clear that they viewed the war as a chastening from the
hand of God, to which the appropriate response was moral reformation, evangelism
and prayer for the return of forgiveness and peace.
Ecclesiastical politics were another major factor in the formation of
churchmen's attitudes to the war. Orthodox Establishment ministers in both England
and Scotland increasingly feared the advance of Evangelicalism and also believed
themselves to be increasingly insecure in terms of government protection and support,
and this encouraged them to voice loud support for the government and its policies
during the war, in order to prove their indispensability to public order and loyalty.
Some Dissenters were easily persuaded to oppose the war because its cause was
embraced by the Establishment, and others because of the support that the war was
seen to give to Roman Catholicism in Europe, anathema to the most reformed of the
sects.
Finally, in common with the rest of the population, those ministers who
continued to sympathize with the cause of the French Revolution after the war broke
out (whether because of their radical or reformist political views or because of their
antipathy to Catholicism) usually opposed the war, while those in whom it inspired
fear concerning the survival of religion, authority and public order generally supported
it. Religious radicalism of the left or of the right tended towards political radicalism
and opposition to the war, while religious moderation or conservatism tended towards
loyalism. This particularly affected Evangelicals and Methodists within the Established
Churches, who retreated from 'high-flying' liberalism somewhat in order to support
the Church and State against enemies foreign and internal, shelving ecclesiastical and
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political reformism for the time being and emphasizing the need for nationwide moral
reform. Government inducements to loyalty should not be overlooked, although it is
impossible to say how many they actually persuaded to preach loyalty, since they
were usually given to ministers whose inclinations were likely to have been
conservative already. Henry Dundas was particularly assiduous in courting Scottish
ministers of different persuasions: 'perhaps if I was to name what circumstance was
of the most essential importance to the peace of the country, I would name the
influence of the clergy over the people properly exercised,' he told Pitt. Moderates and
Evangelicals in the Establishment received royal chaplaincies, and the Episcopal and
Catholic Churches received relief and subsidies.137
How far did their preaching affect the ordinary people? The impact of
conservative and radical literature in general on public opinion will be considered in
chapter 8, but the churches held a particular significance war-time as leaders and foci
of national sentiment and as a source of comfort for the anxious and the bereaved,
despite the gradual erosion of the influence of Establishment religion by the
Enlightenment and by industrial urban growth, which had already begun.138 The
combined loyalism of the majority of the clergy of most denominations at such a time
of national emergency undoubtedly had some impact. The number of published
loyalist sermons was probably only a small proportion of the whole and many more
taught conservative principles without referring directly to the war, or even to the
French Revolution. Sermons were an unusually powerful means of communication,
in that they reached the literate and illiterate alike and could claim the support of the
highest possible authority. The pulpit was a most effective platform, particularly when
combined with the written word. Bradley ranks the Anglican clergy with the best of
politicians and government pamphleteers, and many of their Scottish counterparts
could also be commended for their consistency and force of argument. Attendance
was high on national Fast and Thanksgiving Days, since these were regarded as times
of great symbolic significance. 'Many eighteenth-century Englishmen and women still
understood society and politics in predominantly religious terms, and in times of
national crisis they looked to the pulpit for a defence and reaffirmation of traditional
beliefs.'139 Printed sermons could have a wide circulation: 10 000 coarse and 1000
fine copies of George Hill's The Present Happiness of Great Britain (Edinburgh,
1792) were distributed.140 Nevertheless, it is open to debate how much success the
137 Fry, The Dundas Despotism, pp.177, 179, 180, 182; Dundas quotation on p. 179.
138 See Watson, Charge to the Clergy of Llandaff, pp. 125-6 on this; Murray, 'The Influence of the
French Revolution', pp.387-9, 395.
139 Bradley, Church, Clergy and Counter-Revolution, pp.7, 16.
140 Brims, 'Scottish Democratic Movement', p.357.
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conservative sermons had in converting those with reformist or radical inclinations to
patriotism and submission, or, on the other hand, how many otherwise loyal citizens
were persuaded to oppose the war by pacifist or radical sermons. It seems likely that,
in general, the most that sermons could achieve politically was to confirm people in
their own attitudes by giving them Scriptural and ecclesiastical backing.
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7. Women at War: British Women and the Wars Against
Revolutionary France 1792-1802
As sailors in a storm throw overboard their more useless lumber, so
it is but fit that the Men should be exposed to the dangers and
hardships of war, while we remain in safety at home. They are,
generally speaking, good for little else but to be our bulwarks.1
Thus 'Sophia' (possibly the redoubtable Lady Mary Wortley Montagu) sought to
justify the masculinity of the military profession, while stating her case for Woman
Not Inferior to Man in 1739. In 1793 war was as imminent a problem for British
women as it had been for 'Sophia', and one which kindled similar anxieties about
gender and spheres of operation.
The difficulties of attempting to delineate the attitudes of British women to the
wars against revolutionary France are largely concerned with the lack of evidence.
Those women who left detailed written records of their opinions on the conflict were
usually exceptional people as well as unusual women for their time, and they are few
in number. Yet the question of female views on the war is important enough, though
generally neglected,2 to be considered seriously on the basis of what evidence there is.
Their opinions were naturally often identical to those of men, but it is arguable that,
whatever part of the social or political spectrum they represented, women consistently
emphasized certain issues and concerns. Moreover, not only were they trying to
answer the questions posed also for men by the war (issues of the grounds and aims
of the war, its nature and conduct, and the question of peace) but, in a war which had
a direct impact on a very wide cross-section of society over such a long period of
time, they also struggled with the question of their own role in a society at war. Their
very contribution to the literary debate on the war was questioned for its validity and
propriety. In the decade in which Mary Wollstonecraft published her Vindication of
the Rights of Woman (1792), this controversy provided an immediate illustration of
some of the issues she had raised concerning the nature and rights of women. This
chapter will examine the active involvement (both traditional and innovative) of British
women in the war against revolutionary France; the opinions of female writers on its
grounds, nature and conduct; their views on female involvement in it; and an
1 Quoted in Virginia Sapiro, A Vindication of Political Virtue. The Political Theory of Mary
Wollstonecraft (Chicago and London, 1992), p.261.
2 Exceptions include Linda Colley, Britons. Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (Yale, 1992), pp.250-
262; Stella M. Ni Ghallchoir Cottrell, 'English Views of France and the French, 1789-1815',
unpublished D.Phil, thesis (Oxford, 1991), pp.95-146.
238
examination of men's attitudes towards women's participation in the war and the
debates surrounding it. As Stella Cottrell has pointed out, it would be unhelpful to
study women in isolation with respect to a phenomenon so intrinsically male as
eighteenth-century warfare and its literature.3
I
Laetitia Matilda Hawkins claimed in her Letters on the Female Mind (1793) that
The whole world might be at war and yet not the rumor of it reached
the ears of an Englishwoman—empires might be lost, and states
overthrown, and still she might pursue the peaceful occupations of
her home; and her natural lord might change his governor at
pleasure, and she feel neither change nor hardship.4
Yet, in a war in which one-sixth of British men of military age were involved in the
army, navy, militia, or Volunteer corps,5 it was surely impossible that women would
remain completely unaware and unaffected. Fanny Burney insisted that public affairs
demanded the interest of private feelings of even mothers, wives and children, such
was the magnitude of the crisis;6 and historians now recognize that even Jane
Austen's works, though traditionally regarded as being oblivious to the major events
of her day, and despite the peaceful rural settings and plots of her novels, were
probably highly coloured by the turmoil of the Revolution and the wars.7
Women were, firstly, actively involved in traditional female wartime
occupations and in those concerns peculiar to this war which fitted into the accepted
spheres of female influence. Sacrifice was seen as a female speciality (male loss and
bereavement is rarely mentioned), and their biggest public contribution to the war
effort was held to be their releasing of husbands, brothers and sons to serve in the
armed forces with the risk that they might not return. Sewing and knitting were more
mundane skills that women could respectably contribute—Colours for Volunteer
corps, socks and flannel waistcoats for the regular army. Some society ladies, such as
Georgiana, Duchess of Devonshire, accompanied their husbands to their militia
obligations.8 Standing naval personnel (pursers, boatswains, gunners, carpenters and
3 Cottrell, 'English Views', p.96.
4 Laetitia Matilda Hawkins, Letters on the Female Mind (2 vols.: London, 1793), ii, 194.
5 Emsley, British Society and the French Wars, p. 133.
6 Fanny Burney, Brief Reflections Relative to the Emigrant French Clergy: Earnestly Submitted to
the Humane Consideration of the Ladies ofGreat Britain (London, 1793), pp. 1-2.
7 See Marilyn Butler, Jane Austen and the War of Ideas (Oxford, 1975) and Warren Roberts, Jane
Austen and the French Revolution (London and Basingstoke, 1979).
8 Earl of Bessborough (ed.), Georgiana. Extracts from the Correspondence ofGeorgiana, Duchess of
Devonshire, (London, 1955), pp.204, 207. See also BMC 8347, James Gillray, 'Flannel Armour;—
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cooks) were each usually warranted to one particular ship for the greater part of their
working lives and, while warships were in port, their wives and families often treated
their vessels as their homes.9
Philanthropic work was another recognizably female sphere. Hester Lynch
Piozzi (previously Mrs. Thrale) was particularly concerned for the ordinary people in
her neighbourhood because of the hardships they sustained during the war, and she
distributed food, held special dinners on holidays, encouraged basic education for the
children, and criticized the government for apparently ignoring the misery of the poor
(and its potential consequences).10 The French emigres who took refuge in Britain
were not welcomed by all women—the pro-French writer Helen Maria Williams had
no sympathy for them, and Lady Elizabeth Foster was frankly terrified of them11—
but others pitied and tried to help them. Fanny Burney married an emigre, Alexandre
d'Arblay. Her novel, The Wanderer (1814) was begun and set in the 1790s, and has
much to say about the position of the homeless and alienated refugees. Hannah More
insisted that British help for the emigres ought not to be seen as 'rare and splendid
actions', but rather 'the ordinary and habitual virtues which occur in the common
course of action among Christians'.12
Some British women, of differing social and political backgrounds, had
reason to be resident in France during the Revolution or even during part of the war,
and so gained first-hand experience of international events and their Continental
repercussions. The Duchess of Devonshire and her husband, Foxite supporters, left
England for a year in June 1789: en route to Spa, they spent some time with the Queen
of France (a friend of Georgiana's since 1774) just at the very outbreak of the
Revolution, experiencing the incursions of the mob at Versailles and hearing accounts
from some of the principal actors of the events happening in the States General. The
Duchess returned to the Continent in November 1791 and did not return to England
until September 1793, eight months after the outbreak of the war between Britain and
Female Patriotism,—or—Modern Heroes Accoutred for the Wars' (18 November 1793); ibid., 8348,
[William Dent], 'Beauty's Donation or Feeling and Loyalty' (21 November 1793); ibid., 8349, Isaac
Cruikshank, 'Flannel Coats of Mail against the Cold or the British Ladies Patriotic Presents to the
Army' (25 November 1793).
9 Michael Lewis, A Social History of the Navy, 1793-1815 (London, 1960), pp. 261, 280, 285; see
also N.A.M. Rodger, The Wooden World (Glasgow, 1986; Fontana Press, 1990), pp.21-3.
10 William McCarthy, Hester Thrale Piozzi. Portrait ofa Literary Woman (Chapel Hill and London,
1985); see, for example, Katharine C. Balderston (ed.), Thraliana. The Diary ofMrs. Hester Lynch
Thrale (later Mrs. Piozzi) 1776-1809 (2nd edition, 2 vols.: Oxford, 1951), ii, 1002-3.
11 Helen MariaWilliams, Letters from France: Containing Many New Anecdotes Relative to the
French Revolution, and the Present State of French Manners (2nd edition: London, 1792), p. 104;
Bessborough (ed.), Georgiana Corr., p.224, Lady Elizabeth Foster to the Duchess of Devonshire, 2
March 1797.
12 Hannah More, 'Remarks on the Speech of M. Dupont, with a prefatory address in behalf of the
French Emigrant Clergy' (1793) in Works (3 vols.: London, 1847), ii, 403.
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France. Her friend, Lady Sutherland, was in Paris during the eventful month of
August 1792.13 The radical Mary Wollstonecraft lived in France from December 1792
until late summer 1795—through two and a half years of continual conflict between
the two countries. Helen Maria Williams' elder sister, Cecilia, had married a
Frenchman and lived there, and Williams herself, another radical, spent much time in
France from 1788 onwards. The conservative Lady Eglantine Wallace had been
arrested in Paris in October 1789 under suspicion of being an agent of the English
government; she was aquitted, but remained on the Continent for the next three years,
making the acquaintance of the French General Dumouriez, whom she greatly
admired. Wallace eventually fled from Spa when it was pillaged by the Austrians and
Prussians in their retreat in September 1792, and took refuge first in Liege and then in
Maastricht, before returning to England in January 1793.14
Women also became actively involved in the British war effort in this period in
greater numbers and in new ways. Many more engaged in pro-war activism than had
been the case in any previous conflict, encouraged, as were ordinary British men, by
the late eighteenth-century context of burgeoning extra-parliamentary political activity
of various sorts—an abundance of available literature, pressure groups, associations,
meetings, and so on. Female friendly societies marched in displays of patriotic
celebration,15 and local ladies were much in demand to present Colours to newly-
formed militia and Volunteer corps at great open-air ceremonies.16 Mrs. Jane Webb of
Plymouth, anxious to prove the loyalty of the great majority of the whole British
population, male as well as female, wrote:
...all ranks of people, with a spirit becoming Britons, are arming for
our internal defence....May we not borrow a phrase from the French
Convention—but, I hate them all—may we not say the whole
kingdom is the school of Mars; the ladies are zealous, and in many
places have presented those new-raised corps with colours.17
D.G. Vaisey's research on donations to the 1798 Voluntary Contribution in
Staffordshire suggests that women were eager to participate in patriotic subscriptions,
13 Bessborough (ed.), Georgiana Corr., p. 194, Lady Sutherland to Georgiana, Duchess of Devonshire,
31 August 1792.
14 Lady Eglantine Wallace, The Conduct of the King ofPrussia and General Dumourier Investigated
by Lady Wallace (London, 1793).
15 Colley, Britons, pp.237-8, 277-81.
16 See R.W. Chapman (ed.), Jane Austen's Letters to Her Sister Cassandra and Others (2 vols.:
Oxford, 1932), i, 65, Jane Austen to Cassandra Austen, 2 June 1799; Sophia Sarah Banks' collection
of broadsides and newspaper cuttings in the British Library, LR.301.h.6, ff.55-70; Valpy, Sermon
Before the Reading and Henley Associations, pp.33-4.
17 Jane Webb, A Letter to His Grace the Duke of Portland, on the Late Alarming Parties in the
Country, by Mrs. Webb (Plymouth, 1795), pp. 12-13.
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giving small and large amounts according to their means.18 In the face of much male
sneering and teasing, Mrs. Crewe and the Marchioness of Buckingham set up a
Society of Ladies designed to raise money to help emigre clergy in Britain.19 Linda
Colley argues that these activities were not just a socially acceptable extension of 'the
traditional female virtues of charity, nurture and needlework' into the military sphere,
but rather 'the thin end of a far more radical wedge', because they demonstrated that
these domestic skills possessed 'a public as well as a private relevance'.20 Such
organized charity, as distinct from hidden generosity, demonstrated that women
wanted these needs to be noticed by British society and that they had the self-
confidence to set about meeting them themselves.
They were rarely involved in the physical defence of the country. The
presentation of flags and the collection of subscriptions were as close as they were
generally permitted to encroach—or as far as they wanted to be involved.
Nevertheless, during the Fishguard landings of 1797, when the danger was real and
present rather than merely anticipated, local women played a significant part in the
defence of the town. They turned out in numbers to help chase off the enemy, and one
of them, Jemima Nicholas, was said to have captured fourteen of the invaders, for
which she was awarded a pension for life of fifty pounds a year.21 Moreover, despite
its illegality, some women did sail with warships during operational voyages. Samuel
Grant, purser on board the Dido in 1795-6, recorded in his journal playing cards on
several occasions 'with the Ladys', presumably passengers. Twice in the summer of
1798, he noted that women gave birth on board his ship the Goliath, when it was
anchored at the mouth of the Nile.22 At least two other women were present at the
Battle of the Nile in 1798, for they were still alive to present claims for the General
Service Medal in 1847 (which the Admiralty did not refute, but declined to award).23
During the naval mutiny at the Nore in June 1797, The Times reported that 'A
Lieutenant of Marines is said to have been killed by a pistol-shot from one of the
women in the Iris Frigate.'24 On the practice of female stowing away, Michael Lewis
wrote: 'How often this happened it is impossible to say, but odd instances of women
18 Vaisey, 'The Pledge of Patriotism', esp. pp.214, 220-2.
19 Joyce Hemlow (ed.), The Journals and Letters ofFanny Burney (12 vols.: Oxford, 1972-84), iii, 5,
Fanny Burney to Dr. Burney, 16 September [1793]; Margaret Anne Doody, Frances Burney. The Life
in the Works (Cambridge, 1988), p.205.
20 Colley, Britons, p.261.
21 Cottrell, 'English Views', pp. 121-2. Cottrell points out that these facts were entirely ignored by
the broadsides describing and celebrating the community's escape—these rather emphasized women's
weakness and helplessness.
22 NMM, GRT/3, 28-30 April, 10 May 1795; ibid., GRT/6, 17 July, 16 September 1798.
23 Lewis, Social History of the Navy, p.283.
24 The Times, 14 June 1797.
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aboard turn up so regularly, and often so unexpectedly, that the thing cannot have
been a rarity.'25
Women could also accompany the armed forces legitimately, although they
were not universally welcomed. Admiral Sir John Jervis (later Earl St. Vincent)
declared in August 1796 that 'the nurses, and other women, on board the Dolphin
Hospital Ship...are become so licentious as to be a nuisance to the Sick, to the
Surgeon, and [to Dr. Harness, Physician to the Mediterranean Fleet]', and he ordered
that they be all discharged to the Naval Hospital at Gibraltar.26 In a similar vein,
Matthew Lewis, a Home Office clerk, grumbled to Evan Nepean at the War Office
about the numbers of women travelling with British army regiments, for whom
additional accommodation had to be provided (quoting numbers of around 50 - 150
women, often together with their children, per regiment of 500 - 900 men). At the end
of one such letter, Lewis added darkly: 'While you hawe Female Armies, there will be
plenty of Plundering.'27
Women's activism during the war was not limited to pro-war activities. There
were women of all backgrounds who believed that war in general was sinful and that
this particular war was unjust and unnecessary. Scottish women took part in anti-
militia riots. In the 1797 Tranent militia disturbances, the women complained that 'it
was a hard thing for them to have the trouble of bringing up children...and then to
have them taken away from them' to do military service.28 John Bohstedt notes that,
interestingly, no women are reported to have been involved in the riots provoked by
the Supplementary Militia Act in England and Wales; however, they did participate in
the London 'crimp' riots of August 1794, and they were very often involved in food
riots all over the country, particularly in those years in which the hardships of war¬
time exacerbated poor harvests, notably 1795-6 and 1799-1800. They were also
prominent in Campbeltown's resistance to the press-gang in February 1795 and in the
crowds in London in September 1800 protesting against high prices, the war and the
government's policies in general.29 Women supported John Thelwall's series of
radical lectures in London, Norwich and Yarmouth, and one lady participated in a
25 Lewis, Social History of the Navy, p.282.
26 NMM, DUC/3, Jervis to Captain Retalick, 25 August 1796.
27 PRO HO 50/385 ff.175,461, Matthew Lewis to Evan Nepean, 19 Feb. and 7 May 1794. C.f. the
Sun, 28 February 1793: 'The Duke of York did not suffer any but married women, who could shew
their certificates, to embark with the Guards.' On women accompanying troops abroad, see also the
Sun, 14, 17 August 1799.
28 R.A. Houston, 'Women in the economy and society of Scotland, 1500-1800,' in R.A. Houston
and I.D.Whyte, Scottish Society 1500-1800 (Cambridge, 1989), p. 137.
29 Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics, pp.174, 3, 33, 69, 74, 85-6, 93-4, 189, 206;
Stevenson, 'The London "Crimp" Riots', pp.45-6; Logue, Popular Disturbances in Scotland, p.121;
RogerWells, Wretched Faces, p.65.
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subscription to prosecute the press-gang which had disrupted his lectures in
Yarmouth.30 The eccentric Lady Wallace tried to influence government policy directly:
having met and been enchanted by Dumouriez, she was prevailed upon by the French
general to appeal to her government on his behalf to form an alliance with the French
Republic. After stipulating to Dumouriez that he must not bombard Maastricht or
attack Holland in any other way, she wrote confidently to the British Cabinet, not only
from the Continent, but repeatedly after her return to England at the beginning of
1793. 'I was ignorant enough to flatter myself,' she confessed in a pamphlet
explaining her actions to the nation at large, 'that I was most materially serving my
country, by making these proposals,' and she was bewildered by the lampooning she
received from the loyalist press.31
Political pamphleteering, however, was possibly the most radical activity in
which women were involved during the war, however conservative the contents of
some of their publications, for it demonstrated that women were able to do the one
thing in which their presumed inability was supposed to set them apart from men—to
think intelligently about the war and its issues. In replying to Helen Maria Williams'
radical Letters from France with her own Letters on the Female Mind (1793), Laetitia
Hawkins tried to prove that women's minds were naturally unsuited to politics, yet
she herself had to plunge deeply into political arguments in order to refute her
opponent.32 She feared social anarchy, whether among ranks or between the sexes,
but it could only be prevented by political means.33
Mary Wollstonecraft's literary output did not end with the Vindication of the
Rights ofWoman. Shortly after her arrival in Paris in December 1792, she wrote to
her sister Everina: 'my spirits are fatigued with endeavouring to form a just opinion of
public affairs'.34 She proceeded to write the Letter on the Present Character of the
French Nation (1793), which, according to Virginia Sapiro, 'is also the first glimpse
we have of the political idealist (an English Jacobin) seriously grappling with the
reality of human political behaviour: the Terror.'35 Helen Maria Williams also
struggled with this, but she did little more than accept the violence and note her
confusion. Wollstonecraft's thinking and questioning were much more substantial. In
30 E.P. Thompson, 'Hunting the Jacobin Fox', pp.96, 99.
31 Wallace, The Conduct of the King ofPrussia, pp. 116-7.
32 Hawkins, Letters on the Female Mind, i, 5, 7-11, 18, 21-3, 117.
33 Ibid., i, 85-7, 105-6; ii, 90-1; Mary Poovey, The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer. Ideology as
Style in the Works ofMary Wollstonecraft, Mary Shelley and Jane Austen (Chicago and London,
1984), pp.31-2.
34 Ralph M. Wardle (ed.), The Collected Letters ofMary Wollstonecraft (New York and London,
1979), p.225, Mary Wollstonecraft to Everina Wollstonecraft, 24 December 1792.
35 Sapiro, A Vindication ofPolitical Virtue, p.32.
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1794, she published a substantial Historical and Moral View of the Origin and
Progress of the French Revolution; and the Effect It Has Produced in Europe, which
provides us with her fullest analysis of the French Revolution and the nature of
politics. It covers only the period up to 1790; nevertheless, being delivered from the
standpoint of 1794, it has a significant amount to say about war and the tendency of
the Revolution towards it. Ardently pro-French and profoundly emotionally involved
with the Revolution, Wollstonecraft was nevertheless clear-sighted enough to perceive
and fear the tyranny of human passions which, in the present situation, had produced
the Terror and war. She was sickened by the cruelty she saw, yet she understood the
Revolution to be intrinsic to the general progress of the world towards a more
enlightened and equitable state, and she tried to explain the presence of violence in
such a process.
Loyalist works by women are also significant. Hester Piozzi's Retrospection
(1801) is deceptively easy to brush aside as the collection of thoughts and ponderings
of an elderly lady36—almost an ordered version of Thraliana, her private book of
jottings and journalistic fragments. It presents, however, a tight and deterministic
vision of world history, rather in the style of seventeenth-century Puritan apocalytic
literature, presenting events as moving inexorably towards the Revolution and the
war, with which the work closes. It can be argued that Fanny Burney's novels from
the revolutionary and war period are not typically simple conservative fables, but
rather—particularly The Wanderer—a mixture of ideological elements in a serious
exploration of current aspects of the revolutionary war debate in Britain, such as
political radicalism, national chauvinism, the role of women in society and the
stultifying effects of luxury and insularity in a nation.37 Other women—notably Mary
Robinson and Amelia Alderson (later Mrs. Opie)—expressed clear views on the war
through poetry published in newspapers and periodicals.38
The writings of these women and others should not be cast aside as superficial
or insignificant. Like those of men, they might not always have been accurate, but
they were making serious contributions to the general discussion about the current
turbulence of world affairs. To appreciate these fully we need to explore in greater
detail what they had to say about the war with France in particular.
36 The Critical Review dismissed it as 'a series of dreams by an old lady'—quoted in McCarthy,
Hester Thrale Piozzi, p.248.
37 Doody, Frances Burney, pp.205,325-8.
38 See Betty T. Beimett (ed.), British War Poetry in the Age ofRomanticism: 1793-1815 (New York
and London, 1976), passim.
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II
The majority of the British population, male and female, welcomed the French
Revolution in its initial stages and certainly did not envisage the magnitude of the
cataclysm it would become. T somehow fancy 'tis but a temporary Judgement on a
Court so impious as theirs has been,' Mrs. Piozzi commented airily, '...and France
after She has been bent backwards so long, will feel her Elastic Force, & restore
herself speedily.'39 Many were subsequently greatly disappointed by the rapid
degeneration of the Revolution into violence and ferocious ambition. Unsurprisingly,
most women were convinced that war was, in general, an evil which ought to be
avoided if at all possible; they were also, however, generally imbued with the same
Francophobia as characterized the average British male in this period. Ward Hellstrom
and Warren Roberts have detected a markedly Gallophobic bias in Jane Austen's
novels, particularly through her characterization of certain individuals (Windham in
Pride and Prejudice, the Crawfords in Mansfield Park and Frank Churchill in Emma,
for example) with classic 'French' personality traits, such as frivolity, urbanity,
polish, moral carelessness, deviousness and wilfulness, as opposed to her heroes'
and heroines' plain 'English' virtues.40 The Lady's Magazine continued to carry
reports on the fashions current in Paris whenever it could, despite the war;41 but
women were part of a population which by and large supported its government in the
conflict against the French Republic. Hester Piozzi, as so often, colourfully captured
the ambivalent attitude of many: 'The Times are sadly out of Joynt indeed, the War
ruinous, & Peace a peril that I hope we shall be spared; for as things now stand We
have a Right to keep French men from our Island by Alien Bills &c.'42
Some, such as Hannah More, were quite convinced of the justice of the war.
In what war, she asked, 'can the sincere Christian ever have stronger inducements,
and more reasonable encouragement to pray for the success of his country, than in
this?' It was a war fought not for revenge or conquest, but for the defence of Britain's
king, constitution, religion, laws and liberty ('in the sound, sober, and rational sense
of that term').43 British aims in the hostilities, according to most pro-war literature,
were clearly the protection of British blessings; some women followed a more
Burkean, crusading line and were, like More, of the opinion that Britain's best, and
39 Balderston (ed.), Thraliana, ii, 788.
40 Ward Hellstrom, 'Francophobia in Emma', Studies in English Literature, v (1965), 607-17;
Roberts, Jane Austen, pp.31-42.
41 See the issues for May and October 1798 (vol. 29), June, September, November and December
1799 (vol. 30).
42 Balderston (ed.), Thraliana, ii, 904-5.
43 More, 'Remarks on the Speech of M. Dupont', p.407.
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perhaps only, security lay in the utter destruction of the Revolution and its doctrines
and the restoration of the monarchy in France.44
It is also true, however, that many women did think that they, as women, had
a particular interest in the successful outcome of the war. They were convinced that
the survival of the family institution, and indeed their own personal safety, was at
risk. Colley suggests that this fear, though partly inspired by the significant danger of
a French invasion in this particular conflict, was partly caused by the trial and
execution of Marie-Antoinette and other prominent French women, demonstrating that
the revolutionaries were no respecters of gender. 'In Great Britain, woman was
subordinate and confined. But at least she was also safe.'45 Thus, Mrs. Richard
Wyatt, presenting their Colours to the Havering Volunteers, told them: 'As fathers,
husbands, brothers, relations and friends, our sex and our children have every natural
and well-founded reason to hope, for all the protection in your power, under God,
that zeal, affection, and courage, can yield.'46
There were also, of course, women who continued to support the French
Revolution and who therefore opposed the British war against France. Mary
Wollstonecraft and Helen Maria Williams were the most prolific of these female
writers. Because of the increasing diffusion of the knowledge and understanding of
political principles, Wollstonecraft believed that it was possible to be confident of an
approaching era of peace and reason, in which war would be abandoned as irrational
and brutish.47 The arguments used by female anti-war pamphleteers mirrored those of
their male counterparts, although they were more likely to condemn all war as futile
and immoral, as well as the present war as unjust and unnecessary. Wollstonecraft, in
an interesting development of the ancient concept of otium (the possession of leisure
as the distinction of the nobility) into the late eighteenth-century middle-class disdain
for the idleness of the rich, condemned war as an adventure pursued by the idle.48
Mrs. Barbauld insisted that the language of 'natural enemies' was absurd, 'as if
nature, and not our own broad passions, made us enemies...and yet this language is
heard in a Christian country, and these detestable maxims veil themselves under the
semblance of virtue and public spirit.' People ought to think less about glorious
44 See, for example, Mrs. Piozzi in Balderston (ed.), Thraliana, ii, 932 and Miss Patterson's speech
to the Poplar and Blackwell Volunteers as reported by the Times, 6 June 1799 (Banks Collection,
f.64).
45 Colley, Britons, pp.254, 256.
46 Banks Collection, f.57.
47 Mary Wollstonecraft, 'An Historical and Moral View of the Origin and Progress of the French
Revolution; and the Effect it has Produced in Europe' (1794), in Janet Todd and Marilyn Butler (eds.),
The Works ofMary Wollstonecraft (7 vols.: London, 1989), vi, 17.
48 Ibid., p.23.
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heroes returning home and more about the maimed, the bereaved, the orphaned, the
mental agonies of war and the ravages it inflicted upon countries (of which Britain,
geographically isolated from the Continent, was complacently ignorant).49
In discussing the nature of the war, women writers were often accused of
'emotionalism' in their writing. It is true that they often vented their personal
emotional responses to the Revolution itself. They were particularly fixated by French
atrocities and the sufferings of individuals; whereas male writers, by and large, wrote
about these only for a purpose, chiefly that of inspiring loyalty to the British
government through fear, female writers and readers seemed to be genuinely
transfixed by them. Many women were deeply affected by the trial and execution of
Louis XVI,50 but it was not only the sufferings of royalty which fascinated women.
The Lady's Magazine carried such items as 'The Dying Soldier; a Fragment' and
'Verses from the French; written by a French Prisoner, as he was Preparing to go to
the Guillotine' ,51 Helen Maria Williams herself admitted that her political creed was
'entirely an affair of the heart; for I have not been so absurd as to consult my head
upon matters of which it is so incapable of judging', and she wrote of falling
'violently in love' with delegates to the National Assembly for their patriotic
gestures.52
It is not necessary, however, to see all subjective female writing about the
Revolution as warm-hearted romanticism. Sapiro argues that Wollstonecraft's heated
style in the Vindication of the Rights ofMen (1791) was all part of her response to
Edmund Burke, who had himself written in a subjective and often violently colourful
style. Wollstonecraft was simply replying in kind or, perhaps, even criticizing his
method by parody rather than responding to the substance of his argument.53
Furthermore, when women wrote 'sentimentally' about the Revolution or the war, it
was generally because, for various reasons, they elevated the private aspects of events
over the public. Wollstonecraft's Vindication of the Rights ofWoman was, on one
level, a call for radical political thought to be extended beyond public politics of
government institutions into the private politics of the home.54 They recognized this
49 [Barbauld], Sins ofGovernment, Sins of the Nation, pp.22-4, 28-30.
50 See, for example, Wardle (ed.), Wollstonecraft Letters, p.227, Wollstonecraft to Joseph Johnson,
26 December 1792; also poems written by Mary Robinson, Charlotte Smith and Eliza Daye for The
European Magazine,The Scots Magazine, The Universal Magazine, and The Gentleman's Magazine,
printed in Bennett (ed.), British War Poetry, pp.74-6,81-2,91-4.
51 The Lady's Magazine, 29 (July 1798), 325, 328. See also Pendleton, 'English Conservative
Propaganda', p.216.
52 Helen MariaWilliams, Letters written in France in the summer of 1790 (London, 1790), pp.66,
59-60.
53 Sapiro, A Vindication ofPolitical Virtue, pp. 191-202.
54 Ibid., p.28.
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quality in themselves: the heroine of Helen Maria Williams' little tale, Madeleine and
Auguste, perceived the chief implication of the Revolution's liberation of all
Frenchmen to be that every Frenchman must surely be free to marry the woman he
loved. The lady of the house in Charlotte Smith's novel, The Banished Man (1794),
was able to talk of politics, but chose not to be interested in them except insofar as
they could advance her own family members.55
A preoccupation with individual public figures was a natural by-product of this
concern for the personal in female writing and opinions. Lady Wallace was clearly
fascinated by Dumouriez—'this wonderful little hero' —while Helen Maria Williams
was infatuated with Napoleon, 'the benefactor of his race' .56 Other women were more
fascinated by what they believed to be the Corsican general's ferocity and brutality,
and with what particulars of his early history and present lifestyle they could glean
from the press. Mrs. Piozzi was vehement, viewing the name 'Napoleon' as a
corrupted form of the word 'Apollyon', which means 'Destroyer': the apocalyptic
name for the devil.57 The superhero for pro-war writers was Horatio Nelson,
particularly after his victory over the French fleet at the Nile in 1798. The Lady's
Magazine published a biographical sketch of the admiral, together with 'an elegant
Engraving' of his ship engaging two larger Spanish ships off Cape St. Vincent in
1797.58 He became a focus for the cult of heroism which had grown among women
in particular in Britain over the preceding five years, though this was adulation at a
distance. Nearer at hand, as Jane Austen noticed, in Pride and Prejudice, were those
soldiers barracked around the country, parading in their fine uniforms and attracting
much female attention—another way, personal and small-scale, in which women
could involve themselves in a society at war. Colley notes that the Oldham diarist
William Rowbottom was also very aware of this enthusiasm for military men among
the local working women. Austen did not describe this situation with approval,
however, as Roberts comments—rather, in Lydia's downfall, she showed what could
happen as a result of billeting soldiers among the civilian population.59
55 Williams, Letters from France (1792), pp. 174-5; Charlotte Smith, The Banished Man (4 vols.:
London, 1794), ii, 110-1. See also Bessborough (ed.), Georgiana Corr., p.208, the Duchess of
Devonshire to her mother, 2 July [1794].
55 Wallace, The Conduct of the King of Prussia, p. 125; Helen Maria Williams, A Tour in
Switzerland, or a View of the Present State of the Governments and Manners of those Cantons, with
comparative sketches of thepresent state ofParis (2 vols.: London, 1798), ii, 56-7.
57 Hester Lynch Piozzi, Retrospection: or a view of the most striking and important events,
characters, situations, and their consequences, which the last eighteen hundred years havepresented to
the view ofmankind (2vols.: London, 1801), ii, 523-4. See Revelation 9:11.
58 The Lady's Magazine, 29 (November 1798), 483-5.
59 Colley, Britons, pp.256-7; Roberts, Jane Austen, p.96. See also BMC 9315, Rowlandson, 'She
Will Be a Soldier' (1 May 1798); ibid., 9316, Rowlandson, 'Soldiers Recruiting' (1 August 1798).
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This tendency of women writers to focus on the private at the expense of the
public is entirely in keeping with the views of late eighteenth-century society on what
women of their class ought to be interested in. It was deliberately encouraged, as
Mary Poovey points out, by the male editors and journalists of women's literature.
She contrasts the reporting of the execution of the French King in The Gentleman's
Magazine with that in its companion-piece, The Lady's Magazine. Whereas the former
concentrated on detailed political information, of which the execution of Louis XVI
was merely one part, the latter, which rarely reported on political events, made a great
deal of the event, concentrating especially on the outward appearance of the king on
the day of his death.60 Women were not supposed to be concerned with public affairs,
and their emphasis on the personal, private side of public events may well have been
the valve they used in order to be able to comment on the war at all.61 Some clearly
felt this constraint more than others—radicals such as Wollstonecraft and Williams felt
no shame in commenting freely on the war; the conservative Austen and Burney were
much more restrained, but this does not mean that they were unaware of the public
arena of political events or unable to express opinions about it, as Austen showed in
her subtle comment on the government policy creating military barracks.
Female writers often carried a vivid impression of the sense of the significance
of the times, whether they believed them to be enlightened or evil. 'The times,'
proclaimed Mrs. Piozzi, '...are signally aweful, and I verily think that Daemons are
roaming about among us, with enlarged permission both to tempt and terrify. God
preserve us!' 'The face of things, public and private, vexes me,' Wollstonecraft told
Gilbert Imlay in 1794, '...I really believe that Europe will be in a state of convulsion,
during half a century at least.'62 They frequently rejected as arrogant and unjustified
the notion that Britain was a favoured nation. Britain was not so pure, wrote Mrs.
Barbauld austerely, that it could afford to see itself as an instrument of divine justice.
It was true that Britain was a great nation, in terms of power, resources, connections
and dependencies, and had it in its power considerably either to add to, or to diminish,
the sum total of human happiness, but it had abused that power shamefully. Its trade
in African slaves and its conquests in India were crimes at least as heinous as any
France had committed, and it had wilfully encouraged the aggression of the European
states towards one another. In any case, she insisted, 'as God is no respecter of
persons, neither is he of nations.' Fanny Burney agreed. 'We are too apt to consider
60 Poovey, The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer, pp. 16-19.
61 Roberts, Jane Austen, p. 105.
62 Oswald G. Knapp (ed.), The Intimate Letters ofHester Piozzi and Penelope Pennington 1788-1821
(London, 1914), p. 188, Mrs. Piozzi to Mrs. Pennington, [April 1800]; Wardle (ed.), Wollstonecraft
Letters, p.242, Mary Wollstonecraft to Gilbert Imlay, [1 January 1794].
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ourselves rather as a distinct race of beings,' she told readers of herBriefReflections,
recognizing that English chauvinism was a major obstacle to helping the emigres,63
Miss Berry disliked her enforced wartime restriction to Britain and the insularity of her
countrymen: 'All the other cities, and courts, and greatmen of the world may be very
good sort of places and of people, for aught we know or care; except they are coming
to invade us, we think no more of them than of the inhabitants of another planet.'64
Conservative female writers were particularly anxious about the domestic
troubles, potential and actual, created by the war. 'John Bull is a fine Fellow,' claimed
Mrs. Piozzi, 'but if not well fed he will roar.''65 She disapproved both of measures
taken by the rich that were guaranteed to irritate the poor (such as the closure of the
London brewhouses in 1795) and measures taken by the poor to redress their
grievances against the rich (such as the handbill posted on church doors in Streatham
'demanding, not requesting Relief for the lower Orders').66 Hannah More's
pamphlet, Remarks on the Speech of M. Dupont (1793), made the connection
between atheism and radical politics: 'it is much to be suspected, that certain opinions
in politics have a tendency to lead to certain opinions in religion.' In its turn, the curse
of atheism was that it cut civil and social ties, it acted against happiness, excellence
and virtue, and its fruit was intolerance. She saw the war as a divine chastening 'for
the iniquities of the human race', and called for individual and national self-
examination and repentance. 'Let us learn to fear the fleets and armies of the enemy
much less,' she warned, 'than those iniquities at home which this alarming
dispensation may be intended to chastise.'67 Mrs. Jane West, in her Tale of the Times
(1799), wrote approvingly of contemporary moral instructors who 'would not ascribe
the annihilation of thrones and altars to the arms of France, but to those principles
[such as the French sanctioning of divorce] which, by dissolving domestic
confidence, and undermining private worth, paved the way for universal
confusion.'68 Mrs. Piozzi also saw the war in a fundamentally religious light, but hers
was a much more apocalyptic vision. The Retrospection, in particular, reads in many
places like a work of biblical prophecy. Distinguishing first from second causes, she
63 [Barbauld], Reasons for National Penitence, pp.16, 4; [Barbauld], Sins of Government, p.25;
Burney, BriefReflections, p. 12.
64 Lady Theresa Lewis (ed.), Extracts ofthe Journals and Correspondence ofMiss Berryfrom the year
1783 to 1852, (3 vols., 1865), ii, 70, Miss Berry to Mr. Greathead, 2 August 1798.
65 Balderston (ed.), Thraliana, ii, 842.
66 Ibid., ii, 920, 909; Knapp (ed.), Letters to Mrs. Pennington, p. 180, Mrs. Piozzi to Mrs.
Pennington, 21 August 1799.
67 More, 'Remarks on the Speech of M. Dupont', pp.402, 405-6.
68 Quoted in Butler, Jane Austen and the War ofIdeas, p. 105.
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perceived the first, cosmic cause of the French Revolution to have been the turbulence
which is the preparation for Antichrist. In May 1795, she noted in her journal:
a complete Famine, and three raging Factions are now devouring
Paris, Poland is become a mere Desart deluged with blood,
Insurrections in Rome and Naples threat those unhappy States with
calling in the French directly, whilst Russia & the Porte prepare for
instant war.—And is not the End of all to be expected? What other
Signs would this adulterous Generation have?69
Since the war was, at least partly, to be viewed in a religious light; since
Britain had no great cause for complacency concerning its own standing with heaven;
and, above all, since it was highly desirable from the point of view of domestic social
order, female writers urged moral vigilance on the nation. The reform of political
grievances, Hannah More insisted, would be insufficient to render the British 'a
happy people'; for that, a reformation of manners would be necessary. Helen Maria
Williams was horrified by tales of atrocities perpetrated by British officers upon Italian
patriot prisoners of war, which she felt to be a great stain on British honour.70 So
depressed was Mrs. Piozzi about the moral state of the nation that, in 1800, she told
her friend Mrs. Pennington that the government 'must leave off appointing such
solemnities' as national fasts, since 'the time is over when they did any good.'71 Mrs.
Barbauld, whose pamphlets of 1793 and 1794 were written especially for national
Fast Days, was also scathing in her denunciation of their use. 'We cannot subsidize
the Deity, as we have subsidized his majesty of Sardinia,' she warned. Instead, a
national fast ought to generate serious and sober reflections among the British people,
and a firm resolve to turn from all their evil conduct.72
Nevertheless, British women could be as 'jingoistic' as men and, despite their
condemnation of national chauvinism and their sternness concerning Britain's moral
shortcomings, most of them were confident of their country's superiority in most
respects. Conservative moralists had to be careful: they berated their nation, yet they
wanted to encourage contentment with its constitution and submission to the
government.73 Even the pro-French Helen Maria Williams was scornful of Gallic
69 Balderston (ed.), Thraliana, ii, 929.
70 More, 'Remarks on the Speech of M. Dupont', p.391; Helen Maria Williams, Sketches of the
State ofManners and Opinions in the French Republic, towards the close of the eighteenth century.
In a Series ofLetters (2 vols.: London, 1801), i, 198.
71 Knapp (ed.), Letters to Mrs. Pennington, p. 188, Mrs. Piozzi to Mrs. Pennington, [April 1800].
72 [Barbauld], Sins ofGovernment, pp.7-9, 30-3.
73 See, for example, More, 'Remarks on the Speech of M. Dupont', p.390; R. Brimley Johnson
(ed.), Letters ofHannah More (London, 1925), p. 132, Hannah More to Mrs. Boscawen, 1797; Knapp
(ed.), Letters to Mrs. Pennington, p.203, Mrs. Piozzi to Mrs. Pennington, 6/7 September 1800.
252
naval pretensions, however enthusiastic: 'they cannot be formidable against so vast a
superiority as ours, and naval skill so pre-eminent.'74
Women writers did not often comment on the actual conduct of the war. Mrs.
Piozzi, Miss Berry and Helen Maria Williams were the most interested in its events
and in the conduct of British strategy, but they did not often offer sustained
examination of these aspects of the conflict. Miss Berry, who was as well informed,
however, as any private individual, male or female, was frequently scathing of the
government's strategy in the United Provinces. 'How Holland is now to be saved I do
not see,' she wrote to Horace Walpole on 28 September 1794; 'and how we are to be
safe when it is gone, I as little see; and how and why the D. of York stays to have half
his army destroyed, and the other half driven home, I still less see.' ' I have long been
perfectly convinced,' she later wrote, 'by several circumstances that have come to my
knowledge, of the entire and disgraceful ignorance of our Ministers as to foreign
politics.'75
Fears of invasion, however, were often expressed. Mrs. Piozzi wrote a short
Address to the Females ofGreat Britain to urge women to make themselves useful in
the face of an invasion by acting rationally and supporting the men, rather than
panicking and becoming an extra burden. She translated General Dumouriez's
pamphlet, Tableau Speculatif de 1'Europe (1798), to raise the invasion alarm among
the apparently complacent upper ranks of British society: by then, she thought that
'Invasion was a fear no longer fashionable', and when the Irish rebellion erupted later
that year, she saw it as a severe mortification of British vanity.76 Fanny Burney was
not one of those who were sanguine about the prospect of an invasion. Her beloved
sister, Susannah, had moved to Ireland with her husband in 1796, and since the threat
to Ireland was always greater in the 1790s than that to England, Burney was
continually anxious for her sister's safety. She was not confident that the militia
would be able to fend off an invasion once the French had landed:
I hope our shipping will keep off any deeds of contest, as I own I
am not very valiant for Men unused to arms as opposed to those
who have triumphed in them, & who exist but by plunder. God keep
them off, I cry, for Militia men would find it difficult.77
74 Helen MariaWilliams, Letters from France: Containing a Great Variety of Interesting and Original
Information (2 vols.: London, 1793), ii, 126.
76 Lewis (ed.), Berry Correspondence, i, 441, Miss Berry to the Earl of Orford, 28 September, 1794;
ibid., ii, 102, Miss Berry to Mrs. Cholmeley, 28 October 1799.
76 McCarthy, Hester Thrale Piozzi, p.229; Piozzi, Retrospection, ii, 527.
77 Hemlow (ed.), Burney Journals and Letters, iii, 273, Fanny Burney to Mrs. Phillips, 10 February
[1797],
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Linda Colley has suggested that 'in the wars against Revolutionary and
Napoleonic France, as in so many later conflicts, British women seem...to have been
no more markedly pacifist than men,' despite the assumptions of history.78 This may
have been true, but the issue of peace was a characteristically female emphasis. Men
might stand to gain from war—professional soldiers and sailors, armaments
manufacturers, cloth and leather manufacturers, shipbuilders and contractors. These
interests might benefit women indirectly, too, but women were perhaps more likely to
be influenced by thoughts of the darker side of war and its adverse consequences for
individuals and families involved. Mrs. Piozzi would have endorsed this. 'Female
politicians,' she wrote, 'confide in negotiation. Elizabeth of England, Isabella of
Spain, hated war, and took every possible method to avoid it; while Queen Anne's
natural ardour to conclude the peace of Utrecht cost her almost her life.'79 Hannah
More, for all her conviction of the justice of the conflict on Britain's part, was weary
of it:
I say nothing of war, because I am weary of the word, nor of peace,
because I lose all hope of it. I am thankful, however, that the fault
does not rest with us; one can bear the affliction far better, when one
has not to bear the guilt also.80
Songs and poems lamenting the miseries of war and sighing for peace were common,
such as the sonnets to peace and war published in The Lady's Magazine of 1799.81
These were not always simple diatribes against the horrors of conflict. Amelia
Alderson's Ode, Written on the Opening of the Last Campaign (1795), might be
described as a pragmatic cry for peace. Preferring an immediate cessation of
hostilities, but recognizing that this call was unlikely to be heard on its own merits, the
poem prays not only for immediate peace but also for victory against France in the
coming campaign, in the hope that this may hasten peace.82
Mrs. Piozzi did have doubts about the eventual peace settlement at Amiens.
Admitting that, like everyone else in Britain, she was glad of the peace for material
reasons, she nevertheless deplored what to her was a peace bought for the indulgence
of British avarice and which allowed the French to reorganize the map of Europe and
persuaded Britain to abandon its allies to their fates. Georgiana, Duchess of
78 Colley, Britons, p.262.
79 McCarthy, Hester Thrale Piozzi, p.221.
80 Johnson (ed.), Letters ofHannah More, p. 132, Hannah More to Mrs. Boscawen, 1797.
81 vol. 30, pp. 40, 88. See also Banks Collection, p. 12—'A Favourite SONG. Sung by Miss
WALPOLE in the CAMP.'
82 See Bennett (ed.), British War Poetry, pp. 137-8.
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Devonshire, was much more sanguine and perhaps more typical: 'Peace! Peace!
Peace!...I must rejoice in spite of all the alarmist long faces.'83
Ill
What did female writers think about women's involvement in the war? Again, the
available evidence comes from a very limited group of writers; but the subject was one
they discussed, because it was of particular relevance to them. By referring to the war
at all in their writings, they were taking part in the debate on it, and even this was
questioned for its validity by many in late eighteenth-century Britain.
There was much acquiescence among these female writers with the notion of
separate spheres for men and women, particularly since they were dealing with such
an overwhelmingly male-dominated phenomenon as warfare. In this value system, a
woman's sphere was almost wholly confined to the private, the domestic and the
small-scale—the public arena, the acknowledged sphere of the significant and the
substantial, was for men. 'Till Amazonian virtue is again the fashion, we shew better
in peace than in war, at home, in our closet or our nursery, than in the field of battle,'
admonished Laetitia Hawkins.84
The acceptance by women of these separate spheres of influence, however,
did not preclude activism in the war effort. Mrs. Piozzi's Address to the Females of
Great Britain appealed to women to cease behaving like children and statuettes:
Nobody hinders [women] from being wise or strong, Learned or
brave; nor does any one...pretend to like them better for being weak,
ignorant or pusillanimous. You are therefore...called upon, to act
rationally, & steadily: & to maintain that Place among reasonable
Beings we have so often heard you urge a Claim to.85
Women instructed each other to contribute good domestic management and, thus,
money to the British war effort. Hannah More's Remarks on the Speech of M.
Dupont was prefaced by an 'Address in Behalf of the French Emigrant Clergy' which
was particularly directed at a female audience, urging them to make small
retrenchments in their domestic economy and especially in their own fashion expenses
in order to be able to give more to this cause.86 Fanny Burney admitted that charitable
giving was not an exclusively female virtue, but she argued that women's demands on
83 Balderston (ed.), Thraliana, ii, 1030-1; Bessborough (ed.), Georgiana Corr., p.248, the Duchess of
Devonshire to her mother, [31 March 1802].
84 Hawkins, Letters on the Female Mind, i, 118.
83 Quoted in McCarthy, Hester Thrale Piozzi, p.234.
86 More, 'Remarks on the Speech of M. Dupont', pp.377-80.
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their own money were less serious and pressing than those of men, and that their
response to her appeal might therefore be swifter and more general.87 The role that
women claimed for themselves in public life and in the war, if at all, was largely a
moral one, and this view would be preserved well into the nineteenth century. As
Colley points out, 'Invoking woman's superior morality and virtue proved
enormously helpful because it converted the desire to act into an overwhelming duty to
do so'; moreover, 'being thought of as moral exemplars is a lot better than being
dismissed as merely inferior and irrelevant.'88 In her Strictures on Female Education
(1799), More argued that German and French infidel literature, which had played such
a substantial part in the making of the Revolution in France, was now being
specifically directed at Englishwomen, through novels, romances and plays designed
to carry their message subtly into female hearts and minds. She urged moral vigilance
upon her readers, particularly because she believed that the influence of women of
rank on society was considerable. This meant that women had a major contribution to
make to the well-being of the state and, while Britain was at war, towards the saving
of their country.89
Fanny Burney protested against a female involvement in public political
debate. She told Princess Mary that she had deliberately left political ideas out of her
novel, Camilla (1796), because 'they were not a feminine subject for discussion' as
well as because she believed that steering her readers clear of politics altogether was
doing them a better service even than inculcating them with her own ideas on the
subject. She also thought it necessary to preface her Reflections on the Emigrant
French Clergy (1793) with an 'Apology' to justify the entry of a woman into public
affairs on the grounds of 'tenderness and humanity'. Yet enter that arena she did: as
Katharine M. Rogers has argued, Burney was what most women who entered public
affairs in late eighteenth-century Britain had to be—a mixture of the professedly
conformist and the protesting individual. Indeed, that very preface went on to argue
that while it was generally right for women to remain in the background, on this
occasion it was more proper for them to come forward to offer their help to the
emigres.90
Mrs. Piozzi claimed that she was 'no Politician.. .nor either think much or care
about publick Concerns.' She had learned, as William McCarthy comments, to
87 Burney, Brief Reflections, p.7.
88 Colley, Britons, pp.277, 280.
89 More, 'Strictures on the Modern System of Female Education' (London, 1799) in Works (2nd
edition, 3 vols.: London, 1847), iii, 33-7, 11-13.
90 Katharine M. Rogers, Frances Burney. The World ofFemale Difficulties (New York and London,
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dissemble her 'unfeminine' interest in politics.91 In fact, she worried that she had
learned to camouflage it too well: of her British Synonymy (1794), which used
political affairs to illustrate many of its definitions, she wrote, 'I am only afraid the
title may prove a millstone round its neck: no one will think of looking for Politics in a
volume entitled British Synonymy.'92 It was a typically female way of expressing
political opinion—subtly rather than overtly—but the fact remained that to express
political opinion publicly was not at all a typically female thing to do.
Hannah More, like Fanny Burney, felt compelled to defend her entry into
political polemics: at the beginning of her preface to her Remarks on M. Dupont's
Speech, she justified her boldness by the emergency facing the country. Yet
throughout the pamphlet, she claimed not to be 'entering far into any political
principles' 93 It is true that her conservative case was specifically based on religious
principles, but it was just as clearly extended to be applied to political submission and
loyalty. She also actively encouraged the distribution of conservative propaganda, and
she wrote a great many of the famous Cheap Repository Tracts herself.
Miss Edwards, who presented the Colours to the St. Clement Danes
Volunteers, and who was herself the daughter of the captain of the First Company of
the Corps, made an eloquent defence of the active participation of women in the war
effort. As reported by the True Briton, she told the assembled company:
...I am not unconscious that such public exhibitions [as this] are far
less within our province than the exercise of retired and domestic
virtues...however...When the safety of our Country has been
menaced—when half the Civilized World look up to Great Britain as
their best bulwark against despotism and oppression, it may be
allowed even female diffidence to become animated beyound its
usual sphere of action, and to feel—ardently feel, that no sex or
station should be indifferent in the Cause of Freedom and
Religion.94
Helen Maria Williams wrote self-deprecatingly of her former ignorance of and lack of
interest in public affairs, but explained that she had been stimulated to write by her
'love of the French revolution' .95
All these women were in some way claiming that the extraordinary nature of
the present times justified their self-directed extension of the female sphere of
91 Quoted in McCarthy, Hester Thrale Piozzi, p.210.
92 Knapp (ed.), Letters to Mrs. Pennington, p.101, Mrs. Piozzi to Mrs. Pennington, 2 December
1793.
93 More, 'Remarks on the Speech of M. Dupont', p.407.
94 True Briton, 10 June 1799, in the Banks Collection, f.64. See also Miss Patterson's speech to the
Poplar and Blackwell Volunteers, as reported by the Times, 6 June 1799, in ibid., f.64.
93 Williams, Letters from France (1790), p. 108.
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influence. It was true that it was the extremity of threatened revolution in Britain and
actual warfare with France which drew them into public activity and permitted their
acceptance in this role by society, and that the implication (doubtless often, if not
always, sincerely meant) was that after the return of peace and domestic order, they
would shrink back into their traditional place in the national wallpaper. Indeed, this is
what many women did after 1815; yet a precedent had been created, a wedge forced
in, an erosion encouraged. Women would continue to write public tracts on social and
political subjects; they would be prominent, for instance, in the Chartist movement of
the 1830s and 1840s.
Neither conservative nor radical female writers advocated the idea of female
soldiers. While More wanted to 'prevail on beauty, and rank, and talents, and virtue,
confederating their several powers, to exert themselves with a patriotism at once firm
and feminine, for the general good,' this was intended only in the sense of moral
influence, for she immediately went on to insist that she was not 'sounding an alarm
for female warriors, or exciting female politicians,' for she hardly knew which of the
two was 'the most disgusting and unnatural character.' Wollstonecraft might well
have wanted to see female politicians—she certainly wanted women to study politics
and to have a greater involvement in it—but she insisted that while she wished to see
'the bayonet converted into a pruning-hook', she would not advise women to 'turn
their distaff into a musket' .96
IV
What did British men think about women's involvement in the wars against
revolutionary France? Those who thought about the question at all reacted, as might
be expected, in various different ways. Some simply used gender to characterize
men's attitudes to the war and to incite them to particular responses; some saw a
passive role for women in the war effort; others were willing to allow them, or even
demand from them, a more active participation; and various tactics were employed to
steer women towards perceiving their war role in particular ways.
The concept of woman as weak and helpless, physically, mentally and
emotionally, was used to denigrate different responses to the war. Both pro-war and
anti-war writers and artists dubbed their opponents' position as effeminate and, by
implication, unworthy. Dennis O'Bryen charged the government with a 'feminine'
cowardice, in resorting to slander against France rather than relying in a 'manly' way
96 More, 'Strictures on Female Education', p. 14; Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights
ofWoman (1792; London, 1985), pp. 162, 160.
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solely on the military force of the nation, pitted against that of France. It boded ill, he
pointed out, for the success of peace negotiations that the British government and its
hirelings should continue to insult and vilify the power it could not conquer.97
Vicesimus Knox, the Foxite Rector of Runwell and Ramsden Crays in Essex, and
Master of Tunbridge School, went even further, smearing the very trappings of
warfare with effeminacy. 'Poor outside pageantry!' he lamented. 'What avails the
childish or womanish finery of gaudy feathers on the heads of warriors?'98
It was more usual, however, for war to be represented as virile and peace as
effeminate. Reasons againstNational Despondency was a pamplet written in reply to
Thomas Erkine's anti-war tract, A View of the Causes and Consequences of the
Present War against France (1797). Its author scornfully dismissed peace-
campaigning as 'this effeminate and womanish longing for what will rivet their chains
[to revolutionary France] in the soundness of their slumbers.'99 Recruitment literature
appealed to masculinity, offering ways in which to assert it, such as the physical
training and discipline necessary for the work of a soldier or sailor, and providing a
reason to undertake the dangers and hardships of battle—the protection of women and
children, man's natural role. By implication, not to serve one's country in this way
was to leave one's masculinity open to doubt. This taunt was reinforced by a
comparison of British men firstly with the French, and secondly with British
women.100
One of the propaganda devices directed against Frenchmen was to smear them
as effeminate. This was not a new insult—it had been employed for decades before
the Revolutionary wars, and the French fop was a standard element in eighteenth-
century caricatures and literature.101 It was used extensively during the wars,
however, particularly in caricature representations of the French army and its generals,
and it was suggested that the French had used not only weak and soft men in their
regiments, but also women.102 The Times noted on 1 February 1793 that:
In General CUSTINE'S army are said to be more than 1000 women
in the dress of men. This explains an article in the Frankfort Gazette
97 O'Bryen, Utrum Horum? pp.29-31.
98 Knox, The Prospect ofPerpetual and Universal Peace, p.353.
99 Reasons against National Despondency, pp. 104, 167.
100 Cottrell, 'English Views', pp.111-2, 118.
101 Michael Duffy, The Englishman and the Foreigner (Cambridge, 1986), pp.34-7.
102 Leonora Davidoff and Catherine Hall, Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle
Class 1780-1850 (London, 1987), p.19; Cottrell, 'English Views', p.117; BMC 8435 and 8436,
Gillray, 'A Republican Beau' and 'A Republican Belle' (10 March 1794); the Sun, 24 September
1793.
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which states, that one of the French officers taken at Hockheim, was
soon after delivered of a fine boy.103
The implication was not only that the French army was contemptible but, further, that
if an army of British men could be defeated by them, it would destroy all their own
and their country's pretensions to masculinity. Some propaganda, moreover,
suggested that the French were so unmanly that even the women of Britain could fight
them successfully—and if British men could be outshone by the women, their own
virility was to be doubted.104 Caricaturists were especially contemptuous of the
British militia and Volunteers, and one print of 1798 or 1799 shows eight of these
soldiers each in conversation with a woman on some point of equipment or tactics. In
each pair, the woman is depicted as humouring, showing contempt for, or even
correcting the man's ignorance and ineptitude in military matters.105
Most writing by men that considered the position of women in wartime
assumed and reinforced an environment of separate spheres for men and women, but
often these were spheres in which there was a contribution of some sort which women
could make towards the successful outcome of the conflict. Some propaganda viewed
this contribution as fundamentally passive. Women, along with children, provided a
valuable justification for the war and a compelling reason for men to fight for their
country, because of their helplessness and need for protection. 'Who can call himself
a Man,' asked 'Job Nott' rhetorically, 'who can pretend love for women, who will
not prepare or assist in some way to thrust such villains from his Country's shores.'
Arthur Young made the same point, although his priorities were less flattering to
women: 'The question [of the Revolution and the war] concerns not empires, kings,
and ministers alone—it comes home to our fortunes, our houses, our families.'106
Women could also, passively, be seen as a reward for men who had fought
valiantly. Their approval and their safeguarded and faithful chastity were held up as
prizes for military courage and service. In a more abstract sense, they were sometimes
seen as goddesses or figureheads, either for the nation, or for particular groups of
soldiers, sailors, or Volunteers. This perhaps made it peculiarly appropriate that they
produced and presented the banners and flags which were to be carried at the head of
103 See also the Sun, 11 February 1794: 'A French Serjeant was delivered of male twins in the
prisons of Cologne, on the 27th ult.'
104 Cottrell, 'English Views', pp.118-20.
103 BMC 9314, [Woodward] and Isaac Cruikshanks, ['Female Opinions on Military Tactics'],
([1798/9]). C.f. Lady Elliot's amusement at a friend of hers and her husband's enlistment in the
Volunteers (Minto (ed.), Life and Letters, ii, 291-2, Lady Elliot to Sir Gilbert Elliot, 12 June 1794.
106 [Theodore Price], A Continuation ofMy Last Book, or a Back Front View of the Five Headed
Monster. By Job Nott, Buckle-Maker (Birmingham, 1798), p.6; Young, The Example of France,
p. 144.
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regiments and corps of soldiers, which could come to symbolize their benefactors,
perhaps rather in the manner that ladies' tokens had been worn centuries previously at
jousts. Col. Parker replied to the presentation of his corps' banner with the words,
'when they shall look upon this banner, presented by a female hand, it will bring to
their recollections, other tender and interesting affections, and add enthusiasm to their
loyalty.'107 Female figureheads could be either homely or exalted: 'Mrs. Bull' (an
innovation of the American revolutionary era), or 'Liberty' or 'Britannia'. 'Britannia'
is interesting, in that she symbolized both the country and womanhood. As Cottrell
puts it, 'In her, defence of the country and defence of women become one composite
issue and chivalric protectionist attitudes can be harnessed in the interests of
patriotism.' She further points out that Britannia, by never taking part in battle, even
in defence (although she was usually shown to be armed), encapsulated the position
of women within the war propaganda. She watched the conflict from the safety of her
island or from the heavens, and her weapons appear to be decorative and symbolic
rather than for practical use. She symbolized all women, since in prints she was
depicted as a beautiful young woman, while songs and broadsheets stressed her older,
maternal aspect.108
Other war propagandists were prepared to permit women a more active role in
the British war effort than merely to provide figureheads, to be possessions to be
fought for or to be rewards for male soldiers and sailors. One of the most frequently
expounded contributions of this sort was the moral significance of women. In part,
this was to be seen as a contribution to military morale, in women's faithfulness to
their absent husbands. It was also claimed to be a much more fundamental force in
society, however. Months before the outbreak of war between Britain and France, in
June 1792, a print had been published showing French fish-wives scourging nuns in
a convent church. Beneath the title was etched the message:
N:B: This Print is dedicated to the Fair-Sex of Great-Britain, &
inten[d]ed to point out the very dangerous effectes which may arise
to Themselves, if they do not exert that influence to hinder the
'Majority of the People' from getting possession of Executive
Power.109
107 Col. Parker of Maidstone, as reported in the Sporting Magazine, 73 (October 1798), 33-4, Banks
Collection, f.57.
108 Cottrell, 'English Views', pp. 113-6.
109 BMC 8109, [Gillray], 'A Representation of die horrid Barbarities pracdsed upon the Nuns by the
Fish-Women, on breaking into the Nunneries in France' (21 June 1792).
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It was therefore incumbent on women to be all they could, both morally and
intellectually. For John Bowles, the government war propagandist, as for many
others, the most important attribute of a woman was her chastity, and not only that,
but its very appearance also, must be jealously guarded.
Female chastity has ever been, and ever must be, the main source of
all the virtues, which constitute the strength and the security of
human society. And female modesty is ordained, by the unalterable
constitution of our nature, to be the Guardian of female chastity.110
Thus it was that Bowles saw in the current fashion for women to wear lower
necklines than he thought modest, 'a much more formidable enemy than Buonaparte
himself, with all his power, perfidy, and malice', for female modesty was 'the last
barrier of civilized society'.111
Colley has pointed out that most wars of any length emphasized the divisions
between the sexes, as the men left home to fight, leaving the women to stay at home,
and that the chastity of women was taken particularly seriously by propagandists in
this war against revolutionary France because it was a way of scoring points against
the enemy, whose women, it was suggested, were somewhat less than chaste.112 A
further reason for the chastity of women being held in such great regard by British
men in the late eighteenth century, however, has been suggested by Mary Poovey.
'Because of the complex economic and psychological roles of property, a woman
could, by one act of infidelity, imperil both a man's present security and his dynastic
ambitions.'113 This explains why, in the prints and literature which depicted women
as potential victims of Frenchmen, their treatment was highly ambivalent. Some
propaganda showed them simply as objects of purity and beauty to be protected and
sheltered from the contamination and plundering of the French. Some, however,
showed them as unreliable and unscrupulous, revoltingly eager for the attentions of
Frenchmen and greedy for the potential material gain involved in these
transactions.114 In the second case, the fear was not so much for the violation of the
women as for the contamination of the British line, and therefore British property and
liberty, by a French attack. That this was so is supported by the fact that those whom
110 John Bowles, 'Remarks on Modern Female Manners, as Distinguished by Indifference to
Character, and Indecency ofDress; extractedfrom 'Reflections Political andMoral at the Conclusion
of the War' (London, 1802), p.5.
111 Ibid., p.12.
112 Colley, Britons, pp.250-3. See, for instance, Desultory Thoughts, pp.64-6; 'A Word to the
Wise', The Anti-Gallican Songster, i (London, 1793), 6; Mallet du Pan, Dangers Which Threaten
Europe, p.53.
113 Poovey, The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer, pp.5-6.
114 See, for example, BMC 9725, Cruikshank, 'Thoughts on the Invasion!' (27 August 1801).
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men were urged to protect were almost exclusively female, rather than the sick or the
aged.115 The role of women as childbearers was naturally exalted in time of war,
when the size and health of the population was a particularly significant issue. It was
also an important part to play in the sense that they were the crucial link in the
progress of the male British line.
Another important active role admitted to women by even the sternest
conservatives was that of encouraging their men to fight for their country. Theodore
Price, alias 'Job Nott', insisted that every British arm be lifted against such wild
beasts as the French were proving themselves to be; 'and if every Arm be lifted; then
an old man's arm and a Woman's Arm must be lifted up.' Among other things,
women could be 'stirring up young men to be public spirited protectors of their fair
country-women,' and, he added, 'you can laugh at those who hang back.'116 Arthur
Young argued that if the influence of British women were thus extended, he was sure
that it would send 'thousands with ardour to the standard'.117 Some seemed
positively to relish the bloodthirstiness of the role they were thus assigning women, as
Robert Farren Cheetham's lines suggest:
...like Spartan dames of yore,
Who bravely met their coward-men,
And sham'd them to the embattled field again,
To bear away the palm, or welter in their gore...118
Other suitably feminine contributions were good domestic management and the
donation of money, and tending the sick and wounded. The Sun wrote approvingly
on 27 November 1799 of a ladies' subscription for the relief of those bereaved by the
expedition to Holland, and even noted severely that young men ought to follow this
shining example. Women were urged to 'buy British' and not to be influenced by
fashion into buying goods from abroad. Since men were fighting to preserve comforts
and pleasures for them, women ought to donate their money and jewellery and to live
frugally for the cause. Ladies were asked to refuse to patronize shops which had men
employed in work that women could do, in the hope that this would both send men
115 Cottrell, 'English Views', p. 138.
116 [Price], A Back Front View, p.6.
117 Young, National Danger, p.30; also published in idem., (ed.), The Annals ofAgriculture, xxviii
(1797), 184.
118 Robert Farren Cheetham, 'Ode for Her Majesty's Birthday', in idem.,Odes and Miscellanies
(London, 1796), p. 108.
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into the army or navy and provide work for impoverished women.119 Thomas
Gisborne allowed that
...fortitude is not to be found merely on the rampart, on the deck, on
the field of battle. Its place is no less in the chamber of sickness and
pain, in the retirements of anxiety, of grief, and of disappointment.
In bearing vicissitudes of fortune, in exchanging wealth for penury,
splendour for disgrace, women seem, as far as experience has
decided the question, to have shewn themselves little inferior to
men.120
Female pamphleteering was a more questionable activity. Some male writers
approved heartily of well-known conservative female writers such as Hannah More:
'MISS HANNAH MORE APPEARS to be another Instrument in the hand of
Providence to benefit Mankind, and I hope she will go on in her labour for the public
good, and not be diverted from her object by the sneers,' wrote 'Job Nott'.121 Fanny
Burney's BriefReflections Relative to the Emigrant French was favourably reviewed
in the British Critic, the Monthly Review, the Critical Review and the European
Magazine.122 Men were often doubtful of the value or propriety of women publicly
airing their views on political subjects, however. Richard Polwhele thought that it had
been just tolerable in the past, when they had been few and far between—then, a
female writer had been 'esteemed a Phenomenon in Literature' and sure of a
favourable reception among the critics simply because she was a woman. Now there
were so many of them that they had grown complacent and bold, and no longer could
they charm critics by self-deprecating acknowledgements of their own 'comparative
imbecility'.123 The Sun noted on 24 September 1795: 'The Comedy which Mrs.
Inchbald has ready, we hope to find devoid of all political allusions; and if so, her
Muse, we doubt not, will receive and deserve a liberal patronage.'
With regard to the defence of the country, men were even more loath to yield
their traditional prerogative to women. 'Chamberpot defence' was the most that was
generally allowed to women by the cartoonists—beyond that, it was men's work.124
119 Cottrell, 'English Views', p. 103; [Theodore Price], Further Humble Advice from Job Nott
(Birmingham, 1800), pp.5-6; P.H., xxxiii, 1455, Windham, 24 April 1798; The Times, 11 March
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'A hen is a repectable animal when she is feeding or brooding her chickens,' 'Thomas
Bull' told his cousin 'John', 'but in a cockpit she is ridiculous.'125 A letter to The
Gentleman's Magazine of February 1795126 complained that women in Edinburgh
were sporting military dress and, worse still, having been caught up in the
Volunteering fervour, were learning military drill. 'Unsuccessful as the present war
has hitherto been,' he spluttered, 'it has been shown that the courage and bravery of
Britons is not yet evaporated...' — in other words, that men were not yet quite reduced
to allowing women to fight with or for them. Apart from this wound to machismo,
female soldiery was, according to a reply in the March issue, 'absurd, indecent, and,
I will add, wanton, behaviour'.127 This was made plain to readers of The Lady's
Magazine in 1799:
Women were created to be the companions of man, to please him, to
solace him in his miseries, to console him in his sorrows, and not to
partake with him the fatigues of war, of the sciences, and of
government. Warlike women, learned women, and women who are
politicians, equally abandon the circle which nature and institutions
have traced round their sex; they convert themselves into men.128
Even the Morning Chronicle expressed disapproval of the Scottish women's
involvement in the Tranent militia riot.129 Poets occasionally referred to women in
arms, though rather ambiguously: Robert Southey's epic poem Joan ofArc (1795),
taking a military woman for its main subject, was clearly hostile to England, and
W.F. Sullivan, a little tongue-in-cheek, insisted that
...shou'd occasion warrant such a proffer,
E'en BRITISH AMAZONS themselves would offer;
Wou'd drop their Needles, Scissars, and their Stitches;
And like some Ladies—All wou'd wear the Breeches...130
It was not until 1803 that 'The Projector' wrote in The Gentleman's Magazine of his
genuine concern that women were being wasted as a potential military resource and
that, were they suitably trained and educated for the task, women might be equal if not
superior to men as soldiers. This, of course, was a highly controversial claim.131
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Men wrote much of the literature directed at women. The Lady's Magazine and
other periodicals for women were edited by men and mostly written by men.
Furthermore, as Cottrell points out, while several pamphlets were signed by 'an
Englishwoman' or 'Britannia', the text suggests that they were written by men.132 A
Sketch ofModern France. In a Series of Letters to a Lady of Fashion.. .By a Lady
(1798) is a good example. It was edited by a Christopher Lake Moody and it
professed a respectably conventional female attitude to international affairs, relying for
the most part on giving the political opinions of various male figures rather than
expressing the lady's own thoughts. It could as easily have been written by a man, for
didactic purposes, as by a woman. Most pamphlets were specifically addressed to a
male readership. Literature addressed to women laid much less emphasis on reporting
facts and was of a much more emotional or moralizing strain. 'The implicit
assumption,' as Poovey notes, 'is that women's quick passions will be more
effectively engaged by such formulations'; they were expected to be more emotionally
than intellectually responsive.133
V
The large-scale and protracted warfare of the French revolutionary period, as Colley
concludes, had a paradoxical impact on the British home front, in that it both
underlined the perceived functional differences between men and women and yet
enlarged the boundaries of women's activities.134 Clearly, only a minority of women
engaged heavily in patriotic activism, and an even smaller proportion published their
views on the war. These naturally reflected their social class and their era in the
attitudes they revealed. As McCarthy remarks of one of them: 'To read through
Piozzi's political remarks from the 1790s is to encounter again and again sharable
sentiments emphatically expressed.'135 Yet it is clear that women also had identifiably
characteristic concerns and emphases in the issues they discussed. They believed that
they had a particular interest in this war against France, as potentially the chief victims
of a French invasion and conquest. Women were often more emotional in their writing
than were men, and generally more concerned with the personal and the private than
with the massed and the public. Female writers were universally horrified by the
violence and cruelties of warfare and, while they could be as chauvinistically British
132 Cottrell, 'English Views', p.97 n.l.
133 Poovey, The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer, p. 18.
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as male writers, they also more often noticed and rebuked this attitude than did men.
Most did not comment much on the British government's conduct of the war, but
some of those who did showed themselves to be as well-informed as most male
observers. Peace was, if anything, an event still more desired by women than by men,
whatever their political stance; none seemed to be war-crusaders of the intensity of a
Burke or a Windham, ready to sacrifice all possibility of peace until monarchical
government was restored in France, however much they might wish for such an
outcome.
It is also true to say that it was a war which offered women a substantially
greater opportunity to become involved in its issues and activities than any previous
conflict had done. This was partly because it was such a long war and involved such
a great proportion of the British population. It had a direct impact on ordinary women
as well as on professional male soldiers and sailors. This was also a war in which
more emphasis was consciously placed on ideological issues than any since the wars
of religion and, since the intervening period had seen an escalation both of the press
and of literacy, there was more place for women to become actively involved. Indeed,
it might be argued that part of the war was fought not on the battlefields of Europe,
but in the realm of domestic propaganda and, in that sphere, women, if not so
numerous as men, fought alongside them, and some—Hannah More, Hester Piozzi,
Mary Wollstonecraft, Helen Maria Williams—might certainly have been accorded high
ranking posts on either side.
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8. The Voice of the People? Public Opinion and the Wars
Against Revolutionary France
J.A.W. Gunn has traced the establishment of public opinion as an acknowledged
force in British politics to the second half of the eighteenth century, through the
development of extra-parliamentary political activity and 'a corresponding softening
of the traditional animus against recognizing the popular voice outside Parliament.'1
By the 1780s, he argues, there was a growing awareness of public sentiment and an
anxiety to know how it could be gauged. The growth of popular interest in domestic
politics, and the need for popular cooperation with the government's measures if
Britain were to wage a successful war against revolutionary France, meant that the
1790s saw both loyalists and opposition politicians concerned not only to measure
public opinion but also, in some degree, to manipulate or control it.
The question immediately raised is, of what did public opinion consist? Who
were 'the public' and what were their opinions? Were they Burke's 'people', a
political elite of around 400 000, or could they be said to include the population of
Britain? Gunn, in line with Burke, restricts his enquiry to the electorate as the section
of the nation with whose opinions politicians were most concerned. Hannah Barker
has widened the definition to include all those who read newspapers and whose views
were thereby shaped and reflected in newspaper columns, while H.T. Dickinson has
studied the political activities of all extra-parliamentary classes of society.2 The war
against revolutionary France was not an abstract political question affecting only the
traditionally politically literate classes. The debate over the French Revolution itself
had, by its passion and breadth of application, burst the seams of the governing and
literary ranks of society. Church and King clubs rallied against the Dissenters'
campaign to have the Test Acts repealed in 1790; radical societies sprang up
throughout 1792; political riots multiplied towards the end of that year; and Loyal
Associations mushroomed from late November 1792 onwards.3 The outbreak of the
conflict itself demanded a response from an even wider cross-section of the nation, for
it involved a greater proportion of the British population than any previous war had
done, in terms of military participation, of vulnerability to a French invasion, and of
liability for supplying the material resources required to finance and supply the war
1 J.A.W. Gunn, Beyond Liberty and Property. The Process of Self-Recognition in Eighteenth-
Century Political Thought (Kingston and Montreal, 1983), p.263.
2 Hannah Jane Barker, 'Press, Politics and Reform: 1779-1785', unpublished D. Phil, thesis
(University of Oxford, 1994), pp.267-8, 273; H.T. Dickinson, The Politics of the People in
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3 On popular interest in politics inspired by the French Revolution debate, see also 'The Politicians',
a graphic print published in the Carlton House Magazine (1 December 1792), BMC 8133.
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effort. In a sermon preached to Volunteer companies in London in late 1798, the Rev.
William Vincent told them that 'the interests of all are so interwoven with yours, that
you are the people in reality yourselves.'4 By this time, after the Defence of the
Realm Act (1798), the Volunteers were truly a mass movement, since able-bodied
men in all classes of society were eligible to join. How is it possible to know the
views of ordinary people two hundred years ago? Some left behind diaries, letters and
memoirs; another measure of educated opinion is the vast array of caricatures and
other graphic prints published on the war—evidence, as M.D. George points out, of
an intense public interest.5 Barker suggests that the opinions expressed in
newspapers, especially the London press, reflected the attitudes of their readership to
a significantly greater extent than is usually allowed, largely due to market
economics.6 Caricaturists and graphic satirists set out more self-consciously to reflect
as well as to shape public reactions to the events and implications of the war.7 Indeed,
the character of John Bull was appropriated and further developed by them in this
decade as a representative observer of home and foreign affairs: a common
Englishman outside the governing classes, typically urban or rural middle-class, but
sometimes artisan, and, importantly, neither loyalist nor reformer, but equally critical
of both the government and the Foxite Whigs. He represented the patriotism of
common sense rather than either unthinking submission or factious opposition, and he
was a figure abused by both government and Opposition.8 Diana Donald has
suggested that loyalists tried to use him as a representation of British patriotic spirit
against revolutionary France, but that the inconsistency between this free-born
Englishman and the model they wished to promote of a self-effacing and obedient
loyalist was too great for Bull to be kidnapped by them for their own sole use. This
was forcefully demonstrated by the contribution to the pamphlet war between loyalists
and radicals of the skirmish over the 'Bull family letters' in late 1792 and early 1793.
Most of these were loyalist, written by the Rev. William Jones, but various radical
4 Rev. William Vincent, 'A Sermon Delivered in the Church of St. Magnus, London Bridge,
November 25; and in the Church of Allhallows the Great and the Less, Thames Street, December
1798; Before the Associated Volunteer Companies, in the Wards of Bridge, Candlewick, and
Dowgate', in Sermons on Faith, Doctrines, and Public Duties (2 vols.: London, 1817), i, 286. See
also Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics, p. 137.
5 George (ed.), Catalogue ofPolitical and Personal Satires, vi, p.xi; on the audience of graphic prints,
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Brewer, The Comjnon People and Politics, 1750-1790s (Cambridge, 1986), pp.45-7.
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269
answers characterized John Bull as a plain man and his brother Thomas Bull as the
servile dupe of the propertied classes.9
Clearly, it is easier to discover the views of the literate classes than those of
people who could not leave a written record of their opinions, but some impression
may also be gained from the various activities in which people became involved
because of the war, although it is as difficult to know their motives for participation as
it is to be sure of the motives of politicians and others whose attitudes have been
recorded.10 Most people, as Clive Emsley points out, were probably only aware of
and concerned with the conflict in so far as it affected their own lives;11 but many
more were thus affected, either directly or vicariously, than had been the case even in
the American war little more than a decade previously. There were troops stationed in
Britain in substantial numbers; militia ballots required lists of all men within a certain
age-range; and the Volunteers created further military visibility and experience.12 Sea¬
ports were constantly busy, and those who lived near the coast must have been aware
of the threat of a French invasion. 'A great meeting at Reepham today,' reported
Parson Woodforde of Norfolk on 23 April 1798, 'respecting all People arming
themselves &c. against an Invasion of this Country from the French &c. which is
much talked of at present by all kinds of People especially the poor.'13 War taxes
affected everyone; and bonfires and illuminations to celebrate victories happened all
over the country. The information and views of much of the population were probably
very crude, but no less valid for that.
This chapter seeks first to demonstrate the concern of the political elite with
public opinion in the 1790s and their endeavours to influence it. It then attempts to
trace popular pro-war, anti-war and uncommitted popular behaviour and the
influences on public opinion to show both its fluidity in its reactions to the war in
general and its lack of substantial engagement with the issues behind the government's
hostility to revolutionary France.
9 Diana Donald, 'John Bull and Problems of Picturing "The People" in the 1790s', unpublished paper
given at a conference of the North West Branch of the British Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies
on 'National Identities in Eighteenth-Century Britain' (September 1994); George (ed.), Political and
Personal Satires, vii, pp.xvii-xviii. For examples of radical Bull family letters, see A Few Words, but
No Lies; from Roger Bull to his Brother Thomas (London, 1792), and [Aim Jebb], Two Penny-Worth
of Truth for a Penny; or a True State ofFacts: with an Apologyfor Tom Bull in a Letter to Brother
John (London, 1793), which are both replies to the loyalist One Penny-Worth of Truth from Thomas
Bull to his Brother John (London, 1792).
10 See Colley, Britons, p.285.
11 Emsley, British Society and the French Wars, p.26.
12 See, for instance, Parson Woodforde's diary entries for 7 and 15 May 1795, printed in John
Beresford (ed.), The Diary ofa Country Parson: the Reverend James Woodforde, 1758-1802 (5 vols.:
Oxford, 1924-31), iv, 194, 197. See also p.277 below.
13 Ibid., v, 113-4, 23 April 1798; see also ibid., v, 115, 25 April 1798.
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I
When ministers spoke of the need to persuade 'the country' of the benefits of their
policies, they were usually thinking chiefly of MPs and then of the electorate. The
ministry's experience in 1790 over the Ochakov affair had shown it that it could not
automatically raise sufficient public support for a war even to defend what it
described as 'vital interests'. Nevertheless, domestic stability and popular cooperation
with the government's war effort were also essential if it was to succeed.
Loughborough warned Dundas in April 1792 that Talleyrand had been heard to
estimate that fewer than two hundred people had deliberately sought a revolution in
France. 'I hope there are not so many who mean a change of this Government [in
Britain],' he continued, 'but they will count on this side all who appear indifferent.
The Lookers on make the mob.'14 David Eastwood has written that 'the problem of
the 1790s...became the creation of an accommodation between an elitist society
struggling for survival and the broad mass of the people who, whilst denied a formal
political role, nevertheless might possess the capacity either to make or to break an
anti-revolutionary and anti-democratic state.'15 This was not only necessary in order
to defeat the radical enemy at home, by producing sufficient support for the existing
social and political order, but also in order to defeat the revolutionary enemy abroad,
by producing enough support for the war effort to supply the necessary manpower
and material resources, both to defend Britain and to defeat France. It was essential
that the British population should be persuaded that the demands made on it by the
government in aid of the war were vital to the survival of the familiar surroundings of
British life: that the war was for their own benefit as well as for that of their social and
political superiors.
The government was sufficiently concerned with mass public opinion to direct
local officials and other channels—customs officers, the Post Office, local
government officials, magistrates and hired spies—to gather information about it for
them. Ministers were clearly delighted, if surprised, by the huge response of loyalty to
the Royal Proclamation in December 1792—Grenville thought it 'little less than
miraculous', and James Bland Burges at the Foreign Office believed it to have
provided an ideal opportunity for going to war against France.16 After the conflict
began, ministers repeatedly insisted on their certainty of public support for the war
14 Peter Jupp, Lord Grenville, p. 137; Loughborough to Dundas, 24 April 1792, quoted in Emsley,
'The Impact of the French Revolution on British Politics and Society', pp.38-9.
15 Eastwood, 'Patriotism and the English State', p. 150.
16 Dropmore, ii, 359, Grenville to Auckland, 18 December 1792; BL Add. MSS 34446, ff.l61-v.,
Burges to Auckland, 18 December 1792.
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and the basic loyalty of the great majority of the population.17 'Our public spirit is
excellent,' Grenville assured Auckland on 15 February 1793. In October 1799
Canning was able to write to Lord Mornington that 'the country is more right than it
has been at any time within my remembrance.'18 Nevertheless, they were always
aware of the challenge in reality of keeping the public supportive of the war, especially
at times when the British army was suffering defeat on the Continent, or when it
appeared that the French government was ready to consider negotiations for peace, as
in early 1800. John Ehrman claims that Pitt's preoccupation with domestic unrest in
the spring of 1794 contributed to his neglecting to send off the first and second crucial
instalments of the Prussian subsidy for a whole month, which meant that the Prussian
troops it was to pay for arrived too late to take part in that year's campaign. Piers
Mackesy comments that whenever riots broke out due to high bread prices in the years
of poor harvests (1795-6 and 1798-9), 'Parliament's enthusiasm for the war would
wilt'. Grenville, impatient with popular pressure on the government to seek peace in
October 1797, told Pitt that 'If this country could but be brought to think so, it would
be ten thousand times safer... to face the storm, than to shrink from it.'19
Ministers were also conscious that any pledge to specific objectives in the
conflict might commit them to staying in the war after public support for it had run
out.20 Auckland wrote to Pitt in October 1793, after British setbacks at Dunkirk and
Toulon: 'I am angry with John Bull who lazily & peevishly by a good Fire side
neither calculates nor comprehends the Difficulties nor the Necessity of the War, but
criticizes the Ministers for doing what they could not avoid, & the Generals for not
doing impossibilities.'21 The conservative elite was convinced that radical opposition
to the government or to the war was largely based in the lower classes—the Duke of
Portland told the King in July 1797 that the only people likely to attend radical
meetings in Nottingham 'cannot consist of more than two or three hundred people at
most of the lowest and most contemptible description.' 'It is not draymen, porters,
and handicraftmen, who are qualified to speak the sentiments of the City of London,
17 See, for example, P.H., xxx, 1328, Canning, 31 January 1794.
18 BL Add. MS 34448, f.187, Grenville to Auckland, 15 February 1793; Canning to Lord
Mornington, 20 October 1799, quoted in Mackesy, War Without Victory, p.6. See also Aspinall,
LCGIII, iii, 112, Dundas to George III, 29 August 1798.
19 John Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, pp.340-2; Piers Mackesy, War Without Victory, p.6;
Dropmore, iii, 378, Grenville to Pitt, 8 October 1797. See also David Eastwood, 'Patriotism and the
English State', p. 162.
20 Mackesy, War Without Victory, pp.38-9; Colin Jones, Britain and Revolutionary France, p.21.
21 BL Add. MSS 45728, ff,176-v., Auckland to Pitt, 7 October 1793. See also BL Add. MS 37844,
f.14, Pitt to Windham, 13 October 1793, on the defeat at Dunkirk; and BMC 8434, 'Billy in the
Dumps or how to Manage Affairs on the Next Meeting of Parliament' [March 1794].
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upon the question ofWar and Peace,' sniffed one conservative pamphleteer.22 Yet the
government was aware that, as Roger Wells remarks, 'if the most vociferous of the
war's opponents found themselves outnumbered, recurrent crises [of grain supply]
threatened to galvanise a massive accretion of support for peace.'23
Not surprisingly, ministers were, if anything, still more concerned with the
loyalty of the armed forces than they were with that of the general population.
Investigations had been made as early as summer 1792 of the loyalty of army
regiments at home, and their commanding officers continued to report to the Home
Office on the attitudes of their troops. Colonel Vyse reported that, despite his
regiment's loyalty, Norwich was an imprudent place to station troops because of its
radicalism.24 Sir Gilbert Elliot wrote to his wife in February 1793 of the enthusiasm
he had noticed among soldiers embarking at Greenwich for Holland: 'their zeal and
eagerness to go on service, which does not promise to be child's play, was very
striking. The regret and dejection of those who were left was no less so.'25 The naval
mutinies of 1797 were probably as alarming to the government as any other single
event of the decade. Moreover, the elite was anxious not only about disaffected
civilian mobs, but also about pro-government rioters. 'I do not admire riots in favour
of Government much more than riots against it,' Grenville had stated in 1791, and this
apprehension was not overcome by the government's later desire to obtain the
voluntary services of loyalist activists throughout the country. The Lord Mayor of
London, for instance, was 'wearied out with this Overflow of Joy', in which Quakers
and others had been attacked for their non-participation, after the news of the Glorious
First of June.26 Hannah More was criticized by many loyalists for her attempts to
educate the poor even into a solidly conservative understanding of the world, because
by pointing them towards literacy and independent thought she seemed to be
undermining traditional social and political hierarchies.27
22 Aspinali, LCGI1I, ii, 605, Portland to George III, 31 July 1797; Reasons Against National
Despondency (1797), p.157 n. See also Aspinall, LCGIII, iii, 415, Portland to George III, 21
September 1800.
23 RogerWells, Wretched Faces: Famine in Wartime England, 1793-1801 (Gloucester, 1988), p.2.
24 PRO HO 42/20/386-395, Colonel Oliver De Lancey to Dundas, 13 June 1792, reporting on
regiments in the north of England; ibid., 42/22/436-9, Col. R. Vyse to Evan Nepean, 20 November
1792—De Lancey made a similar comment about Manchester on 30 November 1792 (ibid.,
42/22/625-6).
25Minto (ed.), Life and Letters, ii, 118, Elliot to his wife, 26 February 1793.
26 Dropmore, ii, 136, Grenville to Auckland, 22 July 1791; PRO HO 42/31/171-4, Paul Le
Mesurier to Nepean, 12, 13 and 14 June 1794.
27 A similar irony is depicted in BMC 8836, Gillray, 'Opening the Budget' (17 November 1796),
where John Bull submissively yields his breeches full of money to Pitt's grasp, but thereby becomes
sans-culotte.
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It has already been shown that the government tried to harness local and
voluntary efforts to its cause in an attempt to reach as many of the population as
possible with the conservative view of the conflict; and that religion, too, was enlisted
to encourage the submission and loyalty of the masses.28 Grenville was so harassed
by Opposition taunts at the end of 1792 that there was no such spirit of insurrection in
the country as ministers had claimed when they called out the militia and assembled
Parliament, that he planned to form a small secret committee from both Houses of
Parliament to gather enough evidence, without publicizing specific names or facts, for
ministers to be able to assert that there had been subversive designs and plans in
agitation in Britain.29 Ministers pursued public relations policies which would have
mass impact, prosecuting cheap radical publications rather than, for instance, William
Godwin's An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793), which cost three
guineas.30 Victories were magnified to eclipse the impact of war failures, as in the
case of the 'Glorious First of June', a real but small victory achieved by Lord Howe
and his fleet in the midst of their failure to prevent a convoy of grain from America
arriving safely on French shores.31 The vast numbers of conservative tracts
distributed freely to the lower orders in the 1790s may well indicate upper-class
anxiety rather than lower-class appetite, as John Dinwiddy has remarked. Yet, as
Gayle Trusdel Pendleton points out, despite the wide understanding among the
political elite that public opinion required energetic cultivation, only twenty-seven
peers (eighteen of them bishops) and twenty-four MPs made the effort themselves to
publish pamphlets in the conservative cause. Over half of the loyalist tracts and
pamphlets were written by government-hired and church writers.32
Public opinion, of course, did not concern only the government. 'The public'
was argued over and used, as passive beneficiaries or victims of the war, by both
conservatives and opposition forces in their own clashes. As Frank O' Gorman has
written, 'The issues thrown up by the war were acting as an ideological wedge
between politicians and so momentous were the causes at stake that men of all shades
of opinion were carrying them to the country.'33 Conservatives hoped that the
strength of loyalist opinion in the country would destroy radical hopes at home and
allow ministers to act decisively against revolutionary France. The opposition
28 See chapters 3 and 6 above; also Lady Eglantine Wallace, A Sermon Addressed to the People,
Pointing Out the Only Sure Method to Obtain a Speedy Peace and Reform (London, [1794]).
29 BL Add. MS 34446, f.381, Grenville to Auckland, 1 January 1793.
30 Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, p.391.
31 Ibid., p.349.
32 John Dinwiddy, 'Interpretations of anti-Jacobinism', p.47; Gayle Trusdel Pendleton, 'English
Conservative Propaganda', p. 193.
33 O'Gorman, The Whig Party, p. 163.
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emphasized the sufferings of the poor during war-time in the hope that the government
might be panicked into retreat. 'Who will say it is safe to oppress the people in their
present temper, by still heavier exactions?' warned one writer just before the outbreak
of war.34 They scorned conservative claims that the nation was united behind the
government against France. 'When declaimers take upon them to assert that the nation
is unanimous, they should at least condescend to enquire what are the sentiments of
the most numerous classes of mankind. They are as much concerned in the progress
and events of a war as any aristocratic confederacy.' Dennis O'Bryen refused to
accept that even the government believed that the Volunteers and militia, 'selected
factions, accoutred capapee(.stc)', represented the British people. David Hartley, on
the other hand, warned that rank and file soldiers ordered into action against their
fellow-citizens, always had the practical power of veto.35 The opposition too,
however, could be frustrated by a lack of clear popular cooperation with their wishes:
'John Bull knows well enough that he has been gulled all through the war; but, with
his characteristic simplicity, he prefers being duped by the ministry, to the
acknowledgement of being outwitted by the superior sagacity of those who warned
him of his danger.'36
II
A consideration of popular pro-war behaviour during the 1790s may help to bridge the
gap between David Eastwood's heterogeneous popular patriots and their many,
ambiguous and unreliable reasons for patriotic action, and Robert Dozier's militant
loyalists, criticized by Eastwood for their simple delineation as a uniformly solid
group of government supporters.37 Popular pro-war behaviour was motivated by
three broad categories of factors: the impact of active loyalism, direct individual profit
and the influence of specific issues relating to this particular war against revolutionary
France. This section discusses these influences and their effects in turn in an attempt
to examine the evidence for public support for the British government's cause in its
struggle against the French republic.
Naturally, the conservative elite hoped that the role of active loyalism would be
significant in promoting popular conservatism and support for the war. Their clear
advantage over the forces of opposition was the inherent conservatism of the majority
34 The Crisis Stated, p. 14; see also Holcroft, Letter to Windham, pp.32-3, 38-40.
35 The Crisis Stated, p. 15; O'Bryen, Utrum Horum? pp.73-4, 82; Hartley, Argument on the French
Revolution, p.36.
36 O'Bryen, Utrum Horum? p. 108.
37 Eastwood, 'Patriotism and the English State', p. 147.
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of the population, supporting the monarchy, the landed hierarchy and the Church of
England—the political and social establishment. There was therefore a lack of genuine
mass support for radicalism among the population. Widespread contentment with the
existing order meant that suggestions of possible change to a familiar system were
greeted with suspicion, particularly such a violent and chaotic change as was
demonstrated by the revolution in France. In other words, most people in Britain
believed that they had an interest in the continuation of the status quo.39, Ian R.
Christie concludes a study of popular conservative opinion with the claim that, on the
basis of the forces making for social and political stability, and demonstrated by the
balance of loyalist and anti-establishment crowd demonstrations, 'the instinct of the
people coincided with the thought of the critics of the Revolution' 39
The vast outflow of conservative propaganda may well have had some effect
in convincing, or at least assuring, those who could read it. Pendleton has claimed that
'the dominance of conservative authors, titles, and total sales in proportions so
overwhelming...make safe the flat assertion that English [literate] public opinion was
conservative rather than reformist.' The Anti-Jacobin Review sold 2500 copies
weekly, a substantial sale for such virulent loyalism.40 Pamphlets, tracts and
broadsides were written to suit both middle-class and working-class readers, and the
ideas of Burke and other popular conservative writers such as Bowles and More were
repeated frequently in loyal addresses.41 While Pendleton urges caution concerning
the use of the term 'popular literature', arguing that literature for 'the real masses' was
largely apolitical, she also refers to research which shows that the French Revolution
provoked a great number of loyal statements in mass literature, 'after two centuries of
popular lampoons on the royal family and the Church', thus indicating that the
majority of the population at the bottom end of the social scale were not oblivious to
events played out on the international political stage.42 Pamphlets written locally may
38 H.T. Dickinson, 'Popular Conservatism and Militant Loyalism', in idem, (ed.), Britain and the
French Revolution (London, 1989), pp.104, 123; Dozier, For King, Constitution and Country,
pp. 19-20; Ian R. Christie, 'Conservatism and Stability in British Society', in Philp (ed.), The French
Revolution and British Popular Politics, pp. 170-6; Schofield, 'English Conservative Thought and
Opinion', p. 15; Fry, The Dundas Despotism, p. 174. See also BMC 8695, Richard Newton,
'Spectacles for Republicans' (24 November 1795); 'King, Lords and Commons!' [1792] and 'Britons
are Happy, if They will Think So', in the British Library collection of songs and broadsides at
648.C.26, ff.56, 99.
39 Christie, 'Conservatism and Stability', p. 187, c.f. John Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics
in England and Wales, 1790-1810 (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), p.222.
40 Pendleton, 'English Conservative Propaganda', pp.219, 183 , 301, 357, 462, 489-90, 501;
Emsley, British Society and the French Wars, p.66.
41 Dickinson, 'Popular Conservatism and Militant Loyalism', pp.106, 108-12. See also Ehrman,
The Reluctant Transition, p. 163.
42 Pendleton, 'English Conservative Propaganda', pp.162-4, referring to Robert Collison, The Story
ofStreet Literature, Forerunner of the Popular Press (London, 1973).
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well have had more impact in their communities than more famous and complex
publications;43 and propaganda such as free public dinners, victory celebrations,
military parades and church sermons needed no literacy at all.44
The social intimidation practised generally and locally by militant loyalists may
also have had some effect, though equally unmeasurable: aside from stopping the
mouths of the more prudent radicals, it may well have persuaded some to display
loyalty more ostentatiously than they might otherwise have done, if at all. The sedition
trials in Scotland in 1793-4 and the treason trials in England in 1794, despite the
acquittals of the English radicals, increased public distrust of political reform and
reformers.45 Foxite politicians were often portrayed by caricaturists as Jacobins,
wearing the tricolour or the bonnet-rouge and attempting to collaborate with a French
invasion of Britain, thus reflecting popular disapproval of Opposition 'factiousness'
during war-time and suspicion that it overlay a deeper malign disposition.46
43 Eastwood, 'Patriotism and the English State', p.151.
44 James Greig (ed.), The Farington Diary by Joseph Farington, R.A. (8 vols.: London, 1922-8), i,
220, 15 November 1797; Beresford (ed.), Diary ofa Country Parson, v, 149,29 November 1798; W.
Branch Johnson (ed.), 'Memorandoms for...The Diary Between 1798 and 1810 ofJohn Carrington,
Fanner, Chief Constable, Tax Assessor, Surveyor of Highways and Overseer of the Poor, of
Bramfield in Hertfordshire (London and Chichester, 1973), pp.48-9, 13 June 1800.
45 Morris, 'The Monarchy as an Issue', pp. 192-3.
46 See, for example, BMC 8140, [Dent], 'Jacobine Wigs, or, Good Night to the Party' (18 December
1792); ibid., 8142, Cruikshank, 'A Right Honourable versus a Sans Culotte' (20 December 1792);
ibid., 8291, [Dent], 'A Right Hon.ble Democrat Dissected' (15 January 1793); ibid., 8305,
Cruikshank, 'The Solicitor General for the French Republic' (18 February 1793); ibid., 8317,
[Cruikshank], 'Which way Shall I turn me How shall I Decide' (25 March 1793); ibid., 8426,
[Cruikshank], 'A Peace Offering to the Genius of Liberty and Equality' (10 February 1794); ibid.,
8443, Sayers, 'John Bull's Sacrifice to Janus a Design for a Peace-offering to the Convention' (17
March 1794); ibid., 8448, [Gillray], 'The Noble Sans-Culotte' (3 May 1794); ibid., 8457, Sayers,
'Egalite' (12 May 1794); ibid., 8461, Sayers, 'A Gazette Extraordinary from Berkeley Square' (31
May 1794); ibid., 8468, Cruikshank, 'The Renunciation of an Ex Noble now become A Republican
Sans Culotte Citizen' (10 June 1794); ibid., 8479, [Gillray], 'The Eruption of the Mountain' (25
July 1794); ibid., 8612, Gillray, 'French-Telegraph making Signals in the Dark' (26 January 1795);
ibid., 8614, Gillray, 'The Genius of France Triumphant,—or—Britannia Petitioning for Peace' (2
February 1795); ibid., 8636, J. Sayers, 'Frontispiece' (14 April 1795); ibid., 8639, Sayers, 'The
Bedford Level' (14 April 1795); ibid., 8640, Sayers, 'The St[anhope] a Republican Gunboat
constructed to sail against Wind and Tide' (14 April 1795); ibid., 8642, Sayers, 'French Invasion
upon Dutch Bottoms' (14 April 1795); ibid., 8644, Gillray, 'Light Expelling Darkness,
—Evaporation of Stygian Exhalations, —or—the Sun of the Constitution rising superior to the
Clouds of Opposition' (30 April 1795); ibid., 8648, 'The Real Cause of the Present High-Price of
Provisions, or, a View on the Sea Coast of England, with French Agents, smuggling away Supplies
for France' (11 May 1795); ibid., 8681, [Gillray), 'The Republican-Attack' (1 November 1795); ibid.,
8826, Gillray, 'Promis'd Horrors of the French Invasion,—or—Forcible Reasons for Negotiating a
Regicide Peace' (20 October 1796); ibid., 8839, Newton, 'Billy's Political Plaything' (21 November
1796); ibid., 8979, Gillray, 'End of die Irish Invasion;—or—The Destruction of the French Armada'
(20 January 1797); ibid., 8992, Gillray, 'The Table's Turn'd' (4 March 1797); ibid., 9020,
[Cruikshank], 'Divertions of Purley, or Opposition Attending their Private Affairs' (5 June 1797);
ibid., 9039, Gillray, 'Le Coup de Maitre' (24 November 1797); ibid., 9160, Cruikshank, 'The Raft in
Danger or the Republican Crew Disappointed' (28 January 1798); ibid., 9167, Gillray, 'The Storm
rising,—or—the Republican Flotilla in Danger' (1 February 1798); ibid., 9204, [Cruikshank], 'The
Republican Soldier!' (12 May 1798); ibid., 9240, Gillray, 'New Morality;—or—The promis'd
Installment of the High-Priest of the Theophilanthropes, with the Homage of Leviathan and his
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Certainly there were many mass demonstrations of loyalty and support for the
war, involving great numbers of ordinary people, which must have been stimulated by
government and loyalist publicity and propaganda. There were huge numbers of loyal
addresses, resolutions and petitions sent to the King—many more than their radical
counterparts, although it naturally took substantially more bravado to organize a
reformist or anti-war petition than one applauding the activities of the government.
Loyalist and pro-war addresses were sent from towns, counties, religious bodies,
universities, theatres, magistrates, manufacturers, merchants, Volunteer and militia
corps, clubs and societies. Some 386 were sent in response to the May 1792 Royal
Proclamation; a further hundred arrived in late 1792-93; and nearly six hundred
declared their support for the King after he was attacked on his way to open
Parliament in October 1795.47 These were no doubt usually organized by active
loyalists, but they carried substantial numbers of signatures—11 000 on one from
Liverpool and 8032 on one from the Merchant Taylors Hall in December 1792, and
2500 on a pro-war address from Portsmouth and Portsea in November 1798—which
suggests that non-activists were also involved, whether voluntarily or under
pressure.48
Subscriptions also must have attracted the support of many ordinary subjects.
The fund established by the Association at the Crown and Anchor Tavern for the relief
of sailors' wives and children received support not just from other Loyal
Associations, but also from 'ladies of fashion', philanthropists, church congregations,
Eton College, town and county corporations and army regiments; the Observer
claimed on 10 March 1793 that so widespread an activity must be an 'irrefutable
attestation' of the war.49 The Loyalty Loan of December 1796 was such a success that
the loyalists of the Crown and Anchor Tavern offered to transmit to Parliament any
further funds which members of the public, disappointed by being too late to
contribute to the originally stipulated £18 million, should wish to donate for the public
good. D.G. Vaisey says of the 1798 Voluntary Contribution that, because of the threat
of invasion, 'from being a self-interested substitute for an unpopular form of taxation
Suite' (1 August 1798); ibid., 9248, Gillray, 'Nelson's Victory;—or—Good News operating upon
Loyal Feelings' (3 October 1798); ibid., 9262, [Cruikshank], 'A Sleepy Dose to the Jacobines—or—
the Effects of Nelson's Victory' (3 November 1798); ibid., 9371, R.S. and J. Chapman, 'The Night
Mare' (1 May 1799). Occasionally, radicals were portrayed in this manner also, instead of Foxites: see
ibid., 8617, Sayers, 'An Address from the Citizens of N[orwic]h to the National Convention' (14
February 1795).
47 Dozier, For King, Constitution and Country, p.l; Dickinson, 'Popular Loyalism in the 1790s',
p.529; Dickinson, 'Popular Conservatism and Militant Loyalism', p.l 13.
48 See the London Gazette, 18-22 December 1792 and 10-13 November 1798.
49 Dozier, For King, Constitution and Country, p. 109. See also ibid., pp.148, 164; and Beresford
(ed.), Diary of a Country Parson, iii, 380, 19 October 1792, for a clerical subscription in aid of
French emigre clergy.
278
[the tripled assessed taxes], it became an end in itself which converted into patriotism
and sacrifice those feelings which, without such an outlet, might well have become
panic'. It raised £2 826 000, 'only marginally less than the gross income from all the
assessed taxes'.50 Moreover, substantial local subscriptions were collected to fund
public military parades and dinners for soldiers stationed in the vicinity on such
occasions as the King's birthday.51
Crowds were involved in activities such as burning effigies of Thomas Paine
and pro-war street demonstrations. According to H.T. Dickinson, 'Although there
were several instances of incitement by the local elite, there were simply too many
crowds capable of enlisting considerable local support to support the contention that
they were merely hired bands of ruffians or simple-minded folk easily incited or
manipulated by their superiors.'52 Wealthier people had other opportunities to
demonstrate their support for the war. One journalist, reporting on the second
performance of one of Joseph Haydn's 'London Symphonies', the 'Military' (no.
100), said of the audience's response:
...the middle movement was again received with absolute shouts of
applause. Encore! Encore! Encore! resounded from every seat: the
Ladies themselves could not forbear. It is the advancing to battle; and
the march of men, the sounding of the charge, the thundering of the
onset, the clash of arms, the groans of the wounded, and what may
well be called the hellish roar of war increase to a climax of horrid
sublimity!53
Ladies wore decorative items of dress to express their loyalty— 'King and
Constitution' favours in their hair or caps in 1792, 'Camperdown bonnets' in 1798. A
graphic satire of 1799 ridiculed the fashion among London fops of feigning war-
wounds when the British army returned from Holland.54
Recruitment was a major opportunity for ordinary people to show practical
support for the government and the war. There were 35 000 regular British troops in
1793; by 1795 there were nearly 125 000, and the 1790s in general saw the highest
returns from recruitment for the eighteenth century. The combination of the bounty,
natural patriotism and the anticipated excitement and drama of military life attracted a
50 Vaisey, 'The Pledge of Patriotism', pp.212, 223.
51 Voluntary Aid, for Assisting the Public Revenue, Under the Direction of Parliament (post 20
December 1796), British Library, 648.C.26, f.71; Beresford (ed.), Diary ofa Country Parson, iv, 202,
4 June 1795.
52 Dickinson, 'Popular Conservatism and Militant Loyalism', p.l 19.
53 Quoted by David Wyn Jones in the programme for the BBC Prom. Concerts, 24 August 1992,
p.ll.
54 Stanley Ayling, George the Third (London, 1972), p.358; Beresford (ed.), Diary of a Country
Parson, v, 129, 25 July 1798; BMC 9447, [Cawse], 'The Bond Street Battalion—or the Hospital
Staff from Holland!!!' (18 November 1799).
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substantial number of men to the Volunteers and the supplementary militia as well as
to the army and the navy. William Rowbottom of Oldham reported a 'universall pant
for glory' as well as financial hardship among enlisting local weavers. One Scotsman
serving in the rank and file at the siege of Valenciennes in 1793 wrote home to his
mother of his desire to 'do more yet for my King & Country's saik'. Clive Emsley
has estimated that 10% of all adult British males served in the regular armed forces
during the whole 1793-1815 period, and that this proportion rises to one-sixth if the
Volunteers and militia are included.55 While it is true that rather more of these served
after 1802 than before, it is undeniable that very substantial numbers of British men
participated in the military defence of their country even before the Peace of Amiens.
The bounties offered to enlisting soldiers and sailors raises a second
motivation for ordinary people to demonstrate support for the war: the expectation or
experience of direct profit. Professional soldiers and sailors were one group who
might fall into this category. Others who profited from the conflict were industrialists
who manufactured woollen goods, boots and shoes, iron, copper, arms and ships.
Workmen in certain trades were also able to benefit from the increased demand for
their labour in wartime: coal seamen, dockers and tailors, and, as Emsley points out, it
was the agitation of cotton weavers in the north-west for increased wages which
provoked the government to pass the Combination Acts of 1799-1800. Joseph
Farington noted in 1795 that 'Caulkers & Shipwrights who understand their business
well can get twenty shillings a day.—In peaceable times, they can earn when paid by
the piece, half a guinea a day.'56 It was even reported that the town of Okehampton
had been 'much improved by the French prisoners on parole—one of the blessings of
war!' and Parson Woodforde received in October 1797 a 'very impertinent' letter from
his nephew 'at Norman Cross near Stilton Huntingdonshire now attending the French
Prisoners at that Place as a Surgeon and Apothecary.'57
Third, certain events and aspects of the war against France encouraged pro-
war behaviour from ordinary people. The execution of Louis XVI on 21 January 1793
had a huge impact on British people. Immediately after the first news of it arrived, on
55 Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, pp.485, 488; Rowbottom quotation from Emsley, British
Society and the French Wars, p.37; ibid., pp.74, 133; soldier's quotation from Aspinall, LCGIII, ii,
86, Corporal George Robertson to his mother, 1 August 1793. See also Colley, Britons, pp.302-3,
308; A.D. Cameron, Living in Scotland, 1760-1820 (Edinburgh, 1969), p.129; A Sketch of the
Campaign of 1793, Parts I and II (London, 1795), pp.26-9, 'written in the trenches before
Valenciennes, and enclosed in the preceding letter'; NMM, PAR/188 (1-2)—letters home from Lord
St. Vincent's young nephew, at sea from 1793 at the age of eleven.
56 Emsley, British Society and the French Wars, pp.31-2, 83-4; Greig (ed.), The Farington Diary, i,
92, 22 February 1795.
57 A.D. Harvey, English Literature and the Great War with France (London, 1981), pp.4-5; Beresford
(ed.), Diary ofa Country Parson, v, 71, 12 October 1797.
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23 January, theatre performances were cancelled and calls for war were made, both in
street demonstrations and in the press. Chauvelin, the French envoy, wrote to his
superiors that he could not so much as leave his house 'without being exposed to the
insults and ignorant ferocity of that part of the nation that is still called here the
mob' .58 The horror and curiosity created by the news of the execution were still
lingering on 23 March 1793, when the Sun advertised a five-foot high model of a
guillotine on show in London and reported it to be a great public attraction. The
popularity of George III grew, and he became a national asset to be defended against a
nation of regicides.59 This appealed to a natural prejudice in favour of the monarchy
among the majority of the British population, and the frequent references to the
execution of the French king in conservative propaganda throughout the decade may
suggest that it was an issue which continued to raise anti-gallican sentiment.
Caricaturists often portrayed George III as synonymous with John Bull, the
representative of the ordinary British people.60
Popular xenophobia and, in particular, anti-gallicism were in any case hardly
new characteristics of the British people. The eighteenth century had erected a tradition
of commercial, territorial, military, religious and political difference and rivalry with
France. Gerald Newman describes vigorous anti-French cultural stirrings from the
mid-eighteenth century, in such writers as John Brown, Thomas Day and Tobias
Smollett. In February 1792 the York Courant expressed the view that 'the
Annihilation of the Power of France will prove a permanent Peace in the End to
Europe, whether Monarchy be restored or Democracy triumphs.'61 In the 1790s
atheism and republican chaos replaced Catholicism and absolute monarchy as the
French foils to British Protestantism and mixed government, but this merely inflamed
the popular sense of ideological rivalry. With the outbreak of war, traditional British
pride and suspicion of the French became hostility and downright bigotry among the
British population. Revolutionary France was associated with blood, destruction,
licence, wickedness and impiety. Previous images of the French as foolish and ragged
58 Murley, 'Origins and Outbreak', p.452; Dropmore, ii,373, Grenville to Auckland, 24 January
1793; BMC 8304, Gillray, 'The Blood of the Murdered crying for Vengeance'; Chauvelin quotation
from Pendleton, 'English Conservative Propaganda', p.373. See also Emsley, British Society and the
French Wars, p. 17.
59 Morris, 'The Monarchy as an Issue', p.282.
60 See, for example, BMC 8458, [Cruikshank], 'John Bull Humbugg'd alias Both-Eared' (12 May
1794) and ibid., 8664, 'Billys Hobby Horse or John Bull Loaded with Mischief (6 July 1795). See
also Carretta, George 111 and the Satirists, pp.244-346, on the increasing identification of the king
with the nation as presented through visual imagery in the 1790s.
61 Michael Duffy, The Englishman and the Foreigner (Cambridge, 1986), pp.34-5,46; Newman, The
Rise of English Nationalism, pp.80ff., 105ff., Ill, 133ff.; idem., 'Anti-French Propaganda and
British Nationalism', pp.386-91; the York Courant, 28 February 1792, quoted by Dozier, For King,
Constitution and Country, p. 17. See also Colley, Britons, pp.17, 24-5.
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were superimposed on the ideology of warfare in graphic prints and caricatures.62
This did not mean that the French threat was taken lightly, however; prints often
emphasized the strength, aggression and atrocities of the enemy and, in the later
1790s, Napoleon was seized upon as the embodiment of the rapacious French
revolutionary enemy.63 Wariness of the impoverished emigres was described among
different classes of people, from the fashionable world of Joseph Farington to the
humbler one of the Rev. James Woodforde, although they were apparently fighting a
common enemy with the British.64
The other side of British anti-gallicism was a pride in Britain itself, an
instinctive patriotism, another useful tool for pro-war propaganda and displayed in
many of the prints.65 The outbreak of hostilities produced a natural flow of patriotism,
especially since the French had declared war, and many probably expected an early
success 66 London theatre audiences had been singing a popular verse celebrating the
opening of hostilities with France for a week before they were actually declared.
Robert Dozier quotes the Sussex Weekly Advertiser of 14 March 1793, a paper not
always wholly in approval of government measures: 'never was there a war in which
the spirit of the nation seemed more roused and interested than the present.'67
Victories achieved by the British army or navy were powerful stimulants to pro-war
sentiment and behaviour: the national anthem and other patriotic songs were sung by
audiences at the theatre, illuminations were made and street celebrations were held.68
After the difficult year of 1797, the victories at the Nile and Minorca lifted the public
62 For example, BMC 8340, [Cruikshank], 'The Murder of Custine. French Gratitude or Republican
rewards for Past Services' (16 September 1793); ibid., 8473, Carlton House Magazine, 'The
Republicans on a March' (1 July 1794); ibid., 9355, Gillray, 'Egyptian Sketches' (12 March 1799);
ibid., 9361, Gillray, "'Tirailleur Francais, et Chevau Leger de l'Armee du Pacha de Rhodes"—
Evolutions of French Mounted Riflemen' (12 March 1799).
63 See BMC 8435, Cruikshank, 'A Republican Beau. A Picture of Paris for 1794' and 'A Republican
Belle. A Picture of Paris for 1794' (both 10 March 1794); ibid., 8630, 'Sans Culottes Fundamentally
Supplied in Dutch Bottoms' (10 March 1795); ibid., 9156, Gillray [and Frere], 'The Apotheosis of
Hoche' (11 [Jan.] 1798). On Bonaparte, see ibid., 9431, [Cawse], 'Satans return from Earth
Discovered in Council' (30 November 1799); ibid., 9523, [Gillray], 'Buonaparte Leaving Egypt' (8
March 1800); ibid., 9534, Gillray, 'Democracy;—or—a Sketch of the Life of Buonaparte' (12 May
1800).
64 Greig (ed.), The Farington Diary, i, 3, 21 July 1793; ibid., pp.14-15, 9 November 1793; ibid.,
p. 182,3 January 1797; Beresford (ed.), Diary ofa Country Parson, v, 206, 20 July 1799.
65 See, for example, BMC 8497, 'Freedom' (17 November 1794); ibid., 9719, 'The Consular Toy'
([April 1801]).
66 Ibid., 8417, [Dighton], 'Here's a health to the Duke of York wherever he goes' ([Feb. 1793]);
ibid., 8321, [Dent], 'The great Dumourier taking French leave of the Netherlands' (April 1793); ibid.,
8322, [Cruikshank], 'A Dose for Dumourier' (11 April 1793); ibid., 8345, [Cruikshank], 'A Member
of the FrenchWar Department Raising Forces to Conquer all the World' (2 November 1793).
67 Murley, 'Origins and Outbreak', p.505; Dozier, For King, Constitution and Country, p.111.
68 Aspinall, LCGIII, ii, 215 n.2; Beresford (ed.), Diary of a Country Parson, v, 150, 30 November
1798; Greig (ed.), The Farington Diary, i, 53, 11 June 1794 (Farington shows a hint of irritation
with the boisterous festivities, however).
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spirit and increased public tolerance for the continuation of the struggle. 'Even the
sensation produced by...untoward events, such as the stoppage of the Bank, was
mitigated by that darling and most natural subject of English exultation, Great Naval
Victories,' Lord Holland wrote.69 Sheridan agreed: 'If ever man loved man; if ever
one part of the people loved another, the people of this country love the seamen' .70
Perhaps a more powerful motivation still to loyalty during the war was the real
threat of a French invasion.71 It was probably this which stimulated so swift and so
generous a response to the government's appeal in December 1796 for a Loyalty
Loan; and it is hardly surprising that the Duke of York was able to report to the King
that 'nothing could exceed the zeal and loyalty which has been shewn by all the
people' at Fishguard when the French attempted to land there in February 1797.72 The
King himself noted in 1801 that 'the not having had any [recent] attempt of invasion
has certainly in a great measure cooled the ardour and dilligence of the Volunteer
Corps and perhaps of the embodied militia.'73 Songs attempting to inspire courage
and loyalty in the face of this threat reminded their listeners of famous English
victories over France in the past, such as Poitiers and Crecy.74 Prints expressed both
69 Holland, Memoirs, i, 9. For prints showing 'jingoism' on various naval victories, see: BMC
8471, Cruikshank, 'Lord Howe they run, or the British Tars giving the Cannignols a Dressing on the
Memorable 1st of June 1794' (25 June 1794), also ibid., 8469-70; ibid., 8831, Cruikshank, 'A Peep
into Saldhana Bay or Dutch Perfidy Rewarded' (7 November 1796), on the capture of the Cape of
Good Hope; ibid., 8992, Gillray, 'The Table's Turn'd' (4 March 1797), on Jervis's victory at Cape
St. Vincent; ibid., 9034, [Cruikshank], 'The Dutch in an Uproar or the Batavian Republic crying for
Winter!' (15 October 1797), on Camperdown; ibid., 9250, Gillray, 'Extirpation of the Plagues of
Egypt;—Destruction of Revolutionary Crocodiles;—or—The British Hero cleansing ye Mouth of ye
Nile' (6 October 1798); ibid., 9257, Gillray, 'John Bull taking a Luncheon:—or—British Cooks
cramming Old Grumble-Gizzard with Bonne-Chere' (24 October 1798); and ibid., 9251-3, 9255-6,
9259, 9269, 9278, all on the Battle of the Nile; ibid., 9264, Rowlandson, 'High Fun for John Bull or
the Republicans Put to Their Last Shift' (12 November 1798); and ibid., 9268, Gillray, 'Fighting for
the Dunghill:—or—Jack Tar settling Buonaparte' (20 November 1798), both on British naval
victories in general. On allied military success, see ibid., 8313, Cruikshank, 'Dumourier and his Aid
du Camp on full March to Seal up the Papers of the Prince of Orange, by order of the Convention
but prevented by Messrs. Frog & Co.' (13 March 1793); ibid., 9388, Gillray, 'The State of the
War—or—the Monkey-Race in danger' (20 May 1799); ibid., 9403, [Gillray], 'French Generals
retiring, on account of their health;—with Lepaux presiding in the Directorial Dispensary' (20 June
1799); ibid., 9412, Gillray, 'Allied-Powers, Un-Booting Egalite' (1 September 1799).
70 P.H., xxxiii, 641, Sheridan, ? May 1797. BMC 9277, [Cruikshank], 'A Singular Situation, or I
by-myself I in the Dumps!!' (7 December 1798) reflects the wide opposition provoked by Sir John
Sinclair's proposal to reduce naval manpower.
71 For the genuine anxiety produced by this menace, see, for example, Beresford (ed.), Diary of a
Country Parson, v, 108-9, 1 April 1798; ibid., v, 329,6 August 1801.
72 Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, p.641; Aspinall, LCG1II, ii, 543, the Duke of York to George
III, 25 February 1797. Ibid., ii, 544-5, the Duke of Portland to George III, 26 February 1797, notes
that 'innumerable numbers of colliers, peasantry, farmers, laborers' and others, of both sexes and all
ages, were involved. See also Emsley, 'The Impact of the French Revolution', p.55; idem., British
Society and the French Wars, p.67; Colley, Britons, pp.305-6; Dozier, For King, Constitution and
Country, p.126.
73 Aspinall, LCGlll, iii, 580, George III to Lord Hobart, 22 July 1801.
74 For instance, 'Invitation to Repel Invasion' ([1796]) and 'The Patriot-Briton; or, England's
Invasion, 1796' (1796), in the Madden Collection, Cambridge University Library, 1796.15.60, 64.
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apprehension concerning the horrors which might be produced by a successful
revolutionary invasion and at the same time the conviction that a French invasion
could never succeed (the defending and triumphant British soldiers were often
pictured as humble labourers, or with wooden limbs).75
Popular behaviour indicated some support for this particular conflict, but it
was largely a variation on the theme of a natural war-time cooperation with the
government due to instinctive patriotism and self-defence—a traditional 'jingoism'
with counter-revolutionary clothes on. Loyal addresses sent in the wake of the failed
peace negotiations of 1796 and 1797 which expressed disappointment also declared
resignation to the hardships of war and support for the government against an
unreasonable enemy.76 Pro-war songs frequently extolled the benefits of the British
constitution and reviled French attempts to destroy it, seeing it as a chief stake in the
war,77 but it seems likely that most popular pro-war usage of terms referring to
Jacobinism was superficial—the current language of abuse towards radicals, putative
grain-hoarders and all causes, French and British, of the war-time troubles of the
ordinary people. One handbill called for 'Success to our Army and Navy. No
Exportation of Grain. No Jacobins. No Assignhatts.' Joseph Farington, on a private
tour of the country, noted that 'There is an excellent public Library at Leeds, which
has been established 50 years or upwards....There is also a Library which probably
from having been established by certain people is called the Jacobin Library. —The
other, the Old Library, on the contrary is called the Anti-Jacobin Library.'78
Ill
However popular pro-war sentiment may have been, it was nevertheless neither
unanimous nor constant. In Sheffield, Nottingham and Surrey, opposition was voiced
to the loyal addresses to be sent in response to the May 1792 Royal Proclamation, and
ten counties and 81 cities and towns appear not to have responded formally at all. A
75 On the expected results of a successful invasion of Britain, see BMC 9180-3, Dalrymple and
Gillray, 'Consequences of a Successfull French Invasion' (1 March 1798). Prints ridiculing the
French attempt: ibid., 9176, 'The Grand Republican Balloon' (24 February 1798); ibid., 9187,
Rowlandson, 'England Invaded, or Frenchmen Naturalized' (16 March 1798); ibid., 9207,
Rowlandson, 'Rehearsal of a French Invasion as Performed before the Invalids at the Islands of St.
Marcou, on the Morning of ye 7 May 1798' (18 May 1798).
76 See, for instance, the addresses printed in the London Gazette from Bath (10-14 January 1797), the
City of London (7-11 February 1797), Nairn (12-16 December 1797), Lanark (26-30 December 1797)
and Bradford (13-17 Lebruary 1798).
77 Lor example, 'Death or Victory; or, the British War Song' ([1796]), Madden Collection,
Cambridge University Library, 1796.15.56.
78 'Britons are Happy, if They will Think So'; Greig (ed.), The Farington Diary, i, 314-5,27 August
1801.
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majority of those present at the meeting in Durham to discuss resolutions in response
to the December proclamation, rejected them, and the loyalist minority had to convene
separately in order to issue their declaration.79 Moreover, Roger Wells has suggested
that opposition to scarcity, land enclosure, technological innovation, grain exportation
and military service, together with tensions over poor relief, produced a more unstable
situation in rural areas in the 1790s than is sometimes assumed to have been the
case.80 There was domestic unrest in the autumn of 1792 over a poor harvest and high
prices, as well as that possibly stimulated by radicals (the passing of a new Corn Act
that year made it more difficult to tell political from economic causes).81 If these did
not necessarily produce anti-war activism, it is unlikely that those already in such
straits over matters of subsistence would have been happy at the prospect of war with
all its concomitant burdens and distresses. Popular anti-war sentiment was produced
mainly by the hardships of the wartime experience for ordinary people and partly,
especially for the literate classes, by a simple desire, for whatever reason, to criticize
the government, and it resulted in verbal and physical protests of various kinds. As
with loyalism and pro-war sentiment, it is difficult to distinguish wholly between non¬
organized radicalism or pacifism and sporadic popular anti-war behaviour.82
Historians disagree on how the 1790s fit into a broadly improving trend in the
economic situation—whether their relative difficulty was eclipsed by the general
upward trend or whether it was a significant departure from it83 Whatever the case, it
seems clear that in this decade population increase and repeatedly poor harvests forced
food prices up: the cost of living rose by 30% between 1790 and 1795, and its rate of
increase doubled after the outbreak of the war in early 1793. Wages also rose, but not
sufficiently to swallow the gap, and underemployment and rising taxation aggravated
the difficulties. Economic trends were perhaps of little interest to those who struggled
to make ends meet and, whether or not the war was genuinely to blame, it was an easy
target. Petitions containing demands for peace began to arrive in Westminster in 1795,
which also saw one of the worst harvests of the decade.84 Trade was constricted by
war, but more by financial fragility and the closure of European and corresponding
colonial markets than by French attacks on British shipping or the fear of it, so that
79 Dozier, For King, Constitution and Country, pp.21, 82. See also Ginter, 'The Loyalist
Association Movement'.
80 Wells, 'English Society and Revolutionary Polities', pp.192-5, 212-4; idem., Insurrection: The
British Experience, 1795-1803 (Gloucester, 1983,1986).
81 Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, pp.217-20.
82 c.f. Philp, 'The Fragmented Ideology of Reform', esp. pp.51-6.
83 Compare Christie, 'Conservatism and stability', p. 177 and Wells, 'English Society and
Revolutionary Polities', p. 189.
84 Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, pp.443, 451-2, 475-6. On popular antipathy to wartime taxes,
see 'A New Song, To Spend All Our Cash in the Wars' ([1793]), British Library, 648.C.26, f.74.
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when merchants and trading companies began to find other markets and trading
routes, it recovered considerably. This recovery of economic health, however,
according to Emsley, did not always reach ordinary working men.85 From 1795 bread
and an end to the war were two demands regularly made by rioting crowds.86
The middle and commercial classes also felt the financial burden of the British
war effort, however. The Sun was already reporting on 7 March 1793 that the
departure of the Foot Guards for Holland had deprived the coal wharfs of London of a
substantial number of labourers, encouraging demands for a rise in wages by those
who remained and found their labour a scarce resource. The caricaturists' frequent
depiction of John Bull as a character overloaded, ground down, bleeding, or in some
other way suffering from government taxation reflected public preoccupation with
wartime stringency. Often these prints questioned the validity of the government's
claim of necessity for high taxes, suggesting that the French threat was not so
menacing as it was declared to be.87 Some graphic prints criticized the hypocrisy of
wealthy statesmen and bishops appointing general fasts and the bitter irony of
requiring the poor to fast.88
85 Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, p.616; Emsley, British Society and the French Wars, pp.28-9,
33. See also the Manchester address to 'the landed, commercial and manufacturing interest' printed in
the Morning Chronicle, 20 September 1793; Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics, p.74.
86 Emsley, 'The Impact of the French Revolution', p.48.
87 See Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, p.616; also BMC 8488, [Hewitt], 'Favorite Chickens, or
the State of Johnny's Farm-yard in 1794' (1 October 1794); ibid., 8620, Cruikshank, 'Doctor
Sangrado Releeving John Bull of the Yellow Fever' (25 February 1795); ibid., 8628, Newton, 'One
of the Swinish Multitude. A Sister to the Guinea Pig. The Guinea Pig' (6 March 1795), ibid., 8629,
Gillray, 'Leaving Off Powder,—or—A Frugal Family saving the Guinea' (10 March 1795), ibid.,
8646, Cruikshank, 'No Grumbling' (6 May 1795), all on the new tax on hair powder; ibid., 8654,
[Gillray], 'John Bull Ground Down' (1 June 1795); ibid., 8658, [Gillray], 'Blindmans-Buff—or—Too
Many for John Bull' (12 June 1795), reflecting displeasure with spending British taxes on foreign
loans and subsidies; ibid., 8669, [O'Keefe], 'A Locust' (1 August 1795); ibid., 8797, [Gillray], 'John
Bull and his Dog Faithful' (20 April 1796); ibid., 8808, [West], 'Johnny in a Flatting-Mill' (25 May
1796); ibid., 8842, Gillray, 'Begging no Robbery,—i.e.—Voluntary Contributions;—or—John Bull,
escaping a Forced Loan' (10 December 1796), on the Loyalty Loan; ibid., 8990, 'Bank-Notes,—Paper
Money,—French Alarmists,—O, the Devil, the Devil!—ah! poor John Bull!!!' (February 1797), on
the stopping of Bank cash payments in February 1797; ibid., 8998, Newton, 'The New Paper Mill or
Mr Bull Ground into 20 Shilling Notes' (12 March 1797); ibid., 9025, Newton, 'The Inexhaustible
Mine!' (22 June 1797); ibid., 9038, 'The Wonderful Strong Man!' (15 November 1797); ibid., 9157,
Cruikshank, 'Voluntary Subscriptions' (16 January 1798); ibid., 9287, 'Days of Prosperity; or,
Congratulations for John Bull!' ([1798]); ibid., 9337, [Ansell], 'The Stratagem Alias the French Bug-
a-Bo or John Bull Turn'd Scrub' (1 January 1799); ibid., 9338, Cruikshank, 'John Bull in Training
for the year 1799!!' (1 January 1799); ibid., 9400, O'Keefe, 'Supply for the Allies Billys Wonderful
Goose Laying Golden Eggs' (6 June 1799); ibid., 9430, Gillray, 'Effusions of a Pot of Porter,—or—
Ministerial Conjurations for Supporting the War' (25 November 1799); ibid., 9525, [Cawse],
'Smuggling Corn from Egypt!!!' (18 March 1800); ibid., 9544, [Ansell], "The Rival Accoucheurs or
Who Shall Deliver Europe' (10 July 1800); ibid., 9707, 'Continental Amusements or John Bull
Paying the Piper' (17 February 1801); ibid, 9714, [Cruikshank], 'John Bull at the Sign, the Case is
Altered' (2 March 1801); ibid., 9859, 'A Peaceable Pipe; or, a Consular Visit to John Bull!!' (14
April 1802), a post-war reflection on war taxation.
88 Ibid., 8323, Newton, 'Fast Day!' (19 April 1793); ibid., 8428, Cruikshank, 'A General Fast in
Consequence of the War!!' (14 February [1794]); ibid., 8801, Cruikshank and Woodward, 'General
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Prints and poems lamented the cruelties of the battlefield and the bereavement
suffered due to war. James Gillray went to Flanders to observe the British army in the
summer of 1793 and, along with Isaac Cruikshank, he began to represent the Duke of
York and his entourage as living in luxury in stark contrast to the suffering and cruelty
around him, thus breaking with the early patriotic enthusiasm for the war.89 After the
first months of the conflict, a simple weariness with war and its effects and a natural
desire for peace grew widespread:
I am a brave fellow, I love my country and king,
And wish to do right to both country and him;
But I still love the poor, that I always will do,
And them that won't join me they're not true blue.
Then fill up a bumper,
Let's drink to the men that strive to make peace.90
One graphic print showed ten characters from different walks of life musing on the
blessings of peace—the alderman could again afford to dine on turtle, the sailor would
squander his prize-money and there would be better business for various others.91
Loyal addresses supporting the war often also expressed the hope for a swift,
honourable and lasting peace; and Emsley quotes one Philip Vincent of Camborn, near
Truro, who wrote in 1797: 'I suppose there is not so loyal a place in the King's
Dominions as this. I suppose they would turn out to a Man for their King and
Country...at the same time they wish for peace.'92 It was, indeed, largely due to the
impression that a majority in the country was impatient for peace that the ministry
Fast' (4 May 17%). See also the 'Song on the General Fast' (February 1795), Madden Collection,
Cambridge University Library, 1796.15.49.
89 BMC 8327, Gillray, 'Fatigues of the Campaign in Flanders' (20 May 1793); 8328, Gillray, 'John
Bull's Progress' (3 June 1793); ibid., 8329, [Cruikshank], 'Preparing for Action or an English man
of War Engaging Two Dutch Doggers' (9 June 1793)—behind a satirized Duke of York stands a
homesick officer; ibid., 8333, Cruikshank, 'He would be a Soldier or the History of John Bull's
Warlike Expedition' (1 July 1793); ibid., 9418,Woodward [and Cruikshank], 'The Beauties ofWar!!'
(12 October 1799)—this may have been especially powerful because it was published during a British
land campaign, in Holland. For examples of poetry on this theme, see 'Written After Seeing Opie's
Picture of the Tired Soldier in the Late Exhibition', in the Gentleman's Magazine, lxix (August
1799), 696; 'A War Poem', in The British Poetical Miscellany (1799), pp.7-8; both also in Bennett,
War Poetry, pp.240-2.
90 'A Good Wish for Old England', Madden Collection, Cambridge University Library, 1785.4.698.
See also 'A New Irish Song', in the British Library, 648.C.26, f.73, on the war's lack of clear
objectives; BMC 8792, Cruikshank (28 March 1796), on general war-weariness and doubtfulness over
Pitt's sincerity in declaring his willingness to negotiate with the French.
91 BMC 9106, T. Squibb, ['Effects of Peace'], (24 July 1797).
92 See, for example, addresses printed in the London Gazette for November and December 1798;
Emsley, British Society and the French Wars, p.63.
287
attempted to treat with France in 1796 and 1797. 'Lysons hears,' wrote Farington in
August 1796, 'that if Pitt does not make peace before November He must go out' ,93
Public anti-war sentiment may have been provoked more than anything else by
the actual exigencies of war for ordinary people, but anti-war propaganda probably
played some part in suggesting further reasons for discontent. This need not have
been printed literature; radicals addressing customers in taverns, street
demonstrations, graffiti and so on may have encouraged some who were beginning to
grow impatient with the continuation of the war and its burdens to verbalize their
dissatisfaction and perhaps even disaffection. Seditious language berating the King
and the Duke of York for failing to appreciate the hardships of war for the generality
of their people began to appear as early as 1793. A handbill condemned George III for
missing a theatre performance to show his sorrow at the death of Louis XVI but
enjoying the show as usual after fifteen Londoners were killed (crushed?) at the
Haymarket Theatre. 'Who would not Die for such a Gracious King!!!' it ended
sarcastically.94 One London tailor told a discontented crowd that the Duke of York's
father was 'a Fool unless it is at Burthening the People and you like Fools to put up
with it nay all the Family are Fools and Rogues'. A notice put up in Bath in 1800
demanded 'Peace and large Bread or a King without a head'.95 It is more likely,
however, as Emsley warns, that ordinary people who voiced such sentiments wanted
food and peace rather than political change as the radicals did.96
The caricaturists satirized the failings of Britain's allies, representing them as
greedy, cruelly rapacious and unreliable, preying on the long-suffering John Bull, but
this could be ambiguous: it did not necessarily entail blame for the British
government.97 There was, however, as the corollary of popular joy at British
95 Greig (ed.), The Farington Diary, i, 158, 3 August 1796; Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition,
pp.647-8.
94 British Library, 648.C.26, f.35.
95 Morris, 'The Monarchy as an Issue', p.115; Emsley, 'The Impact of the French Revolution',
p.53.
96 Emsley, 'Revolution, war and the nation state', p.l 12.
97 BMC 8472, 'The Progress of the Campaign' (June 1794); ibid., 8477, [Cruikshank], 'The Faith
of Treaties Exemplified or John Bull's last Effort to Oblige his False Friends' (17 July 1794); ibid.,
8478, Cruikshank, 'Back Front and Side View of a Dutch Light Horseman with their Improved
Method of Mounting' (24 July 1794); ibid., 8483, [Newton], 'A Dance Round the Poles' (5 August
1794); ibid., 8607, [Cruikshank], 'Royal Recreation' (7 January 1795); ibid., 8608, [Cruikshank],
'The Coalition Scene on the Continent' (12 January 1795); ibid., 8613, [Cruikshank], The first
Articles in Requisition at Amsterdam or the Sans Culotts become touts Culotts' (29 January 1795);
ibid., 8633, Woodward and Cruikshank, 'A New Dutch Exercise' (1 April 1795); ibid,. 8791, 'How
to Throw an Army into Confusion' (March 1796); ibid., 8821, Cruikshank, 'The British Menagerie'
(5 July 1796); ibid., 9285, [Ansell], 'A Dilemma or the German Macheath' (27 December 1798);
ibid., 9387, [Cruikshank], 'General Swarrow, towing the French Directory into Russia!!' (16 May
1799)—satires on the Russian General Suvarov were usually double-edged, showing pleasure at his
resounding victories over the French armies, but refusing to forgive him for his bloody campaigns
against Poland; ibid., 9390, Gillray, 'Field-Marshall Count Suwarrow-Romniskoy' (23 May 1799);
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victories, deep disappointment and frustration with British military or naval failure.
The campaign of 1793, while hardly an unmitigated triumph, could still be argued to
hold out hopes of future success; but the disappointments of 1794 and 1795 in the
Low Countries provoked much public criticism. By 1796, the continental situation
was going from bad to worse, while the British army was largely removed from the
scene of action, leaving the British war effort in the hands of the navy, so that the
public could only look on in helpless frustration.98 The prints captured these
sentiments, mixing contempt with anger.99 Farington criticized what he thought to be
unjust public carping in December 1793:
Everybody, expecting that it was in consequence of Lord Howe
having taken the French ships he was left chasing, were
disappointed on finding the guns were fired on account of our troops
in the West Indies having gained possession of part of the Island of
St. Domingo. As the public attention was not directed to that object,
it was less felt on account of Lord Howes returning unsuccessful.100
Popular protests against the war were made in various forms and against
various intermediary targets. The most common targets of the graphic satirists were,
unsurprisingly, the government—especially Pitt—and the King.101 They were also
ibid., 9392, Cruikshank, 'Gen.l Swallow Destroying the French Army' (1 June 1799); ibid., 9393,
'Suwarrow giving the French Directory a taste of the knout!' (June 1799); ibid., 9408, [Cruikshank],
'The Russian Colossus making the Tour of Italy, France & carrying home a few Presents' (15 July
1799); ibid., 9415, [Gillray], 'The Magnanimous Ally' (17 September 1799); ibid., 9422, [Cawse],
'The Great Swallow all!!! Disgorging or French Bullie too hot for Bear's Stomach' (29 October
1799); ibid., [Gillray], 9700, 'The Magnanimous Ally' (20 January 1801).
98 Ehrman, The Reluctant Transition, pp.380, 427, 614.
99 BMC 8351, Cruikshank, 'The Wet Party or the Bogs of Flanders, a new Song' (7 December
1793); ibid., 8425, Gillray, 'Pantagruel's victorious return to the court of Gargantua, after extirpating
the Soup-Meagre's of Bouille Land' (10 February 1794); 8488, [Hewitt], 'Favorite Chickens, or the
State of Johnny's Farmyard in 1794' (1 October 1794); ibid., 8656, Gillray, 'A Keen-Sighted
Politician finding out the British Conquests' (8 June 1795); ibid., 8659, Gillray, 'A Keen-Sighted
Politician Warming his Imagination' (13 June 1795); ibid., 8676, Will Hanlon, 'The State
Caterpillar' (1 September 1795)—a reference to the Quiberon disaster; ibid., 9231, 'Whitsunday
Duellists' (22 June 1798); ibid., 9418, Woodward [and Cruikshank], 'The Beauties of War!!' (12
October 1799)—this may have been a response to the bad news from Holland; ibid., 9421, [Cawse],
'Opening the Sluices or the Secret Expedition' (October 1799).
100 Greig (ed.), The Farington Diary, i, 24-5, 9 December 1793.
101 BMC 8341, [Cruikshank], 'Oh! Dear What Can the Matter Be' (21 September 1793)—on
Richmond, the unpopular Master of the Ordnance until November 1793; ibid., 8496, [West], 'A New
Song, Written by Captain Morris, Addressed to John Bull and his numerous Family' (5 November
1794); ibid., 8500, 'Wonderful Exhibition!!! Signor Gulielmo Pittachio The Sublime Wonder of the
World!' (November 1794); ibid., 8516, 'Plan of Mud Island, off the Kingdom of Corsica' ([1794]);
ibid., 8652, Hanlon, 'The Triumphal Entry of Alexander the Great, Into Babylon after the Conquest
of Persia' (27 May 1795); ibid., 8653, Gillray, 'A True British Tar' (28 May 1795)—the Duke of
Clarence; ibid., 8682, [Gillray], 'The Sleep-Walker', (1 November 1795); ibid., 8691, Gillray, 'The
Royal Bull-Fight' (21 November 1795); ibid., 8705, [Cruikshank], 'A Recent Escape' (21 December
1795); ibid., 8980, Gillray, 'The Giant-Factotum amusing himself (21 January 1797); ibid., 8994,
[Cruikshank], 'Billy a Cock-Horse or the Modern Colossus amusing himself (8 March 1797); ibid.,
9001, Newton, 'Retort Courteous or the Disloyal Address Returned without Ceremony' (27 March
1797)—on Portland's rejection of the Common Hall's address to the King, asking him to dismiss the
289
targets of lower-class criticism, since they had the power to make war and peace. In
contrast with the radicals, who presented George III as the dupe of wicked ministers
or the European despots, popular complaints against him perceived him as holding the
power to stop the war if he realized how great was the suffering it imposed on his
subjects.102 Local government officials were also attacked: an anonymous letter to
George Phelps, chief magistrate of Tewkesbury, was printed in August 1795 in the
London Gazette, demanding that he convene a meeting without delay to consider
organizing a petition for peace to the King, and threatening 'a leaden bullit through
your brains' if he did not comply. An indiscriminately anti-establishment paper found
at Hammersmith in 1794 commanded
Deal Destruction to the Foe
Lay the Haughty Monarch Low
Pitt Dundas & Hood shall fall
Damn the King & Damn them all
Arise & Destroy the Tyrant.103
Soldiers and sailors, as the agents of war, were also butts of criticism and sour
ridicule. As the handbill quoted above shows, military and naval commanders were
singled out for attack as names associated with the conflict. Lord Howe apparently
talked of resigning his command of the Channel Fleet before his triumph on the
'Glorious First of June', 1794, because of the regular attacks made on him in the
newspapers and prints.104 Ordinary members of the armed forces, however, were
also assailed. Volunteers, militiamen and regular soldiers stationed locally in barracks
could be very unpopular, being associated with disorder and brawling, unjust
recruiting strategies and military government. Officers walking around Norwich after
dark risked being attacked.105 The prints reflected this unpopularity, usually ridiculing
ministry as the first step to peace; ibid., 9047, Dighton, 'The Hopes of Britain Blown Away Thro' a
Speaking Trum-Pitt' (11 December 1797); ibid., 9166, Kay, 'The Modern Cain's Lament' (1798);
ibid., 9195, 'A Political Hypochondriac!!' (18 April 1798); ibid., 9703, [Cruikshank], 'Bloody News
Bloody News!!!' (1 February 1801); ibid., 9865, [Williams], 'John Bull viewing Billy's Preparations
for his Birth-Day' (18 May 1802); ibid., 9869, [Williams], 'The Brazen Image erected on a Pedestal
wrought by Himself (29 May 1802).
102 See Morris, 'The Monarchy as an Issue', pp.113-4.
103 London Gazette, 8-11 August 1795; PRO HO 50/385, f.524, Sir George Yonge to Nepean, 3
June 1794, encl.
104 Greig (ed.), The Farington Diary, i, 63, 18 July 1794. See also BMC 8352, Gillray, 'A French
Hail Storm,—or—Neptune loosing sight of the Brest Fleet' (10 December 1793); ibid., 8353,
[Cruikshank], 'HOW a Great Admiral, with a Great fleet, went a Great way, was lost a Great while,
saw a Great sight—& then came home for a Little water' (10 December 1793); ibid., 8657, 'What a
Cur 'tis!' (9 June 1795)—on the public perception of Admiral Sir Roger Curtis's self-promotion;
ibid., 8789, 'Favourite Amusement at Head Quarters' (March 1796)—further criticism of the Duke of
York's 1793-4 campaign in Flanders; ibid., 8790, 'A Council of War Interrupted' (March 1796);
ibid., 8978, [Gillray], 'The Lion's Share' (2 January 1797).
105 Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics, pp.22, 25, 172-3; Wells, Insurrection, p.79; Harvey,
English Literature, p. 11; PRO HO 42/27, f.223, petitions on the cost of barracks for troops.
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the Volunteers for their lack of horsemanship and general military skills (John Kay
was particularly scathing about the Edinburgh Volunteers), or the regular soldiers in
their training camps in the south of England. Sometimes they displayed a greater
bitterness concerning military enforcement of law and order.106 Despite the wide
popularity of the navy, the residents of Sheerness, reported to have fled their homes
during the mutiny of 1797 from fear and in order to make room for the soldiers called
in to resist the mutineers, may have waned in enthusiasm somewhat; and various
addresses were sent to Westminster that year severely criticizing the revolt.107
The practices of crimping and impressment to recruit for the army and navy,
and balloting to recruit for the militia, were deeply unpopular, and there were
consequently many riots in specific protest against instances of these throughout the
1790s.
Come rouse my good fellows to arms,
And follow the sound of the drum,
If you'd cut a fine figure in story;
Inlist in my regiment, come:
For wonderful sums we will promise,
Which we possibly never will pay;
But of this my brave comrades be certain,
You' 11 be shot at for sixpence a day.108
As early as February 1793 crowds engaged violently with press-gangs in Whitby and
in South Shields, and a group of colliers disembarked from their coal-ship near
Patrington, some way up the River Humber from their usual port of Hull, in order to
106 BMC 8513, John Kay, 'Edinburgh Royal Volunteers' (1794); ibid., 8733, Kay, 'Leith
Volunteer' (1795); ibid., 8734, Kay, 'To the Right About-Face' (1797); ibid., 8429, Cruikshank,
'The Auckward Squad' (19 February 1794); ibid., 8459, 'Essex Calve-lry for Internal Defence' (12
May 1794); ibid., 8476, Cruikshank, 'John Gilpin the Second, or City Light Horse Volunteers
Performing their Evolutions' (17 July 1794); ibid., 8492, [Cruikshank], 'Hampshire Fencibles
Protecting their Bacon' (20 October 1794); ibid., 8503, Woodward [& Rowlandson], 'Village Cavalry
Practising in a Farm-Yard' (18 December 1794); ibid., 8597, [Cruikshank], 'Suffolk Rats protecting
their Cheese or the County Fencibles called to Arms' (1 January 1795); ibid., 8619, Bunbury [and
Dickinson], 'A General on the Staff. An Inspecting General' (23 February 1795); ibid., 8805, Gillray,
'The Dissolution; or—the Alchymist producing an Aetherial Representation' (21 May 1796); ibid.,
8840, Gillray, 'Supplementary Militia, Turning Out for Twenty Days Amusement' (25 November
1796); ibid., 8977, Woodward [and Cruikshank], 'Supplementary Cavalry and Infantry' (1 January
1797); ibid., 8991, Gillray, 'St. George's Volunteers charging down Bond Street, after clearing the
Ring in Hyde Park, & Storming the Dunghill at Marybone' (1 March 1797); ibid., 9026, 'Look at
Me, I'm an Object!' (28 June 1797); ibid., 9221, 'Lobsters for the Ladies i.e. Jessamin Soldiers or a
Veteran Corps Going on Duty' (2 June 1798); ibid., 9239, [Ansell], 'Military Portraits—or a Brace
of Heroes' (30 July 1798); ibid., 9247, [Ansell], 'It is not all Gold that Glitters, or Volunteers
settling about Pedigree and Precedence' (1 October 1798).
107 The Times, 3 June 1797; for addresses, see the London Gazette, June-July 1797.
108 'Seijeant Kite's Invitation to the Swinish Multitude To Be Shot at for Sixpence a Day', Madden
Collection, Cambridge University Library, 1796.15.45. See also BMC 8447, 'Manning the Navy' ([1
May 1794]); ibid., 8484, [Cruikshank], 'Kiddnaping, or a Disgrace to Old England' (26 August
1794); ibid., 8486, [Cruikshank], 'Modem Mode of Beating Up for Volunteers!' (1 September 1794).
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avoid the press-gang that was thought to be operating from a warship docked there; in
Uig, Lewis, military recruiting parties were forcefully resisted. In March a large
crowd at Norwich tried to persuade army recruits to desert.109 Crowds of Londoners
rioted in August 1794 against crimps and balloting for the militia.110 The press-gang
was driven away by the people of Campbeltown, Argyll, in February 1795. Four or
five hundred people were involved in the disturbance at Denbigh in March 1795
caused by opposition both to balloting for service in the navy and the militia and to the
exportation of grain. A few days later there was trouble in Halifax when magistrates,
overseers of the poor and churchwardens tried to persuade the poor to volunteer for
the navy, because those authorities insisted on keeping two-thirds of each man's
bounty in trust for him until he returned—the men naturally wanted the whole sum
immediately.111 In 1796 the Supplementary Militia Act, increasing the size of the
English force, caused riots in Lincolnshire, Buckinghamshire, Northamptonshire,
Norfolk, Cambridgeshire, Cumberland, Merionethshire, Shropshire, Gloucestershire
and Derbyshire.112 Sir Gilbert Elliot told Lady Palmerston in August 1797 that
Scotland was 'in a flame from one end to the other' over the Bill introducing a system
of militia into Scotland for the first time. The trouble began in Eccles, in
Berwickshire, and spread, in just over a month, through the Borders, the Lothians,
Galloway, the central belt, Fife and Perthshire, to Braemar in Aberdeenshire, causing
most trouble in Tranent, East Lothian. Crowds demanded the destruction of ballot lists
by those who held them (mainly schoolmasters and Deputy Lieutenants), protesting
against the narrow age band affected by it (thus involving a great proportion of
economically crucial young men), against the concept of a ballot rather than voluntary
service and against misconceived notions that militiamen might be sent on foreign
service or even sold as slaves.113
109 Emsley, British Society and the French Wars, pp.27-8; Logue, Popular Disturbances in Scotland,
1780-1815 (Edinburgh, 1979), pp. 117-20; PRO HO 42/24, ff.549-50, Joseph Balmer to Robert
Burdon, MP, 18 February 1793; the Sun, 28 February 1793; PRO HO 42/25, f.110, printed notice
offering a reward for information leading to the conviction of rioters. See also PRO HO 42/24, f.356,
for a handbill from Newcastle trying to dissuade potential sailors from being lured into the navy by
the bounty a few days before the French declaration of war was known in Britain.
110 Stevenson, 'The London "Crimp" Riots', 40-58.
111 Logue, Popular Disturbances in Scotland, pp.121-3; PRO HO 42/34, ff.277-9, John Lloyd to
Portland, 1 April 1795; ibid., ff.302-v., G. Armytage and others to Portland, 6 April 1796.
112 Logue, Popular Disturbances in Scotland, p.78; Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics, p. 173.
113 Minto (ed.), Life and Letters, ii, 415-7, Elliot to Lady Palmerston, 28 August 1797; Logue,
Popular Disturbances in Scotland, pp.75-115. On the Tranent anti-militia riot, see Kenneth J. Logue,
'The Tranent Militia Riot of 1797', Transactions of the East Lothian Antiquarian and Field
Naturalists' Society, 14 (1974), 37-61; Sandy Mullay, Scotland's Forgotten Massacre (Edinburgh,
1979). See also Buddie Atkinson and Jackson (eds.), Letters to James Loch, i, 21, Andrew Clephane
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Furthermore, soldiers and sailors themselves sometimes showed a marked
disloyalty instead of support for the war. The naval mutinies of April - June 1797 at
Sheerness and the Nore were only the largest and most famous examples of this.114
Lord St. Vincent complained to Evan Nepean at the Home Office in February 1800 of
the lack of discipline still lingering in his fleet: 'The state of the Navy is so bad, that I
begin to despair of setting it to rights, for the moment any Ship of the old Leaven is
out of my sight, both officers and Crews are as bad as ever, & no-one attempts to
correct them...In short my dear Nepean, it is high time to make peace...'.115 Some
militiamen who had previously volunteered their services for Ireland fought shy when
the time of departure arrived.116 Instead of restoring order, Volunteers in Dingwall
and Peterhead in 1796 and in Macduff and Devonshire in 1800 joined in local meal
riots; in Honiton and Cullompton in 1795 and in Teignmouth in 1797, Volunteers
refused act against food rioters. Regular troops had joined in food riots in the south of
England in 1794-5, but generally these soldiers did not refuse to suppress riots,
probably because they themselves were not local to their areas of action, as were
Volunteers.117 Soldiers and sailors might of course simply dislike the loneliness and
hardships of war. Samuel Grant, ship's clerk, wrote in his diary in December 1793,
'This has not been one of the happiest years of my life—having been nearly 9 Months
of it absent f[ro]m My Dear Wife & Children...& 4 Months in a very ill state of
health'. The following year was not a great deal better: 'had various alterations and
disappointments with regard to the situation of my ship—but, most particularly,
disappointed in going home when reduced almost to a certainty' .118
As with the loyal addresses, it seems likely that the peace petitions of 1795,
1797, and 1801 were signed by non-partisans, simply because of the numbers of local
people involved—the Yorkshire petition of 1801 bore 30 000 signatures.119
Moreover, petitions for peace were not sent only at times of mass campaigns: the
merchants, manufacturers and traders of Paisley, for instance, petitioned the King
against the 'present unhappy & ruinous war' which was 'the source of all [their]
unsupportable miseries' in January 1794. Hopes for peace were also expressed in
114 For the sailors' requests concerning wages, supplies, provisions and medical care, see P.H.,
xxxiii, 493-501 n.; see also Wells, Insurrection, pp.81-3, 95-6, 100-2. See Dozier, For King,
Constitution, and Country, p.44, on sailors' riots in November 1792 at Great Yarmouth, South
Shields, King's Lynn and Ipswich. On army disaffection, seeWells, Insurrection, pp. 104-6.
115 NMM, NEP/6, ff.3-v., St. Vincent to Nepean, 7 February 1800.
116 Aspinall, LCGIII, iii, 123, Portland to George III, 12 September 1798.
117 Logue, Popular Disturbances in Scotland, pp.43-4; Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics,
pp.29, 49-50; Emsley, British Society and the French Wars, pp.42-3; Wells, Insurrection, p.80; see
also PRO HO 42/34, f.348, Archdeacon John Turner of Wells to Portland, 28 April 1795.
118 NMM, GRT/1-2.
119 Cookson, Friends ofPeace, pp.19, 152, 161, 190.
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loyal addresses.120 The caricaturists sometimes reflected literate opinion that the
government's handling of the 1796-7 negotiations might have been more skilful.121
Similarly, on the news of peace being settled at Amiens, there was both
widespread joy at the end of the war and criticism of its terms. Even at the signing of
the preliminaries in October 1801, illuminations were ubiquitous, guns were fired and
bells were rung in Manchester, the French diplomats Otto and General Lauriston were
towed in their carriage from Downing Street to St. James's Square and back, and the
price of wheat fell by ten shillings a quarter. David Erdman notes that 'A publican at
Lambeth, who had vowed that whenever peace was made he would give away all the
beer in his cellar, opened his barrels on the thirteenth [of October ]' .122 The prospect
of the end of the tax on incomes, of lower prices and of the reduction of the armed
forces was very popular. Richard Westall wrote to his friend Matthew Flinders, a
sailor: 'I remember when I had the pleasure of seeing you at Spithead, you lamented
that in your profession, distinction was scarce ever to be obtained but by the
destruction of our fellow creatures: you will therefore have rejoiced that long harassed
Europe is at length at Peace.'123 Approval was not unanimous, however. 'I am told,'
Thomas Grenville told his brother, the former Foreign Secretary, 'that though the
word peace be popular amongst the lowest classes, yet amongst persons of all
descriptions who affect to reason upon the articles, they are considered as a
confession of our defeat.'124 Mr. Custance, the most influential property-owner in
Parson Woodforde's area in Norfolk, refused to allow public celebrations of the
settlement in June 1802.125 Napoleon became the hero of the hour, while Pitt, though
120 PRO HO 42/28, ff. 115-8; Emsley, 'The Impact of the French Revolution', p.50.
121 BMC 8829, [Cruikshank], 'The Messenger of Peace' (29 October 1796); ibid., 8832,
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Bull in the Year 1800! John Bull in the Year 1801!' (12 October 1801); ibid., 9731, Woodward and
Roberts, 'Old Friends with New Faces, or Welcome Visitors to John Bull' ([October 1801]); ibid.,
9732, [Williams], 'John Bull visited with the Blessings of Peace' (21 October 1801); ibid., 9734,
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now out of office, was unpopular and regarded as having been the stubborn obstacle
to peace throughout the decade. This was reflected in the prints. In 'John Bull's
Prayer to Peace, or the Flight of Discord', Roberts showed Napoleon exalted to the
clouds and glorified together with Peace, while Pitt, the demon of discord, fled in
terror and disarray.126
Popular antipathy to the war against revolutionary France probably took even
less account of the reasons for the conflict than did popular support for it. The war
was opposed by public opinion largely because of the strains and stresses it imposed
on the population in common with all wars. It was perhaps particularly odious to the
people because it affected such a wide cross-section of them, because it was so long
and because it demanded so much in terms of human and material resources, but these
were differences of degree and not of kind from other eighteenth-century conflicts,
and the connection was not often made between these in popular opposition to this
war.
IV
Public opinion was, by its very nature, not entirely committed to one cause or the
other over the whole period of the 1790s—neither actively promoting the war nor
actively campaigning against it. Its acquiescence and submission throughout allowed
the government to pursue the policy of war, but at certain times it appeared to be more
favourable than at others. The outbreak of war was quite widely popular, after the
alarmism of late 1792 and the execution of Louis XVI; as the war wore on and the
economic pressures of the decade squeezed more tightly, popular hostility increased;
when French intransigence was revealed in 1796 and 1797, and when British troops
or fleets were victorious in 1798, public patience with the war was restored; but peace
in 1802 was almost universally welcomed. It would, however, be an
oversimplification to imagine that everyone had an opinion or strong feelings about the
126 bmc 9737, Roberts, 'John Bull's Prayer to Peace, or the Right of Discord' ([1801]). See also
ibid., 9726, Gillray, 'Preliminaries of Peace! —or—John Bull and his Friends "Marching to Paris'" (6
October 1801); ibid., 9733, [Williams], 'The Child and Champion of Jacobinism, New Christened'
(26 October 1801); ibid., 9738, [Williams], 'The Balance of Power' (1 December 1801); ibid., 9839,
[Williams], 'A Game at Chess' (9 January 1802); ibid., 9841, Cruikshank, 'Roast Beef at Amiens'
(20 January 1802); ibid., [Williams], 'Cross Examination' (8 February 1802); ibid., 9847,
[Cruikshank], 'A Merry Go Round' (March 1802); ibid., 9852, [Williams], 'Long Expected Come At
Last or John Bull disappointed at his Crippled Visitor' (3 April 1802); ibid., 9857, Woodward and
Roberts, 'John Bull in Astonishment at the conduct of Old Friends' ([April 1802]); ibid., 9866, 'The
Consular Warehouse or a Great Man nail'd to the Counter!' (20 May 1802); ibid., 9868, Woodward
and Roberts, 'Mr and Mrs Bull Looking Over Their Accounts' ([May 1802]).
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struggle all of the time, and it seems much more likely that most British people were
open to persuasion for much of the time.127
The work of the graphic satirists in the 1790s reflects the floating nature of
public opinion. There were no government engravers to give a falsely optimistic view
of the British military situation for public consumption, as there were in France.128
Kate Watson has made the point that the graphic prints produced by Gillray and other
satirical artists were highly ambiguous, sometimes portraying Fox as a bumbling and
oafish fool, conniving with the French enemy, yet sometimes attacking Pitt and the
King and Queen as threatening and even demonic figures. 'These vicious, yet
imaginative portrayals of the British elite were so powerful...that the French
Revolutionary artist and politician, Jacques-Louis David, adopted them as models for
his own propaganda campaign against the British government.'129 This ambiguity not
only reflected the market for prints, and thus changes in public opinion on the war
through the decade, but also perhaps, in the case of Gillray at least, the artist's own
political thinking. His role in the loyalist propaganda campaign is not clear, but he did
work for a while from December 1797 for the Anti-Jacobin Magazine and Review,
under Canning, for an annual pension of £200. This seems to have been in line with
his ideological standpoint, because of his disillusionment with the French Revolution
especially after the rise of Napoleon, in common with many, yet he retained a mind of
his own and could not be relied upon to ply the government with constant support-
indeed, the savagery of his satire was feared by government and radicals alike, even
when he was employed by the government.130 Many prints, therefore, were double-
edged, such as Gillray's 'Opening the Budget;—or—John Bull giving his Breeches to
save his Bacon' (1796), which showed Pitt scaring John Bull into paying extra taxes
to defend the country against a rumoured invasion, but also Fox beckoning the French
over.131 Other graphic prints appeared to show neither approval nor disapproval of
127 John Bohstedt notes that parliamentary elections in Norwich in the 1790s and early 1800s could
be taken as rough referenda on the war and its impact on the town (Riots and Community Politics,
p.204), indicating the fluctuating nature of public opinion on the conflict.
128 George (ed.), Political and Personal Satires, vii, p.xii.
129 Kate Watson, 'Popular Loyalists: Subjects or Citizens? Case Study: Hannah More and James
Gillray', unpublished paper given at the Colloquium on British Eighteenth-Century History, 1688-
1832 in London (January 1993), p.4; see also A. Boime, 'Jacques-Louis David, Scatological
Discourse in the French Revolution, and the Art of Caricature', in Lynne Hockman (ed.), French
Caricature and the French Revolution, 1789-1799 (University of California, 1989).
130 Watson, 'Popular Loyalists: Subjects or Citizens?' p.5; Dickinson, Caricatures and the
Constitution, p. 16; George (ed.), Political and Personal Satires, vii, p.xiii.
131 BMC 8836, Gillray, 'Opening the Budget;—or—John Bull giving his Breeches to save his
Bacon' (17 November 1796). See also ibid., 8303, Gillray, 'A Smoking Club' (13 February 1793);
ibid., 8458, [Cruikshank], 'John Bull Humbugg'd alias Both-Ear'd' (12 May 1794); ibid., 8599 &
8600, [Gillray], 'Ministerial Eloquence' and 'Opposition Eloquence' (6 January 1795); ibid., 8837,
[Cruikshank], 'The Budget or John Bull Frightened Out of his Wits' (20 November 1796); ibid.,
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the war—they were not satirical, but simply portrayed British soldiers in their
uniforms, or conveyed news of continental events.132
Moreover, apparently pro-war activities engaged in by ordinary people were
not necessarily motivated by pro-war sentiment. Earlier in the century Dr. Johnson
had warned in The False Alarm (1770) of taking 'public opinion' at face value, citing
various reasons why one might sign a petition other than conviction of its importance,
such as to annoy the authorities or to prove one's literacy.133 Mark Philp issues a
similar caution concerning the efficacy of the Cheap Repository Tracts, suggesting
that it is more likely that they were 'taken as entertainment than as gospel'134—
though it should be remembered that entertainment can be extremely influential.
Certainly, even some who were loyalist in sympathy thought that the government's
alarmism in late 1792, for example, was unnecessary or exaggerated. 'A great alarm is
gone abroad in this country of danger to the State, more than there is I think sufficient
ground for,' wrote Edward Law to his brother, the Bishop of Elphin. Dr. John
Symonds told Arthur Young that Sir Henry Moncrieff-Wellwood and Dr. Thomas
Hardy, luminaries of the Church of Scotland, had 'laughed at Dundas's account of the
political riots in Scotland. They absolutely denied the existence of them—considered
them as political; and when you read Hardy's pamphlet [The Patriot, (1793)], you will
see that he would not have failed setting them forth if they had deserved any
consideration.'135 Donald Ginter concluded that the Loyal Associations of 1792-3
'were so effective', that is, attracted such a heterogeneous membership, 'as to be a
most unreliable gauge of public opinion'.136
Recruitment to the army or navy cannot necessarily be taken as a sign of
sympathy with the war. Unemployed men were attracted by the offer of a paid job,
prisoners by the chance of a life outside jail, poor men by the bounty, and some, like
Parson Woodforde's boy, by the glamour they imagined to distinguish the military or
naval life. Although sailors might occasionally receive a small share of prize-money,
8995, Gillray, 'Midas, Transmitting all into Paper' (9 March 1797); ibid., 9241, [Ansell],
'Anticipation—Ways and Means—or Buonaparte really taken!!' (13 August 1798); ibid., 9416,
Woodward, 'Political Hoaxing!!' (1 October 1799).
132 BMC 8124, [Cruikshank], 'Bobadil Disgraced or Kate in a rage' (October 1792); ibid., 8731,
Kay, 'Military Promenade' (1795); ibid., 8828, Gillray, 'Glorious Reception of the Ambassador of
Peace, on his Entry into Paris' (28 October 1796); ibid., 9238, Rowlandson, 'The Light Horse
Volunteers of London and Westminster' (5 July 1798); ibid., 9809, Woodward, 'A Negotiation for a
Piece!!' ([October 1801]); ibid., 9864, [Williams], 'A Trip to Paris or John Bull and his Spouse
invited to the Honors of the Sitting!' (14 May 1802).
133 See Gunn, Beyond Liberty and Property, p.278.
134 Philp, 'The Fragmented Ideology of Reform', p.70.
135 PRO 30/12/17/2, f.106, Edward Law to John Law, 12 November 1792; M. Bentham-Edwards,
The Autobiography of Arthur Young with Selections from his Correspondence (London, 1898),
p.238, Dr. John Symonds to Young, 8 April 1793.
136 Ginter, 'The Loyalist Association Movement', p. 187.
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there was little else to offer rank-and-file military and naval recruits much hope of
reward: ordinary soldiers were not awarded government medals for bravery until
Waterloo.137 One wonders if some joined the army simply because it licensed
violence—some of the worst domestic violence, Marilyn Morris notes, involved
soldiers in theatres attacking members of audiences who refused to remove their hats
when the national anthem was played.138 Some also offered their services to the
Volunteers because they were unemployed, or because of pressure from landlords or
employers. Another powerful attraction of Volunteer service, which was limited to
action within one's home locality, was its privilege of exemption from the militia
ballot. Linda Colley has suggested that it also represented an opportunity to improve
business: many who joined the local corps were shopkeepers or tradesmen who were
aware that their fellow-Volunteers were potential customers.139 Others were unwilling
to volunteer, but claimed that should a real invasion occur, they would be active in
helping to resist it.140 Professional officers might care only about the war as a stage in
their careers, or for its impact on the army or navy as a whole. Sir Ralph Abercromby,
according to Piers Mackesy, 'was not ideologically committed to the struggle. He
cared deeply for the reputation of the British army; but he did not share the
singleminded hatred of the French Revolution which pervaded the ruling classes', and
he did not believe that opinions could be controlled by force.141
Many may have participated in popular celebrations of British victories more
for the fun and excitement of the occasion than from any real sentiments of support for
the war. Effigies of Pitt were burned on twenty of the London bonfires set ablaze in
honour of Duncan's victory at Camperdown in 1797. Cruikshank's graphic print 'The
Victorious Procession to St. Paul's' (1797), highlighted the burden of taxation
imposed on ordinary people and the difficulty they would find in celebrating naval
victories in their straitened circumstances. Bohstedt points out that attacks on
Dissenters or radicals who failed to illuminate their windows during victory
celebrations were less motivated by political loyalty than by a desire to punish
nonconformity.142 Similarly, activities which might have given the appearance of
137 Beresford (ed.), Diary of a Country Parson, iv, 276, 10 May 1796; Harvey, English Literature,
p. 130. See also the requests for military patronage in PRO HO 42/25, ff.753-v., John Alexander
MacDowell to Dundas, 14 October 1793; ibid., 42/30, ff.l29-v., William Maxwell (a prisoner in the
King's Bench Prison) to Dundas, 19 May 1794.
138 Morris, 'The Monarchy as an Issue', pp.267-8.
139 Colley, Britons, pp.300-2.
140 Emsley, British Society and the French Wars, p.74.
141 Mackesy, Statesmen at War, p. 138.
142 Emsley, British Society and the French Wars, p.27; Wells, 'English Society and Revolutionary
Polities', p.209; BMC 9046, Cruikshank, 'The Victorious Procession to St. Paul's, or Billy's Grand
Triumphal Entry a Prelude' (11 December 1797); Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics, p.24.
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hostility to the war were not always influenced by anti-war sentiment. The fascination
which Napoleon held for many in Britain in the late 1790s did not necessarily imply
sympathy with his country's cause in the war or hostility to Britain's. A poem
published anonymously in 1799, simply entitled 'Buonaparte', narrated the French
general's military adventures to date and poked gentle fun at those who enjoyed
gossip about his personal life. It ended with a note:
The verses upon this renowned chief were written before he had
assumed the new part which he is now playing in the political drama
of the French Revolution; and if our readers should relish his past
history, as we have given it, we do not absolutely despair of his
supplying them with further amusement.143
Anxieties concerning trade and the scarcity of food at affordable prices were not
necessarily vented in anger at the war, either. The Marquis of Lansdowne wrote to
Admiral John Duckworth in December 1800:
Our own interior is sadly clouded, not by any apprehension from
abroad, for the people seem still insensible to the state of foreign
politics, but are dreadfully alive to apprehensions of scarcity and fear
of Famine...144
V
Graphic prints in the 1790s usually demonstrated the views of the literate classes of
British society, but their general reflection of the divided, fluid and uncommitted
nature of public opinion on the wars against revolutionary France may be said to
provide an accurate picture of popular views throughout society below the governing
elite. In the 1800s, when the threat of invasion was still more imminent, the grounds
of war were much more clear-cut and comprehensible, and the figure of Napoleon
could successfully be made into an easy target for popular antipathy (as opposed to the
diverse and constantly changing governments of the French Republic during the
1790s), British public opinion became much more united and inflexible in support of
the government and in virulent hostility to France.
The 1790s, however, saw constant variations in the public mood. Most people
tended to respond to events as they happened, and particularly as they impinged upon
their own lives, rather than to hold to one particular standpoint throughout the decade.
The loud enthusiasm of February 1793 soon became subdued into resignation and
fatalism in the face of economic hardship at home and military failure abroad.
143 'Buonaparte', in The Meteors, i (1799), 17-25, also printed in Bennett, War Poetry, pp.226-30.
144 NMM, DUC/6, Lansdowne to Duckworth, 4 December 1800.
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Victories temporarily rekindled morale in June 1794, October 1797 and August 1798,
but while the government was given general public aquiescence in its conduct of the
war, the public mood seems to have been one of resignation rather than of inspired
and eager cooperation. The obscurity of the government's case against France in the
1790s made it much more difficult for them to carry public opinion with them than it
would be in the 1800s, which was precisely Burke's charge against them. As John
Ehrman notes, public loyalty and disaffection provided foils for each other throughout
the decade—order for unrest, subversion for counter-propaganda, discipline and
patriotism for desertion and mutiny, attacks on the King for thousands of loyal
addresses addressing him with reverent affection. Loyalist and radical activity were
simply two ends of the spectrum along which public opinion—including, perhaps,
most loyalists and most radicals—shifted back and forth depending on external and
private circumstances. John Dinwiddy has argued that circumstances were more
important in the success obtained by conservative propagandists in the British debate
over the French Revolution than the superiority of their arguments and ideology over
the radical case.145 Circumstances were probably very important in determining public
opinion on the war at any given time in the decade, but they did not allow a clear
judgement on the general pro-war / anti-war competition in the 1790s to the same
extent as that on the Revolution debate, which was more clearly won by the
conservatives.
145 Dinwiddy, 'Interpretations of anti-Jacobinism', p.48.
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Conclusion
The wars against revolutionary France provoked many very practical responses from
the British people. Economic, political or personal gain or loss (or their prospect)
naturally determined the views of probably the majority of the population. Pittites,
conservative Whigs and loyalists, by and large, did well politically out of the war. Pitt
himself resigned in 1801, taking with him a substantial part of his Cabinet; but he did
not go because of unpopularity caused by the war. Rather, he resigned over the
substantially unrelated issue of Roman Catholic emancipation, on which he disagreed
with the King, and probably also because his health was suffering badly from the long
and heavy strain of conducting the British war effort. He was back in power in 1804,
and he remained there until his death in 1806. The Foxites and the radicals tried hard
to make political capital from the conflict, but they usually failed dismally. Instead of
heaping opprobrium on the government, they more often succeeded in bringing it on
themselves by making themselves vulnerable to the charge of support for the French
armies and disloyalty to their own country. Most people probably made up their minds
on the war according to how it personally affected them, economically or otherwise.
Businesses flourished or withered; commerce prospered or was stunted; employment
in individual trades expanded or contracted; prices rose or fell. Many were wounded
or bereaved; some made their careers and some found fame. Most of those who lived
on the south coast favoured the strengthening of the British defences against a French
invasion attempt; many throughout the country were outraged by the activities of
crimps and press-gangs.
Nevertheless, there was also a lively debate on many more ideological issues
raised by the war throughout the 1790s, and this determined the attitudes of a minority
to the conflict, notably Edmund Burke and the war crusaders, the government, the
radicals at the start of the war and the Friends of Peace. It also perhaps helped to
shape the views of many others, such as Fox and some of his supporters, the radicals
after 1793 and the loyalists, for all of whom the war was secondary to their first
ambition or loyalty. The legitimacy of the war was debated heatedly throughout the
decade, on moral, religious and political grounds. Was war ever to be justified? Could
military hostility to a set of opinions be morally permissible? Was an armed conflict
against the French Revolution desirable, and had it been provoked or not? The
necessity of the war was argued as vigorously, in terms of politics, the economy,
commerce, religion, and military and strategic interests. Thirdly, the aims of the war
were discussed. Should Britain be fighting to obtain territory in Europe, or new
colonies elsewhere? Was the defeat of the French Revolution necessary, or would a
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change of the French government prove sufficient? Was it morally justifiable to pursue
either of these latter objectives? Was the government really waging war abroad at least
partly in order to suppress British civil liberty at home? Opinion also varied, therefore,
on the nature of the conflict, whether it was purely territorial or partially or fully
ideological, and whether it was defensive or aggressive. In a war on such a large
scale, materially, geographically and temporally, it was inevitable that many opinions
would be held concerning its conduct. Many views were aired on whether it would
best be fought mainly by the navy or by the army in conjunction with the allied
armies, and on whether Britain should concentrate its efforts in the colonies, in the
Mediterranean, on the continent or within France itself. The desirability of the
involvement of women and of the lower classes in the British war effort was also
discussed and, where favourably, to what extent and in what roles. Finally, peace was
a constant topic of controversy. When could it be safe to treat with the revolutionary
rulers of France, if ever? What, indeed, would constitute peace? What conditions
ought Britain to demand, and what concessions, if any, should it yield?
While Britain clearly entered the war because of a pragmatic care for strategic
British interests, the British government was also substantially influenced in its entry
into hostilities by its attitude to the French Revolution, especially to the revolutionary
foreign policy which encroached on British interests and which defied the acceptable
and traditional conduct of international relations. In the same way, while naturally the
British people held many pragmatic attitudes to the conflict, the division of British
opinions on the war was also produced by the French Revolution and their differing
views on that. Some people's views on the Revolution were to an extent shaped by
the war, but the British battle-lines over the French Revolution had largely been drawn
before the outbreak of war in February 1793 and they remained little altered by it in
the 1790s. While it seems likely that ordinary people were less influenced by the
ideological issues surrounding the conflict than by its practical impact on them, the
nature of the printed controversy over the war and its close relation to the debate on
the French Revolution suggests that, in the 1790s, literate British opinion perceived
the role of political ideology in the wars against revolutionary France to be significant,
perhaps even crucial.
Edmund Burke's views on the conflict were clearly born of his analysis of the
French Revolution: having determined that the Revolution was a menace to the British
constitution and to the political, social, religious and moral order of all Europe, he was
convinced that it must be destroyed militarily by defeating its armies and restoring the
pre-revolutionary government and social order of France as well as by exposing its
doctrines as deceptive, false and wicked. This, to Burke, was the whole purpose of
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the war, and any diversification of British aims was a boost to the enemy cause. The
British government, by the nature of its role, had to pay more attention to strategic and
economic realities than did Burke, and it was less preoccupied by the truth or
falsehood of revolutionary principles in the abstract. Only a few ministers pressed for
the objective of overthrowing the French revolutionary government to be accepted, let
alone that of replacing it with a restored Bourbon monarchy. Nevertheless, all
ministers were very aware of the danger of these principles becoming popular in
Britain and they made strenuous efforts to help ensure that they did not; moreover,
they recognized that the French foreign policy, and its conduct, which antagonized
them to the point of warfare and which prevented them from negotiating before 1796
and between 1798-1801, emanated from revolutionary administration of French
affairs. Crusading commentators and pamphleteers sympathized with Burke's views
and placed a corresponding importance on ideological hostility, though they were less
rigid in their insistence upon it than was Burke. Loyalists' views were coloured by
similar thinking, but they were more concerned to defend the government and its
actions than were the crusaders and they were therefore less tied to ideological warfare
and more ready to contemplate and even to support traditional colonial, maritime and
continental objectives and strategies. They were also considerably more willing to
accept the necessity of peace negotiations, for the sake of a war-weary nation, before
the Revolution in France could be said to have been overthrown.
The attitudes of radical politicians to the conflict were, like Burke's, clearly
determined by their opinion of the French Revolution. Their sympathy for the
Revolution and their disgust with the British constitution caused them to oppose
vigorously a war which appeared to be waged for the purpose of crushing the
republican government they so admired. As the war wore on, however, they
increasingly also tried to enlist discontent with war-time conditions to their own cause
of opposition to the government and, more fundamentally, hostility to the current
political system in Britain. Thus, the war became more important to them as a means
of stirring up discontent than as a primary object of contention. Fox and his
supporters also opposed the war because they sympathized with the French
Revolutionary cause, but they, perhaps even more than the radicals, were also
concerned to make use of the war to criticize the government, and ultimately that was
more important to them than support for the French. The Friends of Peace agreed that
military opposition to political or religious opinions was wrong, but they were more
anxious to attack the conflict because it was a war at all than because it was a war
fought against the French Revolution. Some churchmen and some women, the
politically literate and interested, aligned themselves with one or other of these
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stances. Others did not and, like the majority of the ordinary people in general, their
attitudes were probably shaped more by the ways in which the war directly impinged
on their lives than by the debates on the French Revolution and the war.
This view, that literate opinion in Britain understood the role of political
ideology in the wars against revolutionary France to be at least significant, if not
crucial, is borne out by contrasting the 1790s with a projection into the following
decade of Napoleonic warfare. The Peace of Amiens collapsed in May 1803 after it
had become clear that Napoleon had no intention of halting his pursuit of continental
hegemony. Britain demanded control of Malta to balance growing French influence in
Switzerland and northen Italy, and eventually replied to continued French refusals
with a declaration of war.1 From this time until the end of the war in 1815, British
society displayed a much greater degree of unity in support of the conflict than had
been the case in the 1790s.
Some British radicals continued to admire Napoleon as a 'son of the
Revolution', but the majority of the population associated him with military despotism
and aggression.2 France no longer defended 'French principles' of democracy or
republicanism, nor hid behind such a claim, but seemed to lust shamelessly after
territorial power and control, eyeing greedily even Britain. Some liberal opponents of
the war had already renounced their support of the French in the late 1790s in favour
of the British war effort; with the advent of the threat of Napoleon's 'Army of
England', many more who had been hostile to the war, or who had been uncommitted
to supporting or opposing it, came to favour the war effort against France. After the
failure of his invasion attempt had been sealed at Trafalgar, Napoleon's attempts to
paralyze Britain economically by a blockade of continental Europe against British
commerce hardened many others against him. The case for a defensive war appeared
to be much more persuasive, and even those who continued to oppose Britain's
involvement in the conflict, such as the Friends of Peace, might be persuaded to
participate in defensive measures in such crises as the invasion scare of 1803-5. The
war against Napoleon was thus much more popular than the conflict against the
French Revolution had been. Resistance to recruiting diminished, as did radical
criticism of the government.3
Opposition to the war in the 1800s was rarely caused by ideological sympathy
for the French government or cause. The Friends of Peace continued to oppose it on
grounds of religion and morality, but they were also much more successful than they
1 Ian R. Christie, Wars and Revolutions: Britain 1760-1815 (London, 1982), pp.259-60.
2 Emsley, 'Revolution, War and the Nation-State', p. 116; Dickinson, British Radicalism and the
French Revolution, p.64.
3 Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics, p. 19.
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had been in the 1790s in harnessing the economic discontent of industrial and
manufacturing interests, in the north and Midlands of England particularly. One of
their most effective campaigns was organized against the British reply to Napoleon's
Continental System of 1806, the Orders in Council of January and November -
December 1807, which blockaded all European ports from which British ships were
excluded and forced all neutral shipping to the blockaded ports to pass through British
ports first, and to pay transit duties there. Provincial merchants and manufacturers
who dealt with America were enraged by the actual and potential damage done to their
trade by foreign resentment caused by these measures, and they signed long petitions,
organized by the Friends of Peace in 1808 and in 1811-12, in protest. In 1812 the
government, in the political chaos caused by Spencer Perceval's assassination, but
also under the pressure of a mass of petitions and the likelihood of war with America,
repealed the Orders in Council.4
An interesting study could be made of British attitudes to the Napoleonic wars
of 1803-1815; it seems that support for and opposition to the conflict was rarely based
on political-ideological sympathies and usually on defensive or economic interests.
General public opinion in the 1790s was moved by similar considerations, but there is
also substantial evidence of a debate for and against the war in that decade which was
motivated by political opposition to and sympathy for the revolutionary regime in
France.
4 See Cookson, Friends of Peace, pp.215-229; B.H. Tolley, 'The Liverpool Campaign Against the
Orders in Council and the War of 1812', in J.R. Harris (ed.), Liverpool and Merseyside (London,
1969), pp.98-146; D.J. Moss, 'Birmingham and the Campaigns Against the Orders in Council and
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